Opinion
PALMER, J.
This appeal requires us to determine whether hospital employees who perform plumbing work for the hospital are exempt from the licensure requirements of chapter 393 of the General Statutes, § 20-330 et seq.2 We conclude that they are not exempt.
The following facts and procedural history are undisputed. On October 7,1994, the defendant plumbing and piping work board (board)3 issued complaints against the plaintiffs, Hartford Hospital (hospital) and Herve Gelinas, Charles Rowe and Arnrit Kalicharen, three of the hospital’s employees.4 Specifically, the board [711]*711alleged that the hospital had violated General Statutes §§ 20-334, 20-337 and 20-3415 because certain of its [712]*712employees had performed plumbing and piping work6 on the hospital premises without a certificate, license [713]*713or registration to do so. The board further alleged that Gelinas, a foreman, had violated the licensure requirements of chapter 393 by causing plumbing work to be performed by hospital employees who were not licensed or registered to do such work.7 With respect to Rowe and Kalicharen, the board claimed that they had violated statutory licensure provisions by performing plumbing work at the hospital without a license.
In November, 1994, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling8 that the statutory licensure requirements are inapplicable to them because the work performed by Rowe and Kalicharen was primarily maintenance work and not plumbing installation work. Alternatively, the plaintiffs claimed that they are exempt from the requirements of chapter 393 because the hospital is an “industrial firm” within the meaning of § 20-340 (6).9 After a [714]*714hearing, the board issued a declaratory ruling in which it concluded that the work performed by Rowe and Kalicharen constituted plumbing and piping work under § 20-330 (3) and, further, that § 20-340 (6) does not exempt the hospital’s employees from the statutory licensure requirements.
The plaintiffs appealed from the declaratory ruling of the board to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, claiming that § 20-340 (6) exempts employees of the hospital from the licensure requirements of chapter 393.10 The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that the hospital is an “industrial firm” within the meaning of § 20-340 (6) and, consequently, sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal. The defendants appealed [715]*715from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). On appeal, the defendants renew their argument that the hospital is not an “industrial firm” under § 20-340 (6) and, therefore, is not exempt from the licensure requirements of chapter 393. We agree with the defendants.
“[B]ecause our resolution of the [defendants’] claim requires the application of a statutory provision, namely, [§ 20-340 (6)], to a specific factual scenario, we are . . . guided by well established tenets of statutory interpretation. It is fundamental that statutory construction requires us to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to construe the statute in a manner that effectuates that intent. . . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 239 Conn. 124, 140-41, 680 A.2d 1329 (1996). “Furthermore, when a state agency’s determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny, as in this case, the agency’s determination is not entitled to special deference.” Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 688, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996); see Duni v. United Technologies Corp., 239 Conn. 19, 25, 682 A.2d 99 (1996). Finally, exemptions to statutes are to be strictly construed; Cannata v. Dept, of Environmental Protection, supra, 141; and “those who claim the benefit of an exception under a statute have the burden of proving that they come within the limited [716]*716class for whose benefit it was established.” Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 424, 479 A.2d 187 (1984); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532, 549, 441 A.2d 30 (1981). With these principles in mind, we turn to the defendants’ claim.
Section 20-334 provides that individuals performing certain kinds of work, including plumbing and piping work, must be licensed. Since the enactment of the statutory licensure requirements in 1965,11 the legislature has created eleven exemptions to the licensing mandate of § 20-334, including the exemption under § 20-340 (6) for any person employed by an “industrial firm” whose main duties concern, inter aha, plumbing and piping work.12 The plaintiffs’ sole claim of exemption from the requirements of § 20-334 is that the hospital is an “industrial firm” under § 20-340 (6). Specifically, the plaintiffs, urging a broad construction of the term “industrial firm,” maintain that that term encompasses all commercial enterprises engaged in any industry, including the health industry. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the term applies only to business entities involved in manufacturing activities and, consequently, that the hospital, because it is not involved in such activities, does not fall within the exemption.
Where, as here, a statute does not define a term, “we refer to [its] commonly approved usage for guidance in our determination.” Williams v. Best Cleaners, Inc., [717]*717237 Conn. 490, 500, 677 A.2d 1356 (1996); see Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 794, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). The term “industrial firm” is not defined in the dictionary; see, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; and the dictionary definitions of “industrial” and “firm” provide little guidance as to whether the term “industrial firm” connotes only an enterprise that is involved in manufacturing activities, as the defendants claim, or one that is engaged in any form of business or commercial activity, as the plaintiffs contend.13
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Opinion
PALMER, J.
This appeal requires us to determine whether hospital employees who perform plumbing work for the hospital are exempt from the licensure requirements of chapter 393 of the General Statutes, § 20-330 et seq.2 We conclude that they are not exempt.
The following facts and procedural history are undisputed. On October 7,1994, the defendant plumbing and piping work board (board)3 issued complaints against the plaintiffs, Hartford Hospital (hospital) and Herve Gelinas, Charles Rowe and Arnrit Kalicharen, three of the hospital’s employees.4 Specifically, the board [711]*711alleged that the hospital had violated General Statutes §§ 20-334, 20-337 and 20-3415 because certain of its [712]*712employees had performed plumbing and piping work6 on the hospital premises without a certificate, license [713]*713or registration to do so. The board further alleged that Gelinas, a foreman, had violated the licensure requirements of chapter 393 by causing plumbing work to be performed by hospital employees who were not licensed or registered to do such work.7 With respect to Rowe and Kalicharen, the board claimed that they had violated statutory licensure provisions by performing plumbing work at the hospital without a license.
In November, 1994, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling8 that the statutory licensure requirements are inapplicable to them because the work performed by Rowe and Kalicharen was primarily maintenance work and not plumbing installation work. Alternatively, the plaintiffs claimed that they are exempt from the requirements of chapter 393 because the hospital is an “industrial firm” within the meaning of § 20-340 (6).9 After a [714]*714hearing, the board issued a declaratory ruling in which it concluded that the work performed by Rowe and Kalicharen constituted plumbing and piping work under § 20-330 (3) and, further, that § 20-340 (6) does not exempt the hospital’s employees from the statutory licensure requirements.
The plaintiffs appealed from the declaratory ruling of the board to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, claiming that § 20-340 (6) exempts employees of the hospital from the licensure requirements of chapter 393.10 The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs that the hospital is an “industrial firm” within the meaning of § 20-340 (6) and, consequently, sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal. The defendants appealed [715]*715from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c). On appeal, the defendants renew their argument that the hospital is not an “industrial firm” under § 20-340 (6) and, therefore, is not exempt from the licensure requirements of chapter 393. We agree with the defendants.
“[B]ecause our resolution of the [defendants’] claim requires the application of a statutory provision, namely, [§ 20-340 (6)], to a specific factual scenario, we are . . . guided by well established tenets of statutory interpretation. It is fundamental that statutory construction requires us to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to construe the statute in a manner that effectuates that intent. . . In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 239 Conn. 124, 140-41, 680 A.2d 1329 (1996). “Furthermore, when a state agency’s determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny, as in this case, the agency’s determination is not entitled to special deference.” Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 688, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996); see Duni v. United Technologies Corp., 239 Conn. 19, 25, 682 A.2d 99 (1996). Finally, exemptions to statutes are to be strictly construed; Cannata v. Dept, of Environmental Protection, supra, 141; and “those who claim the benefit of an exception under a statute have the burden of proving that they come within the limited [716]*716class for whose benefit it was established.” Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 424, 479 A.2d 187 (1984); Aaron v. Conservation Commission, 183 Conn. 532, 549, 441 A.2d 30 (1981). With these principles in mind, we turn to the defendants’ claim.
Section 20-334 provides that individuals performing certain kinds of work, including plumbing and piping work, must be licensed. Since the enactment of the statutory licensure requirements in 1965,11 the legislature has created eleven exemptions to the licensing mandate of § 20-334, including the exemption under § 20-340 (6) for any person employed by an “industrial firm” whose main duties concern, inter aha, plumbing and piping work.12 The plaintiffs’ sole claim of exemption from the requirements of § 20-334 is that the hospital is an “industrial firm” under § 20-340 (6). Specifically, the plaintiffs, urging a broad construction of the term “industrial firm,” maintain that that term encompasses all commercial enterprises engaged in any industry, including the health industry. The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the term applies only to business entities involved in manufacturing activities and, consequently, that the hospital, because it is not involved in such activities, does not fall within the exemption.
Where, as here, a statute does not define a term, “we refer to [its] commonly approved usage for guidance in our determination.” Williams v. Best Cleaners, Inc., [717]*717237 Conn. 490, 500, 677 A.2d 1356 (1996); see Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, 794, 663 A.2d 365 (1995). The term “industrial firm” is not defined in the dictionary; see, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; and the dictionary definitions of “industrial” and “firm” provide little guidance as to whether the term “industrial firm” connotes only an enterprise that is involved in manufacturing activities, as the defendants claim, or one that is engaged in any form of business or commercial activity, as the plaintiffs contend.13 Moreover, we have not had previous occasion to define the precise term “industrial firm,” in this or any other context. Cf. United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 754-55, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992) (discussing term “industrial plant” as defined in regulations relating to taxing statutes); Roan v. Connecticut Industrial Building Commission, 150 Conn. 333, 335-36, 189 A.2d 399 (1963) (discussing term “industrial plant” as defined under statute, since repealed, creating industrial building commission).
As the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument, however, the term “industrial firm” is not one which, in common parlance, ordinarily would be deemed to include a hospital. Moreover, the plaintiffs further acknowledge that, under the expansive definition of the term they espouse, [718]*718virtually any business or commercial enterprise would qualify as an “industrial firm,” including, for example, insurance companies, banks, private schools and colleges, hotels and restaurants, retail stores, apartment complexes, and the like. We do not think that the commonly approved usage of the term “industrial firm” includes these and other such business enterprises. By contrast, the term “industrial firm” more readily brings to mind commercial entities engaged in manufacturing activities.
Furthermore, several well established tenets of statutory construction provide persuasive support for the defendants’ claim regarding the intended scope of the exemption created under § 20-340 (6). First, under the interpretation of the term “industrial firm” advanced by the plaintiffs, the word “industrial” has little, if any, significance because virtually any “firm” — that is, any “business unit or enterprise”14 — would qualify for the exemption created under § 20-340 (6). In addition, under the plaintiffs’ interpretation of “industrial firm,” the exemption created by § 20-340 (9) for “employees of stage and theatrical companies” and the exemption under § 20-340 (10) for “employees of carnivals, circuses or similar transient amusement shows”15 would be unnecessary because those persons already would be exempt from the statutory licensure requirements by operation of § 20-340 (6). “It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless provisions. . . . [I]n construing statutes, we presume1 that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Castagno v. Wholean, 239 Conn. 336, 346, 684 A.2d 1181 (1996); Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 90-91, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994). In contrast to the plaintiffs’ interpretation of § 20-340 (6), the [719]*719statutory construction advanced by the defendants gives full effect both to the word “industrial” and to each of the ten other exemptions created by the legislature under § 20-340.
Second, the plaintiffs also concede that under their construction of the term “industrial firm,” only that class of persons performing plumbing services for the general public is likely to fall outside the scope of the exemption created by § 20-340 (6). If the legislature had intended to limit the statutory licensure requirement in such a manner, it easily could have done so without creating the numerous exemptions set forth under § 20-340.16 See, e.g., LoPresto v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 234 Conn. 424, 435, 451-52, 662 A.2d 738 (1995). The fact that the legislature eschewed that approach and, instead, crafted eleven specific exemptions to the licensure requirement suggests that it did not intend such a sweeping application of § 20-340 (6).
Finally, a primary purpose of the licensure requirement, in addition to establishing a uniform, statewide [720]*720system of licensing, is to protect the public health and safety. See, e.g., 11 S. Proc., Pt. 6, 1965 Spec. Sess., p. 2186, comments by Senator Charles T. Alfano (“[w]e feel that [the electrical, plumbing, steamfitting and elevator repair] trades are of such a character that they are essential to the public health and safety, and they should be regulated on the state level”). As a remedial statute, we must afford it a liberal construction in favor of those whom the legislature intended to benefit. Knight v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 241 Conn. 466, 474, 696 A.2d 1249 (1997); Fruin v. Colonnade One at Old Greenwich Ltd. Partnership, 237 Conn. 123, 133, 676 A.2d 369 (1996). “In furtherance of that principle, exemptions or exclusions are to be strictly construed.” Success Village Apartments, Inc. v. Local 376, 175 Conn. 165, 168, 397 A.2d 85 (1978); State Board of Labor Relations v. West Hartford Board of Education, 177 Conn. 68, 74, 411 A.2d 28 (1979). Construing the term “industrial firm” to include virtually any commercial or business enterprise would be contrary to that principle. Indeed, the plumbing and piping work performed in a hospital is critical to the health and safety of its patients; as the defendants have explained, such work includes the installation and maintenance of water and gas lines for patient rooms, operating rooms, and laboratories and, therefore, it is likely the legislature intended those performing such work to meet the highest professional standards.17 Moreover, the plaintiffs acknowledge that [721]*721our determination regarding the scope of the exemption created under § 20-340 (6) for plumbing and piping work is equally applicable to the electrical, fire protection system, elevator repair and installation, and heating and cooling trades. Thus, under the statutory construction espoused by the plaintiffs, the hospital, and all other business or commercial entities that provide services to the public, would be allowed to employ unlicensed personnel to perform any or all of its electrical work; see General Statutes § 20-330 (2);18 any or all of its elevator installation, repair and maintenance work; see General Statutes § 20-330 (7);19 any or all of its heating, piping and cooling work; see General Statutes § 20-330 (5);20 and any or all of its fire protection sprinkler [722]*722systems work. See General Statutes § 20-330 (9).21 The significant additional public health and safety implications raised by a broad application of the exemption to those occupations militates strongly in favor of the less expansive interpretation of the term “industrial firm” urged by the defendants.
This case presents a good example of why the legislature, for purposes of granting exemptions under § 20-340 (6) from the licensure requirements of § 20-334, distinguished between firms engaged in manufacturing activities and firms engaged in other business or commercial pursuits. In the case of a firm or company involved in a manufacturing activity, the general public is unlikely to be affected by the plumbing and piping work performed at the manufacturing site. By contrast, faulty plumbing and piping poses a far greater public safety risk in the case of an enterprise that, like the hospital, provides services to the public. Moreover, manufacturing firms are far more likely than most other businesses to employ persons who, due to their mechanical and engineering training and skill, may be able to rectify problems arising from substandard plumbing and piping work performed by unlicensed personnel. Consequently, the legislature reasonably [723]*723concluded that the need for licensed personnel is significantly less in the case of a firm engaged in manufacturing activities than it is for other business and commercial enterprises.
We conclude, therefore, contrary to the determination of the trial court, that the hospital is not an “industrial firm” within the meaning of § 20-340 (6). Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not exempt from the licensure requirements of chapter 393.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the appeal.
In this opinion CALLAHAN, C. J., and BORDEN, J., concurred.