Opinion
PALMER, J.
The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether the habeas court properly rejected the claim of the petitioner, William A. Connelly, that the forty year prison sentence he received following his conviction of two counts of kidnapping in the second degree in [376]*376violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § SSa-941 and two counts of assault in the second degree in violation General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-602 was the product of judicial vindictiveness in violation of his constitutional right to due process.3 We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The relevant facts and unusual procedural history of this case are set forth in State v. Connelly, 46 Conn. App. 486, 700 A.2d 694 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 907, 908, 713 A.2d 829, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 907, 119 S. Ct. 245, 142 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998), in which the Appellate Court affirmed the petitioner’s kidnapping and assault convictions. Id., 513. “On November 10, 1989, the [petitioner] and his brother Brian Connelly resided at their mother’s house in the town of Newington. Their mother, at that time, was hospitalized. The [petitioner’s] other brothers, Timothy Connelly and Edward Connelly, and sister, Maureen Briggs, thought that their mother should be placed in a nursing home. The [petitioner] disagreed.
“That morning, Edward and Timothy arrived at their mother’s house to clean out a room that Timothy had [377]*377been using as an office. While they were moving the room’s contents, the mail arrived, and Edward brought it in. The [petitioner] accused Edward of taking mail that did not belong to him because the [petitioner] believed that an envelope containing a large check had arrived for Brian. Edward and Timothy were in a bedroom. From the hallway, the [petitioner] argued with them about the mail. He then pulled a gun from his clothing and fired a shot, which struck no one and lodged in the back wall of the bedroom. The [petitioner] entered the bedroom, locked the door, and ordered Edward and Timothy to get down on the floor. He asked Brian, who was in the hallway, to telephone the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When Brian refused, the [petitioner] tried to place the call himself but instead reached the Newington police department.
“Newington police officer Michael Tkac responded to the telephone call. The [petitioner] told Tkac that he was holding Edward and Timothy for mail fraud, and that he would release them only to the FBI. Other officers, including a special weapons and tactics police team, arrived at the house. The [petitioner] demanded that the FBI, Attorney Edward Daly, and a court reporter arrive by 1 p.m. or else he would shoot Edward. At 12:50 p.m., the FBI had not arrived, and the [petitioner] shot Edward in the wrist, breaking a bone. The [petitioner] set another deadline of 3 p.m., threatening to shoot Timothy if the persons he requested had not arrived. The [petitioner] asked for certain documents from his briefcase, which were passed under the door to him. At approximately 2:50 p.m., the [petitioner] shot Timothy in the hand, injuring bones and ligaments.” Id., 488-89.
“[0]n April 20, 1990, in a trial to the court, Dunn, J., the [petitioner] was found not guilty by reason of [lack [378]*378of capacity due to mental disease or defect]4 of . . . two counts of kidnapping in the second degree and two counts of assault in the second degree arising out of the . . . incident. He was then committed [by the trial court, Holzberg, J.] to the custody of the commissioner of mental health . . . for a period of ten years, subject to periodic [review] by the psychiatric security review board.5 The [petitioner] did not appeal from either . . . [the judgment of] acquittal [by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect] or his commitment to the custody of the commissioner of mental health.”6 (Citation omitted.) Id., 490.
In 1993, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking, inter alia: (1) to vacate the trial court’s judgment of acquittal by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect and to have the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings; and (2) to be released from the custody of the commissioner of mental health and to be transferred to the custody of the commissioner of correction. Id. “The [petitioner] claimed in his habeas petition that his confinement was illegal because, among other things ... he was not canvassed regarding the waiver of his right to a jury [379]*379trial.7 The record in the habeas proceeding reveals that his [habeas] attorney cautioned him that, if he were to prevail on his habeas petition, he would be exposed to incarceration by the commissioner of correction. The habeas court, Higgins, J., on August 16,1994, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-493,8 ordered that the [trial court’s] judgment of acquittal by reason of [lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect] be vacated and issued a writ of habeas corpus. ... In affording the [petitioner] relief, the habeas court relied on [his] claim that his constitutional right to a trial by jury was violated because he had not waived his right to a jury trial on the record.” Id., 490-91.
In January, 1995, the petitioner was retried on the same charges of which he previously had been acquitted by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect, namely two counts of second degree kidnapping and two counts of second degree assault. Id., 492. A [380]*380jury found the petitioner guilty of all charges,9 and the trial court, Scheinblum, J., rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of forty years imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the second trial court’s judgment of conviction.10 Id., 513.* 11
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he claimed that the second trial court had imposed a forty year prison sentence in retaliation for his successful habeas challenge to his insanity acquittal and attendant period of commitment. In support of his claim, the petitioner relied primarily on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), and its progeny, which hold that, in some circumstances, an increased sentence after retrial for the same charges gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of judicial vindictiveness. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 564-65, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 82 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1984). The petitioner requested that his second sentence of forty years be vacated and the original sentence of ten years be reinstated. The habeas court, Hon. Thomas H. Corrigan, judge trial referee, rejected the petitioner’s claim and dismissed the petitioner’s habeas petition, concluding that a presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted when the second sentence follows an insanity acquittal [381]*381and period of commitment, as in the present case, rather than a conviction and sentence of imprisonment.
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Opinion
PALMER, J.
The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether the habeas court properly rejected the claim of the petitioner, William A. Connelly, that the forty year prison sentence he received following his conviction of two counts of kidnapping in the second degree in [376]*376violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § SSa-941 and two counts of assault in the second degree in violation General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-602 was the product of judicial vindictiveness in violation of his constitutional right to due process.3 We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
The relevant facts and unusual procedural history of this case are set forth in State v. Connelly, 46 Conn. App. 486, 700 A.2d 694 (1997), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 907, 908, 713 A.2d 829, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 907, 119 S. Ct. 245, 142 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998), in which the Appellate Court affirmed the petitioner’s kidnapping and assault convictions. Id., 513. “On November 10, 1989, the [petitioner] and his brother Brian Connelly resided at their mother’s house in the town of Newington. Their mother, at that time, was hospitalized. The [petitioner’s] other brothers, Timothy Connelly and Edward Connelly, and sister, Maureen Briggs, thought that their mother should be placed in a nursing home. The [petitioner] disagreed.
“That morning, Edward and Timothy arrived at their mother’s house to clean out a room that Timothy had [377]*377been using as an office. While they were moving the room’s contents, the mail arrived, and Edward brought it in. The [petitioner] accused Edward of taking mail that did not belong to him because the [petitioner] believed that an envelope containing a large check had arrived for Brian. Edward and Timothy were in a bedroom. From the hallway, the [petitioner] argued with them about the mail. He then pulled a gun from his clothing and fired a shot, which struck no one and lodged in the back wall of the bedroom. The [petitioner] entered the bedroom, locked the door, and ordered Edward and Timothy to get down on the floor. He asked Brian, who was in the hallway, to telephone the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When Brian refused, the [petitioner] tried to place the call himself but instead reached the Newington police department.
“Newington police officer Michael Tkac responded to the telephone call. The [petitioner] told Tkac that he was holding Edward and Timothy for mail fraud, and that he would release them only to the FBI. Other officers, including a special weapons and tactics police team, arrived at the house. The [petitioner] demanded that the FBI, Attorney Edward Daly, and a court reporter arrive by 1 p.m. or else he would shoot Edward. At 12:50 p.m., the FBI had not arrived, and the [petitioner] shot Edward in the wrist, breaking a bone. The [petitioner] set another deadline of 3 p.m., threatening to shoot Timothy if the persons he requested had not arrived. The [petitioner] asked for certain documents from his briefcase, which were passed under the door to him. At approximately 2:50 p.m., the [petitioner] shot Timothy in the hand, injuring bones and ligaments.” Id., 488-89.
“[0]n April 20, 1990, in a trial to the court, Dunn, J., the [petitioner] was found not guilty by reason of [lack [378]*378of capacity due to mental disease or defect]4 of . . . two counts of kidnapping in the second degree and two counts of assault in the second degree arising out of the . . . incident. He was then committed [by the trial court, Holzberg, J.] to the custody of the commissioner of mental health . . . for a period of ten years, subject to periodic [review] by the psychiatric security review board.5 The [petitioner] did not appeal from either . . . [the judgment of] acquittal [by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect] or his commitment to the custody of the commissioner of mental health.”6 (Citation omitted.) Id., 490.
In 1993, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking, inter alia: (1) to vacate the trial court’s judgment of acquittal by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect and to have the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings; and (2) to be released from the custody of the commissioner of mental health and to be transferred to the custody of the commissioner of correction. Id. “The [petitioner] claimed in his habeas petition that his confinement was illegal because, among other things ... he was not canvassed regarding the waiver of his right to a jury [379]*379trial.7 The record in the habeas proceeding reveals that his [habeas] attorney cautioned him that, if he were to prevail on his habeas petition, he would be exposed to incarceration by the commissioner of correction. The habeas court, Higgins, J., on August 16,1994, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-493,8 ordered that the [trial court’s] judgment of acquittal by reason of [lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect] be vacated and issued a writ of habeas corpus. ... In affording the [petitioner] relief, the habeas court relied on [his] claim that his constitutional right to a trial by jury was violated because he had not waived his right to a jury trial on the record.” Id., 490-91.
In January, 1995, the petitioner was retried on the same charges of which he previously had been acquitted by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect, namely two counts of second degree kidnapping and two counts of second degree assault. Id., 492. A [380]*380jury found the petitioner guilty of all charges,9 and the trial court, Scheinblum, J., rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of forty years imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the second trial court’s judgment of conviction.10 Id., 513.* 11
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he claimed that the second trial court had imposed a forty year prison sentence in retaliation for his successful habeas challenge to his insanity acquittal and attendant period of commitment. In support of his claim, the petitioner relied primarily on North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969), and its progeny, which hold that, in some circumstances, an increased sentence after retrial for the same charges gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of judicial vindictiveness. See, e.g., Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 564-65, 104 S. Ct. 3217, 82 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1984). The petitioner requested that his second sentence of forty years be vacated and the original sentence of ten years be reinstated. The habeas court, Hon. Thomas H. Corrigan, judge trial referee, rejected the petitioner’s claim and dismissed the petitioner’s habeas petition, concluding that a presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted when the second sentence follows an insanity acquittal [381]*381and period of commitment, as in the present case, rather than a conviction and sentence of imprisonment. Judge Corrigan also concluded that, because Judge Scheinblum had articulated “logical, nonvindictive reasons for the [forty year] sentence,” the petitioner had failed to establish that that sentence was the product of actual vindictiveness. The petitioner appealed from the judgment dismissing his habeas petition to the Appellate Court,12 and we transferred the case to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. On appeal,13 the petitioner renews his constitutional due process claim.14 We conclude that the petitioner’s claim is without merit and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the habeas court.15
We begin our analysis of the petitioner’s claim with a review of the applicable precedent. In North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 395 U.S. 711, “the United States [382]*382Supreme Court examined the constitutional constraints imposed on a court which metes out a greater sentence upon retrial than that which the defendant originally received. After holding that neither the equal protection clause nor the double jeopardy provision imposes an absolute bar to a harsher sentence upon reconviction, the court considered the impact of the due process clause on such a position. Id., 723-26. Where a conviction has been set aside, the action of a court in imposing a harsher sentence upon reconviction for the purpose of punishing a defendant for exercising his rights in seeking to have the conviction set aside is a flagrant violation of due process of law. Id., 723-24. Due process requires that vindictiveness must not [play a part in] resentencing that results from a successful attack on a defendant’s conviction. Id., 725. A defendant’s fear of such vindictive behavior may unconstitutionally deter the exercise of the right to appeal or to attack collaterally a conviction, and thus, due process requires that a defendant be free from such apprehension. Id. To ensure that retaliatory motivation does not [play a part in] the resentencing process, whenever a court imposes a harsher sentence following a new trial, the court must state its reasons upon the record. Id., 726.
“The United States Supreme Court has subsequently examined the applicability of the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness. See, e.g., Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, [136, 138, 141] 106 S. Ct. 976, 89 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1986) (defendant originally sentenced by jury; judge concluded defendant entitled to new trial; upon retrial defendant chose sentencing by judge; Pearce presumption inapplicable and even if it were to apply, court’s findings overcame presumption); Wasman v. United States, [supra, 468 U.S. 569-70] (presumption of vindictiveness applies since petitioner received greater sentence following retrial than that he had originally received; consideration by court of conviction between [383]*383original sentencing and sentencing after retrial rebuts presumption); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, [380-81], 102 S. Ct. 2485, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1982) (pretrial decision by prosecutor to modify charges does not warrant presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in pretrial setting); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, [358, 365], 98 S. Ct. 663, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 ... (1978) (prosecutor’s action in carrying through on statement made during plea negotiations to bring additional charges against defendant if he refused to plead guilty to offense originally charged did not violate due process clause); Blackledge v. Perry, [417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 94 S. Ct. 2098, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1974)] (prosecutor [violated due process clause when he brought] more serious charge against defendant prior to trial de novo in response to defendant’s exercise of statutory right to appeal); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, [28], 93 S. Ct. 1977, 36 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1973) ([when jury charged with responsibility of] resentencing [defendant] . . . potential for abuse in sentencing is minimal [and] Pearce does not apply); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, [112, 116], 92 S. Ct. 1953, 32 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1972) (prophylactic rule announced in Pearce not appropriate in context of two-tier system which allowed for trial de novo in court of general criminal jurisdiction following trial or guilty plea in an inferior court; likelihood of vindictiveness not present).
“The decision in . . . Pearce . . . was only premised on the apparent need to guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process. . . . [I]n certain cases in which action detrimental to the defendant has been taken after the exercise of a legal right ... it [is] necessary to presume an improper vindictive motive. Given the severity of such a presumption, however— which may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct—[the presumption [384]*384applies] only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists. . . . The Pearce requirements thus do not apply in every case [in which] a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial. Like other judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the [United States constitution] . . . [the United States Supreme Court has] restricted application of Pearce to areas where its objectives are thought most efficaciously served .... Texas v. McCullough, supra, [475 U.S.] 138.
“The violation of due process [found in cases] such as Pearce and Perry does not arise from the possibility that a defendant may be discouraged from exercising legal rights, but instead from the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, [434 U.S.] 363. [Wjhere the presumption applies, the sentencing authority or the prosecutor must rebut the presumption that an increased sentence or charge resulted from vindictiveness; where the presumption does not apply, the defendant must affirmatively prove actual vindictiveness. . . .
“The United States Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S. Ct. 2201, 104 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1989). Smith clarified the scope of the Pearce rule, stating that [w]hile the Pearce opinion appeared on its face to announce a rule of sweeping dimension, [the court’s] subsequent cases have made clear that its presumption of vindictiveness do[es] not apply in every case [in which] a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial. . . . Id., 799. The court further explained that the application of the Pearce rule is limited to circumstances where its objectives are thought most efficaciously served, [namely] those [circumstances] in which there is a reasonable likelihood . . . that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sen[385]*385tencing authority. ... Id. On the basis of this conclusion, the court reasoned that when a greater penalty is imposed after trial than was imposed after a prior guilty plea, the increase in sentence is not more likely than not attributable to . . . vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge. . . ,16
“[Accordingly] there is no basis for a presumption of vindictiveness where a second sentence imposed after a trial is heavier than a first sentence imposed after a guilty plea .... [Id.], 801-803.”17 (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 535-39, 700 A.2d 14 (1997).
[386]*386In light of the foregoing precedent, the petitioner can prevail on his claim of presumptive judicial vindictiveness under Pearce and its progeny only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the sentence he received following his second trial is greater than the sentence he received after his first trial; (2) the circumstances culminating in the greater sentence give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge; and (3) that judge failed to articulate reasons sufficient to justify the greater sentence. We agree with Judge Corrigan that the petitioner has failed to meet this burden. We also conclude that Judge Corrigan properly determined that the petitioner had failed to establish that his sentence was the product of actual vindictiveness.
“[B]efore undertaking a Pearce analysis, we must determine whether the [second] sentence imposed . . . was, in fact, greater than the sentence originally imposed. ... In determining whether the sentence was more severe, [i]t is the actual effect of the new sentence as a whole on the total amount of punishment lawfully imposed by [the judge] on the defendant . . . which is the relevant inquiry .... Further [more], [i]n determining whether the second sentence is harsher than the first, we look not at the technical length of the sentence but at its overall impact [on the defendant].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faria, 254 Conn. 613, 622-23, 758 A.2d 348 (2000).
As Pearce and its progeny make clear, the petitioner cannot prevail on his judicial vindictiveness claim unless he makes a threshold showing that the forty year sentence imposed by Judge Scheinblum is greater than the sentence that he had received following his first trial. In common parlance, the petitioner’s forty year sentence reasonably may be considered “greater,” or [387]*387more severe, than the ten year period of commitment imposed after the petitioner’s first trial. For purposes of the comparison required by Pearce, however, equating a term of imprisonment with a period of commitment is like comparing apples with oranges. A commitment following an insanity acquittal is not a sanction, and its purpose, therefore, is entirely different from that of a criminal sentence. “As a general matter, the confinement of insanity acquittees, although resulting initially from an adjudication in the criminal justice system, is not punishment for a crime. The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous. . . . As he was not convicted, he may not be punished. His confinement rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hospital, 215 Conn. 675, 683-84, 578 A.2d 1025 (1990). Thus, unlike a defendant who has been convicted of a crime, a defendant who has been found not guilty by reason of lack of capacity due to mental disease or defect is not criminally responsible for his or her unlawful conduct and, consequently, certain important goals of sentencing, including punishment and deterrence, are inapplicable. See Jones v. United States, supra, 369 (“There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for recovery. The length of the acquittee’s hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment.”) Therefore, the considerations that motivated Judge Holzberg to impose a ten year period of commitment following the petitioner’s insanity acquittal are wholly different from the factors [388]*388considered by Judge Scheinblum when he imposed the forty year sentence in connection with the petitioner’s judgment of conviction. In light of this “fundamental distinction between . . . incarceration pursuant to a criminal sentence and . . . commitment following an insanity acquittal”; Copeland v. Warden, 225 Conn. 46, 49, 621 A.2d 1311 (1993); it is difficult, if not impossible, meaningfully to compare the two as contemplated by Pearce because, in such circumstances, “a sentence increase cannot truly be said to have taken place.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Texas v. McCullough, supra, 475 U.S. 140. Therefore, it is highly questionable whether the petitioner’s successful challenge to his insanity acquittal provides a proper predicate for application of the Pearce rule.
Even if we assume, for purposes of the comparison mandated by Pearce, that the sentence imposed on the petitioner after his second trial is greater than the period of commitment he received following his insanity acquittal, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the Pearce presumption applies to the present case. When a different judge presides at the second trial, as in the present case, the likelihood of vindictiveness is minimal: that judge has “no personal stake in the prior conviction and no motivation to engage in self-vindication”; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, 412 U.S. 27; because “it is not the court that is asked to do over what it thought it had already done correctly.” Golten v. Kentucky, supra, 407 U.S. 116-17; see also State v. Coleman, supra, 242 Conn. 544 n.24 (when different judge imposes subsequent sentence, probability that sentence will be viewed as vindictive is substantially reduced). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the Pearce “presumption is . . . inapplicable [when] different sentencers [have] assessed the varying sentences that [the defendant] receive[s]. . . . [W]hen different sentencers are involved, [i]t may often [389]*389be that the [second sentencer] will impose a punishment more severe than that received from the [first]. But it no more follows that such a sentence is a vindictive penalty for seeking a [new] trial than that the [first sentencer] imposed a lenient penalty.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Texas v. McCullough, supra, 475 U.S. 140, quoting Colten v. Kentucky, supra, 117. Therefore, as long as the record reflects a reasonable, nonvindictive basis for the greater sentence, there is no reason to presume that it is the product of a retaliatory motive. See Texas v. McCullough, supra, 140.18 Finally, “it is not necessary that the second sentencing judge rely on and provide facts not available [390]*390at the time of the first sentence to support the more severe sentence”; Macomber v. Hannigan, 15 F.3d 155, 157 (10th Cir. 1994); see Rock v. Zimmerman, 959 F.2d 1237, 1257 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1222, 112 S. Ct. 3036, 120 L. Ed. 2d 905 (1992) (Pearce presumption is inapplicable when “the second sentence is imposed by a different sentencer and the record provides an affirmative assurance that the harsher sentence reflects simply a fresh look at the facts and an independent exercise of discretion”); Gauntlett v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1988) (when “resentencing judge [relies] on objective information . . . justifying the increased sentence . . . the information [need] not relate to conduct of the defendant that occurred after the initial sentence” [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]); because “trial judges must be accorded broad discretion in sentencing . . . .” Texas v. McCullough, supra, 140.
Although the defendant in McCullough originally was convicted and sentenced by a jury and, following a retrial before a second jury, was found guilty and sentenced by the trial judge; id., 135-36; the court’s reasoning is no less applicable to the facts of the present case: when a different judge sentences a defendant after a retrial, and that judge articulates logical, nonvindictive reasons for the sentence, there simply is no sound basis to presume that that sentence is the product of judicial vindictiveness.19 Thus, courts uniformly have con-[391]*391eluded, under the federal constitution, that a presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted in such circumstances. See, e.g., Macomber v. Hannigan, supra, 15 F.3d 157; United States v. Newman, 6 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1064 (7th Cir. 1993); Rock v. Zimmerman, supra, 959 F.2d 1257; United States v. Perez, 904 F.2d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 1990); Gauntlett v. Kelley, supra, 849 F.2d 217; Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 419 Mass. 815, 821, 647 N.E.2d 1168 (1995); State v. Hurlburt, 135 N.H. 143, 147, 603 A.2d 493 (1991); People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 171, 178, 723 N.E.2d 58, 701 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1999); see also Hurlburt v. Cunningham, 996 F.2d 1273, 1274 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (“research indicates that decisions by the [federal] circuit courts of appeals after McCullough have uniformly held that the Pearce presumption does not apply to the two-sentencer situation”).
The record of the sentencing hearing before Judge Scheinblum reflects a wholly logical, nonvindictive basis for the forty year sentence. Immediately before imposing sentence, Judge Scheinblum observed that, although he would have preferred that the petitioner receive psychiatric treatment, he had no choice but to incarcerate the petitioner because the evidence adduced at trial indicated that he is a dangerous individual who steadfastly has refused psychiatric help notwithstanding his lengthy period of commitment at [392]*392Whiting Forensic Institute (WTúting) in Middletown.20 Furthermore, the presentence investigation report prepared in connection with the petitioner’s sentencing, which Judge Scheinblum expressly stated that he had read, fully supports Judge Scheinblum’s conclusions. That report states in relevant part: “[The petitioner] has refused all attempts of rehabilitation offered by the [s]tate .... His psychiatric condition that resulted in the [kidnapping and assault] offensefs] in 1989 is most probably the same today .... [The petitioner] continues to pose a real potential threat toward any target of his paranoia. Due to the serious nature of the offenses for which he was convicted and his outright refusal [of] mental health assistance, one can only consider the safety of the victims, other family members [and] any other individual involved with [the petitioner].” The report also indicated that several members of the petitioner’s family were afraid of the petitioner and that they would relocate if and when the petitioner was released from custody.21 Finally, the record of the sentencing hearing indicates that, although the petitioner regretted the harm that he had caused his victims, he nevertheless believed that he was justified in acting as he did and, further, that his actions were precipitated by the victims’ wrongdoing.22
[393]*393Thus, at the time of sentencing, the petitioner, for the first time, stood convicted of several serious crimes of violence. The facts adduced at the sentencing hearing indicated that the petitioner: (1) was unwilling to accept responsibility for his misconduct; (2) lacked remorse for the crimes; (3) refused to acknowledge his mental illness; (4) rejected all attempts to treat that illness; and (5) represented a danger to the victims and others as a result of his untreated psychiatric condition. These facts provide a sound and logical basis for the prison term imposed by Judge Scheinblum.23 Finally, the fore[394]*394going facts strongly support Judge Corrigan’s conclusion that the petitioner failed to establish actual vindictiveness. The petitioner, moreover, adduced no evidence to suggest that the forty year sentence was imposed in retaliation for his successful attack on his insanity acquittal, or for any other improper reason.24 In the absence of any such evidence, Judge Corrigan properly rejected the petitioner’s claim of actual vindictiveness.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.