Hunstein, Justice.
Ms. Johnnie Lusk brought an action in February 1990 against Robert Harrell, who is a licensed pharmacist, and others, alleging that Harrell had negligently filled a prescription she had given him with the incorrect dosage (5 mg. instead of the prescribed 25 mg.). The parties agree that Lusk attached the affidavit of a medical doctor to her complaint and that thereafter the action was dismissed on the ground that the affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1.1 Lusk then filed the instant action in August 1991, attaching the affidavit of a pharmacist. Harrell and the other defendants (hereinafter “Harrell”) moved to dismiss on the ground that Lusk’s action constituted a professional malpractice action to which OCGA § 9-11-9.1 was applicable and that Lusk was barred by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f) from renewing her malpractice action. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that pharmacy is not among those professions delineated in Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117 (414 SE2d 197) (1992) and thus OCGA § 9-11-9.1 was not applicable. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Harrell v. Lusk, 208 Ga. App. 358 [896]*896(430 SE2d 653) (1993).
In Gillis, supra, this Court, in determining the professions tha1 come within the ambit of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, looked not only to OCG^ § 14-7-2 (2) (which defines “profession” by setting forth 16 specific professions), but also OCGA § 14-10-2 (2) (defining “professional service”) and OCGA § 43-1-24 (providing that licensed professionals arc subject to regulation by state examining boards). OCGA § 14-10-2 (2) provides that a professional service is that “which may be legally performed only pursuant to a license from a state examining board pursuant to Title 43.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 43-1-24 speaks in terms of “[a]ny person licensed by a state examining board” (emphasis supplied) and cross-references Title 14, Chapters 7 and 10, as containing the Code sections setting forth the professions and professional services subject to regulation.
It is apparent from the interplay between OCGA § 14-10-2 (2) and OCGA § 43-1-24 that the Gillis Court sought to limit the application of the affidavit requirement in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to those professions which can legally be performed only when a state examining board has determined that the applicant has successfully completed the schooling or training statutorily required to qualify him to practice that profession.2 By applying OCGA § 9-11-9.1 only to those licensed professions where the state examining board’s issuance of the license is conditioned upon an applicant’s successful completion of schooling and/or training, we do nothing more than acknowledge that these certain professions require specialized knowledge and the mastery of certain skills. Because the basis of legal liability in a professional malpractice case is whether a defendant exercised a reasonable degree of skill and care, as determined by the degree of skill and care ordinarily employed by respective professionals under similar conditions and like surroundings, Kneip v. Southern Engineering Co., 260 Ga. 409 (2) (395 SE2d 809) (1990), and because this matter involves highly specialized expert knowledge with respect to which lay persons can have no knowledge at all, see Jordan, Jones & Goulding v. Wilson, 197 Ga. App. 354 (1) (398 SE2d 385) (1990), only those individuals possessing like expertise, obtained through commensurate education or training, are competent to testify as to whether a professional defendant complied with or deviated from the applicable standard of professional conduct, an expertise requirement that applies to the [897]*897OCGA § 9-11-9.1 affidavit, see Chandler v. Koenig, 203 Ga. App. 684 (417 SE2d 715) (1992), to motions for summary judgment, see Gen. Hosps. of Humana v. Bentley, 184 Ga. App. 489 (361 SE2d 718) (1987), and to trial testimony. See Sandford v. Howard, 161 Ga. App. 495 (4) (288 SE2d 739) (1982). Accord Howard v. Walker, 242 Ga. 406, 408 (249 SE2d 45) (1978). Therefore, we hold that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 applies only to those licensed professions regulated by state examining boards where licensure is predicated upon the successful completion of the specialized schooling or training necessary to obtain the expertise to practice that profession.
Pharmacy has been legislatively defined as a profession. OCGA § 26-4-2. The practice of pharmacy is regulated by the State Board of Pharmacy, OCGA § 26-4-37, and an applicant is entitled to receive a license to practice pharmacy only upon compliance with the requirements in OCGA § 26-4-72, including graduating from a recognized school or college of pharmacy and successfully passing an examination administered by the State Board of Pharmacy. An extensive review of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated reveals that pharmacy, with its education-qualified licensing and state examining board regulation, is the only profession declared to be such by the legislature that is not included in Title 43.® As the legislature itself recognized when it enacted the Fair Business Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-391 et seq., and provided, among the powers of the administrator, the authority to revoke professional licenses, our Code defines a “person holding a professional license” as including not only Title 43 but also Chapter 4 of Title 26, i.e., pharmacists. OCGA § 10-1-395 (f).
We therefore find it necessary to augment the list of professions set forth in Gillis,
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Hunstein, Justice.
Ms. Johnnie Lusk brought an action in February 1990 against Robert Harrell, who is a licensed pharmacist, and others, alleging that Harrell had negligently filled a prescription she had given him with the incorrect dosage (5 mg. instead of the prescribed 25 mg.). The parties agree that Lusk attached the affidavit of a medical doctor to her complaint and that thereafter the action was dismissed on the ground that the affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1.1 Lusk then filed the instant action in August 1991, attaching the affidavit of a pharmacist. Harrell and the other defendants (hereinafter “Harrell”) moved to dismiss on the ground that Lusk’s action constituted a professional malpractice action to which OCGA § 9-11-9.1 was applicable and that Lusk was barred by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f) from renewing her malpractice action. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that pharmacy is not among those professions delineated in Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117 (414 SE2d 197) (1992) and thus OCGA § 9-11-9.1 was not applicable. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Harrell v. Lusk, 208 Ga. App. 358 [896]*896(430 SE2d 653) (1993).
In Gillis, supra, this Court, in determining the professions tha1 come within the ambit of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, looked not only to OCG^ § 14-7-2 (2) (which defines “profession” by setting forth 16 specific professions), but also OCGA § 14-10-2 (2) (defining “professional service”) and OCGA § 43-1-24 (providing that licensed professionals arc subject to regulation by state examining boards). OCGA § 14-10-2 (2) provides that a professional service is that “which may be legally performed only pursuant to a license from a state examining board pursuant to Title 43.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 43-1-24 speaks in terms of “[a]ny person licensed by a state examining board” (emphasis supplied) and cross-references Title 14, Chapters 7 and 10, as containing the Code sections setting forth the professions and professional services subject to regulation.
It is apparent from the interplay between OCGA § 14-10-2 (2) and OCGA § 43-1-24 that the Gillis Court sought to limit the application of the affidavit requirement in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to those professions which can legally be performed only when a state examining board has determined that the applicant has successfully completed the schooling or training statutorily required to qualify him to practice that profession.2 By applying OCGA § 9-11-9.1 only to those licensed professions where the state examining board’s issuance of the license is conditioned upon an applicant’s successful completion of schooling and/or training, we do nothing more than acknowledge that these certain professions require specialized knowledge and the mastery of certain skills. Because the basis of legal liability in a professional malpractice case is whether a defendant exercised a reasonable degree of skill and care, as determined by the degree of skill and care ordinarily employed by respective professionals under similar conditions and like surroundings, Kneip v. Southern Engineering Co., 260 Ga. 409 (2) (395 SE2d 809) (1990), and because this matter involves highly specialized expert knowledge with respect to which lay persons can have no knowledge at all, see Jordan, Jones & Goulding v. Wilson, 197 Ga. App. 354 (1) (398 SE2d 385) (1990), only those individuals possessing like expertise, obtained through commensurate education or training, are competent to testify as to whether a professional defendant complied with or deviated from the applicable standard of professional conduct, an expertise requirement that applies to the [897]*897OCGA § 9-11-9.1 affidavit, see Chandler v. Koenig, 203 Ga. App. 684 (417 SE2d 715) (1992), to motions for summary judgment, see Gen. Hosps. of Humana v. Bentley, 184 Ga. App. 489 (361 SE2d 718) (1987), and to trial testimony. See Sandford v. Howard, 161 Ga. App. 495 (4) (288 SE2d 739) (1982). Accord Howard v. Walker, 242 Ga. 406, 408 (249 SE2d 45) (1978). Therefore, we hold that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 applies only to those licensed professions regulated by state examining boards where licensure is predicated upon the successful completion of the specialized schooling or training necessary to obtain the expertise to practice that profession.
Pharmacy has been legislatively defined as a profession. OCGA § 26-4-2. The practice of pharmacy is regulated by the State Board of Pharmacy, OCGA § 26-4-37, and an applicant is entitled to receive a license to practice pharmacy only upon compliance with the requirements in OCGA § 26-4-72, including graduating from a recognized school or college of pharmacy and successfully passing an examination administered by the State Board of Pharmacy. An extensive review of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated reveals that pharmacy, with its education-qualified licensing and state examining board regulation, is the only profession declared to be such by the legislature that is not included in Title 43.® As the legislature itself recognized when it enacted the Fair Business Practices Act, OCGA § 10-1-391 et seq., and provided, among the powers of the administrator, the authority to revoke professional licenses, our Code defines a “person holding a professional license” as including not only Title 43 but also Chapter 4 of Title 26, i.e., pharmacists. OCGA § 10-1-395 (f).
We therefore find it necessary to augment the list of professions set forth in Gillis, supra, with those persons holding a professional license pursuant to Chapter 4 of Title 26.3
4 Because a suit that calls into question the conduct of a professional pharmacist in his area of expertise is a suit brought against a defendant who provides a service [898]*898which can be legally performed only pursuant to a license from a stati examining board issued upon successful completion of specializec schooling and/or training, we hold that the requirements of OCGJ § 9-11-9.1 must be met. Accord Sparks v. Kroger Co., 200 Ga. App 135 (407 SE2d 105) (1991). See also Faser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 674 F2d 856 (11th Cir. 1982).
However, although ordinarily this Court would rule that Lusk’i second complaint, filed with the affidavit of a licensed pharmacist should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f) that result would be unfair in this case. As in Lutz v. Foran, 262 Ga. 819 (4) (427 SE2d 248) (1993), this is an instance in which it wai unclear at the time Lusk filed her initial suit in 1990 whether OCG/ § 9-11-9.1 applied to claims of malpractice against pharmacists Thus, it would be manifestly unfair to apply OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f) tc the case at bar. Accord Lutz, supra. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err by affirming the trial court’s denial of Harrell’s motion t( dismiss Lusk’s suit.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Carley, J. who concurs specially.