Hardin v. City of Gadsden

837 F. Supp. 1113, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19531, 1993 WL 482455
District Court, N.D. Alabama·Decided November 12, 1993·No. Civ. A. 89-C-2164-M·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CLEMON, District Judge.

Civil litigants in the federal courts have a right to petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp.1993). Moreover, no citizen may be excluded from service as a petit juror because of race or economic status. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. 1993). According to the evidence, the Northern District of Alabama is the country’s only statutorily-divided judicial district whose jury plan provides for the use of district-wide jury wheels in civil cases.

A substantial majority (64%) of the district’s eligible black voters live in two of the district’s seven divisions. The district covers half of the state. Aside from interstate carriers, there is no inter-division public transportation. A one-way distance from a community in one division to the courthouse in another may be as great as 223 miles. Black households in the district are disproportionately poor and lack motor vehicles. The Jury Plan of the Northern District of Alabama (the “Plan”) does not provide for the advancement of expenses to summoned jurors whose service will require long-distance travel and overnight lodging. On many of the civil petit juries in the Northern District, there are no blacks and on others, there is only one black.

In this factual milieu, plaintiff and the intervenors raise three pregnant questions on their motion to quash the venire. (1) Does the Northern District’s use of a district-wide jury plan deny black litigants their right to a jury selected from a “fair cross section of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes?” (2) Does the use of the district-wide plan disproportionately exclude blacks from the opportunity to be considered for jury service because of their race and economic status? (3) Finally, does the exclusive use of voter lists satisfy the “fair cross-section” requirement?

Plaintiff and intervenors’ challenges of the Northern District’s master jury wheel (“MJW”) and qualified jury wheel (“QJW”) are based on the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878 (Supp. 1993), (“the Act”) and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff Josephine Hardin is the adminis-tratrix of the estate of Edie Houseal, a deceased black woman. In the main action, plaintiff contends that the City of Gadsden, Alabama was deliberately indifferent to the known medical needs of the decedent, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Intervenor City of Birmingham is the largest city in the State of Alabama. It has a majority black citizenry. Intervenors R.L. Webb and Julius *1115 Walker are individual black citizens who reside in the Southern Division. All of the intervenors are litigants in ongoing jury-demanded litigation in the Northern District. Plaintiff and the intervenors have standing to challenge the Plan because they are litigants and they raise claims of racial discrimination. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1862 (Supp.1993).

The United States has appeared as amicus curiae. It takes the position that the use of a district wide plan does not violate the Act, and that the voter lists alone properly represent a fair cross section of the community.

Based on the accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court concludes that the plaintiff and intervenors have carried their burden of proof that the Northern District’s continued use of district-wide jury wheels violates the Act. 1

I

The Plan provides that “the official voter registration lists maintained by the counties comprising the district represent a fair cross-section of the community_” Inter-venor Exhibit (“IX”) 1 (emphasis added). In the view of the Plan, the district itself is “the community.” Notably, the Act requires something more than juries selected at random from the district. It requires that jurors represent a fair cross section of the community “wherein the court convenes” in the district or division. 2

The factual findings make it abundantly clear that the demographics of the various divisions in the Northern District differ substantially. Early on, prior to the existence of the Act and its “fair cross section of the community” requirement, our predecessor circuit noted that “the compositions of the different Divisions within the [Northern] District varied greatly in population, in the urban or rural character of the component counties, and in the racial characterizations of the counties.... ” Jackson v. Morrow, 404 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir.1968).

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized the vast differences between communities in the divisions of the Northern District. In discussing the propriety of requiring a Huntsville resident to be tried in Birmingham, the Circuit observed that “one must not arbitrarily be sent, without his consent, into a strange locality to defend himself against the powerful prosecutorial resources of the Government. We must remember in applying Rule 18 that Huntsville is almost 100 miles from Birmingham” United States v. Burns, 662 F.2d 1378, 1382 (11th Cir.1981) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the opinion, the Circuit described the Southern Division as “an environment alien to the [Huntsville defendant].” Id. at 1383.

The word “community,” in its plain and ordinary meaning, denotes a unified body of individuals with common interests living in a particular area. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 267 (1987). Legally, it has the same meaning: “neighborhood; vicinity, synonymous with locality.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 254 (5th ed. 1979). It is “a society or body of people living in the same place, under the same laws and regulations, who have common rights, privileges, or interests.” Id.

The First Judiciary Act and the predecessor statutes all provided that “[g]rand and petit jurors shall from time to time be selected from such parts of the district as the court directs.... ” Erwin Surrency, History of the Federal Courts, 172 (1987) (emphasis added). In 1911, Congress authorized district courts to maintain “separate jury boxes for some or all of the places for holding court in the district.” 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1966). 3

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Hardin v. City of Gadsden, 837 F. Supp. 1113, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19531, 1993 WL 482455 (N.D. Ala. 1993).

837 F. Supp. 1113 (Hardin v. City of Gadsden) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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