Mr. Justice Smith
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a condemnation suit brought by the respondent under our laws of eminent domain against the petitioners for a right of way out of and over and across a 61.22-acre tract of land adjoining the city limits of the City of Denton. We have but one question to decide, which is: Was certain testimony hereinafter more specifically referred to, offered by the respondent and excluded by the trial court, admissible, and if so, did the exclusion thereof constitute such a denial of the rights of respondent as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment? We have concluded that such proffered testimony was inadmissible, therefore, the exclusion thereof could not be prejudicial.
In the trial court the parties entered into certain stipulations thereby reducing the controversy to only the question of the market value of the land to be taken and the market value of the remaining land. Proper issues were submittd to a jury for determination. The jury found that the value of the tract of 3.22 acres taken on December 23, 1954, was the sum of $2437.00; that the value of the remaining tract of 58 acres immediately before the taking was $43,500.00; and the value of the remaining land immediately after the taking was $29,000.00. Based upon such findings, the trial court rendered judgment for $16,-937.00, together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent on the sum of $6,437.00, being the portion of the judgment not deposited in the registry of the court on December 23, 1954. On Appeal perfected by the respondent, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 308 S.W. 2d 165. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm that of the trial court.
In view of respondents’ insistence both by cross point and argument that this Court is without jurisdiction and that petitioners’ application should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, we deem it necessary to dispose of the question. Respondent advances the theory that since the excluded evidence hereinafter discussed was offered by the respondent and not by the petitioners, and since the trial court’s rulings did not in any [313]*313particular prevent the petitioners from fully developing their case, and since the excluded evidence was only defensive in nature, such evidence did not control and the case did not “turn” on the evidence in question. The respondent invokes the well settled rule that where a complaint is made as to the admission or exclusion of evidence, it will not be said to concern a matter of substantive law unless the evidence “controls” the case, or the case “turns” on the evidence in question. The contention is made that it is only in situations where, because of the ruling of the trial court, the party is prevented from making out a case that the question concerning the admissibility of evidence becomes a matter of substantive law, citing the case of Allen v. Pollard, 109 Texas 536, 212 S.W. 468, in support of such contention.
We do not agree with the position thus taken by the respondent. It is true that respondent, who was the appellant in the Court of Civil Appeals, presented only three points of error. Each of these points complained that the trial court erred in refusing to permit appellant-respondent to introduce certain testimony. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained such contention and reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. Unquestionably, the court made the evidence controlling of the case, and the judgment of the court “turned” on the evidence in question. It reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. Thus, that court by its action made the evidence controlling of the case, and the judgment of that court “turned” on the evidence in question. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court that if the evidence necessarily controls the case, or if the case turns on the evidence in question, this Court has jurisdiction. See Merchants Cotton Oil Company, Inc. v. Acme Gin Company, 121 Texas 91, 42 S.W. 2d 777; Smith v. Butcher, 110 Texas 617, 223 S.W. 166; Kansas City, M. & O. Railway Company v. Torres, Texas Com. App., 57 S.W. 2d 1099. In the Acme Gin Company case, supra, the court, after stating that the only question presented by the application for writ of error was one of admissibility of evidence, disposed of the jurisdictional question by holding that “* * * Since the evidence excluded does not necessarily control the case * * *, we are compelled to dismiss the application for want of jurisdiction. * * * ” In the instant case, we have held that the evidence is controlling and that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals turned on the evidence in question. In all of these cases, including the instant case, this Court had and has jurisdiction to determine the question of whether or not the excluded evidence was controlling, or whether the case “turned” on the evidence. We hold that this Court has [314]*314jurisdiction to consider the questions presented in the petition for writ of error.
Turning now to the merits, we have carefully considered a 53-page bill of exception made up largely of the testimony of Mr. Hanks taken out of the presence of the jury and statements of the attorneys as well as comments and rulings of the trial judge. The excluded testimony was offered by the respondent in an effort to refute the testimony given by Mr. Hanks as to the value of the remaining tract of land before and after the taking.
Mr. Hanks testified before the jury that in' his opinion the fair cash market value of the land on December 23, 1954, in Denton County, Texas, immediately before the railroad went over and across his land was the sum of $1000.00 per acre or a total of $58,000.00; that the fair market value of the same land after the taking was the sum of $500.00 per acre or a total of $29,000.00 for the 58 acres. The record reflects that the excluded testimony involves two separate and distinct alleged oral offers to sell the remaining land. One such offer came about when a Mrs. Brown, a real estate agent, telephoned Mr. Hanks and in response to her inquiry, he informed her that if her prospective purchaser would take the entire 58 acres, he would sell for $2000.00 per acre. We have concluded that the trial court did not exclude this testimony. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to pass upon the question of whether or not the conversation between Mrs. Brown and Mr. Hanks was admissible. It is sufficient to say that the attorneys stated to the court that it was their desire to offer testimony and to cross examine Mr. Hanks relative to whether or not he had ever made a statement that the market value of his remaining land was $1000.00 per acre, or $1250.00, or was in excess of or far in excess of $500.00 per acre, the value given by Mr. Hanks upon the trial.
The bill of exception reflects that the trial court ruled that the attorneys for respondent would be permitted to fully cross-examine Mr. Hanks with reference to his testimony on value. The Court stated “You have the right of full cross-examination with reference to the figures he has said on the land taken and the remainder both prior to and subsequent to the condemnation. * * * So I think that as far as the right of cross examination before the jury with reference to values, of course you would have that right and I will sustain it.” The respondent made no effort to introduce such evidence before the jury through cross-examination of Mr. Hanks or otherwise. The other offer to sell, first for $1000.00, and later for $1250.00 per acre, was in con[315]
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Mr. Justice Smith
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a condemnation suit brought by the respondent under our laws of eminent domain against the petitioners for a right of way out of and over and across a 61.22-acre tract of land adjoining the city limits of the City of Denton. We have but one question to decide, which is: Was certain testimony hereinafter more specifically referred to, offered by the respondent and excluded by the trial court, admissible, and if so, did the exclusion thereof constitute such a denial of the rights of respondent as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment? We have concluded that such proffered testimony was inadmissible, therefore, the exclusion thereof could not be prejudicial.
In the trial court the parties entered into certain stipulations thereby reducing the controversy to only the question of the market value of the land to be taken and the market value of the remaining land. Proper issues were submittd to a jury for determination. The jury found that the value of the tract of 3.22 acres taken on December 23, 1954, was the sum of $2437.00; that the value of the remaining tract of 58 acres immediately before the taking was $43,500.00; and the value of the remaining land immediately after the taking was $29,000.00. Based upon such findings, the trial court rendered judgment for $16,-937.00, together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent on the sum of $6,437.00, being the portion of the judgment not deposited in the registry of the court on December 23, 1954. On Appeal perfected by the respondent, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 308 S.W. 2d 165. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm that of the trial court.
In view of respondents’ insistence both by cross point and argument that this Court is without jurisdiction and that petitioners’ application should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, we deem it necessary to dispose of the question. Respondent advances the theory that since the excluded evidence hereinafter discussed was offered by the respondent and not by the petitioners, and since the trial court’s rulings did not in any [313]*313particular prevent the petitioners from fully developing their case, and since the excluded evidence was only defensive in nature, such evidence did not control and the case did not “turn” on the evidence in question. The respondent invokes the well settled rule that where a complaint is made as to the admission or exclusion of evidence, it will not be said to concern a matter of substantive law unless the evidence “controls” the case, or the case “turns” on the evidence in question. The contention is made that it is only in situations where, because of the ruling of the trial court, the party is prevented from making out a case that the question concerning the admissibility of evidence becomes a matter of substantive law, citing the case of Allen v. Pollard, 109 Texas 536, 212 S.W. 468, in support of such contention.
We do not agree with the position thus taken by the respondent. It is true that respondent, who was the appellant in the Court of Civil Appeals, presented only three points of error. Each of these points complained that the trial court erred in refusing to permit appellant-respondent to introduce certain testimony. The Court of Civil Appeals sustained such contention and reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. Unquestionably, the court made the evidence controlling of the case, and the judgment of the court “turned” on the evidence in question. It reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. Thus, that court by its action made the evidence controlling of the case, and the judgment of that court “turned” on the evidence in question. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court that if the evidence necessarily controls the case, or if the case turns on the evidence in question, this Court has jurisdiction. See Merchants Cotton Oil Company, Inc. v. Acme Gin Company, 121 Texas 91, 42 S.W. 2d 777; Smith v. Butcher, 110 Texas 617, 223 S.W. 166; Kansas City, M. & O. Railway Company v. Torres, Texas Com. App., 57 S.W. 2d 1099. In the Acme Gin Company case, supra, the court, after stating that the only question presented by the application for writ of error was one of admissibility of evidence, disposed of the jurisdictional question by holding that “* * * Since the evidence excluded does not necessarily control the case * * *, we are compelled to dismiss the application for want of jurisdiction. * * * ” In the instant case, we have held that the evidence is controlling and that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals turned on the evidence in question. In all of these cases, including the instant case, this Court had and has jurisdiction to determine the question of whether or not the excluded evidence was controlling, or whether the case “turned” on the evidence. We hold that this Court has [314]*314jurisdiction to consider the questions presented in the petition for writ of error.
Turning now to the merits, we have carefully considered a 53-page bill of exception made up largely of the testimony of Mr. Hanks taken out of the presence of the jury and statements of the attorneys as well as comments and rulings of the trial judge. The excluded testimony was offered by the respondent in an effort to refute the testimony given by Mr. Hanks as to the value of the remaining tract of land before and after the taking.
Mr. Hanks testified before the jury that in' his opinion the fair cash market value of the land on December 23, 1954, in Denton County, Texas, immediately before the railroad went over and across his land was the sum of $1000.00 per acre or a total of $58,000.00; that the fair market value of the same land after the taking was the sum of $500.00 per acre or a total of $29,000.00 for the 58 acres. The record reflects that the excluded testimony involves two separate and distinct alleged oral offers to sell the remaining land. One such offer came about when a Mrs. Brown, a real estate agent, telephoned Mr. Hanks and in response to her inquiry, he informed her that if her prospective purchaser would take the entire 58 acres, he would sell for $2000.00 per acre. We have concluded that the trial court did not exclude this testimony. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to pass upon the question of whether or not the conversation between Mrs. Brown and Mr. Hanks was admissible. It is sufficient to say that the attorneys stated to the court that it was their desire to offer testimony and to cross examine Mr. Hanks relative to whether or not he had ever made a statement that the market value of his remaining land was $1000.00 per acre, or $1250.00, or was in excess of or far in excess of $500.00 per acre, the value given by Mr. Hanks upon the trial.
The bill of exception reflects that the trial court ruled that the attorneys for respondent would be permitted to fully cross-examine Mr. Hanks with reference to his testimony on value. The Court stated “You have the right of full cross-examination with reference to the figures he has said on the land taken and the remainder both prior to and subsequent to the condemnation. * * * So I think that as far as the right of cross examination before the jury with reference to values, of course you would have that right and I will sustain it.” The respondent made no effort to introduce such evidence before the jury through cross-examination of Mr. Hanks or otherwise. The other offer to sell, first for $1000.00, and later for $1250.00 per acre, was in con[315]*315nection with an oral offer to purchase submitted by Fred Rayzor in behalf of his brother, Newton Rayzor. The respondent offered to prove this transaction by the testimony of a real estate agent, Mr. Ritchie, and through cross-examination of Mr. Hanks. We shall not attempt to set out in this opinion all the testimony offered in connection with this transaction as reflected by the bill of exception. The testimony adds up to an oral offer to purchase by Newton Rayzor, without any showing of written authority to Fred to make the offer. The evidence does not even tend to prove value. At the very most, the offer of Rayzor to pay $1250.00 per acre for the remaining land was an unaccepted offer to purchase. It was merely the opinion as to the value Rayzor placed upon the land. Such evidence, if offered through the testimony of Mr. Rayzor would be inadmissible, much less is such testimony admissible when offered through a third party.
The trial court in sustaining petitioners’ objection to the testimony regarding the Rayzor-Hanks transaction said: “* * * I am going to sustain Mr. Coleman’s [petitioners’ attorney] objection to the proposal to introduce evidence regarding an offer of Mr. Hanks. Because I think from what I heard yesterday [out of the presence of the jury] it shows an offer on the the part of the defendant to sell land for $1250 an acre. And it is not an admission * * * it is not admissible on the question of market value. And there was, of course, no written offer from the prospective buyer, and there was no offer at all that I heard of. There was no meeting of the minds between the buyer and the seller; that the buyer, Newton Rayzor, wasn’t present, and apparently it was contemplated that Mr. Hanks’ offer was to be taken by Mr. Minor or Mr. J. Fred Rayzor and submitted to the prospective buyer in some other town. There was no evidence of a bona fide offer on the part of the prospective buyer. And it is not shown that it was an assertion of market value on the part of Mr. Hanks. He has testified in this case that the market value was $500, and now he was saying in that office that he will take 1250. I don’t really feel like the statements are contradictory. If he had positively said over there in that conversation that the market value was 1250. T won’t take a penny less,’ or ‘It is worth 1250,’ we might get into a problem of contradictory statements. But now as I see it, it is still an unaccepted offer and not a contradictory statement, and therefore inadmissible on the question of market value. * * *” Then, again, and still after the presentation of additional evidence out of the presence of the jury, the trial court in continuing to sustain the objection, said: “Gentlemen, I think this amounts to quite an extended period of negotiations relative to an unaccepted [316]*316offer, and I am not going to permit you to introduce that evidence before the jury for that reason.” The exclusion of such evidence is supported by such authorities as Hine v. Manhattan R. Co (1892), 132 N.Y. 477, 30 N.E. 985, 15 L.R.A. 591; Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341; 24 Sup. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211; Abramson v. City of San Angelo, Texas Civ. App., 210 S.W. 2d 476, wr. dism. See also 7 A.L.R. 2d 785, 787.
The case of Hine v. Manhattan R. Co., supra, assigns reasons why an unaccepted offer to purchase is not competent evidence upon the issue of market value of the land. The court, among other things, says: “Such market value may be shown by the testimony of competent witnesses but not by an offer. In the first place the evidence * * * is objectionable, because it places before the court or jury an absent person’s declaration or opinion as to value, while depriving the adverse party of the benefit of cross-examination. The highest value at which an offer, standing alone, can be estimated is, that it represents the opinion of him who makes it as to the worth of the property. Nevertheless, the assertion that he offered to part with his money, might give to such hearsay opinion more weight with the jury, than an opinion given by a witness before them, not thus supported. While, notwithstanding, his opinion was backed by a promise to pay money, which was not enforceable, he may not have been competent in a legal sense to express an opinion on the subject. If he was, other reasons may have prompted the offer than an expectation of actually becoming the purchaser; or of obtaining it at its market value.”
In discussing the evidence involved in the case of Sharp v. United States, supra, the court said that such evidence was of a nature “entirely too uncertain, shadowy, and speculative to form any solid foundation for determining the value of the land. * * * If the offer were admissible, not only is it almost impossible to prove (if it exists) the lack of good faith in the person making the offer, but the circumstances of the parties at the time the offer was made as bearing upon the value of such offer may be very difficult, if not almost impossible to show. To be of the slightest value'as evidence in any court, an offer must, of course, be an honest offer made by an individual capable of forming a fair and intelligent judgment, really desirous of purchasing, entirely able to do so, and to give the amount of money mentioned in the offer, for otherwise the offer would be but a vain thing. Whether the owner himself, while declining the offer, really believed in the good faith of the party making it, and in his ability and desire to pay the amount offered, if such offer [317]*317should be accepted, or whether the offer was regarded as a mere idle remark, not intended for acceptance, would also be material upon the question of the bona fides of the refusal. * * *”
The testimony excluded by the trial court in the instant case could be of no probative value or aid to the trier of the facts in determining the market value of the land involved. “Oral and not binding offers are so easily made and refused in a mere passing conversation, and under circumstances involving no responsibility on either side, as to cast no light on the question of value. It is frequently very difficult to show precisely the situation under which these offers were made. In our judgment they do not tend to show value.” Sharp v. United States, supra.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court is affirmed.
Justice Hamilton not sitting.
Opinion delivered January 14, 1959.