SHADUR, Senior District Judge:
This appeal presents the single, seemingly straightforward question whether the word “is” really means “is,” at least as that word is employed in 25 U.S.C. § 81.1 At the core of the present dispute, that statute requires the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (“Secretary”) to approve any “contract with an Indian tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or more years” before such a contract can be considered valid. Section 81(a) defines the term “Indian lands” in part as “lands the title to which is held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe” (emphasis added).
Appellant NGV Gaming Ltd. (“NGV”) asks us to read Section 81 literally—as pertaining solely to contracts that implicate lands already held in trust by the federal government. Appellees Harrah’s Operating Company (“Harrah’s”) and Gui-diville Band of Pomo Indians (“the Tribe”2 ), on the other hand, urge a nonliteral reading of the statute—one that would treat Section 81 as also covering contracts in which the parties reach agreement, not with respect to already-held lands, but to [770]*770acquire lands in the future that might eventually be held in trust. Under the latter interpretation the contract at issue in this appeal would be invalid, lacking as it does the Secretary’s approval, and the district court’s decision to dismiss NGV’s suit against Harrah’s for tortious interference with that contract would have to be affirmed. But under the first—and literal—reading, the district court’s decision would be in error, and the state law action could proceed.
Motivated largely by the plain meaning of Section 81—but after also taking into account related statutes, relevant legislative history and the language of the contract itself—we conclude that the word “is” means just that (in the most basic, present-tense sense of the word) and that Section 81 therefore applies only to contracts that affect lands already held in trust by the United States. We therefore reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual Background
A. Terms of the Contract
On July 3, 2002 the Tribe contracted with FEGV Corporation (“FEGV”) for the latter to develop and construct a gaming facility on a to-be-acquired parcel of land in Northern California. In December 2003 FEGV assigned to NGV its rights and duties under that contract, which comprised two separate documents: (1) a Development Agreement and Personal Property Lease (“the Lease”), and (2) a Cash Management Agreement. Here is the purpose of the transaction as described at the outset of the Lease:
The Tribe requires assistance with (i) financing the day-to-day operations of the Tribal government, (ii) acquiring real property and petitioning the United States to accept title to such property in trust for the benefit of the Tribe ..., and (iii) the development, design, financing, construction and initial equipping of the Facility.
“Facility,” the Lease explains, includes “buildings and improvements” that would be constructed on to-be-acquired real property and that would then be used to conduct Class II or Class III gaming3 for the public. Both parties intended to transfer the to-be-acquired real property into trust, a process set forth under Section 465 that allows the United States to accept and hold property for the benefit of an Indian tribe.4 But to be clear: No such land existed at the time the contract was entered into—nothing had been identified or acquired or, least of all, had been placed in trust.
NGV’s role in that forward-looking endeavor was to use its “experience, expertise and resources ... to assist the Tribe” in accomplishing its objectives. In exchange NGV would be compensated through a combination of fixed payments and a percentage of gross and net revenues earned by the newly constructed [771]*771gaming facility. In addition NGV would enjoy other rights related to the land. Most notably, under the Lease the Tribe could not without NGV’s consent:
Sell, dispose of, lease, assign, sublet, transfer, mortgage or encumber (whether voluntarily or by operation of law) all or any part of its right, title, or interest in or to the Trust Lands, the Facility, or the Equipment.
Finally the Lease set forth several commitments, one of which is critically important to this appeal. It specified that the Tribe would “[ojbtain all necessary and appropriate federal and tribal permits and approvals necessary with respect to the enforceability of the [Lease and Cash Management Agreement] or the operation of the Facility.” Among such potential federal approvals was the approval contemplated by Section 81. Another potentially relevant federal statute was Section 2710(b)(2)(A), which calls for the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission (“Gaming Commission”) to approve “any tribal ordinance or resolution” involving Class II gaming on Indian lands.
B. Rescission of Tribe’s Contract with NGV
Beginning in January 2004 Harrah’s and Upstream Molate, LLC (“Upstream”) partnered and entered into negotiations to purchase 354 acres of land from the City of Richmond, California. Harrah’s and Upstream intended to place that land in trust on behalf of the Tribe and to use the land to build a gaming facility that the Tribe would operate. According to NGV, Harrah’s and Upstream began those negotiations despite knowing of the Tribe’s preexisting obligations to NGV.
On August 2, 2004 the Tribe—acting through its chairperson, Merlene Sanchez—sent a letter to NGV seeking to rescind their contract. Sanchez explained that the Tribe had submitted their contract to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“Bureau”) and the Gaming Commission for both agencies’ approval under Sections 81 and 2710. Because the Gaming Commission had already informed the Tribe that its contract with NGV was illegal, Sanchez concluded that the Tribe had “no choice but to rescind the agreement.”
Indeed, in a letter dated July 21, 2004 the Gaming Commission explained that the Tribe’s contract with NGV violated Section 2710(b)(2)(A). It stated that “the Agreements evidence Developer’s proprietary interest in the Tribe’s gaming activity” and that such a proprietary interest contravened the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”).
Similar news came from the Bureau on April 13, 2005. After reviewing the Lease and Cash Management Agreement, that agency “concluded, as a matter of law, that the agreements must be approved by the Secretary under Section 81 in order for them to be valid and enforceable.” Absent such approval, the Bureau explained, the contract was “unenforceable as a matter of law.” Its conclusion, it noted, stemmed from information provided to it by attorneys for the Tribe “showing that the United States had accepted at least three parcels in Mendocino County, California, into trust for the benefit of the Tribe in 1999.” Those 44 acres had been accepted into trust in 1999 with the intention that they would be used by the Tribe for residential development, not a gaming facility. Based on the existence of the Mendocino County property the Bureau “determined that the Tribe has an interest in ‘Indian land’ as defined in § 81(a),” and that interest was encumbered by its contractual provision with NGV that “affirmatively require[s] the Tribe to refrain from selling or disposing of any part of an interest the Tribe has [772]*772in Indian land ... so long as the agreements remain in effect.”
In August 2004—before having received the Bureau’s letter but after having received the Gaming Commission’s decision—the Tribe officially entered into an agreement with Harrah’s and Upstream to develop and manage the Tribe’s proposed gaming facility. That agreement contained an indemnification clause requiring the Tribe to defend Harrah’s against any future claims made by NGV.
C. Procedural History
NGV eventually filed suit against both Upstream and Harrah’s in the federal district court, alleging that those two defendants had tortiously interfered with its existing contract with the Tribe. Later the Tribe filed its own lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against NGV, asking to have the Lease and Cash Management Agreement declared invalid under applicable federal statutes. Both actions—NGV’s against Upstream and Harrah’s and the Tribe’s against NGV— were later consolidated.
On July 28, 2005 the Tribe, Harrah’s and Upstream all moved for summary judgment. NGV responded by contesting the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. It claimed that there was no case or controversy between NGV and the Tribe, for NGV had assured the Tribe that it would not file an action against it. For its part the Tribe contended that there was subject matter jurisdiction based upon (1) the Tribe’s obligation to indemnify Harrah’s against claims made by NGV and (2) the Tribe’s continuing interest in developing a gaming facility without fear of litigation.
On October 19, 2005 the district court granted the Tribe’s motion for declaratory relief. In particular the court held that (1) it had subject matter jurisdiction over the Tribe’s declaratory relief action; (2) Section 81 applied to contracts involving lands not yet acquired and not yet transferred into trust; and (3) because the Secretary of the Interior had not approved the Tribe’s contract with NGV as required under Section 81, the contracts were invalid. As a result the district court granted the Tribe’s motion. In so doing it also granted Harrah’s and Upstream’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing NGV’s tortious interference claim as a matter of law because no valid contract existed between NGV and the Tribe.
NGV timely filed this appeal. While it was pending this court granted NGV’s motion for the voluntary dismissal of Upstream from the matter because those two parties had settled. In addition, while this appeal was pending the Tribe and Har-rah’s terminated their contract and entered into a settlement agreement that provided in part for the Tribe’s continued indemnification of Harrah’s against claims made by NGV—but the Tribe acknowledges that its original contract with Har-rah’s (the one that spawned the termination and its continued indemnification undertaking) lacked the approval necessary under Section 2710.
II. Standards of Review
We review both the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and a grant of summary judgment de novo (Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (9th Cir.1998)). In reviewing the latter decision, we determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact for trial, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir.2005)). We also review de novo the interpretation and construction of statutes (Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir.2001)), as well as the principles of contract interpretation [773]*773as applied to the facts before us (L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Eng’rs & Constructors Inc., 880 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir.1989)).
III. The Tribe’s Claim Against NGV
We begin with the Tribe’s effort to obtain a declaratory judgment, seeking a proclamation that its agreement with NGV was invalid because it had not been approved by the Secretary pursuant to Section 81 or, in the alternative, because it violated Section 2710. We have no occasion to decide the merits of those questions—at least not at this stage of this opinion5—because we conclude that the Tribe’s efforts do not belong in the federal courts at all.
It is undisputed that the Tribe’s claimed adversary NGV has released it from any liability whatever, looking instead solely to a claim against Harrah’s. And the Tribe has itself recognized that its management contract with Harrah’s (which would have imposed on it an indemnification obligation covering NGV’s claims against Harrah’s) was void under Section 2705(a)(4) due to the Tribe’s failure to have obtained approval of that contract by the Chairman of the Gaming Commission.6 That being so, the Tribe cannot bootstrap itself into an Article III case or controversy vis-a-vis NGV by undertaking a new indemnification obligation as part of an agreement to terminate its already void contract with Harrah’s—an indemnification promise that is wholly lacking in consideration and is hence itself invalid.7
In short, the Tribe—which does not itself face any potential liability to NGV must try to fall back on its claimed sense of uncertainty about any future essays into the gambling industry. But those uncertainties exist only in outer space—they surely cannot be trotted out against NGV, with which the Tribe no longer has any contractual relationship or any on going exposure to liability. Instead such uncertainties raise wholly speculative concerns that call for a type of purely advisory opinion that federal courts are prohibited by the Constitution from giving to putative litigants (see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106-07, 110-11, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), holding that because Lyons could not show that he “faced a real and immediate threat of again being illegally choked,” his claim was “speculative” in nature and therefore could not meet Article Ill’s “case or controversy” requirement).
[774]*774As already stated, that alone should operate to knock the Tribe out of the box in terms of standing to pursue its own litigation. This case scenario poses a dramatic contrast to litigation such as a patent case seeking a declaratory judgment (see, e.g., Société de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng’g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 942-44 (9th Cir.1981)), where there are two parties involved in the dispute with actual interests “of sufficient immediacy and reality” (Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941)), even though no infringement action has been brought.
If, as and when the Tribe chooses to engage in a future proposed entry into gambling activity with some other party and may then seek a declaration of its rights under a contract with that party, there may perhaps be federal subject matter jurisdiction to address that subject (a question that need not be answered here because it is purely hypothetical). But here, with the contractual relationship that once bound NGV and the Tribe already having been terminated, there is no one on the other side of the “v.” sign from the Tribe—and that is fatal in jurisdictional terms. We thus vacate the district court’s decision to grant the Tribe the declaratory relief it sought.
IV. NGV’s Claim Against Harrah’s
We turn now to NGV’s claim that Harrah’s tortiously interfered with the contract that once bound NGV and the Tribe. Under California law “[t]he elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with contract are: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendants’ knowledge of the contract; (3) defendants’ intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage” (Tuchscher Dev. Enters., Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 132 Cal. Reptr.2d 57, 73 (Cal.Ct.App.2003)). At issue in this appeal is the first element of the tort: NGV contends that its contract with the Tribe was valid because it did not require approval under Section 81, while Harrah’s argues that the contract was invalid precisely because it lacked such approval. In the alternative, Har-rah’s argues that the contract violated Section 2710, which requires that an “Indian tribe have the sole proprietary interest and responsibility for any gaming activity.”
We address each of those arguments in turn, tackling the Section 81 inquiry first. That inquiry calls for a consideration of a number of factors, including the plain language of the statute, the role (if any) of 1 U.S.C. § 1, relevant legislative history and, of course, the actual language of the agreement that once bound NGV and the Tribe.
A. Plain Language of Section 81
Our analysis begins with the plain language of Section 81, not only because that is the natural starting point dictated by all accepted canons of statutory construction but also because the statute’s unequivocal present-tense use of the word “is” does a tremendous amount of the legwork in settling one of the main questions raised on this appeal. In full Section 81(a) defines the term “Indian lands” as (emphases added):
lands the title to which is held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe or lands the title to which is held by an Indian tribe subject to a restriction by the United States against alienation.
Section 81(b) then prescribes:
No agreement or contract with an Indian tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or more years shall be [775]*775valid unless that agreement or contract bears the approval of the Secretary of the Interior or a designee of the Secretary.
In this instance the Tribe-NGV contract was not within the purview of Section 81 because it plainly did not implicate “Indian lands” in statutory terms. Section 81(a)’s use of the present tense in defining “Indian lands” unambiguously prescribes that title to the real estate must already be held by the United States in trust for a tribe. Had Congress intended that Section 81 also extend to lands that might later be held in trust, it would have been the simplest of matters to word the statute differently. That it did not do so is not a linguistic decision to be treated lightly (see SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir.2003), explaining that “Congress’s explicit decision to use one word over another in drafting a statute is material” and adding that “[i]t is a decision that is imbued with legal significance and should not be presumed to be random or devoid of meaning”; Biehl v. CIR, 351 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.2003), writing that courts “will not stretch the statutory language to cover a situation not contemplated by Congress”).
Here the parties entered into their contract expressly contemplating—specifically intending-—that land would later be identified and acquired and then still later transferred to the United States to be held in trust for the Tribe. But no such lands existed when the Tribe and NGV entered into their contract. Hence the portion of Section 81 that limits the duration of encumbrances on “Indian lands” is simply inapplicable to this case.
B. Role of the Dictionary Act in Interpreting Section 81
Contrary to the contention raised by the dissent, nothing in our reading of Section 81 contravenes 1 U.S.C. § l.8 More commonly referred to as the Dictionary Act, that statute reads in relevant part:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise—
words used in the present tense include the future as well as the present.
Focusing upon the phrase “words used in the present tense include the future as well as the present,” the dissent asserts that the word “is” as used in Section 81(a) encompasses both lands that are currently held in trust by the United States for an Indian tribe and lands that might eventually be held in similar fashion. But in so doing, the dissent fails to grapple adequately with (1) the Supreme Court’s repeated instructions regarding proper statutory construction and (2) the directive in the Dictionary Act itself that compels us to consider first the “context” of the statute.
First, the Supreme Court has not once invoked the Dictionary Act in an effort to convert an unambiguous verb tense into claimed ambiguity, let alone then going on to employ that manufactured ambiguity as a stepping stone to altering the plain sense of a statute.9 Here is the [776]*776succinct directive in United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) and the cases that it cites:
Congress’ use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes. See, e.g., Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43, 49-50, 95 S.Ct. 247, 42 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 63-64, n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987).
Similarly, Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) made clear that in “all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute.” Inquiries into the meaning of a statute come to an end “if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent” (id., quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)(internal quotation marks omitted)). Given the specific and unambiguous manner in which Section 81(a) defines the term “Indian lands,” it is not apparent why the Dictionary Act must even be consulted.
Second, even on its own terms the Dictionary Act supports the analysis here: It looks first to “context,” and only if the “context” leaves the meaning open to interpretation does the default provision come into play. As defined by Rowland, 506 U.S. at 199-200, 113 S.Ct. 716 (alterations in original, emphasis added):
“Context” here means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or the texts of other related congressional Acts, and this is simply an instance of the word’s ordinary meaning: “[t]he part or parts of a discourse preceding or following a ‘text’ or passage or a word, or so intimately associated with it as to throw light upon its meaning.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 576 (2d ed.1942). While “context” can carry a secondary meaning of “[a]ssoei-ated surroundings, whether material or mental,” ibid., we doubt that the broader sense applies here.
And Rowland, id. at 199 went on to explain that the word “indicates” broadens the scope of the inquiry that a court must make (id. at 200, 113 S.Ct. 716):
If “context” thus has a narrow compass, the “indication” contemplated by 1 U.S.C. § 1 has a broader one. The Dictionary Act’s very reference to contextual “indication” bespeaks something more than an express contrary definition, and courts would hardly need direction where Congress had thought to include an express, specialized definition for the purpose of a particular Act; ordinary rules of statutory construction would prefer the specific definition over the Dictionary Act’s general one. Where a court needs help is in the awkward case where Congress provides no particular definition, but the definition in 1 U.S.C. [777]*777§ 1 seems not to fit.[10] There it is that the qualification “unless the context indicates otherwise” has a real job to do, in excusing the court from forcing a square peg into a round hole.
With that guidance in mind, we consider a series of congressional acts related to Section 81—specifically, Sections 465, 2719 and 271—that clearly avoid an “awkward” rendering of Section 81.
Sections 465 and 2719 are particularly instructive, for they respond directly to the dissent’s concern that construing Section 81 so that it applies only to contracts involving lands already in trust would allow parties to evade federal review entirely. Manipulative parties, the dissent fears, could take advantage of such an interpretation by carefully orchestrating the timing of any agreement so that any provision encumbering Indian lands would be executed only before placing land in trust. But such fears are more than adequately assuaged by the existence of Sections 465 and 2719, both of which guarantee that a contract such as the one that NGV and the Tribe had entered into can never escape the federal government’s attention.
First, Section 465 (already quoted in n. 4) and its implementing regulations set forth an extensive review process that the Secretary of the Interior must undertake before taking lands into trust (see, e.g., 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.3, 151.11(c); Larry E. Scrivner, Acquiring Land into Trust for Indian Tribes, 37 New Eng.L. Rev. 603, 606-07 (2003)(“Scrivner”),11 describing the trust application process and the Secretary’s duty to investigate, among other things, the purpose for which the land will be used and the effect that placing the land into trust will have on the tax bases of local government; Mary Jane Sheppard, Taking Indian Land Into Trust, 44 S.D. L. Rev. 681, 687-88 (1998-99) (“Sheppard”),12 similarly describing the comprehensive nature of a Section 465 review). During such a review a tribe is first required to address, among other issues, its need for the land, the purpose for which the land will be used, the effect that taking the land into trust would have on state and local political subdivisions and whether a decision to take the land into trust would comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (see Scrivner, 37 New Eng.L. Rev. at 606). With that initial information in hand, the Department of the Interior then gives state and local governments the opportunity to object to the tribe’s application through “evidentiary documentation” demonstrating why taking the land into trust would “impact[ ] their jurisdiction or their tax base” (id. at 607). Only after all sides have provided their input does the Department begin its own independent examination of the trust application, a process that “requires a thorough analysis of all the facts and documentation, environmental clearances, archaeological studies, and all of the things that weigh into the action” (id.). Any final decision is subject both to a similarly extensive administrative appeals process and to a subsequent review in the federal courts (id.).
[778]*778And relatedly, in cases where the tribe intends to use lands transferred into trust for gaming purposes, Section 2719(b)(1)(A) requires that the Secretary first “determine[ ] that a gaming establishment ... would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community” (see also Sheppard, 44 S.D. L. Rev. at 687). In short, any concern that NGV was trying to game the system by executing its contract with the Tribe before transferring land into trust is wholly unfounded. Instead any later• effort to take lands into trust triggers an extensive review process by the Secretary—a review that is far more meaningful than any Section 81 proceeding that would deal with not-yet-identified lands that might be taken into trust in the future, because a Section 465 proceeding addresses the suitability of a specific parcel of land in all respects, rather than the totally speculative process that is necessarily involved when a presently unknown future acquisition is sought to be made the subject of an attempted analysis.
Sections 2710(d)(3)(A) and 2710(d)(7) also help illuminate the meaning of Section 81, particularly because both are part and parcel of IGRA, which defines “Indian lands” in much the same manner as Section 81 (see Section 2703(4)(B) (emphasis added), defining “Indian lands” in part as “any lands title to which is held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe.... ”). Section 2710(d)(3)(A) provides:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities.
If any State should fail to enter into such negotiations, Section 2710(d)(7) provides the Indian tribe with a series of remedies, including the right to initiate an action against the State in federal district court. But to bring such an action, as the Sixth Circuit has held in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir.2002), the Indian tribe must show that it has “Indian lands” as defined by IGRA at the time of filing. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish, id. spelled out the rationale underlying its conclusion in terms that bear considerably on the Section 81 question now before us:
Under § 2710(d)(3)(A), it is clear that the State does not have an obligation to negotiate with an Indian tribe until the tribe has Indian lands. The purposes of this requirement appear to be to ensure that the casino will be inside the borders of the State, to give the State notice of where it will be, and to require the tribe to have a place for the casino that has been federally approved. If the Indian tribe does not have any land in the State that can be used for a casino, why should the State waste its time negotiating about such a casino? In the absence of a location, the State would have no way to assess the environmental, safety, traffic, and other problems that such a casino could pose.
Accord, Mechoopda Indian Tribe of Chico Rancheria, Cal. v. Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-03-2327WBS/GGH, 2004 WL 1103021, at *5 (E.D.Cal. Mar.12, 2004).
Given those practical concerns, it is no wonder that the Bureau’s policy has been to review contracts under Section 81 only when they involve lands currently held in trust by the United States. That policy is evinced by the Bureau’s own April 13, 2005 letter to the Tribe, which made clear that its conclusion that the NGV-Tribe agree[779]*779ment was invalid for lack of Section 81 approval was predicated on the Tribe’s lawyers having alerted the Bureau to its Mendocino County property, not to the possibility of acquiring future trust lands.13
That same policy is further confirmed through an affidavit included in the record by NGV from Kevin Gover (“Gover”), a former Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs. Gover attests that during his tenure from late 1997 to early 2001, “it was not the [Bureau’s] policy or practice to review contracts to determine whether such contracts fall within the scope of 25 U.S.C. § 81(b) ... in the absence of the existence of trust lands.” Instead, in cases “where the purpose of the contract between a developer and a tribe [was] to assist the tribe in acquiring real property, and petitioning the United States to accept title to such property in trust for the benefit of the tribe,” the Bureau’s review would be done pursuant to the regulations implementing Section 465. As Gover puts it: “[t]he Secretary’s acceptance of title to the subject property in trust for the petitioning tribe subsumes all approvals required under Federal law.” And as all of that applies to the facts before us, the fact that the Tribe and NGV would eventually have to undergo Section 465 review if their later-acquired lands were to be transferred into trust obviated any need to have then-contract approved under Section 81.
In conclusion, there is no reason to resort to the Dictionary Act’s default rules of statutory interpresentation. Instead the context here clearly indicates that Section 81 is limited only to reviewing those contracts involving presently held trust lands.
C. Legislative History of Section 81
Our literal reading of Section 81 is further corroborated by the statute’s legislative history.14 In seeking to persuade us to read Section 81 other than in plain-language terms, Harrah’s points to some cases that, it claims, identify a legislative history of Section 81 that supports a nonli-teral reading. We have reviewed those cases as well as the pertinent legislative history, and we conclude that those sources not only fail to support the position advanced by Harrah’s but that they instead further corroborate our own plain-language statutory reading.
Thus Harrah’s seeks to call to its aid Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985), but that case significantly couched its view in terms that fed[780]*780eral statutes relating to Indian tribes “are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit” (emphasis added). Here that proposition does not aid Har-rah’s, for Section 81’s present-tense wording leaves no room for ambiguity.15 Indeed, even the Blackfeet Tribe concept of liberal construction “in favor of the Indians” does not call for a nonliteral reading of Section 81(b), for requiring that more— rather than fewer—contracts be approved under Section 81(b) “would frustrate Indian tribes’ efforts to promote economic development and fiscal autonomy” (Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Me., 112 F.3d 538, 554 (1st Cir.1997), adding that the court’s “analysis reflects the modern trend in federal Indian policy away from outmoded paternalistic practices and policies”).
Section 81’s own evolution confirms the advent of that more modern attitude toward Indian tribes, a perspective that the dissent does not acknowledge. That statute was originally enacted in 1872 to “re-flecte ] Congressional concerns that Indians, either individually or collectively, were incapable of protecting themselves from fraud in the conduct of their economic affairs” (see s. Rep. No. 106-150, at 2 (1999), adding that “[t]he first and principal need then was that [Indians] should be shielded alike from their own improvidence and the spoliation of others”). But in 1934 Congress shifted the focus of its Indian policy by enacting the Indian Reorganization Act (“Reorganization Act”) that “represented a fundamental break with [the] policy” underlying Section 81 (see id.). As the 1999 Senate Report, id. (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted) went on to say:
The intent and purpose of the [Reorganization Act] was to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.... [It] seeks to get away from the bureaucratic control of the Indian Department, and it seeks further to give the Indians the control of their own affairs and of their own property.
Following passage of the Reorganization Act, administrative agencies and courts were left “with the difficult task of reconciling an 1872 statute that sought to protect Indian tribes by imposing extensive federal oversight with a 1934 Act intended to disentangle the tribes from official bureaucracy” (id. (internal citation omitted)). Fortunately Congress simplified that task in 1999 when it amended Section 81. Those amendments—which, among other changes, replaced the term “relative to” Indian lands with “encumbers” Indian lands16—“ensure[d] that Indian tribes will be able to engage in a wide array of commercial transactions without having to submit those agreements to the BIA as a precaution” (id. at 9; see also id., expressly noting that the 1999 amendment “eliminated the overly-broad scope” of Section 81).
“elimisimply, the tables have turned since 1872. Although at an earlier point courts [781]*781may have been able to use the Black-feet Tribe presumption to justify a nonliteral expansion of Section 81, certainly the most recent amendment to that statute makes clear that Congress now considers self-determination—not paternalism—to be in the Indians’ best interest. And that goal is more directly advanced by a literal rather than a nonliteral reading of Section 81.
D. Language of the Lease and Mendocino County Property
With all of that said, we turn now to the actual language of the Lease to demonstrate that under the literal present-tense reading of Section 81, it does not apply to the only lands that the United States already held in trust for the Tribe’s benefit at the time the Tribe-NGV agreement was entered into. Taking issue with our addressing the specifics of the contract, the dissent argues that this is a task best left in the first instance to the district court, particularly when “parol evidence” is involved. But our reading is based on the words of the contract itself (see n. 17), and contract interpretation has always been a matter of pure law that needs no preliminary screening by the district court. And our reference to the contract directly addresses Harrah’s argument—indeed the primary one that it has raised on appeal— that the Lease implicates the Mendocino County, California property already held in trust for the Tribe. Because it is exceedingly plain that neither the Tribe nor NGV ever contemplated that the document would extend to the Mendocino County lands, we hold that the agreement binding those two parties was valid without the Secretary’s approval.
It is of course true that the Tribe’s 44 acres in Mendocino County qualify as “Indian lands” as that term is defined by Section 81. And it is equally true that such acreage was taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of the Tribe in 1999, well before NGV and the Tribe formalized their business relationship. But the Mendocino County land issue is really a red herríng: Both the unambiguous language of the Lease and, at least as importantly, the equally unambiguous facts as to that property itself confirm that the Mendocino County lands are not at all within the purview of the parties’ transaction and were therefore not even arguably encumbered by the Lease.
Under the terms of the Lease, NGV and the Tribe partnered not to develop a casino on existing tribal land, but because the Tribe “require[d] assistance ... acquiring real property and petitioning the United States to accept title to such property in trust for the benefit of the Tribe” (emphasis added). With the Mendocino County property already in hand—and having been accepted into trust—when the parties entered into their deal, the Lease cannot fairly be read as providing (or even contemplating) that such property would or could become the eventual site of the casino. It would make no sense at all, of course, to speak of “acquiring” already-owned real property. And it must be remembered that the Mendocino County property had been acquired expressly for residential development, not for commercial development. Nothing suggests that such purpose had changed in any respect either before or at the time that NGV and the Tribe entered into their agreement.
Additional language from the Lease further supports our conclusion. According to the Lease’s “Master Definitions List,” “Trust Lands” is described as:
Property held by the United States in Trust for the benefit of the Tribe.
“Property” is in turn defined in terms of the future, not the present (emphasis added):
[782]*782The real property upon which the Structure will be constructed by Developer, which at the time of construction will be titled to the United States in trust for the benefit of the Tribe.
“Structure” is similarly defined as:
The buildings and improvements constructed and installed on the Trust Lands on which the Tribe operates the Facility.
And finally, “Facility” is defined as:
The Structure, equipped and ready for the Tribe to conduct Gaming for the public.
With that definitional chain, the Lease provision sought to be relied on by Har-rah’s cannot reasonably be read as embracing the Tribe’s acreage in Mendocino County. If that were to be done, “Property” would not be defined only in the future tense and “Structure” and “Facility” would not be defined in terms of a public gaming facility rather than private housing. In short, because the Mendocino County property was already held in trust and because it had been specifically slated'— and remained slated—for residential development, develproperty simply does not come within the provision of the Lease restricting the Tribe’s ability to alienate “Trust Lands.”17
E. Inapplicability of Section 2710
To this point we have demonstrated in a number of different ways why Section 81 is inapplicable to the situation before us. But finally we soldier on to speak far more briefly to the substantially more attenuated possibility that the parties’ agreement could somehow have violated Section 2710. As before, that inquiry begins by recourse to the plain statutory language. And by its express terms, Section 2710 pertains only to tribal ordinances or resolutions—not to a tribe’s contract with a third party—so that nothing in that statute impairs the validity of the Tribe-NGV agreement.
Under Section 2710(b)(2)(A)(emphases added) the Chairman of the Gaming Commission:
shall approve any tribal ordinance or resolution concerning the conduct, or regulation of class II gaming on the Indian lands within the tribe’s jurisdiction if such ordinance or resolution provides that—
(A) .... the Indian tribe will have the sole proprietary interest and responsibility for the conduct of any gaming activity ...
On appeal Harrah’s argues that NGV’s agreement with the Tribe violated that statute because the terms of the Lease allowed NGV to assume the dominant equity interest in the eventual gaming facility. That arrangement, it contends, is concomitant to NGV having a “sole proprietary interest” in the gaming facility.
But Section 2710’s plain language refutes that notion because Harrah’s conclusion rests on a false premise. Here there was no “tribal ordinance or resolution” (note that the statute’s implementing regulations likewise refer to “gaming ordinance or resolution adopted by a tribe ”) (see 25 C.F.R. § 522.1 (emphasis added)). That language simply does not speak to con[783]*783tracts entered into between a tribe and a third party (as contrasted with tribal legislation or regulations officially enacted by the tribe). That reading is further fortified by the sharp contrast between Section 2710 and Section 2705(a), a related statute that speaks of both “tribal ordinances or resolutions” and a specific type of contract that a tribe may enter into with a third party.18 Thus the Tribe’s agreement with NGV cannot be said to violate Section 2710 either.19
V. Conclusion
We first vacate the judgment in the Tribe’s declaratory judgment action against NGV and dismiss that action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As the Tribe’s contracts with both NGV and Har-rah’s have been rescinded, there is no “ease or controversy” at issue as between the Tribe and NGV, leaving us with no federal jurisdiction on that score.
We further hold that Section 81 requires approval by the Secretary as to only those contracts that implicate lands already held in trust by the United States for an Indian tribe. Because the contract between the Tribe and NGV did not implicate such lands, it remained valid without such approval. We further hold that the same contract also did not violate Section 2710, for that statute pertains only to tribal ordinances and resolutions, not to a tribe’s agreement with a third party. All of those things being true, we reverse the judgment in Harrah’s favor and remand for resolution of NGV’s action against Har-rah’s on the merits.
VACATED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.