Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia

30 U.S. 1, 8 L. Ed. 25, 5 Pet. 1, 1831 U.S. LEXIS 337

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: March 18, 1831
• Status: Published

Opinions

Marshall, Ch. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court. — This bill is brought by the Cherokee nation, praying an injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from the execution of certain laws of that state, which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the Cherokee as a political society, and to seize for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by the United States, in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.

If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined. A people, once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our arms, have yielded their lands, by successive treaties, each of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they retain no more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed necessary to their comfortable subsistence. To preserve this remnant, the present application is made.

Before we can look into the merits of the ease, a preliminary inqury presents itself. Has this court jurisdiction of the cause ? The third article of the constitution describes the extent of the judicial power. The second section closes an enumeration of the cases to which it is extended, with “ controversies ” “ between a state or citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.” A subsequent clause of the same section gives the supreme court original jurisdiction, in all *cases in which a state shall be a p party. The party defendant may then unquestionably be sued in *- this court. May the plaintiff sue in it ? Is the Cherokee nation a foreign state, in the sense in which that term is used in the constitution ? The counsel for the plaintiffs have maintained the affirmative of this pi’oposition with great earnestness and ability. So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been completely successful. They have been uniformly treated as a state, from the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States, recognise them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace' and war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States, by any individual of their community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly recognise the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts.

A question of much more difficulty remains. • Do the Cherokees constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution? The counsel have shown conclusively, that they are not a state of the Union, and have insisted that, individually, they are aliens, not owing allegiance to the United States. An aggregate of aliens composing a state must, they say, be a foreign state; each individual being foreign, the whole must be foreign.

This argument is imposing, but we must examine it more closely, before we yield to it. The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is, perhaps, unlike that of any other two people in existence. In general, nations not owing a common allegiance, are foreign to each other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety, applicable by either to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else. '"The Indian ter- ..¡, ritory is admitted to compose a part of the United States. In all *- our maps, geographical treatises, histories and laws, it is so considered. In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our commercial regulations, in any attempt at intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they are considered as within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, subject to many of those restraints which are imposed upon our own citizens. They acknowledge themselves, in their treaties, to be under the protection of the United States ; they admit, that the United States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs as they think proper ; and the Cherokees in particular were allowed by the treaty of Hopewell, which preceded the constitution, “ to send a deputy of their choice, whenever-they think fit, to congress.” Treaties were made with some tribes, by the state of New York, under a then unsettled construction of the confederation, by which they ceded all their lands to that state, taking back a limited grant to themselves, in which they admit their dependence. Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore unquestioned, right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government ; yet it may well be doubted, whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession, when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile, they are in a state of pupilage; their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection ; rely upon its kindness and its power ; appeal to it for relief to their wants ; and address the president as their great father. They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a jiolitical connection *181 them, would *be considered by all as an invasion of our territory J and an act of hostility. These considerations go far to support the opinion, that the framers of our constitution had not the Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the Union to controversies between a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states.

In considering this subject, the habits and usages of the Indians, in their intercourse with their white neighbors, ought not to be entirely disregarded. At the lime the constitution was framed, the idea of appealing to an American court of justice for an assertion of right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered the mind of an Indian or of his tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the government. This was well understood by the statesmen who framed the constitution of the United States, and might furnish some reason for omitting to enumerate them among the parties who might sue in the courts of the Union. Be this as it may, the peculiar relations between the United States and the Indians occupying our territory are such, that we should feel much difficulty in considering them as desig-' nated by the term foreign state, were there no other part of the constitution which might shed light on the meaning of these words. But we think that in construing them, considerable aid is furnished by that clause in the eighth section of the third article, which empowers congress to “ regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” In this clause, they are as clearly contradistinguished, by a name appropriate to themselves, from foreign nations, as from the several states composing the Union. They are designated by a distinct appellation ; and as this appellation can be applied to neither of the others, neither can the application distinguishing either of the others be, in fair construction, applied to them. The objects to which the power of regulating commerce might be directed, are divided into three distinct classes — foreign nations, the several states, and Indian tribes. When forming this article, the convention considered them as entirely distinct. We cannot assume that the distinction was lost, in framing a subsequent article, unless there be something in its language to authorize the assumption.

The counsel for the plaintiffs contend, that the words *“ Indian tribes ” were introduced into the article, empowering congress to reg- *- ulate commerce, for the purpose of removing those doubts in which the management of Indian affairs was involved by the language of the ninth article of the confederation. Intending to give the whole power of managing those affairs to the government about to be instituted, the convention conferred it explicitly ; and omitted those qualifications which embarrassed the exercise of it, as granted in the confederation. This may be admitted, without weakening the construction which has been intimated. Had the Indian tribes been foreign nations, in the view of the convention, this exclusive power of regulating intercourse with them might have been, and, most probably, would have been, specifically given, in language indicating that idea, not in language contradistinguishing them from foreign nations. Congress might have been empowered “ to regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the Indian tribes, and among the several states.”' This language would have suggested itself to statesmen who considered the Indian tribes as foreign nations, and were yet desirous of mentioning them particularly.

It has been also said, that the same words have not necessarily the same meaning attached to them, when found in different parts of the same instrument ; their meaning is controlled by the context. This is undoubtedly true. In common language, the same word has various meanings, and the peculiar sense in which it is used in any sentence, is to be determined by the context. This may not be equally true with respect to proper names. “ Foreign nations ” is a general term, the application of which to Indian tribes, when used in the American constitution, is, at best, extremely questionable. In one article, in which a power is given to be exercised in regard to foreign nations generally, and to the Indian tribes particularly, they are mentioned as separate, in terms clearly contradistinguishing them from each other. We perceive plainly, that the constitution, in this article, does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term “ foreign nations ;” not, we presume, because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States. When, afterwards, the term “ foreign state ” is introduced, we cannot impute to the convention, the intention to desert its former meaning, and to comprehend Indian tribes within it, unless the context force that ^construction on us. We find nothing in the context, and nothing in the subject of the article, which leads to it. *-

The court has bestowed its best attention on this question, and, after mature deliberation, the majority is of opinion, that an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state, in the sense of the constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United States.

A serious additional objection exists to the jurisdiction of the court. Is the' matter of the bill the proper subject for judicial inquiry and decision? It seeks to restrain a state from the forcible exercise of legislative power over a neighboring people, asserting their independence ; their right to which the state denies. On several of the matters alleged in the bill, for example, on the laws making it criminal to exercise the usual powers of self-government in their own country, by the Cherokee nation, this court cannot interpose ; at least, in the form in which those matters are presented.

That part of the bill which respects the land occupied by the Indians, and prays the aid of the court to protect their possession, may be more doubtful. The mere question of right might, perhaps, be decided by this court, in a proper case, with proper parties. But the court is asked to do more than decide on the title. The bill requires us to control the legislature of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical force. The propriety of such an interposition by the court may be well questioned ; it savors too much of the exercise of political power, to be within the proper province of the judicial department. But the opinion on the point respecting parties makes it unnecessary to decide this question.

If it be true, that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true, that, wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future. The motion for an injunction is denied.

Johnson, Justice.

— In pursuance of my practice, in giving an opinion on all constitutional questions, I must present my views on this. With the morality of the case, I have no concern ; I am called upon to consider it as a legal question.

*The object of this bill is to claim the interposition of this court, as the means of preventing the state of Georgia, or the public functionaries of the state of Georgia, from asserting certain rights and powers over the country and people of the Cherokee nation. It is not enough, in order to come before this court for relief, that a case of injury, or of cause to apprehend injury, should be made out. Besides having a cause of action, the complainant must bring himself within that description of parties, who alone are permitted, under the constitution, to bring an original suit to this court. It is essential to such suit, that a state of this Union should be a party ; so says the second member of the second section of the third article of the constitution ; the other party must, under the control of the eleventh amendment, be another state of the Union, or a foreign state. In this case, the averment is, that the complainant is a foreign state.

Two preliminary questions then present themselves : 1. Is the complainant a foreign state, in the sense of the constitution ? 2. Is the case presented in the bill one of judicial cognisance? Until these questions are disposed of, we have no right to look into the nature of the controversy any further than is necessary to determine them. The first of the questions necessarily resolves itself into two : 1. Are the Cherokees a state ? 2. Are they a foreign state ?

I. I cannot but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the applicability of the epithet “state,” to a people so low in the grade of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are. I would not here be understood as speaking of the Cherokees, under their present form of government; which certainly must be classed among the most approved forms of civil government. Whether it can be yet said to have received the consistency which entitles that people to admission into the family of nations is, I conceive, yet to be determined by the executive of these states. Until then, I must think, that we cannot recognise it as an existing state, *under any other character than that which it has maintained hitherto rS! as one of the Indian tribes or nations. L

There are great difficulties hanging over the question, whether they can be considered as states, under the judiciary article of the constitution. 1. They never have been recognised as holding sovereignty over the territory they occupy. It is in vain now to inquire into the sufficiency of the principle, that discovery gave the right of dominion over the country discovered. When the populous and civilized nations beyond the Cape of Good Hope were visited, the right of discovery was made the ground of an exclusive right to their trade, and confined to that limit. When the eastern coast of this continent, and especially the part we inhabit, was discovered, finding it occupied by a race of hunters, connected in society by scarcely a semblance of organic government, the right was extended to the absolute appropriation of the territory, the annexation of it to the domain of the discoverer.' It cannot be questioned, that the right of sovereignty, as well as soil, was notoriously asserted and exercised by the European discoverers. From that source we derive our rights, and there is not an instance of a cession of land from an Indian nation, in which the right of sovereignty is mentioned as a part of the matter ceded.

It may be suggested, that they were uniformly cessions of land, without inhabitants ; and therefore, words competent to make a cession of sovereignty were unnecessary. This, however, is not a full answer, since soil, as well as people, is the object of sovereign action, and may be ceded, with or without the sovereignty, or may be ceded, with the express stipulation that the inhabitants shall remove. In all the cessions to us from the civilized states of the old world, and of our transfers among ourselves, although of the same property, under the same circumstances, and even when occupied by these very Indians, the express cession of sovereignty is to be found. In the very treaty of Hopewell, the language or evidence of which is appealed to, as the leading proof of the existence of this supposed state, we find the commissioners of the United States expressing themselves in these terms. “ The commissioners plenipotentiary of the United States give peace to all the Cherokees, and l’eceive them into the favor and protection of the ■^'United States on the following conditions.” This is certainly the r.|:i language of sovereigns and conquerors, and not the address of equals L to equals. And again, when designating the country they are to be confined to, comprising the very territory which is the subject of this bill, they say, “ Art. 4. The boundary allotted to the Cherokees for their hunting-grounds ” shall be as therein described. Certainly, this is the language of concession on our part, not theirs ; and when the full bearing and effect of those words, “for their hunting-grounds,” is considered, it is difficult to think, that they were then regarded as a state, or even intended to be so regarded. It is clear, that it was intended to give them no other rights over the territory than what were needed by a race of hunters ; and it is not easy to see, how their advancement beyond that state of society could ever have been promoted, or, perhaps, permitted, consistently with the unquestioned rights of the states, or United States, over the territory within their limits. The pre-emptive right, and exclusive right of conquest in case of war, was never questioned to exist in the states, which circumscribed the whole or any part of the Indian grounds or territory. To have taken it from them by direct means, would have been a palpable violation of their rights. But every advance, from the huntsr-state to a more fixed state of society, must have a tendency to impair that pre-emptive right, and ultimately to destroy it altogether, both by increasing the Indian population, and by attaching them firmly to the soil. The hunter-state bore within itself the promise of vacating the territory, because when game ceased, the hunter would go elsewhere to seek it. But a more fixed state of society would amount to a permanent destruction of the hope, and, of consequence, of the beneficial character of the pre-emptive right.

But it is said, that we have extended to them the means and inducement to become agricultural and civilized. It is true : and the immediate object of that policy was so obvious, as probably to have intercepted the view of ulterior consequences. Independently of the general influence of humanity, these people were restless, warlike, and signally cruel in their irruptions, during the revolution. The policy, therefore, of enticing them to the arts of peace, and to those improvements which war might lay desolate, was obvious ; and it was wise, *to prepare them for what was probably then con- -* templated, to wit, to incorporate them in time into our respective governments ; a policy which their inveterate habits and deep-seated enmity has altogether baffled. But the project of ultimately organizing them into states, within the limits of those states which had not ceded or should not cede to the United States the jurisdiction over the Indian territory within their bounds, could not possibly have entered into the contemplation of our government. Nothing but express authority from the states could have justified such a policy, pursued with such a view.

To pursue this subject a little more categorically. If these Indians are to be called a state : then — 1. By whom are they acknowledged as such? 2. When did they become so ? 3. And what are the attributes by which they are identified with other states ?

As to the first question, it is clear, that as a state they are known to nobody on earth but ourselves, if to us : how then can they be said to be recognised as a member of the community of nations? Would any nation on earth treat with them as such ? Suppose, when they occupied the banks of the Mississippi, or the sea coast of Florida, part of which, in fact, the Seminóles now occupy, they had declared war and issued letters of marque and reprisal against us, or Great Britain, would their commissions be respected ? ' If known as a state, it is by us, and us alone ; and what are the proofs ? The treaty of Hopewell does uot even give them a name other than that of the Indians ; not even nation or state : but regards them as what they were, a band of hunters, occupying as hunting-grounds, just what territory wo chose to allot them. And almost every attribute of sovereignty is renounced by them, in that very treaty. They acknowledge themselves to be under the sole and exclusive protection of the United States. They receive the territory allotted to them as a boon, from a master or conqueror ; the right of punishing intruders into that territory is conceded, not asserted as a right; and the sole and exclusive right of regulating their trade and managing all their affairs in such manner as the government of f.TiA TTnif.ArJ Sf,a.f,A.s aha.ll thinlr rvrnr»AV ♦ nmrmnf.inrr in t.Avma f.A a. ■» United States, is yielded in the ninth article. It is true, that the twelfth article gives power to the Indians to send a deputy to congress ; but such deputy, though dignified by the name, was nothing and could be nothing but an agent, such as any other company might be represented by. It. cannot be supposed, that he was to be recognised as a minister, or to sit in the congress as a delegate. There is nothing express and nothing implied, that would clothe him with the attributes of either of these characters. As to a seat among the delegates, it could not be granted to him.

There is one consequence that would necessarily flow from the recognition of this puople as a state, which of itself must operate greatly against its admission. Where is the rule to stop ? Must every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe or nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on exclusively, be recognised as a state? Wo should, indeed, force into the family of nations, a very numerous and very heterogeneous progeny. The Catawbas, having, indeed, a few more acres than the republic of San Marino, but consisting only of eighty or an hundred polls, would then be admitted to the same dignity. They still claim independence, and actually execute their own penal laws, such as they are, even to the punishment of death ; and have recently done so. We have many ancient treaties with them; and no nation has been more distinctly recognised, as far as such recognition can operate to communicate the character of a state.

But secondly, at what time did this people acquire the character of a state ? Certainly, not by the treaty of Hopewell; for every provision of that treaty operates to strip it of its sovereign attributes ; and nothing subsequent adds anything to that treaty, except using the word nation instead of Indians. And as to that article in the treaty of Holston, and repeated in the treaty of Tellico, which guaranties to them their territory, since both those treaties refer to and confirm the treaty of Hopewell; on what principle can it be contended, that the guarantee can go further than to secure to them that right over the territory, which is conceded by the Hopewell treaty ; which interest is only that of hunting-grounds. The general policy of the *United States, which always looked to these Indian lands as a certain future acquisition, not less than the express words of the treaty of Hopewell, must so decide the question.

If they were not regarded as one of the family of nations, at the time of that treaty, even though, at that time, first subdued and stripped of the attributes of a state, it is olear, that, to be regarded now as a state, they must have resumed their rank among nations, at some subsequent period. But at what subsequent period? Certainly, by no decisive act, until they organized themselves recently into a government; and I have before remarked, that, until expressly recognised by the executive, under that form of government, we cannot recognise any change in their form of existence. Others have a right to be consulted on the adnission of new states into the national family. When this country was first appropriated or conquered by the crown of Great Britain, they certainly were not known as members of the community of nations ; and if -they had been, Great Britain, from that time, blotted them from among the race of sovereigns. From that time, Great Britain considered them as her subjects, whenever she chose to claim their allegiance ; and their country as hers, both in soil and sovereignty. All the forbearance exercised towards them was considered as voluntary, and as their trade was more valuable to her than their territory, for that reason, and not from any supposed want of right to extend her laws over them, did she abstain from doing so.

And thirdly, by what attributes is the Cherokee nation identified with other states ? The right of sovereignty was expressly assumed by Great Britain over their country, at the first taking possession of it; and has never since been recognised as in them, otherwise than as dependent upon the will of a superior. The right of legislation is, in terms, conceded to congress, by the treaty of Hopewell, whenever they choose to exercise it. And the right of soil is held by the feeble tenure of hunting-grounds, and acknowledged on all hands subject to a restriction to sell to no one but the United States, and for no use but that of Georgia. They have, in Europe, sovereign and demi-sovereign states, and states of doubtful sovereignty. # . But this state, if it be *a state, is still a grade below them all; for not to be able to alienate, without permission of the remainder-man or lord, places them in a state of feudal dependence.

However, I will enlarge no more upon this point; because I believe, in one view, and in one only, if at all, they are or may be deemed a state, though not a sovereign state, at least, while they occupy a country within our limits. Their condition is something like that of the Israelities, when inhabiting the deserts. Though without land that they can call theirs in the sense of property, their right of personal self-government has never been taken from them ; and such a form of government may exist, though the land occupied be in fact that of another. The right to expel them may exist in that other, but the alternative of departing, and retaining the right of self-government, may exist in them. And such they certainly do possess ; it has never been questioned, nor any attempt made at subjugating them as a people, or restraining their personal liberty, except as to their land and trade.

But in no sense can they be deemed a foreign state, under the judiciary article. It does seem unnecessary, on this point, to do more than put the question, whether the makers of the constitution could have intended to designate them, when using the epithets “ foreign” and “ state.” State, and foreign state, are used in contradistinction to each other. Wo had then just emerged ourselves from a situation having much stronger claims than the Indians for admission into the family of nations ; and yet we were not admitted, until we had declared ourselves no longer provinces, but states, and showed some earnestness and capacity in asserting our claim to be enfranchised. Can it then be supposed, that when using those terms, we meant to include any others than those who were admitted into the community of nations, of whom, most notoriously, the Indians were no part ?

The argument is, that they were states ; and if not states of the Union, must be foreign states. But I think it very clear, that the constitution neither speaks of them as states or foreign states, but as just as what they were, Indian tribes ; an anomaly unknown to the books that treat of states, and which the law of nations would regard as nothing more than wandering .. hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit, and *having -• neither laws nor government, beyond what is required in a savage state. The distinction is clearly made in that section which vests in congress power to regulate commerce between the United States with foreign nations, and the Indian tribes.

The language must be applied in one of three senses ; either in that of the law of nations, or of the vernacular use, or that of the constitution. In th« first, although it means any state not subject to our laws, yet it must be a state and not a hunter horde ; in the vernacular, it would not be applied to a people within our limits and at our very doors ; and in the constitution, the two epithets are used in direct contradistinction ; the latter words were unnecessary, if the first included the Indian tribes. There is no ambiguity, though taken literally ; and if they were, facts and circumstances altogether remove it.

But had 1 been sitting alone in this cause, I should have waived the consideration of personal description altogether; and put my rejection of this motion upon the nature of the claim set up, exclusively. I cannot entertain a doubt, that it is one of a political character altogether, and wholly unfit for the cognisance of a judicial tribunal. There is no possible view of the subject, that I can perceive, in which a court of justice can take jurisdiction of the questions made in the bill. The substance of its allegations may be thus set out. That the complainants have been, from time immemorial, lords of the soil they occupy. That the limits by which they hold it have been solemnly designated and secured to them by treaty, and by laws of the United States. That within those limits, they have rightfully exercised unlimited jurisdiction, passing their own laws and administering justice in their own way. That in violation of their just rights, so secured to them, the state of Georgia has passed laws, authorizing and requiring the executive and judicial powers of the state to enter their territory and put down their public functionaries. That in pursuance of those laws the functionaries of Georgia have entered their territory with an armed force, and put down all powers legislative, executive and judicial, exercised under the government of the Indians.

What does this series of allegations exhibit, but a state *oi war, and the fact of invasion ? They allege themselves to be a sovereign L independent state, and set out that another sovereign state has, by its laws, its functionaries, and its armed force, invaded their state and put down their authority. This is war, in fact ; though not being declared with the usual solemnities, it may perhaps be called war in disguise. And the contest is distinctly a contest for empire. It is not a case of meum and tuum, in the judicial, but in the political sense. Not an appeal to laws, but to force. A case in which a sovereign undertakes to assert his right upon his sovereign responsibility ; to right himself, and not to appeal to any arbiter but the sword, for the justice of his cause. If the state of Maine were to extend its laws over the province of New Brunswick, and send its magistrates to carry them into effect, it would be a parallel case. In the Nabob of Arcot's Case (3 Bro. C. C. 292 ; s. c. 1 Ves. jr. 371; 2 Ibid. 50), a case of a political character not one half so strongly marked as this, the courts of Great Britain refused to take jurisdiction, because it had its origin in treaties entered into between sovereign states : a case in which the appeal is to the sword and to Almighty justice, and not to courts of law or equity. In the exercise of sovereign right, the sovereign is sole arbiter of his own justice. The penalty of wrong is war and subjugation.

But there is still another ground, in this case, which alone would have prevented me from assuming jurisdiction ; and that is, the utter impossibility of doiug justice, at least, even-handed justice, between the parties. As to restoring the complainant to the exercise of jurisdiction, it will be seen at once, that this is no ease for the action of a court ; and as to quieting him in possession of the soil, what is the case on which the complainant would have this court to act ? Either the Cherokee nation are a foreign state, or they are not. If they are not, then they cannot come here ; and if they are, then how can we extend our jurisdiction into their country?

We are told, that we can act upon the public functionaries in the state of Georgia, without the limits of the nation. But suppose, that Georgia should file a cross-bill, as she certainly may, if we can entertain jurisdiction in this case ; and should, in her bill, claim to be put in possession of the whole Indian country ; and we should decide in her favor; how is ^ , *that decree to be carried into effect? Say, as to soil; as to jurisdicJ tion, it is not even to be considered. From the complainant’s own showing, we could not do justice between the parties. Nor must I be considered as admitting that this court could, even upon the other alternative, exercise a jurisdiction over the person, respecting lands under the jurisdiction of a foreign nation. I know of no such instance. In Penn v. Lord Baltimore, the persons were in England, and the land within the king’s dominions, though in America.

There is still another view in which this cause of action may be considered in regard to its political nature. The United States, finding themselves involved in conflicting treaties, or, at least, in two treaties respecting the same property, under which two parties assert conflicting claims ; one of the parties, putting itself upon its sovereign right, passes laws which in effect declare the laws and treaties under which the other party claims, null and void. It proceeds to carry into effect those laws, by means of physical force ; and the other party appeals to the executive department for protection. Being disappointed thex-e, the party appeals to this court, indirectly to compel the executive to pursue a course of policy, which his sense of duty, or ideas of the law, may indicate should not be pursued. That is, to declare war against a state, or to use the public force to repel the force, and resist the laws of a state, when his judgment tells him the evils to grow out of such a course may be incalculable. What these people may have a right to claim of the executive power is one thing ; whether we are to be the instruments to compel another branch of the government to make good the stipulations of treaties, is a very different question. Courts of justice are properly excluded from all considerations of policy, and therefore, are very unfit instruments to control the action of that branch of government, which may often be compelled, by the highest considerations of public policy, to withhold even the exex-cise of a positive duty.

There is then a gi-eat deal of good sense in the rule laid down in the Nabob of Arcot’s Case, to wit, that as between sovereigns, bx-eaches of treaty were not breaches of contract cognisable in '-a court of justice; independent of the general px-inciple, that for their political acts, states were not amenable to tribunals of justice.

*There is yet another view of this subject, which fox-bids our taking jux-isdiction. Thex-e is a law of the United States, which purports to make every trespass set out in the hill to be an offence cognisable in the courts of the United States. I mean the act of 1802, which makes it penal to violate the Indian territory. The infraction of this law is in effect the burden of complaint. What then, in fact, is this bill, but a bill to obtain an injunction against the commission of crimes? If their territory has been trespassed upon, against the provisions of that act, no law of Georgia could repeal that act, or justify the violation of its provisions. And the remedy lies in another court and form of action, or another branch of jurisprudénce.

I cannot take leave of the case, without one remark upon the leading argument, on which the exercise of jurisdiction here over cases occurring in the Indian country, has been claimed for the complainant; which was, that the United States, in fact, exercised jurisdiction over it, by means of this and other acts, to punish offences committed there. But this argument cannot bear the test of principle. For the jurisdiction of a country may be exercised over her citizens, wherever they are, in right of their allegiance ; as it has been in the instance'of punishing offences committed against the Indians. And also, both under the constitution and the treaty of Hopewell, the power of congress extends to regulating their trade, necessarily within their limits. But this cannot sanction the exercise of jurisdiction, beyond the policy of the acts themselves, which are altogether penal in their provisions. I vote for rejecting the motion.

Baldwin, Justice.

— As jurisdiction is the first question which must arise in every cause, I have confined my examination of this, entirely to that point, and that branch of it which relates to the capacity of the plaintiffs to ask the interposition of this court. I concur in the opinion of the court, in dismissing the bill, but not for the reasons assigned. In my opinion, there is no plaintiff in this suit; and this opinion precludes any examination into the merits of the bill, or the weight of any minor objections. My judgment stops *me at- the threshold, and forbids me to examine into ..¡, the acts complained of. *-

As the reasons for the judgment of the court seem to me more important than the judgment itself, in its effects on the peace of the country, and the condition of the complainants, and as I stand alone on one question of vital concern to both ; I must give my reasons in full. The opinion of this court is of high authority in itself ; and the judge who delivers it has a support as strong in moral influence over public opinion, as any human tribunal can impart. The judge, who stands alone in decided dissent on matters of the infinite magnitude which this case presents, must sink under the continued and unequal struggle ; unless he can fix himself by a firm hold on the constitution and laws of the countiy. He must be presumed to be in the wrong, until he proves himself to be in the right. Not shrinking even from this fearful issue, I proceed to consider the only question which I shall ever examine in relation to the rights of Indians to sue in the federal courts, until convinced of my error in my present convictions.

My view of the plaintiffs being a sovereign independent nation or foreign state, within the meaning of the constitution, applies to all the tribes with whom the United States have held treaties; for if one is a foreign nation or state, all others, in like condition, must be so, in their aggregate capacity ; and each of their subjects or citizens, aliens, capable of suing in the circuit courts. This .case, then, is the case of the countless tribes, who occupy tracts of our vast domain ; who, in their collective and individual characters, as states or aliens, will rush to the-federal courts, in endless controversies, growing out of the laws of the states or of congress.

In the spirit of the maxim obsta principiis, I shall first proceed to the consideration of the proceedings of the old congress, from the commencement of the revolution up to the adoption of the constitution ; so as to ascertain whether the Indians were considered and treated with, as tribes of savages, or independent nations, foreign states, on an equality with any other foreign state or nation; and whether Indian affairs were viewed as those of foreign nations, and in connection with this view, refer to the acts of the federal government on the same subject.

*In 1781 (1 Laws U. S. 586), a department for foreign affairs was established, to whieh was intrusted all correspondence and communication with the ministers or other officers of foreign powers, to be carried on through that office ; also with the governors and presidents of the several states ; and to receive the applications of all foreigners, letters of' sovereign powers, plans of treaties, conventions, See,., and other acts of congress relative to the department of foreign affairs ; and all communications, as well to as from the United States in congress assembled, were to be made through the secretary, and all papers on the subject of foreign affairs to be addressed to him. The same department was established under the present constitution in 1789, and with the same exclusive control over all the foreign concerns of this government with foreign states or princes. (2 Laws U. S. 6, 7.) In July 1775, congress established a department of Indian affairs, to be conducted under the superintendence of commissioners. (1 Ibid. 597.) By the ordinance of August 1786, for the regulation of Indian affairs, they were placed under the control of the war department (Ibid. 614) ; continued there by the act of August 1789 (2 Ibid. 32, 33), under whose direction they have ever since remained. • It is clear, then, that neither the old nor new government did ever consider Indian affairs, the regulation of our intercourse or treaties with them, as forming any part of our foreign affairs or concerns with foreign nations, states or princes.

I will next inquire, how the Indians were considered ; whether as independent nations, or tribes with whom our intercourse must be regulated by the law of circumstances. In this examination, it will be found, that different words have been applied to them in treaties and resolutions of congress ; nations, tribes, hordes, savages, chiefs, sachems and warriors of the Cherokees, for instance, or the Cherokee nation. I shall not stop to inquire into the effect which á name or title can give to a resolve of congress, a treaty or convention with the Indians, but into the substance of the thing done, and the subject-matter acted on ; believing it requires no reasoning to prove, that the omission of the words prince, state, sovereignty or nation, cannot divest a contracting party of these ^national attributes, which are •* inherent in sovereign power pre- and self-existing, or confer them, by their use, where all the substantial requisites of sovereignty are wanting.

The proceedings of the old congress will be found in 1 Laws U. S. 597, commencing 1st June 1775, and ending 1st September 1788, of which some extracts will be given. 30th June 1775 : “ Resolved, that the committee for Indian affairs do prepare proper talks to the several tribes of Indians ; as the Indians depend on the colonists for arms, ammunition and clothing, which are become necessary for their subsistence.” “ That the commissioners have power to treat with the Indians ;” “ to take to their assistance gentlemen of influence among the Indians.” “ To preserve the confidence and friendship of the Indians, and prevent their suffering for want of the necessaries of life, 40,000i. sterling of Indian goods be imported.”' “ No person shall be permitted to trade with the Indians, without a license “ traders shall sell their goods at reasonable prices ; allow them to the Indians for their skins, and take no advantage of their distress and intemperance ;” “the trade to be only at posts designated by the commissioners.” Specimens of the kind of intercourse between the congress and deputations of Indians may be seen in pages 602 and 603. They need no incorporation into a judicial opinion.

In 1782, a committee of congress-report, that all the lands belonging to the Six Nations of Indians have been in due form put under the crown, as appendant to the government of New York, so far as respects jurisdiction only ; that that colony has borne the burden of protecting and supporting the Six Nations of Indians, and their tributaries, for one hundred years, as the dependents and allies of that government; that the crown of England has always considered and treated the country of the Six Nations as one appendant to the government of New York ; that they have been so recognised and admitted, by their public acts, by Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia; that by accepting this cession, the jurisdiction of the whole western territory, belonging to the Six Nations and their tributaries, will be vested in the United States, greatly to the advantage of the Union (p. 606). The cession alluded to is the *one r¡j¡ from New York, March 1st, 1781, of the soil and jurisdiction of all L 0 the land in their charter, west of the present boundary of Pennsylvania (1 Laws of U. S. 471), which was executed in congress and accepted.

This makes it necessary to break in on the historical trace of our Indian affairs, and follow up this subject to the adoption of the constitution. The cession from Virginia in 1784 was of soil and jurisdiction. So, from Massachusetts in 1785, from Connecticut in 1800, from South Carolina in 1787, from Georgia in 1802. North Carolina made a partial cession of land, but a full one of her sovereignty and jurisdiction of all without her present limits in 1789. (2 Laws U. S. 85.) Some states made reservations of lands to a small amount, hut, by the terms of the cession, new states were to be formed within the ceded boundaries, to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states ; of course, not shorn of their powers of sovereignty and jurisdiction, within the boundaries assigned by congress to the new states. In this spirit, congress passed the celebrated ordinance of July 1787, by which they assumed the government of the north-western territory, paying no regard to Indian jurisdiction, sovereignty, or their political rights, except providing for their protection ; authorizing the adoption of laws “ which, for the prevention of crimes and injuries, shall have force in all parts of the district; and for the execution of process, civil and criminal, the governor has power to make proper division thereof.” (1 Laws U. S. 477.) By the fourth article, the said territory, and the states which may bo formed therein, shall for ever remain a part of this confederacy of the United States ; subject to the articles of confederation, alterations constitutionally made, the acts and ordinances of congress. This shows the clear meaning and understanding of all the ceding states, and of congress, in accepting the cession of their western lands, up to the time of the adoption of the constitution. The application of these acts to the provisions of the constitution will be considered hereafter. A few more references to the proceedings of the old congress, in relation to the Indian nations, will close this view of the ease.

*In 1782, a committee, to whom was referred a letter from the secretary at war, reported, “ that they have had a conference with the two deputies from the Catawba nation of Indians ; that their mission respects certain tracts of land reserved for their use, in the state of South Carolina, which they wish may be so secured to their tribe, as not to be intruded into by force, nor alienated even with their own consent: — Whereupon, resolved, that it be recommended to the legislature of South Carolina to take such measures for the satisfaction and security of the said tribe, as the said legislature shall in their wisdom think fit.” (1 Laws U. S. 067.) After this, the Catawbas cannot well be considered an independent nation or foreign state. In September 1783, shortly after the preliminary, treaty of peace, congress, exercising the powers of acknowledged independence and sovereignty, issued a proclamation, beginning in these words : “ whereas, by the ninth of the articles of confederation, it is, among other things, declared, that the United States in congress assembled, have the solo and exclusive right and power of regulating the trade, and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of every state, within its own limits be not infringed or violated prohibiting settlements on lands inhabited or claimed by Indians, without the limits or jurisdiction of any particular state, and from purchasing or receiving gifts of land, without the express authority and directions of the United States in congress assembled. Conventions were to be held with the Indians in the northern and middle departments, for the purpose of receiving them into the favor and protection of the United States, and of establishing boundary lines of property, for separating and dividing the settlements of the citizens from the Indian villages and hunting-grounds, &c. “ Resolved, that the preceding measures of congress, relative to Indian affairs, shall not be construed to affect the territorial claims of any of the states, or their legislative rights, within their respective limits. Resolved, that it will be wise and necessary, to erect a district of the western territory into a distinct government, and that a committee be appointed to prepare a plan for a temporary government, until the ^ , inhabitants shall form a permanent constitution *for themselves, and -* as citizens of a free, sovereign and independent state, be admitted to a representation in the Union.” In 1786, a general ordinance was passed for the regulation of Indian affairs under the authority of the ninth article of the confederation, which throws much light on our relations with them (page 614). It closes with a direction, that in all cases where transactions with any nation or tribe of Indians shall become necessary for the purposes of the ordinance, which cannot be done without interfering with the legislative rights of a state, the superintendent within whose district the same shall happen, shall act in conjunction with the authority of such state. After accepting the cessions of the soil and jurisdiction of the western territory, and resolving to form a temporary government, and create new, free, sovereign apd independent states, congress resolved, in March 1785, to hold a treaty with the western Indians. They gave instructions to the commissioners, in strict conformity with their preceding resolutions, both of which were wholly incompatible with the national or sovereign character of the Indians with whom they were about to treat. They will be found in pages Oil, &c., and need not be particularized.

I now proceed to the instructions which preceded the treaty of Hopewell with the complainants, the treaty, and the consequent proceedings of congress. On the 15th March 1785, commissioners were appointed to treat with the Cherokees and other Indians, southward of them, within the limits of the United States, or who have been at war with them, for the purpose of making peace with them, and of receiving them into the favor and protection of the United States, &c. They were instructed to demand that all prisoners, negroes and other property, taken during the war, be given up ; to inform the Indians of the great occurrences of the last war ; of the extent of country relinquished by the late treaty of peace with Great Britain ; to give notice to the governors of Virginia, North and South Carolina and Georgia, that they may attend, if they think proper; and were authorized to expend $4000 in making presents to the Indians ; a matter well understood in making Indian treaties, but unknown, at least, in our treaties with foreign nations, princes *or states, unless on the Barbary coast. A treaty was accordingly made, in November following, between the commissioners L plenipotentiaries of the United States, of the one part, and the head-men and warriors of all the Cherokees, of the other. The word nation is not used in the preamble, nor any part of the treaty, so that we are left to infer the capacity in which the Cherokees contracted, whether as an independent nation, or foreign state, or a tribe of Indians, from the terms of the treaty, its stipulations and conditions. “ The Indians, for themselves and their respective tribes and towns, do acknowledge all the Cherokees to be under the protection of the United States.” (Art. 3, 1 Laws U. S. 322.) “ The boundary allotted to the Cherokees for their hunting-grounds between the said Indians and the citizens of the United States, within the limits of the United States, is and shall be the following,” viz. (as defined in Art. 4.) “ For the benefit and comfort of the Indians, and for the prevention of injuries and aggressions on the part of the citizens or Indians, the United States, in congress assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their affairs in such manner as they shall think proper.” (Art. 9.) “ That the Indians may have full confidence in the justice of the United States respecting their interests, they shall have the right to send a deputy of their choice, whenever they think fit, to congress.” (Art. 12.)

This treaty is, in the beginning, called “ article :” the word “ ti’eaty ” is only to be found in the concluding line, where it is called “this definitive treaty.” But article or treaty, its nature does not depend upon the name given it. It is not negotiated between ministers on both sides, representing their nations ; the stipulations are wholly inconsistent with sovereignty ; the Indians acknowledge their dependent character; hold the lands they occupy as an allotment of hunting-grounds; give to congress the exclusive right of regulating their trade, and managing all their affairs, as they may think proper. So it was understood by congress, as declared by them in their proclamation of 1st September l^S (1 U. S. Laws 619), and so understood at the adoption of the constitution.

*The meaning of the words “ deputy to congress ” in the twelfth article, may be as a person having a right to sit in that body, as, at that time, it was composed of. delegates or deputies from the states, not as at present, representatives of the people of the states; or it may be as an agent or minister. But if the former was the meaning of the parties, it is conclusive to show, that he was not and could not be the deputy of a foreign state, wholly separated from the Union. If he sat in congress as a deputy from any state, it must be one having a political connection with, and within the jurisdiction of, the confederacy; if as a diplomatic agent, he could not represent an independent or sovereign nation, for all such have an unquestioned right to send such agents, when and where they please. The securing the right, by an express stipulation of the treaty ; the declared objects in conferring the right, especially, when connected with the ninth article ; show beyond a doubt, it was not to represent a foreign state or nation, or one to whom the least vestige of independence or sovereignty as to the United States appertained. There can be no dependence so anti-national, or so utterly subversive, of national existence, as transferring to a foreign government the regulation of its trade, and the management of all their affairs, at their pleasure. The nation or state, tribe or village, headmen or warriors of the Cherokees, call them by what name we please ; call the articles they have signed a definitive treaty, or an indenture of servitude ; they are not, by its force or virtue, a foreign state, capable of calling into legitimate action the judicial power of this Union, by the exercise of the original jurisdiction of this court, against a sovereign state, a component part of this nation. Unless the constitution has imparted to the Cherokees a national character, never recognised under the confederation; and which, if they ever enjoyed, was surrendered by the treaty of Hopewell; they cannot be deemed, in this court, plaintiffs in such a case as this.

In considering the bearing of the constitution on their rights, it must be borne in mind, that a majority of the states represented in the convention had ceded to the United States the soil and jurisdiction of their western lands, or claimed it to be remaining in themselves ; that congress asserted, as to the ceded, and the states, as to the unceded territory, their right to the # , soil absolutely, and the dominion in full sovereignty, *within their ' respective limits, subject only fo Indian occupancy, not as foreign states or nations, but as dependent on, and appendant to the state governments ; that before the convention acted, congress had erected a government in. the north-western territory, containing numerous and powerful nations or tribes of Indians, whose jurisdiction was contemned, and whose sovereignty was overturned, if it ever existed, except by permission of the states or congress, by ordaining, that the territorial laws should extend over the whole district; and directing divisions for the execution of civil and criminal process in every part; that the Cherokees were then dependents, having given up all their affairs to the regulation and management of congress, and that all the regulations of congress over Indian affairs, were then in force over an immense territory, under a solemn pledge to the inhabitants, that whenever their population and circumstances would admit, they should form constitutions, and become free, sovereign and independent states, on equal footing with the old compenent members of the confederation ; that by the existing regulations and treaties, the Indian tenure to their land was their allotment as hunting-grounds, without the power of alienation, that the right of occupancy was not individual, that the Indians were forbidden all trade or intercourse with any person, not licensed, or at a post not designated by regulation ; that Indian affairs formed no part of the foreign concerns of the government, and that though they were permitted to regulate their internal affairs in their own way, it was not by any inherent right, acknowledged by congress or reserved by treaty, but because congress did not think proper to exercise the sole and exclusive right, declared and asserted in all their regulations from 1775 to 1788, in the articles of confederation, in the ordinance of 1787, and the proclamation of 1788 ; which the plaintiffs solemnly recognised and expressly granted by the treaty of Hopewell, in 1785, as conferred on congress, to be exercised as they should think proper.

To correctly understand the constitution, then, we must read it with reference to this well-known existing state of our relations with the Indians; the United States asserting the right of soil, sovereignty and jurisdiction, in full dominion ; the Indians, occupancy of allotted hunting-grounds.

We can thus expound the constitution, without a reference *to the definitions of a state or nation by any foreign writer, hypothetical L reasoning, or the dissertations of the Federalist. This would be to substitute individual authority in place of the declared will of the sovereign power of the Union, in a written fundamental law. Whether it is the emanation from the people or the states, is a moot question, having no bearing on the supremacy of that supreme law which, from a proper source, has rightfully been imposed on us by sovereign power. Where its terms are plain, I should, as a dissenting judge, deem it judicial sacrilege to put my hands on any of its provisions, and arrange or construe them according to any fancied use, object, purpose or motive, which, by an ingenious train of reasoning I might bring my mind to believe was the reason for its adoption by the sovereign power, from whose hands it comes to me as the rule and guide to my faith, my reason and judicial oath. In taking out, putting in, or varying the plain meaning of a word or expression, to meet the results of my poor judgment, as to the meaning and intention of the great charter, which alone imparts to me my power to act as a judge of its supreme injunctions, I should feel myself acting upon it by judicial amendments, and not as one of its executors. I will not add unto these things ; I will not take away from the words of this book of prophecy; I will not impair the force or obligation of its enactments, plain and unqualified in its terms, by resorting to the authority of names ; the decisions of foreign courts ; or a reference to books or writers. The plain ordinances are a safe guide to my judgment. When they admit of doubt, I will connect the words with the practice,' usages and settled principles of this government, as administered by its fathers, before the adoption of the constitution ; and refer to the received •opinion and fixed understanding of the high parties who adopted it; the usage and practice of the new government, acting under its authority ; and the solemn decisions of this court, acting under its high powers and responsibility ; nothing fearing, that in so doing, I can discover some sound and safe maxims of American policy and jurisprudence, which will always afford me light enough to decide on the constitutional powers of the federal and state governments, and all tribunals acting under their authority. They will, at . , least, enable me to judge of the true meaning and *spirit of plain •* words, put into the forms of constitutional provisions, which this court, in the great case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, say, “ is to be collected chiefly from its words. It would be dangerous in the extreme, to infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation. Where words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of an instrument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent, unless the natural and common import of words be varied, constructions become necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning of words is justifiable.” But the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, must be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application. 4 Wheat. 202-3. In another great case, Cohens v. Virginia, this court say, “the jurisdiction of this court then, being extended, by the letter of the constitution, to all cases arising under it, or under the laws of the United States, it follows, that those who would withdraw any case Of this description from that jurisdiction, must sustain the exemption they claim, on the spirit and true meaning of the constitution, which spirit and true meaning must be so apparent as to overrule the words which its framers have employed.” 0 Wheat. 379-80. The principle of these cases is my guide in this. Sitting here, I shall always bow to such authority ; and require no admonition to be influenced by no other, in a case where I am called on to take a part in the exercise of the judicial power over a sovereign state.

Guided by these principles, I come to consider the third clause of the second section of the first article of the constitution ; which provides for the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes “ among the several states-which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, excluding Indians not taxed.” This clause embraces not only the old but the new states to bo formed out of the territory of the United States, pursuant to the resolutions and ordinances of the old congress, and the conditions of the cession from the states, or which might arise by the division of the old. If the clause excluding Indians not taxed had not been inserted, or should be stricken out, the whole free Indian ''"population of all the states would bo included in the federal numbers, co-exten*43] sively with the boundaries of all the states included in this Union. The insertion of this clause conveys a clear definite declaration, that there were no independent sovereign nations or states, foreign or domestic, within their boundaries, which should exclude them from the federal enumeration, or any bodies or communities within the states, excluded from the action of the federal constitution, unless by the use of express words of exclusion. The delegates who represented the states in the convention well knew the existing relations between the United States and the Indians, and put the constitution in a shape for adoption, calculated to meet them ; and the words used in this clause exclude the existence of the plaintiffs as a sovereign or foreign state or nation, within the meaning of this section, too plainly to require illustration or argument.

The third clause of the eighth article shows most distinctly the sense of the convention in authorizing congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. The character of the Indian communities'had been settled by many years of uniform usuage, under the old government; characterized by the names of nations, towns, villages, tribes, head-men and warriors, as the writers of resolutions or treaties might fancy ; governed by no settled rule, and applying the word nation to the Catawbas as well as the Cberokees. The framers of the constitution have thought proper to define their meaning to bo, that they were not foreign nations nor states of the Union, but Indian tribes ; thus declaring the sense in which they should be considered, under the constitution, which refers to them as tribes only, in this clause. I cannot strike these words from the book ; nor construe Indian tribes, in this part of the constitution, to mean a sovereign state, under the first clause of the second section of the third article. It would be taking very great liberty, in the exposition of a fundamental law, to bring the Indians under the action of the legislative power as tribes, and of the judicial, as foreign states. The power conferred to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, is the same given to the old congress, by the ninth article, of the old confederation, “ to regulate trade with the Indians.” The raising the word “ trade ” to the dignity of commerce, '“regulating it r4 4 with Indians or Indian tribes, is only a change of words. Mere L phraseology cannot make Indians nations, nor Indian tribes, foreign states.

The second clause of the third section of the fourth article of the constitution is equally convincing. “ The congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful regulations and rules respecting, the territory of the United States.” What that territory was, the rights of soil, jurisdiction and sovereignty claimed and exercised by the states and the old congress, has been already seen. It extended to the formation of a government whose laws and process were in force within its whole extent, without a saving of Indian jurisdiction. It is the same power which was delegated to the old congress, and according to the judicial interpretation given by this court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 209, the word “to regulate” implied, in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated ; it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. Applying this construction to commerce and territory, leaves the jurisdiction and sovereignty of theTndian tribes wholly out of the question. The power given in this clause is of the most plenary kind. Rules and regulations respecting the.territory of the United States — they necessarily include complete jurisdiction. It was necessary to confer it, without limitation, to enable the new government to redeem the pledge given by the old, in relation to the formation and powers of the new states. The saving of “the claims” of “ any particular states,” is almost a copy of a similar provision, part of the ninth article of the old confederation ; thus delivering over to the new congress the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, and regulate the territory they occupied, as the old had done, from the beginning of the revolution.

The only remaining clause of the constitution to be considered Is the second clause in the sixth article. “All treaties made, or to be made, shall be the supreme law of the land.” In Chirac v. Chirac, this court declared, that it was unnecessary to inquire into the effect of the treaty with France in 1778, under the old confederation, because the confederation had yielded to our present constitution, and this treaty had been the supreme law of the land. 2 Wheat. 271. I *consider the same rule as applicable to Indian -* treaties, whether considered as national compacts between sovereign powers, or as articles, agreements, contracts, or stipulations on the 'part of this government, binding and pledging the faith of the nation to the faithful observance of its conditions. They secure to the Indians the enjoyment of the rights they stipulate to give or secure, to their full extent, and in the plenitude of good faith ; but the treaties must be considered as the rules of reciprocal obligations. The Indians must have their rights; but must claim them in that capacity in which they received the grant or guarantee. They contracted, by putting themselves under the protection of the United States, accepted of an allotment of hunting-grounds, surrendered and delegated to congress the exclusive regulation of their trade, and the management of all their own affairs, taking no assurance of their continued sovereignty, if they had any before, but relying on the assurance of the United States that they might have full confidence in tbeir justice respecting their interests ; stipulating only for the right of sending a deputy of their own choice to congress. If, then, the Indians claim admission to this court, under the treaty of Hopewell, they cannot be admitted as foreign states, and can be received in no other capacity.

The legislation of congress under the constitution, in relation to the Indians, has been in the same spirit, and guided by the same principles, which prevailed in the old congress, and under the old confederation. In order to give full effect to the ordinance of 1787, in the north-west territory, it was adapted to the present constitution of the United States in 1789 (l U. S. Stat. 50) ; applied as the rule for its government to the territory south of the Ohio in 1790, except the sixth article (Ibid. 128) ; to the Mississippi territory in 1798 (Ibid. 549) ; and with no exception, to Indiana in 1800 (2 Ibid. 58) ; to Michigan in 1805 (Ibid. 809) ; to Illinois in 1809 (Ibid. 514).

In 1802, congress passed the act regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, in which they assert all the rights exercised over them under the old confederation, and do not alter in any degree their political relations. (2 U. S. Stat. 139.) In the same year, Georgia ceded her lands * -, west of her present boundary to the United States; and by the *sec- -■ ond article of the convention, the United States ceded to Georgia whatever claim, right or title they may have to the jurisdiction or soil of any lands south of Tennessee, North or South Carolina and east of the line of the cession by Georgia. So that Georgia now has all the rights attached to her by her sovereignty, within her limits, and which are saved to her by the second section of the fourth article of the constitution, and all the United States could cede either by their power over the territory, or their treaties with the Cherokees.

The treaty with the Cherokees, made at Holston, in 1791, contains only one article which has a bearing on the political relations of the contracting parties. In the second article, the Cherokees stipulate “ that the said Cherokee nation will not hold any treaty with any foreign power, individual state, or with individuals of any state.” (7 U S. Stat. 39.) This affords an instructive definition of the words nation and treaty. At the treaty of Hopewell, the Cherokees, though subdued and suing for peace, before divesting themselves of any of the rights or attributes of sovereignty which this government ever recognised them as possessing by the consummation of the treaty, contracted in the name of the head-men and,warriors of all the Clierokees ; but at Holston, in 1791, in abandoning their last remnant of political right, contracted as the Cherokee nation, thus ascending in title as they descended in power, and applying the word treaty to a contract with an individual: this consideration will divest words of their magic.

In thus testing the rights of the complainants as to their national character, by the old confederation, resolutions and ordinances of the old congress, the provisions of the constitution, treaties held under the authority of both, and the subsequent legislation thereon, I have followed the rule laid down for my guide by this court, in Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 307, in doing it “ according to the principles established by the political department of the government.” “If the course of the nation has been a plain one, its courts would hesitate to pronounce it erroneous. However individual judges may construe them (treaties), it is the province of’ the court to conform its decisions to the will of the legislature, if that will has been clearly expressed.” That the existence of foreign states cannot be known to this court judicially, except by some *act or recognition of the other departments of this h government is, I think, fully established in the case of United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 634-5; The Divina Pastora, 4 Ibid. 63; and The Anna, 6 Ibid. 193.

I shall resort to the same high authority as the basis of my opinion on the powers of the state governments. “ By the revolution, the duties as well as the powers of government devolved on the people of (Georgia) New Hampshire. It is admitted, that among the latter were comprehended the transcendent powers of parliament, as well as those of the executive department.” Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 651; 4 Ibid. 192; Green v. Biddle, 8 Ibid. 98 ; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Ibid. 254, &c. “ The same principle applies, though with no greater force, to the different states of America ; for though they form a confederated government, yet the several states retain their individual sovereignties, and with respect to their municipal regulations, are to each other foreign.” Buckner v. Findley, 2 Pet. 591. The powers of government, which thus devolved on Georgia by the revolution, over her whole territory, are unimpaired by any surrender of her territorial jurisdiction, by the old confederation or the new constitution, as' there was in both an express saving, as well as by the tenth article of amendments.

But if any passed'to the United States by either, they were retroceded by the convention of 1802. Her jurisdiction over the territory in question is as supreme as that of congress, over what the nation has acquired by cession from the states, or treaties with foreign powers, combining the rights of the state and general government. Within her boundaries, there can be no other nation, community or sovereign power, which this department can judicially recognise as a foreign state, capable of demanding or claiming our interposition, so as to enable them to exercise a jurisdiction incompatible with a sovereignty in Georgia, which has been recognised by the constitution, and every department of this government acting under its authority. Foreign states cannot be created by judicial construction; Indian sovereignty cannot be roused from its long slumber, and awakened to action by our fiat. I find no acknowledgment of it by the legislative or *.g-, executive power. *Until they have done so, I can stretch forth no J arm for their relief, without violating the constitution. I say this with great deference to those from whom I dissent; but my judgment tells me, I have no power to act, and imperious duty compels me to stop at the portal, unless I can find some authority in the judgments of this court, to which I may surrender my own.

Indians have rights of occupancy to their lands, as sacred as the fee-simple, absolute title of the whites ; but they are only rights of occupancy, incapable of alienation, or being held by any other than common right, without permission from the government. 8 Wheat. 592. In Fletcher v. Peck, this court decided, that the Indian occupancy was not absolutely repugnant to a seisin in fee in Georgia ; that she had good right to grant land so occupied ; that it was within the state, and could be held by purchasers under a law, subject only to extinguishment of the Indian title. 6 Cranch 88, 142 ; 9 Ibid. 11. In the case of Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 548, 571, the nature of the Indian title to lands on this continent, throughout its whole extent, was most ably and elaborately considered ; leading to conclusions satisfactory to every jurist, clearly establishing that, from the time of discovery under the royal government, the colonies, the states, the confederacy and this Union, their tenure was the same occupancy, their rights occupancy, and nothing more; that the ultimate absolute fee, jurisdiction and sovereignty was in the government, subject only to such rights ; that grants vested soil and dominion, and the powers of government, whether the land granted was vacant or occupied by Indians.

By the treaty of peace, the powers of government, and the rights of soil, which had previously been in Great Britain, passed definitively to these states. 8 Wheat. 584. They asserted these rights, and ceded soil and jurisdiction to the United States. The Indians were considered as tribes of fierce savages ; a people with whom it was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct society. They are not named or referred to in any part of the opinion of the court, as nations or states, and nowhere declared to have any national capacity or attributes of sovereignty, in their *, g-i ^relations to the general or state governments. The principles estabJ lished in this case have been supposed to apply to the rights which the nations of Europe claimed to acquire by discovery, as only relative between themselves, and that they did not assume thereby any rights of soil or jurisdiction over the territory in the actual occupation of the Indians. But the language of the court is too explicit to be misunderstood. “ This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects or by whose authority it was made, against all other European gov¹ ernments, which title might be consummated by possession.” Those relations which wore to subsist between the discoverer and the natives wore to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power'could interpose between them.

While the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves ; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in the possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian rights of occupancy. The history of America, from its discovery to the present day proves, we think, the universal reeog nition of these principles. 8 Wheat. 574. I feel it my duty, to apply them to this case. They are in perfect accordance with those on which the governments of the united and individual states have acted in all their changes ; they were asserted and maintained by the colonies, before they assumed independence. While dependent themselves on the crown, they exercised all the rights of dominion and sovereignty over the territory occupied by the Indians ; and this is the first assertion by them of rights as a foreign state, within the limits of a state. If their jurisdiction within their boundaries has been unquestioned, until this controversy; if rights have been exercised, which are directly repugnant to those now claimed ; the judicial power cannot divest the states of rights of sovereignty, and transfer them to the Indians, by decreeing them to be a nation, or foreign state, pre-existing and with rightful jurisdiction and sovereignty over the territory they occupy. This would reverse every principle on which our government have acted for fifty-five years; and force, by *mere judicial power, upon the other departments of this government, and the states of this ' Union, the recognition of the existence of nations and states, within the limits of both, possessing dominion and jurisdiction paramount to the federal and state constitutions. It will be a declaration, in my deliberate judgment, that the sovereign power of the people of the United States and Union must hereafter remain incapable of action over territory to which their rights in full dominion have been asserted with the most rigorous authority, and bow to a jurisdiction hitherto unknown ; unacknowledged by any department of the government; denied by all, through all time; unclaimed till now ; and now declared to have been called into exercise, not by any change in our constitution, the laws of the Union or the states ; but pre-existent and paramount over the supreme law of the land.

I disclaim the assumption of a judicial power so awfully responsible. No assurance or certainty of support in public opinion can induce me to disregard a law so supreme ; so plain to my judgment and reason. Those who have brought public opinion to bear on this subject, act under a mere moral responsibility ; under no oath, which binds their movements to the straight and narrow line drawn by the constitution. Politics or philanthropy may impel' them to pass it; but when their objects can be effectuated only by this court, they must not expect its members to diverge from it, when they cannot conscientiously take the first step, without breaking all the high obligations under which they administer the judicial power of the constitution. The account of my executorship cannot be settled before the court of public opinion, or any human tribunal. None can release the balance which will accrue by the violation of my solemn conviction of duty.