Marshall, Ch. J.
delivered the opinion of the court as follows:
This suit having been originally' instituted, in the .court of Kentucky'; for the1 purpose ,of obtaining a conveyance for lands lying in the state of Ohio, an objection is made by the plaintiff in error, who was tlie
defendant below, to the jurisdiction of the court by which the decree was renaefed.
into vievr the character of the suit in chancery brought' to establish á prior title originating under the land law of Virginia against a person claiming under a senior patent, considering it as a substitute for a
caveat
introduced .by the peculiar circumstances attend-' ing those titles, this court is of opinion, that there is much reason for considering it as a local action, and for confining it to the court sitting within the state in which the lands lie. Was this cause, therefore, to be. considered as involving a naked question of title, was it, for example, a contest between Watts and Powell, the jurisdiction of the circuit court of Kentucky would not be sustained; But Where the question changes its character, where the defendant in the original action is liable to the plaintiff, either' in consequence of contract, or as trustee, or .a*, tiie holder of a legal title acquired by any species oi
mala fides
practised on the plaintiff, the principles of equity give a court jurisdiction wherever the person may be found, and the circumstance* that a question of. title may be involved in the inquiry, and may even constitute the essential point on which the case depends, does not seem sufficient to arrest thatjurisdiction.
In the celebrated case of
Penn
v.
Lord Baltimore,
the Chancellor of England decreed a specific performance of a contract respecting lands lying in North America. The objection to the jurisdiction of the court, in that case, as reported by Vezey, was not that the lands lay without the jurisdiction of the court, but that, in cases, relating to boundaries between provinces, the jurisdiction was exclusively in ,the king and-council. Tt is in reference to this objection, not to an objection that the lands were without his jurisdiction, that the chancellor says, ‘f This court, therefore, has no 'original jurisdiction on the direct question of the original right of boundaries.” The reason why it had no original jurisdiction on this direct question was, that the decision on the extant of those grants, including dominion and political power, as well
as property, was exclusively reserved to the king in council.
In a subsequent (part of the opinion, where he treats of the objection to the jurisdiction of the court, arising from its inability to enforce its. decree
in rem,
he allows no> weight to that argument. The strict primary decree of a court of equity is, he says,
in
personam, and may be enforced in all cases where the person is within its jurisdiction.- In confirmation of this position he cites the practice of the courts to decree respecting lands lying in Ireland and in the colonies, if the person, agamst whom tne decree was prayed, be found in England.
In the case of
Arglasse
v. Muschamp, 1
Vernon,
Pa. the defendant, residing in England, having fraudulently obtained a rent charge on lands lying in Ireland, a bill was brought in England to set it aside. To an objection made to the jurisdiction of the court the chancellor replied, u This is surely only a jest put upon the jurisdiction of this court by the commpn lawyers; for when you go about to bind the lands and grant a sequestration to execute a decree, then they readily tell you that the authority of this court is only to regulate a man’s conscience, and ought not to affect the estate, but that this court must
agere in personam
only; and when, as in this case, you prosecute the person for a fraud, they tell you that you must not intermeddle here, because, the fraud, though committed here, concerns lands that lie in Ireland, which makes the jurisdiction local, and so wholly elude the jurisdiction of this court.” The chancellor,, in that case, sustained his jurisdiction .on principle, and on the authority of
Archer
and
Preston,
in which case a contract made respecting lands in Ireland, the title to which depended on the act of settlement,v was enforced in England, although the defendant was a resident of Ireland, and had only made a casual visit to England. On a rehearing before Lord Keeper North this decree was affirmed.
In the case of
The Earl of Kildare
v.
Sir Morrice
Eustace and
Fitzgerald,
1 Vern.
419. it was determined that if the trustee .live in England^ the chancellor may- enforce the trust, although the lands lie in Ireland.
In the case of
Toller
v. Carteret, 2
Vern.
494. a bill wás sustained'for the foreclosure of a mortgage of lands lying dot of the jurisdiction of the court, the person of the mortgagor being wkhin it.
Subsequent to these decisions wás the case of
Penn
against
Lord
Baltimore, 1
Vez. 444.
in which the specific performance of a contract tor lands lying m North America was decreed in England.
Upon the authority of these cases, ahd of others which are to be found in the books, as well as upon general principles, 'this court is'of opinion that, in a case of fraud, of trust, or of contract, the jurisdiction of a court of chancery, is sustainable wherever'-the person be found, although lands not within the jurisdiction of that court may 'be affected by the decree.
The inquiry, therefore,-will be, whether this be an , unmixed. question of title, or
a
case of fraud, trust or contract!
Thé'facts in this case, so far as they affect the question of jurisdiction, are, that, in 1787, the land warrant, of which Watts is.now the proprietor, and which fhen'belonged to, Oneal, was placed without any special contract, in the hands of Massie, as a. common locator of lands.. - In the month of August in the same year h¿ lócáted 1,000 acrés, part .of* this warrant, to adjoin a previous location made on the same day for Robert Powell.
In the year 1793 Massie, as deputy-surveyor, surveyed the lands of Thomas Massie, on which Robert Powell’s entry depended, and the land óf Robert P ow-ell, on which O.neál’s entry1 now the property of Wa£ts, depended. On-the 27th óf June, 1795, Nathaniel Massie, the plaintiff in error, entered for himself 2,366 acres
of land to adjoin the surveys made for Robert Powell, Thomas Massie and one Daniel Stull. The entry of Daniel. Stull commences at the upper corner of Ferdinand .Oneal’s entry on the'Scioto, and the entry of Ferdinand Oneal commences at the upper corner of Robert Powell’s entry on the Scioto; so that the land of ..Oneal would be supposed, from the entries, to occupy the space on the Scioto between Powell and Stull. Nathaniel Massie’s entry, which was made after surveying the lands of Thomas Massie arid of Robert Powell, binds on the Scioto, and occupies the whole space between Powell’s survey and.Stull’s survey.
In the year 1796, Nathaniel Massie surveyed 530 acres of Oneal’s entry, chiefly within Stull’s survey, and afterwards, in the spring of 1797, purchased Powell’s survey. Nathaniel Massie’s entry is surveyed and patented. In 1801 Massie received from Watts, in money, the customary compensation for making his location.
It is alleged that Nathaniel Massie has acquired for himself the land which was comprehended within Oneal’s entry, and has surveyed for Oneal land to which, his entry can by no construction be extended.
If this allegation be unsupported by evidence, there is an end of the case. If it be supported, had the court of Kentucky jurisdiction of the cause ?
Although no express contract be made, yet it cannot be doubted that the law implies a contract between every man who transacts business for another at the request of that other and the person for whom it is transacted. A common locator who undertakes to locate lands. for an absent person is bound to perform the usual duties of a locator, and is entitled to t^e customary compensation for those duties. If he fails in the performance of those duties, he is liable to the action of the injured party, which may be instituted wherever his person is found. If his compensation be refused, he may-sue therefor in anv court within whose-jurisdiction the person for whom the location was made
cari be found. In either action the manner in which the service was performed is inevitably the subject of investigation, and the difficulty of making it cannot oust the court of its jurisdiction.
From the nature of the business, and the situation of the parties, the person for whom the location .is made being generally a non-resident, and almost universally unacquainted with the country in which his land is placed, it is the duty of the locator not only to locate the lands, but to show them to the surveyor. He also necessarily possesses the power to amend or. to change the location ■ if he has sufficient reason to believe that it is for the interest of his employer so to do. So far as respects the location he is substituted in the place df the owner, and his acts done
bona fide
are the acts of the owner.
If, under these circumstances, a locator finding that the entry he has made cannot be surveyed, instead of withdrawing it'or amending it. so as to render it susceptible of being carried into execution, secures the . adjoining land for himself, and shows other land'to the surveyor which the location cannot be construed to comprehend, it appears to this court to be a breach of' duty, which amounts to a violation of the implied contract, and subjects him to the action of the party injured.
If the location be sustainable, and the locator, instead of showing the land really covered by. the entry,. show's other land, and appropriates to himself the land actually entered, this appears to the court to be a Species
of mala Jiotes
which will, ip equity, convert him into a trustee for the party Qriginally entitled ■ to the land.
In either case the jurisdiction of thg, court of' the state in w'hich the person is found, is sustainable.
If we reason by analogy from the distinction between actions local and transitory at common law, this action Would follow the person, because it would
be founded on an implied contract, or on neglect of duty,
If we reason fropi those principles which are laid down in the books relative to the jurisdiction of courts of equity, the jurisdiction of the court. of Kentucky is equal!) sustainable, because the defendant, if liable, is either liable under his contract, or as trustee.
The case, then, as presented to the court, gives it jurisdiction, and the testimony must be examined to ascertain how far the bill is supported.
The entry of Thomas Massie begins at the junction of Paint creek .with the Scioto, .and runs up the Scioto 520 poles, when reduced to a straight line, thence off at right angles from the general course of the river, so far that a line parallel thereto will include the quantity. ■
Respecting this entry there is no, controversyt
Robert Powell enters i,QOO acres of land,' “ beginning at the upper corner on jhe Scioto, of Major Thomas Massif’s entry, No. 480. running up the river 520 poles, when reduced to a straight line, thence from th. beginning with Massie’s line, " so tar that a line parallel with the general course of the river shall include the quantity.”
Then Ferdinand Oneal enters 1,000 acres of land, beginning at the upper corner.on the Scioto, of Robert Powell’s entry, No. 503. running up the river 520 poles, when reduced to a straight line, and. from the beginning with Powell’s line, so far that a line parallel with the general course, of the river shall include the quantity.
As Oneal’s entry depends on Powell’s, it is necessary to ascertain the land taken by Powell, before that of Oneal can be accurately determined.
Had the general course of the Scioto continued
nearly the same, no difficulty would have been found in this case. The surveys might have conformed literally to all the calls of each entry, and each tract would have constituted nearly a rectangular figure, with a base of 520 poles on the river, and a back line parallel to that base. But the unexpected bends of the Scioto have deranged the uniformity of this chain of locations, and produced questions of cbnsiderable intricacy respecting the ground which must be covered by them.
Thomas'Massie’s entry being, of 1,400 acres, and Powell’s of only 1,000 acres, with a base of the same length on the river, it probably was thought certain that Massie’s upper line would extend beyond Powell’s land, and that the line of Powell, which was to run parallel to the river, would intersect Massie’s upper line. Powell’s entry, therefore, calls to run lrom the river with Massie’s line, so far that a line parallel to the general course of the river ,wijl include the quantity. Upon actual survey the course of the river is found to be such that a line parallel thereto, drawn from the end of Massie’s line, would not include 200 acres of land. Under these circumstances' Powell must lose between 8 and 900 acres of land, if his entry cannot be so construed as to extend beyond the length of Massie’s line.
■ From the peculiar situation of titles acquired tinder the land law of. Virginia, a law which offered for sate an immense unexplored wilderness, covered with savages equally fierce and hostile, leaving to the purchaser the right to place his warrant, which was the evidence of his purchase, on any land not previously appropriated, and n quiring him to make his entries so certainly that any other person might locate the .adjacent residuum, it followed inevitably that immense difficulties would occur, and that locations must often be lost, or receive that certainty which the law required from principles adapted to the general. state of things in the ..country, but which were not precisely foreseen when the locations were made.
These principles have been laid down by the courts, and must be considered as expositions of the statute. A great proportion of the landed property of the country deptnds on adhering to them.
The great and equitable foundation on which they Stand is this. , If, by any reasonable construction of an entry, it can be supported, the courts will support it. This principle absolutely requires that, all discretion, with respect to the mode of surveying an entry, should be surrendered. For if a location, might be surveyed in various Wys, then it . is vague, and no subsequent locator would know how to enter the adjacent residuum. ■ The court, therefore, is compelled to say in what manner évery location, which appears, in its terms, to reserve some power in the locator to vary its form, shall be surveyed.
In the exercise of this essential and necessary power, they have declared that when a given quantity of land is to be laid off on a given base, it shall, be included within four lines, so that the lines proceeding from, the base shall-be at right angles ivith it, and the line opposite the base shall be parallel to it, unless this, form be repugnant to the entry.
The consequence, of this principle Is, that if the calls of an entry do not fully describe the land, but furnish enough to enable the court to complete the location by the application of certain principles,. they will complete it.
They have also decided that, if a location have certain material calls sufficient to support it, and to,(le¿ scribe the land, other calls less material and incompatible with the essential calls of the entry, may be discarded.
These principles, it is believed, will enable the court to ascertain, in a reasonable manner, the land covered by Powell’s location.
The beginning is the upper corner of'Massie on the
Scioto. A base line upon the river is then given to insist of .520 poles, when reduced to a straight line. Massie’s upper line, to its whole extent, it necessary, is also given, and a back line parallel to the base is given. The sid- line opposite Massie’s line, and the course from the termination of Massie’s line to the back line are wanting, arid are to be supplied by construction.
The material inquiry, so far as respects the present cause, is, in what direction shall Powell’s upper line, extending back from the river to the line parallel to the general course of the river, be run ? That line is not given, and is, consequently, to be supplied by construction.
According to the uniform course of decisions, Powell’s upper line must project from the base at right angles with it, unless there shall be some other call in the entry which controls this general-principle. It Í6 contended, that it is controlled by the. call to run with Massie’s line from the beginning. Massie’s line not being at right angles with the base .line, it is argued that Powell’s opposite line, discarding the rectangular principle, must be parallel to the line from the begin-, ning.
But the court does not concur with the counsel for the plaintiff in error in 'this opinion. The principle, that the rectangular- figure is to be preferred to any other, and'is to be preserved whenever it can be preserved, originates in the necessity of adopting some regular figure in order to give to locations that ’ certainty which is not always to be iound in their terms, and in the superior convenience of that figure ■ over every otjief, with, respect to the adjacent residuum* These motives apply to a.part as well as to the whole of an entry* If one location be made upon another so-that the linee of that other bind the entry on one side, and then a precise line be called for .from the begin,ning to run a certain distance, from the end of which a line .is to be drawn, and to continue until a line, parallel to the first or base line, or to. some given point in
the lines of the person on whom the location is made, shall include the quantity, the same respect for certainty and convenience which induced originally the adoption of the rectangular figure would seem to require its adoption with respect to those lines which did not receive á different direction from the positive calls of the location. On one side there might be several different lines; but this would not seem to demand that, on the opposite side, the same variety should-be preserved. It would be-departing from the principle unnecessarily to require that the lines of the opposite side of the tract-should be multiplied in order to be all parallel to the lines by which one side was unavoidably bounded. To the court it-see ms that the rectangular principle is always to be preserved where it can be preserved, that is, where there is no call in the entry applying to the lines 'which control them, and that, where it is necessarily departed from, the departure should not be extended further than the necessity re» quires.
In this particular case the location does not calí for a line parallel to Massie’s line, and, as Massie’s line was to run at right angles from the general course of the river, and it was obviously expected Powell’s line would not extend the whole length of Massie’s line, -it is clear that the locator expected that Powell’s upper line, when at right angles with the conree of the. river, would be nearly parallel to Massie’s line.
This may be considered as, in some degree, an auxiliary argument in favour of the opinion which is entertained, by this court, that the circuit court did right in laying dawn the upper line of Powell at right angles with his basé line;
This line being'established, it is of little importance to Oneal’s claim in what manner the remaining lines, of Powell may.be run.
The call of the location, so far as respects the side binding on Massie, is said to stop at Massie’s northwestern comer. Is that line to be continued ? .
The conclusive objection to it is, that it would intersect the upper • line before the quantity was, obtained, and would, consequently, entirely defeat the call for a back, line parallel to the course of the river.
Is a line at right angles with the geperal course of the river to be run from Massie’s corner and continued until aline parallel to,the base line would include the quantity ?
This would, be. less exceptionable, but it \vould be departing further from the square, and might, in some instances, exhibit a'plat the breadth of which would not be one third ,of its'length. This {Joint, however, is not critically examined, because it is of very little importance in the present cause. The upper line of Powell, on which Oneab binds, would be the same-as far as it now runs, and should it be continued further, it would only take a small angle of Oneal’s survey as made by order of the circuit court.
The court is of opinion that Pow-ell’s e'ntry is rightly sUt veyed by order of the circuit court, and it is an additional argument in support of this opinion, that, with the exception of the . angle unavoidably made by the interference of Massie; the general form of the land approaches a. square more' nearly than if laid off in any other manner.
If Powell’s entry be correctly surveyed, Oneal’s. cannot be laid off otherwise than it is, •
Were it even to be admitted that the original survey made for Powell was correct, it' is entirely possible that 'the case of the plaintiff would not be materially improved thereby. •
Powell’s back line would' probably terminate on the river*;, in which event, that would-be his upper corner on the Scioto, Which.is. c.alled' for as the beginning of Oneal’s entry. Oneal then calls to run on .the river a distance of 520 poles on a straight line, and with Pow. ell’s line so lar as that a line parallel to the general
coarse of the river shall include 1,000 acres* Either this.entry is rendered totally incapable of being surveyed in consequence of the call for f^oWell’s line, pr if -shust be so surveyed as to include almost the jyhóle town of Chilicothe, and to take £i considerable part of Massie’sland.'
. It is, however,, unnecessary to inquire what would be the rights of the person claiming Oneal’s entry, in' that event, since the court is satisfied that the survey, as directed by the circuit court, is.correct.
The case, the'ri', as made Out in evidence, is this.Nathaniel Massie, employed to locate a military warrant for Oneal, has entered the warrant , in pursuant©
óí
his engagement. On surveying the entries 6n. which-that of Oneal depended, he either believed that Oneal’sentry was void from the repugnancy of its calls, or if not absolutely void,-was incapable of covering the land which, according to legal construction-;, and the common Understanding of those who might read the entries, it must be.considered-as covering.; or he thought that, by obtaining a prior patent for the land, he might resist any claim which might afterwards be made by ,Oneal’, or those claiming' Under him. If. Massie really believed that Powell’s entry was properly Surveyed, -and that Oneal’s entiy, as. made, could not be surveyed, it was his duty to amend it, or, if that was not hig 'duty, to place it elsewhere. For omitting so tó ¿lo he is chargeable With such gross neglect of duty as fo render him responsible in-damages,- had-his- construction of Oneal’s location, even been-‘correct. But, if -in this he vyas mistaken, it would be dangerous in the extreme, it . Would be " a ¡cover for fraud -which, could seldom be removed, if a locator, alleging difficulties respecting a-location, might withdraw, it arid take the lánd for himself. He., however,, has not withdrawn It, except so far. as it may be impliedly-.withdrawn by the survey of 580. acres, With that exception, the .entry still covers foe land on' which it was originally'placed, rind is still entitled to that land. But .Massie,-the agent of Oneal, has entered and surveyed a portion of that land for himself, and obtained a patent for if in' his own name.
According to the clearest and'best established principles of equity, the agent who so acts becomes a trustee for his principal. He cannot hold the land under an entry for himself otherwise than as trustee for his principal.
So far, then, as Oneal’s land is within* Massie’s survey, Massie is a trustee ,for Oneal and his assignees, and upon ‘the principle stated in the early part of this opinion, the court of Kentucky had jurisdiction pf the cause.
But a part of Oneal’s land is- surveyed for Powell, and in a contest between his assignees and Powell, the court of Kentucky would have had no jurisdiction. This controversy, however, is not with Powell; it is- with Massie, who is the purchaser of Powell’s rights. The whole property being thus in the hands of Massie, and the court of Kentucky being in possession of the . cause, and having clear jurisdiction of a part of it which decides the principle on which the whole depends, that court did fight in deciding the whole cause, and decreeing to the assignees Of Oneal the whole, land originally included in the entry made for him.
Considerable doubts were entertained respecting the right of Watts to more than the unsurveyed part of the entry. But a majority of' the court, is of opinion-that he stands precisely in the place of Oneal.
* As Massie does not show that he had' convéyed any of that part of Powell’s survey which is included within Ofieal’s entry previous tó the institution pf this suit* or even now, the allegation that he has conveyed a part -of Powell’s survey could not famish sufficient matter for preventing the decree which was rendered.
The decree of the circuit court is affirmed with costs.