Griffin v. Warden-A.M.K.C.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 29, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-06302
StatusUnknown

This text of Griffin v. Warden-A.M.K.C. (Griffin v. Warden-A.M.K.C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Griffin v. Warden-A.M.K.C., (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JEREMIAH JEROME GRIFFIN, Petitioner, -against- 22-CV-6302 (LTS) WARDEN A.M.K.C.; NYC DEPT OF ORDER TO AMEND CORRECTIONS; OTHER PERSONS HAVING CUSTODY OF DETAINES, Respondents. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Petitioner, currently incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center (AMKC) on Rikers Island, brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. By order dated July 25, 2022, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons discussed below, the Court directs Petitioner to file an amended petition within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in custody challenging the legality of his detention on the ground that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court has the authority to review the petition and “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled [to such relief].” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the petition. Since May 27, 2022, Petitioner has been

“unlawfully incarcerated” for a New York County arrest. (ECF 2 ¶¶ 6, 13.) Petitioner has not yet been convicted, and he is challenging his pretrial detention on the following grounds: (1) he was denied the right to testify before the grand jury; and (2) there was “improper extension” of the grand jury proceedings, which violated his right to a speedy trial, under N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 180.80. (Id. at ¶ 7.) An attorney filed a habeas corpus petition in the state trial court on Petitioner’s behalf, but that court denied it on June 23, 2022. (Id. ¶ 7, and 19-21.)1 There is no indication that any appeal was taken from that denial. Attached to the present petition are: (1) emails between Petitioner’s attorneys expressing a belief that it was “inadvisable” for Petitioner to testify before the grand jury; and (2) a transcript of proceedings that, according to Petitioner, shows that his attorneys were ineffective

or committed “legal malpractice” because they misrepresented his wishes. (Id. ¶ 7, 10-18.) Petitioner seeks to “dismiss vacate” the arrest and to be released from custody. (Id. ¶ 15.) DISCUSSION A. Challenge to state-court proceedings Petitioner brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the constitutionality of his detention and seeking the dismissal of the criminal

1 Non-paragraph citations are to attachments to the petition, with page numbers from the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (ECF) System. charges and to be released. Section 2241 provides a limited opportunity for a state pretrial detainee to challenge his pretrial detention, but a Section 2241 petition cannot be used to “permit the derailment of a pending state proceeding by an attempt to litigate constitutional defenses prematurely in federal court.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973);

see also Allen v. Maribal, No. 11-CV-2638 (KAM), 2011 WL 3162675, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that a federal habeas corpus proceeding is not to be converted into a “pretrial motion forum for state prisoners”) (citing York v. Ward, 538 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)). In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court may not enjoin a pending state-court criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate. See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. 37); see also Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) (“Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.”). A

pending state-court prosecution ordinarily provides the accused “a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975); see also Baker v. Supreme Court for New York, No. 12-CV-4750 (BMC), 2012 WL 4739438, at *2 (E.D.N.Y Oct. 3, 2012). As Petitioner brings this habeas corpus petition seeking relief in his ongoing criminal proceedings, the Court must consider whether it must abstain from reviewing some or all of his constitutional claims until judgment is final. Courts have found special circumstances warranting habeas corpus relief before trial in at least two situations, one of which is arguably relevant here. First, pretrial habeas relief may be appropriate where the petitioner’s rights cannot be fully vindicated at the conclusion of trial. For example, courts have declined to abstain from considering double jeopardy claims in pretrial habeas corpus petitions because the right to avoid the ordeal of undergoing multiple trials cannot be vindicated after the second trial. See, e.g., Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1979)

(“The very constitutional right claimed . . . would be violated if [the petitioner] were compelled to raise his double jeopardy claim after the second trial.”). Second, courts considering whether to abstain from hearing a constitutional challenge while criminal proceedings are pending have examined whether the claim seeks relief that is collateral to the criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky
410 U.S. 484 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Gibson v. Berryhill
411 U.S. 564 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Gerstein v. Pugh
420 U.S. 103 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Kugler v. Helfant
421 U.S. 117 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Rumsfeld v. Padilla
542 U.S. 426 (Supreme Court, 2004)
York v. Ward
538 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. New York, 1982)
Jordan v. Bailey
570 F. App'x 42 (Second Circuit, 2014)
Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs
134 S. Ct. 584 (Supreme Court, 2013)
Kaufman v. Kaye
466 F.3d 83 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Drayton v. Hayes
589 F.2d 117 (Second Circuit, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
Griffin v. Warden-A.M.K.C., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/griffin-v-warden-amkc-nysd-2022.