Greenlight Systems, LLC v. Breckenfelder

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJune 28, 2021
Docket3:19-cv-06658
StatusUnknown

This text of Greenlight Systems, LLC v. Breckenfelder (Greenlight Systems, LLC v. Breckenfelder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Greenlight Systems, LLC v. Breckenfelder, (N.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 GREENLIGHT SYSTEMS, LLC, et al., Case No. 19-cv-06658-EMC

8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING COUNTER- 9 v. CLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 10 ERIK BRECKENFELDER, Docket No. 95 11 Defendant.

12 13 14 Plaintiffs Greenlight Systems, LLC (“Greenlight”) and Orbital Asset Holdings, Inc. 15 (“Orbital”) sued Defendant Erik Breckenfelder for fraud and breach of contract related to their 16 employment agreement. See Docket No. 2 (“Compl.”). Mr. Breckenfelder raised several contract 17 and employment counterclaims against Plaintiffs and their president/CEO, Andrew D.B. Rowen 18 (collectively, “Counter-defendants”). See Docket No. 17 (“Countercl.”). The Court dismissed 19 Plaintiffs’ Complaint, entered default on Mr. Breckenfelder’s counterclaims against Counter- 20 defendants, and awarded Mr. Breckenfelder attorneys’ fees. See Docket Nos. 33, 84, 89. The 21 Court also held an evidentiary hearing on May 7, 2021, to prove up Mr. Breckenfelder’s damages. 22 See Docket No. 95. 23 Before the Court is Mr. Breckenfelder’s motion for default judgment on his counterclaims 24 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. See Docket No. 95 (“Mot.”). For the following 25 reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Mr. Breckenfelder’s motion and enters default judgment in 26 the amount of $691,384.3 against Counter-defendants. 27 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual History 3 In his counterclaim, Mr. Breckenfelder alleges as follows. 4 Mr. Breckenfelder is a longtime sales representative with extensive experience in the 5 automotive industry. Countercl. ¶ 11. As of April 2019, Mr. Breckenfelder had been employed 6 for about three and a half years at CCC Information Services, Inc. (CCC) as a National Sales 7 Director in Chicago. Id. ¶ 12. His 2019 compensation at CCC was expected to be approximately 8 $400,000 in salary and bonuses. Id.; Docket No. 98 (“Breckenfelder Decl.”) ¶ 4. Andrew Rowen 9 is the president of Orbital, a California corporation, and the CEO of Greenlight, an Ohio limited 10 liability company. Countercl. ¶¶ 8-10. 11 In late April 2019, Jake Tullis, an agent of Mr. Rowen and Orbital, contacted Mr. 12 Breckenfelder through LinkedIn. Id. ¶ 15. Mr. Tullis asked if Mr. Breckenfelder would be 13 interested in working at a new company called Greenlight Systems, which provided service 14 department software to car dealerships. Id. Mr. Breckenfelder was not seeking new employment 15 and did not initiate contact with any of the Counter-defendants. Id. Prior to Mr. Tullis’s call, Mr. 16 Breckenfelder did not know of Mr. Rowen or Greenlight. Id. 17 Between late April and July 1, 2019, Mr. Rowen and Mr. Tullis represented to Mr. 18 Breckenfelder that Greenlight owned a fully functional software designed for the specific needs of 19 automobile dealers, that it had been “alpha, beta, and pilot tested” in dealerships, and that it was 20 ready to be sold and deployed. Id. Both Mr. Rowen and Mr. Tullis communicated this 21 information to Mr. Breckenfelder over telephone calls, email, and text messages. Id. They offered 22 Mr. Breckenfelder a salaried position as a senior executive of the new Greenlight company. Id. 23 Mr. Breckenfelder would oversee the marketing and selling of Greenlight’s software. Id. ¶¶ 15- 24 16. The position would include additional merit-based compensation, equity compensation for 25 meeting sales milestones, and an opportunity to purchase an additional “2.5% share of ownership 26 in the Employer.” Id. ¶ 17. The compensation for this position was largely dependent on 27 successfully selling Greenlight software. See id. ¶¶ 17, 27. 1 an existing sales team, which “was already on the verge of closing a number of sales.” Id. ¶ 18. 2 Mr. Breckenfelder was concerned that he would not have adequate resources or support to do the 3 job. Id. To alleviate Mr. Breckenfelder’s concerns, both Mr. Rowen and Mr. Tullis told him that 4 they had already invested substantial capital into the company and had acquired “multiple human 5 resources” to grow the company. Id. 6 Orbital and Mr. Rowen also stated they would be willing to sell Mr. Breckenfelder an 7 equity stake in the new Greenlight company. Id. ¶ 17. They mentioned that Greenlight had a fair 8 valuation of $12.5 million and asked Mr. Breckenfelder to wire $50,000 to Orbital as a down 9 payment on the 2.5% share of ownership in the company. Id. 10 Based on Orbital’s and Mr. Rowen’s representations, Mr. Breckenfelder quit his job at 11 CCC on July 12, 2019 to accept at-will employment as an executive at the new Greenlight 12 company. Id. ¶ 19; Breckenfelder Decl. ¶ 4. Mr. Breckenfelder also wired a total of $50,000 to 13 Orbital as an initial payment for an equity interest in the new Greenlight Systems entity. 14 Countercl. ¶ 19. 15 According to Mr. Breckenfelder, Orbital and Mr. Rowen’s representations to him about 16 Greenlight, especially its software, employees, and valuation, were false and Counter-defendants 17 knew it. Id. ¶¶ 17-18, 20. First, Mr. Breckenfelder alleges that Counter-defendants knew the 18 Greenlight software was not fully functional because they had failed repeatedly to successfully 19 deploy it at automotive dealerships around the country. Id. ¶¶ 20-24. The software lacked basic 20 functionality. Id. As of late 2017, Patrick Day, an individual who worked with Mr. Rowen to 21 develop the Greenlight software, stated under oath that the product was “unsaleable” and “[could 22 not] be ‘rolled out’ and installed at a customer location without significant additional work to 23 make it ready and saleable.” Id. ¶ 20. Despite all these software problems, Counter-defendants 24 did not disclose this information to Mr. Breckenfelder. Id. Counter-defendants were also aware, 25 but did not tell Mr. Breckenfelder, that most or all the people responsible for designing and 26 marketing the Greenlight software were no longer employed by Greenlight. Id. ¶¶ 14, 25. In fact, 27 several of them had been sued by Mr. Rowen. Id. ¶ 25. 1 had hired “multiple human resources.” Id. ¶ 18. But once Mr. Breckenfelder started working at 2 Greenlight, he soon learned he was the only employee at the company. Id. There was no formal 3 sales team. Id. Instead, there were three individuals, all operating on a short-term “letter of 4 understanding,” who had made a couple of contacts with automobile dealerships but had no 5 pending deals. Id. 6 Third, Mr. Breckenfelder alleges the company valuation appeared unsubstantiated. Id. ¶¶ 7 17, 26. Mr. Rowen and Mr. Tullis told Mr. Breckenfelder that the company valuation had been 8 performed by a third-party appraiser, but this seemed unlikely. Id. At the time the representation 9 was made, Greenlight was not even a formal entity, as Greenlight was not registered as a limited 10 liability company (LLC) until August 2019. Id. ¶ 26. Moreover, Counter-defendants had no 11 reasonable basis for believing that Greenlight could be worth $12.5 million because the company 12 had a non-functional software, no assets, no sales, and no pending customers. Id. Additionally, 13 after wiring the $50,000 payment for an equity stake in Greenlight, the Counter-defendants never 14 gave Mr. Breckenfelder his share of the company. Id. ¶ 61. 15 Mr. Breckenfelder started working at Greenlight on July 15, 2019. Id. ¶ 71. He tried to 16 market and sell the company’s software by setting up pilot installations at dealerships in Chicago, 17 Illinois and Grandville, Michigan. Id. ¶¶ 28, 32. During these pilots, Mr. Breckenfelder started 18 learning about the software’s functionality issues. Id. ¶¶ 28-31. For example, the software could 19 not operate on Internet Explorer, the browser used by many car dealerships. Id. ¶ 30.

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