Gouge v. BAX Global, Inc.

252 F. Supp. 2d 509, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4376, 2003 WL 1477298
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedMarch 11, 2003
Docket3:01-cv-07639
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 252 F. Supp. 2d 509 (Gouge v. BAX Global, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gouge v. BAX Global, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 509, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4376, 2003 WL 1477298 (N.D. Ohio 2003).

Opinion

ORDER

CARR, District Judge.

Plaintiff Patrick Gouge brings 'this case against defendants BAX Global, Inc. (“BAX”) and Air Transport International, L.L.C. (“ATI”), alleging fraud, promissory estoppel, and breach of public policy. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Pending is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion shall be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a resident of Texas, and a former employee of BAX and ATI. BAX, a Delaware corporation, maintains its principal place of business in California. ATI, a Nevada limited liability company, maintains its headquarters in Arkansas. BAX owns 99 percent of ATI. The remaining 1 percent of ATI is owned by BAX Air Inc., a corporation wholly owned by BAX. The events surrounding BAX’s April 30, 1998, acquisition of ATI are at issue in this case.

BAX offers freight forwarding via aircraft and trucks, and manages freight movement. ATI provides air transport of cargo for freight forwarders. Before the acquisition, BAX contracted with ATI to fly routes for BAX’s customers who needed air cargo delivery. BAX owned and leased the airplanes, but ATI subleased them and flew the routes, a service known as providing “lift” for the cargo. ATI was a major supplier of BAX’s lift.

In early 1997, BAX learned that ATI was having financial difficulties when ATI began increasing the prices it charged BAX for its services. BAX feared that ATI would either file for bankruptcy or be sold. BAX sought to reduce the risk of losing its lift capability by applying for FAA certification to start its own airline, *512 BAX Air, to replace ATI as a supplier of its lift.

BAX estimated that it would cost $12,000,000 to get BAX Air certified, and that it would be at least two years before the airline was operational. To obtain certification, the FAA requires new airlines to staff five specific management-level positions, including a Director of Safety. BAX contracted with an aviation consulting firm to oversee the start-up, and a consultant placed an ad seeking candidates for the five required positions on June 30, 1997.

During this time, plaintiff was the Vice President of Corporate Safety at Trans World Airlines, Inc. (“TWA”), earning between $84,000 and $85,000 per year. Intrigued by the opportunity to help start a new airline, plaintiff responded to the ad, applying for the position of Director of Safety. Plaintiff then researched BAX and learned that ATI was a major lift provider for BAX. Plaintiff considered ATI’s safety record “horrific.” (PI. Depo. at 58).

In October, 1997, plaintiff flew to Toledo for a job interview with Mike Odom, then BAX’s Senior Vice President of Hub Operations. Odom was leading BAX’s effort to start BAX Air. At the interview, plaintiff says Odom told him BAX was “going to start its own airline” because the company was frustrated with ATI’s financial difficulties and unreliability. (PI. Depo. at 67). Plaintiff asked Odom why BAX did not purchase ATI instead of starting its own airline, and Odom’s response was, “we don’t have anything to do with ATI, they’ve got unions on the property, we’re a non-union company and they’ve got the issues and problems and we just don’t want them on our property.” (PI. Depo. at 85-86). Plaintiff alleges Odom told him that though BAX had considered buying ATI, it had decided not to do so, and BAX was committed to starting its own airline, “full speed ahead,” so that BAX could “be in charge of [its] destiny.” (PI. Depo. at 86). Plaintiff alleges he told Odom he was glad BAX would not buy ATI, “because I wouldn’t want to be associated with a company with as poor a track record and history as ATI had.” (PI. Depo. at 86).

About a week later, plaintiff traveled to Irvine, California, for a second job interview with Jay Arnold, BAX’s Senior Vice President of Human Resources. Arnold allegedly reiterated BAX’s commitment to BAX Air. Plaintiff says he asked Arnold why BAX was not buying ATI, and Arnold told him it was because of ATI’s unionized workforce. Plaintiff says he told Arnold that “[buying ATI] makes more sense to me, but if you guys want to do this [start-up], then I want to be part of a startup, I don’t want to be part of anything else, I just want to be part of the startup.” (PI. Depo. at 89). While in California, plaintiff also met Dennis Eittreim, BAX’s President, who allegedly also told him that BAX was moving “full speed ahead” to start a new airline. (PI. Depo. at 90-91).

On October 28, 1997, BAX sent plaintiff a letter offering him the position of Director of Safety, with a later transfer over to BAX Air, at a salary of $95,000 per year plus benefits. Plaintiff accepted the offer on October 30, 1997. His start date was set for November 25, 1997. Plaintiff alleges BAX officials repeated their assurances about the company’s commitment to BAX Air through November 25,1997.

BAX Air, however, never got off the ground.

In August, 1997, ATI had retained financial advisor Equity Partners, Ltd. to try to sell ATI’s assets. Equity Partners managing director Patrick May solicited more than 130 potential buyers for ATI, pitching ATI to BAX at a meeting with Eittreim on September 9, 1997. Twenty of those potential buyers, including BAX, executed confidentiality agreements with ATI and *513 received copies of the confidential offering memorandum. May sent BAX the confidential memorandum on October 3, 1997. Five of these potential buyers, including BAX, then attended a presentation at ATI and conducted initial due diligence. Three of those five, BAX, World Airways, and Fine Airways, then submitted nonbinding indications of value. BAX sent its nonbinding indication of value on November 26,1997.

According to May, ATI then entered preliminary negotiations with World Airways, a better bidder. World Airways lost interest, and Fine Airways experienced a financing problem, making BAX the most likely purchaser of ATI as of early December, 1997. Negotiations between BAX and ATI then began in earnest. On December 28, 1997, BAX treasurer James B. Har-tough signed a letter of intent to acquire ATI. According to May, even as of December 23, 1997, the deal could have fallen apart “if any ... conditions precedent to closing wouldn’t have come about, or through the bankruptcy process if [ATI] got a higher and better offer.” (May Depo. at 87).

Meanwhile, as scheduled, plaintiff started his new job in Toledo, Ohio, on November 25, 1997, as BAX’s Director of Safety in the start-up of BAX Air. Consultants for BAX already were working on BAX Air’s certification when plaintiff arrived in Toledo, as were two more of the five FAA-required management employees. Plaintiff reviewed the project’s paperwork during his first week on the job, and during his second week at work, he met with the consultants and the two other management employees, reviewed the start-up timeline, divided the responsibilities, and began work, with a goal of certification by April, 1998.

During the second week of December, 1997, plaintiff alleges, Odom became evasive about giving plaintiff permission to hire employees, and refused to provide the start-up team with offices, computer equipment, or administrative support.

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