Goodwin v. Karlshamns USA, Inc.

619 N.E.2d 508, 85 Ohio App. 3d 240, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 520
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 28, 1993
DocketNo. 92AP-1122.
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 619 N.E.2d 508 (Goodwin v. Karlshamns USA, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Goodwin v. Karlshamns USA, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 508, 85 Ohio App. 3d 240, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 520 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

*241 Tyack, Judge.

On December 8,1989, Kelvin L. Goodwin was seriously injured as a result of an explosion at Capital City Products Company (“Capital City”). Goodwin and his wife later filed a lawsuit in which they claimed that the injuries were caused by the intentional tort of Capital City, which had been Mr. Goodwin’s employer on that date. Karlshamns USA, Inc., d.b.a. Capital City, defended against the lawsuit and eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which was sustained. The Goodwins (hereinafter “appellants”) have appealed, assigning a single error for our consideration:

“The lower court erred in failing to find that reasonable minds could differ concerning whether an intentional tort had been committed by the employer against its employee.”

Civ.R. 56(C) provides the standard for evaluating whether or not summary judgment is appropriate, when it states, in pertinent part:

“Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading[s], depositions, answers to interrogatories, -written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in his favor.”

The issue before the trial court was whether, so construing the evidence before the court, appellants had demonstrated that reasonable minds could find an intentional tort to have been committed by Capital City.

The legal guidelines for assessing whether an intentional tort has been committed were recently set forth in the first two paragraphs of the syllabus to Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108, as follows:

“1. Within the purview of Section 8(A) of the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, and Section 8 of Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5 Ed.1984), in order to establish ‘intent’ for the purpose of proving the existence of an intentional tort committed by an employer against his employee, the following must be demonstrated: (1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition within its business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer- that if the employee is subjected by his employment to *242 such dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to the employee will be a substantial certainty; and (3) that the employer, under such circumstances, and with such knowledge, did act to require the employee to continue to perform the dangerous task. (Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. [1988], 36 Ohio St.3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489, paragraph five of the syllabus, modified as set forth above and explained.)
“2. To establish an intentional tort of an employer, proof beyond that required to prove negligence and beyond that to prove recklessness must be established. Where the employer acts despite his knowledge of some risk, his conduct may be negligence. As the probability increases that particular consequences may follow, then the employer’s conduct may be characterized as recklessness. As the probability that the consequences will follow further increases, and the employer knows that injuries to employees are certain or substantially certain to result from the process, procedure or condition and he still proceeds, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. However, the mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk — something short of substantial certainty— is not intent. * * * ”

Digesting the legal principles set forth above and applying them to the present case, the issue becomes whether or not the evidence before the trial court, construed most strongly in favor of appellants, demonstrated that an explosion at Capital City was a substantial certainty.

The evidence before the trial court was as set forth below.

Stanley Sourelis, the director of engineering for Karlshamns, USA, Inc., on the December 8, 1989 date, provided an affidavit in which he was very critical of the system in use at the plant. His affidavit includes the following:

“When I came to this company the equipment and plant itself was old, outdated and very archaic. We had always, in the back of our minds, waited expectantly for the money to build a new plant. So in the meantime, we had to keep the ship afloat, so to speak. I recall in 1973 when I came here the plant was pretty much a lost cause, but they insisted on keeping it alive. We re-electrified everything to code, nothing here had been up to code, tried to de-bottleneck and spend our money as wisely as possible to upgrade the plant so it was productive and safe. The company was then owned by Stokely VanCamp and subsequently sold to Quaker Oats. Then this division, Capitol [sic ] City Products, spun off and was sold in a leveragefd] buy out. It was purchased by a Swedish firm, Karlshamns, who owns it now.
“At the time of the explosion on December 8, 1989, maintenance people, to the best of my knowledge, took a roof vent, because it was emitting some oil vapor, and contained it in a pot-like arrangement with a four inch opening on top and a *243 [C]hinese-like hat on it. The material which would come out of converters when they were relieved would be a mist which would condense and fill up the pot. They got tired of going up there and emptying the pot with pails, so they connected a drain line to storage tank # 95. You cannot do that because these converters are venting hydrogen gas and the last thing in the world you want to do is communicate gas, in any way, even remotely, with any area which may contain it. You don’t even want hydrogen gas contained intermediately, as in that little pot on the roof. That pot should have been water purged. We are rebuilding this plant here which you can examine to see what is required by code. This pot-venting system was homemade, somebody decided it was a good way to save themselves the trouble of doing the venting system right. There are twenty-six maintenance people and you may be hard pressed to find out exactly who did the homemade venting job.
“On the particular day of the explosion, December 8, 1989, they were hydrogenating soybean oil to a material called stearin in converter # 319, which was vented to the pot on the roof. Stearin has a very high melting point and when it cools, it turns into a substance similar to candle wax. Stearin was in liquid form in converter # 319 and so was misted with the hydrogen gas which was being vented through the relief valve.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
619 N.E.2d 508, 85 Ohio App. 3d 240, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/goodwin-v-karlshamns-usa-inc-ohioctapp-1993.