State v. Hudson, 24009 (8-13-2008)

2008 Ohio 4075
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedAugust 13, 2008
DocketNo. 24009.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2008 Ohio 4075 (State v. Hudson, 24009 (8-13-2008)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Hudson, 24009 (8-13-2008), 2008 Ohio 4075 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

Opinions

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
{¶ 1} Appellant, Robert Hudson ("Hudson"), appeals from the decision of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

I.
{¶ 2} Hudson was the manager and a resident at the Miller Hotel ("the hotel"). Neil Shafer ("Shafer") was a resident at the hotel as well. The two men became involved in a verbal altercation on February 15, 2007, when Hudson asked Shafer to move his vehicle to provide a snow plow with access to the property. Hudson contends that the verbal altercation escalated into a physical fight resulting in Shafer allegedly punching Hudson, cutting his lip. Later in the day, an unknown person was alleged to have kicked in the door of Shafer's room and physically assault him, causing injuries severe enough to require medical attention. During his treatment at a local hospital, Shafer allegedly called a local bar and verbally threatened Hudson. The police told each of them not to have contact with the other. Shafer however, returned to his room at the *Page 2 hotel late that night or early the next morning to learn that Hudson had removed a space heater from his room. There was a confrontation between the two men in a common area of the hotel and a fight ensued. During the fight, Hudson fatally stabbed Shafer. The police arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. Hudson admitted to police that he stabbed Shafer and the police took him into custody.

{¶ 3} On March 5, 2007, Hudson was indicted on one count of murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), a special felony. On June 19, 2007, a supplemental indictment was filed, charging Hudson with an additional count of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), a special felony, one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second degree felony, and one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). Hudson pled not guilty to these charges and on October 29, 2007, the matter proceeded to a bench trial. On November 5, 2007, the trial court found Hudson guilty of murder, felony murder, and felonious assault. For the murder convictions, Hudson was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 15 years to life in prison. For the felonious assault convictions, he was sentenced to two terms of eight years of incarceration. The terms were all to run concurrent. Hudson timely appealed from his convictions, raising one assignment of error for our review.

II.
{¶ 4} Initially we note that Hudson was convicted and sentenced for two murder charges. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the conviction and sentence on two counts of murder for a single killing violates R.C. 2941.25 and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, at 28. The Court further explained that "where a defendant who kills only one victim is convicted of two aggravated murder counts, the trial court may sentence on only one count." State v. Waddy *Page 3 (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 447. In this case, Hudson received two concurrent terms of incarceration for the murder of one victim. While Hudson did not raise this issue below nor did he argue it on appeal, pursuant to Crim. R. 52(B), a plain error or defect that affects a substantial right may be noticed although it was not brought to the attention of the trial court. "A plain error must be obvious on the record, such that it should have been apparent to the trial court without objection." State v. Kobelka (Nov. 7, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 01CA007808, at *2, citing State v. Tichon (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 758,767. We find that the trial court plainly erred by sentencing Hudson on two murder charges. Therefore, these two sentences are merged, and Hudson is sentenced to one term of 15 years to life for the murder, concurrent with the other parts of the sentence imposed by the trial court judge. Accordingly, this error is hereby corrected. State v.Pless (May 21, 1998), 8th Dist. No. 72281, at *6.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
"[HUDSON'S] CONVICTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE."
{¶ 5} In his sole assignment of error, Hudson contends that his conviction was not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. He specifically contends that the evidence showed that he acted in self-defense. We do not agree.

{¶ 6} "While the test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight challenge questions whether the state has met its burden of persuasion." State v. Gulley (Mar. 15, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 19600, at *1, citing State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390 (Cook, J., concurring). A determination of whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence does not permit this Court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the State has met its burden of persuasion. State v. Love, 9th Dist. No. 21654, 2004-Ohio-1422, at ¶ 11. Rather, *Page 4

"an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Otten (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340.

{¶ 7} This discretionary power should be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented weighs heavily in favor of the defendant. Id.

{¶ 8} Hudson argues that the weight of the evidence supported his claim of self-defense. We do not agree.

{¶ 9} By claiming self-defense, Hudson "`concedes [that] he had the purpose to commit the act, but asserts that he was justified in his actions.'" State v. Howe (July 25, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 00CA007732, at *2, quoting State v. Barnd (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 245, 260. Hudson had the burden at trial to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Howe, supra, at *2. To meet this burden, Hudson must have demonstrated

"`(1) that he was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray, (2) that he had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape from such danger was in the use of deadly force, and (3) that he did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger.'" State v. Rust, 9th Dist. No. 23165, 2007-Ohio-50, at ¶ 10, quoting

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Gibson
2011 Ohio 3074 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2008 Ohio 4075, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-hudson-24009-8-13-2008-ohioctapp-2008.