FAY, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellees, Gerald S. Wiggins and LaRue G. Wiggins (“Wiggins”), brought this diversity action against defendant-appellant Warrior River Coal Company (“Warrior”) seeking $125,000.00 in damages, which amount represented the remaining minimum advance royalties allegedly due under a coal mining lease executed by the parties on October 24, 1977. The Wiggins moved for summary judgment. The trial court issued an order and memorandum opinion, dated October 13, 1981, granting Wiggins’ motion for summary judgment and awarding them damages in the amount of $125,000.00.1 Warrior appealed. Finding that the district court did not err in its grant of Wiggins’ motion for summary judgment, we affirm.
I.
The uncontroverted facts of this case establish that on October 24, 1977, the Wiggins entered into a coal mining lease with Warrier under the terms of which Warrior was granted the right to mine coal on property owned by the Wiggins. The lease contained a provision for the payment of minimum total royalties to the Wiggins in the amount of $200,000.00. The lease provided for the payment of this amount in annual installments of $25,000.00, payable on October 24,1977 and each subsequent year until paid. Warrior made royalty payments of $75,000.00 to the Wiggins under the lease, paid as follows: $25,000.00 upon execution of the lease in 1977, $25,000.00 in 1978, and $25,000.00 in 1979.
On September 12, 1980, Warrior notified the Wiggins that it was surrendering and terminating the lease because it was unable to obtain the necessary permits under federal and state mining regulations, which rendered the coal on the leased premises commercially unmineable. The notice further indicated Warrior’s intent to discontinue royalty payments.
On December 1,1980, the Wiggins filed a summons and complaint in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, claiming anticipatory breach and seeking damages in the amount of $125,000.00, which represented the remaining minimum advance royalties allegedly due under the lease. Along with its complaint, the Wiggins filed a motion for summary judgment. On December 12, 1980, the state court entered an order transferring the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Western Division. An order and memorandum opinion were entered by the trial court on October 13, 1981, granting summary judgment in favor of the Wiggins in the amount of $125,-000.00. The summary judgment order was later amended to provide for payment of the judgment amount in installment payments of $25,000.00 per year.
This appeal followed.
[1358]*1358II.
On appeal, Warrior contends that the trial judge erred in granting Wiggins motion for summary judgment because the terms of the contract are so ambiguous with respect to minimum advance royalty payments that reasonable minds may differ; therefore, a question of fact exists for the jury. Generally, the interpretation of a contract is an issue of fact for the jury. General Wholesale Beer Company v. Theodore Hamm Company, 567 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.1978); see Zell Ins. Agency v. Guaranty Security Ins. Co., 399 F. 2d 147 (5th Cir.1968). “If the terms of the contract are unambiguous, however, then the interpretation of the terms is solely for the Judge. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile National Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1234 (5th Cir.1973). Merely because the parties disagree upon the meanings of contract terms will not transform the issue of law into an issue of fact.” General Wholesale Beer, at 313 citing Barclays Bank, at 1234.2
Thus framed, the issue is whether the contract terms governing minimum advance royalties are ambiguous therefore necessitating a jury determination. The trial court found that the lease agreement was clear and certain in regard to Warrior being obligated to pay the Wiggins a minimum total royalty of $200,000.00. The record amply supports the trial judge’s finding, and we concur with its conclusion that the lease agreement as a whole was unambiguous and that the Wiggins, under the terms of the lease, were entitled to minimum total royalties of $200,000.00. A review of the language of the lease agreement supports the trial courts decision.
The “minimum advance royalty” provision of the lease agreement states:
Minimum Advance Royalties. Warrior River shall pay to Lessor a minimum advance royalty of $25,000.00 upon execution from the date hereof and continuing each year thereafter on the anniversary daté while this Lease is in effect. Warri- or River shall pay the Lessor a minimum annual advance royalty of $25,000.00. Minimum total royalties, production and/or annual royalties shall be $200,-000.00. All minimum advance royalty payments may be credited by Warrior River against future production royalties payable to Lessor under Subsection 5(b). If Warrior River should terminate and surrender this Lease as provided in paragraph 15 of this Lease Agreement, at any time before the total royalty of $200,-000.00 has accrued, it will pay to Lessor the unaccrued balance of said $200,000.00 in minimum annual payments of $25,-000.00 or the balance, whichever is less. (Emphasis supplied)
The applicable provision on surrender states:
15. Surrender by Warrior River. Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, and after Warrior River has mined and removed all minable and marketable coal from the Leased. Premises and has performed all its other obligations under this Lease, Warrior River may upon Ninety (90) days’ written notice to Lessor surrender and terminate this Lease as to all of the Leased Premises. Upon a surrender and termination of this Lease as to all to the Leased Premises, Warrior River shall be under no further obligation of any kind or nature to the Lessor except for the making of payments that have accrued at the date of such surrender and termination, the payment of taxes accrued while the Lease [1359]*1359was in effect, and the satisfaction of all federal and state environmental and mining laws and regulations applicable to the Leased Premises which have occurred pri- or to the date of such surrender or termination.
After reviewing the above provisions and the other provisions of the lease, we hold that the language of the lease is clear and certain regarding Warrior’s obligation to pay the Wiggins a minimum total royalty of $200,000. This obligation “accrued” upon the termination of the lease. The lease is also clear and certain in regard to the continuance of that obligation after surrender and termination. In so holding, we adopt the following reasoning of the district court judge:
The agreement uses the word ‘minimum’ in several instances with reference to royalties. This means ‘at least’ in common parlance and reflects an intention to pay at least these amounts.
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FAY, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-appellees, Gerald S. Wiggins and LaRue G. Wiggins (“Wiggins”), brought this diversity action against defendant-appellant Warrior River Coal Company (“Warrior”) seeking $125,000.00 in damages, which amount represented the remaining minimum advance royalties allegedly due under a coal mining lease executed by the parties on October 24, 1977. The Wiggins moved for summary judgment. The trial court issued an order and memorandum opinion, dated October 13, 1981, granting Wiggins’ motion for summary judgment and awarding them damages in the amount of $125,000.00.1 Warrior appealed. Finding that the district court did not err in its grant of Wiggins’ motion for summary judgment, we affirm.
I.
The uncontroverted facts of this case establish that on October 24, 1977, the Wiggins entered into a coal mining lease with Warrier under the terms of which Warrior was granted the right to mine coal on property owned by the Wiggins. The lease contained a provision for the payment of minimum total royalties to the Wiggins in the amount of $200,000.00. The lease provided for the payment of this amount in annual installments of $25,000.00, payable on October 24,1977 and each subsequent year until paid. Warrior made royalty payments of $75,000.00 to the Wiggins under the lease, paid as follows: $25,000.00 upon execution of the lease in 1977, $25,000.00 in 1978, and $25,000.00 in 1979.
On September 12, 1980, Warrior notified the Wiggins that it was surrendering and terminating the lease because it was unable to obtain the necessary permits under federal and state mining regulations, which rendered the coal on the leased premises commercially unmineable. The notice further indicated Warrior’s intent to discontinue royalty payments.
On December 1,1980, the Wiggins filed a summons and complaint in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, claiming anticipatory breach and seeking damages in the amount of $125,000.00, which represented the remaining minimum advance royalties allegedly due under the lease. Along with its complaint, the Wiggins filed a motion for summary judgment. On December 12, 1980, the state court entered an order transferring the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Western Division. An order and memorandum opinion were entered by the trial court on October 13, 1981, granting summary judgment in favor of the Wiggins in the amount of $125,-000.00. The summary judgment order was later amended to provide for payment of the judgment amount in installment payments of $25,000.00 per year.
This appeal followed.
[1358]*1358II.
On appeal, Warrior contends that the trial judge erred in granting Wiggins motion for summary judgment because the terms of the contract are so ambiguous with respect to minimum advance royalty payments that reasonable minds may differ; therefore, a question of fact exists for the jury. Generally, the interpretation of a contract is an issue of fact for the jury. General Wholesale Beer Company v. Theodore Hamm Company, 567 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.1978); see Zell Ins. Agency v. Guaranty Security Ins. Co., 399 F. 2d 147 (5th Cir.1968). “If the terms of the contract are unambiguous, however, then the interpretation of the terms is solely for the Judge. Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile National Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1234 (5th Cir.1973). Merely because the parties disagree upon the meanings of contract terms will not transform the issue of law into an issue of fact.” General Wholesale Beer, at 313 citing Barclays Bank, at 1234.2
Thus framed, the issue is whether the contract terms governing minimum advance royalties are ambiguous therefore necessitating a jury determination. The trial court found that the lease agreement was clear and certain in regard to Warrior being obligated to pay the Wiggins a minimum total royalty of $200,000.00. The record amply supports the trial judge’s finding, and we concur with its conclusion that the lease agreement as a whole was unambiguous and that the Wiggins, under the terms of the lease, were entitled to minimum total royalties of $200,000.00. A review of the language of the lease agreement supports the trial courts decision.
The “minimum advance royalty” provision of the lease agreement states:
Minimum Advance Royalties. Warrior River shall pay to Lessor a minimum advance royalty of $25,000.00 upon execution from the date hereof and continuing each year thereafter on the anniversary daté while this Lease is in effect. Warri- or River shall pay the Lessor a minimum annual advance royalty of $25,000.00. Minimum total royalties, production and/or annual royalties shall be $200,-000.00. All minimum advance royalty payments may be credited by Warrior River against future production royalties payable to Lessor under Subsection 5(b). If Warrior River should terminate and surrender this Lease as provided in paragraph 15 of this Lease Agreement, at any time before the total royalty of $200,-000.00 has accrued, it will pay to Lessor the unaccrued balance of said $200,000.00 in minimum annual payments of $25,-000.00 or the balance, whichever is less. (Emphasis supplied)
The applicable provision on surrender states:
15. Surrender by Warrior River. Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, and after Warrior River has mined and removed all minable and marketable coal from the Leased. Premises and has performed all its other obligations under this Lease, Warrior River may upon Ninety (90) days’ written notice to Lessor surrender and terminate this Lease as to all of the Leased Premises. Upon a surrender and termination of this Lease as to all to the Leased Premises, Warrior River shall be under no further obligation of any kind or nature to the Lessor except for the making of payments that have accrued at the date of such surrender and termination, the payment of taxes accrued while the Lease [1359]*1359was in effect, and the satisfaction of all federal and state environmental and mining laws and regulations applicable to the Leased Premises which have occurred pri- or to the date of such surrender or termination.
After reviewing the above provisions and the other provisions of the lease, we hold that the language of the lease is clear and certain regarding Warrior’s obligation to pay the Wiggins a minimum total royalty of $200,000. This obligation “accrued” upon the termination of the lease. The lease is also clear and certain in regard to the continuance of that obligation after surrender and termination. In so holding, we adopt the following reasoning of the district court judge:
The agreement uses the word ‘minimum’ in several instances with reference to royalties. This means ‘at least’ in common parlance and reflects an intention to pay at least these amounts.
Moreover, the lease expressly provides that ‘[Qf Warrior River should terminate and surrender this Lease as provided in paragraph 15 of this Lease Arrangement, at any time before the total royalty of $200,000 has accrued, it will pay to Lessor the unaccrued balance of said $200,000 in minimum annual payments of $25,000 or the balance, whichever is less.’ Because the lease expressly covers the contingency in issue, the defendant may not avoid its promise. Impossibility does not excuse nonperformance where the promisor has indicated an intent to assume the risk thereof. City of Albertville v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 272 F.2d 594, 509-601 (5th Cir.1959) (applying Alabama law).
This is not changed by the apparent incongruity between clauses 5(a) and 15. Clause 5(a) specifically assures the lessor plaintiff of a minimum total royalty of $200,000 (at least $25,000 annually) even if defendant should terminate and surrender the lease under Clause 15. Clause 15 states generally that notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, the lessee upon termination and surrender will only be responsible for payments that have accrued at the date of such surrender. There is no conflict between the clauses.
‘[I]f there exists inconsistency between two clauses of a contract that cannot be reconciled, the inconsistency must be resolved in favor of a prior clause, unless an intention to thereafter qualify is plainly expressed.’ City of Fairhope v. Town of Daphne, 282 Ala. 51, 58, 208 So.2d 917, 924 (Ala.1968) (citations omitted). No such intention is plainly expressed. This clear intent of the contract is bolstered by Clause 13 of the lease, which provides that ‘[i]f Warrior River is unable to perform any of the terms or covenants of the Lease by reason of damage or delay resulting from disaster, labor disturbances, strikes, lockouts or Acts of God, ... ’ Warrior River will not be excused ‘from paying minimum advance royalties and production royalties to Lessor.’ While this clause does not cover the contingency in issue it is a good indication that Warri- or River intended the Lessor to receive the minimum total royalties even if performance by defendant was rendered impracticable or impossible.
Accordingly, the court is of the opinion that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment for the unpaid minimum royalties in the amount of $125,000.
Oct. 13,1981 Order of the District Court, at 3-5.
AFFIRMED.