City of Fairhope v. Town of Daphne

208 So. 2d 917, 282 Ala. 51, 1968 Ala. LEXIS 1082
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedApril 4, 1968
Docket1 Div. 262
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 208 So. 2d 917 (City of Fairhope v. Town of Daphne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
City of Fairhope v. Town of Daphne, 208 So. 2d 917, 282 Ala. 51, 1968 Ala. LEXIS 1082 (Ala. 1968).

Opinion

COLEMAN, Justice.

Both sides appeal from a declaratory decree construing a contract made in 1950 by the Town of Daphne and the City of Fairhope.

The contract provided that, subject to the provisions of the contract, Daphne shall have the right to purchase from Fairhope a gas distribution system located in Daphne, and also, a one-tenth interest in a gas transmission pipe line running from the source of supply, several miles north of Daphne, to the corporate limits of Daphne. The transmission line continues on south from Daphne to Fairhope.

The distribution system in Daphne and the transmission line were constructed by *53 Fairhope according to the contract. Fair-hope had also constructed a distribution system located in that city. In order to supply increased needs of both parties, a second pipe line has been constructed as provided in the contract.

Two questions are in dispute, to wit: first, the price Daphne shall pay; and, second, the nature of the “interest” which Daphne shall acquire in the transmission lines located between the source of supply and the corporate limits of Daphne.

Daphne filed its bill praying for construction of the contract.

The court declared, in effect, that Daphne shall pay to Fairhope $66,240.53; that Daphne shall acquire full title to and ownership of the distribution system located in Daphne; but Fairhope shall remain the owner of the transmission lines, subject only to Daphne’s right to purchase one-tenth of the volume of the gas in both pipe lines as provided in the contract. 1

Fairhope complains that the court erred in fixing the amount of the purchase price at an amount less than it ought to be under the contract.

Daphne complains that the court erred in declaring that Fairhope shall remain owner of the pipe lines. Daphne says it is entitled to ownership of an undivided one-tenth interest in the pipe lines and not merely the right to purchase one-tenth of the gas.

1. Price.

Fairhope has not set out in its brief a condensed recital of the testimony of each witness as required by Supreme Court Rule 9(b).

It is not clear from Fairhope’s brief precisely what Fairhope claims the purchase price should be. The contract fixes the price to be paid by Daphne to include three elements as follows:

(a) one-tenth of the principal remaining unpaid of bonds issued for contraction of the gas system, plus interest; 2

(b) If it shall become necessary to. increase the capacity of the transmission line, the cost shall be paid by Fairhope and Daphne in the proportion that the needs of each has increased and the cost of such increased needs “shall be added to the cost to Daphne in the acquisition of ownership”; 3 -and

*54 (c) if the corporate limits of Daphne shall he enlarged before Daphne shall purchase, the purchase price shall be increased in an amount equal to the fair and reasonable value of system owned by Fair-hope within that territory added to Daphne by extension of the corporate limits. 4

The contract contains a provision whereby Daphne could lease the distribution system if Daphne so elected, and the references in the contract as to rental or lease relate to the lease provisions. Daphne did not elect to lease, however, and those references do not have any effect on the amount of the purchase price.

(a) The court found that Fairhope did issue “its bonds for the construction of the gas distribution system and gas transmission pipe line contemplated in the agreement,” and that the amount of the principal remaining unpaid on the bonds issued “for the construction of such gas distribution system and gas transmission pipe line originally constructed by the Respondent in 1950,” plus interest, was $294,865.25.

As we understand the testimony of Fair-hope’s witness, Marx, he testified that the unpaid amount of the bonds, plus interest, on the day of the trial, was $294,865.25. Ten per cent of that amount is $29,486,525.

(b) The parties stipulated that the cost of the second transmission line was $216,-000.00, and that, for the purposes of the “NINETH” paragraph of the contract, *55 Daphne’s increased needs were 12.15% and Fairhope’s 87.85%. Twelve and fifteen hundredths per cent of $216,000.00 is $26,-244.00.

(c) Daphne’s witness, Maples, a civil engineer of ten years’ experience, testified that, in his opinion, the value of the system, to serve the thirty-two additional users taken in by Daphne in the newly annexed area, was approximately $10,000.00. The court found that the value of the system in the annexed area is $10,510.00.

It thus appears that the price to be paid by Daphne was fixed as follows:

(a) One-tenth of unpaid cost of original transmission line and distribution system $29,486.53
(b) 12.15% of cost of second transmission line 26,244.00
(c) System in newly annexed area 10,510.00
Price fixed by court $66,240.53

Fairhope has not shown that the purchase price fixed by the court was error.

2. Daphne’s interest.

Daphne’s contention is that the court erred in restricting Daphne’s interest in the transmission line to a mere right to purchase one-tenth of the gas. In replying to Daphne’s contention, Fairhope relies on a single proposition of law, to wit:

“IN DETERMINING THE EFFECTS OF A CONTRACT THE COURT NOT ONLY HAS THE RIGHT BUT A DUTY TO PROBE BEHIND WRITTEN CONTRACTS AND TO EXAMINE ALL FACTS WHICH SHED ANY LIGHT UPON THE TRUE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT, AND TO CONSIDER THE CONTRACT IN ITS ENTIRETY WHERE AMBIGUITY EXISTS.”

It thus appears that Fairhope’s argument must rest on the premise that the contract is ambiguous or contains conflicting provisions. To show this ambiguity or conflict, Fairhope makes three points.

First, Fairhope says that the contracting parties did not intend that Daphné acquire ownership of any part of the transmission line because no mention is made in the preamble of the contract that Daphne shall have such ownership. 5 It is true that Daphne’s ownership of the transmission line is not mentioned in the preamble, but it is also true that Daphne’s ownership of a distribution system is not mentioned in the preamble. It does not appear that even Fair-hope contends that Daphne shall not acquire ownership of the distribution system located in Daphne. We are advised of no rule of law which requires the preamble of a contract to mention every provision of *56 the agreement.' This contract is not a legislative act and the preamble to a contract-is not the title to a' bill.

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Bluebook (online)
208 So. 2d 917, 282 Ala. 51, 1968 Ala. LEXIS 1082, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/city-of-fairhope-v-town-of-daphne-ala-1968.