Genie Construction Co. v. State

51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 153, 1999 Ill. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 28
CourtCourt of Claims of Illinois
DecidedMay 12, 1999
DocketNo. 91-CC-3181
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 153 (Genie Construction Co. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Claims of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Genie Construction Co. v. State, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 153, 1999 Ill. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 28 (Ill. Super. Ct. 1999).

Opinion

OPINION

Raucci, C.J.

The Claimant, Genie Construction Co., Inc., brings this action for compensatoiy damages pursuant to the Illinois Court of Claims Regulations. (705 ILCS 505/8(b).) The Claimant asserts that it suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of a breach of contract committed by the Respondent, the State of Illinois. The Claimant is seeking a refund for liquidated damages charged for beginning work on a bridge cleaning and painting contract late, and is seeking additional compensation for alleged extra work.

The following facts are basically uncontroverted. The Claimant was the successful bidder on two contracts with the Illinois Department of Transportation, hereinafter referred to as “IDOT,” entered into on June 29, 1988. One contract was for cleaning and painting bridges in District 5, which included Champaign county, and the other contract was for cleaning and painting bridges in District 3, which included LaSalle and Bureau counties. At a preconstruction conference on July 7, 1988, at which representatives of the Claimant and the Respondent were present, it was agreed that work on the District 5 bridges was to begin on July 11, 1988. At a similar preconstruction conference, on July 13, 1988, it was agreed that work would begin on the District 3 bridges on August 15, 1988. The Claimant was only able to work on one contract at a time.

Both contracts required that paint removal be done by what is known as Method II. Witnesses disagreed on exactly what was involved in a Method II removal, apparently because the requirements for this method were changed just prior to bidding on these two projects. The differences in the views on what is required for Method II removal will be addressed later.

During the course of work on tire District 5 bridges, representatives of IDOT determined that the paint left after the initial cleaning was not adhering to the surface and had to be removed completely. The Claimant was given additional compensation beyond the contract price for this extra work. Because of this additional work, the Claimant was unable to begin work on the District 3 bridges until nearly one month after the scheduled start-up date. The Claimant was charged $4,687.50 in liquidated damages for this delay. The Claimant contends that a similar problem with paint not adhering occurred on the District 3 bridges, and that the Claimant was told to remove all of the paint. The Claimant is seeking additional compensation for this alleged extra work. The Respondent contends that this was work included in the original contract and did not qualify as extra work that would merit additional compensation. Testimony surrounding these differing contentions will be addressed below.

A hearing was held before Commissioner Stephen R. Clark, at which there was testimony from Michael Ray Wilson, part owner of the Claimant company; Bill Taylor, an employee of the Claimant; George Davis, who was the resident engineer for IDOT in District 5; Richard Wayne Hahn, who was project review engineer for IDOTs Bureau of Construction; Tom Jensen, bridge painting inspector for District 3; and Bill Flannigan, who was IDOTs bridge maintenance engineer. The Commissioner also admitted into evidence five photographs of bridges, a copy of the pre-construction conference memorandum for District 3, a copy of the authorization of contract changes for District 5, department specifications for bridge cleaning and painting,'a summary of the alleged extra costs incurred by the Claimant in the District 3 work, correspondence between the Claimant and the Respondent regarding this claim, and IDOTs departmental report. We give little weight to the narrative at the beginning of the departmental report, because it is self-serving and conclusory.

The two main issues to be resolved are whether the late start on the District 5 project was chargeable to the Claimant or the Respondent, and whether there was extra work performed that was not contemplated by the original contract for the District 5 bridges. The facts being disputed regarding this second issue are whether the work ultimately performed by the Claimant was within the requirements of a Method II removal, and whether testing performed by the Respondents employee on the District 5 bridges complied with IDOTs regulations.

The first issue can be readily disposed of because the facts are basically uncontroverted. We have held that where the evidence presented shows, more probably than not, that the Respondent should have granted reasonable extension of time for delays due to unforeseen causes beyond the Claimants control and without the Claimants fault or negligence, then the Claimant would be entitled to all retainage held by the Respondent as liquidated damages. (Davinroy v. State (1991), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268, 282.) The Respondent should allow an extension where the cause of the delay is not the fault of the Claimant., Id.

In the instant case, it is clear that the delay in beginning the District 3 project was not the fault of the Claimant. The Respondent was aware that the Claimant was to work one project at a time. Before the start-up date on the District 3 project, the Respondent was aware that extra work was being required of the Claimant on the District 5 project and would cause a delay in beginning the District 3 project. There is no excuse that, because these two projects were in two different districts, the Respondents right hand (District 3) would not know what the left hand (District 5) was doing. Therefore, we find that the delay was chargeable to the Respondent and was not the fault of the Claimant, and therefore, award the Claimant $4,687.50.

The second issue-whether the work performed in District 3 was outside the scope of the original contract and should be considered extra work for which additional compensation should be awarded — is a much more difficult issue. Not only are the facts surrounding this issue controverted by the parties, but they also apparently are controverted by employees of IDOT itself. At issue here is the interpretation of a Method II paint removal. To determine what is required by this method, we must consider not only the specifications and the interpretations by the parties, but also tire course of dealing that occurred during the performance of the District 5 contract. The special provisions included in the bidding materials upon which the Claimant based its bid for the District 3 project state the following:

“CLEANING AND PAINTING STEEL BRIDGES: Existing paint shall be removed using Method II cleaning. The three coat lead and chromate free alkyd paint system shall be used for field painting of existing structural steel # 6 #
509.06(a)(6) Surface Preparation Visual Standards. Surface preparation approval shall require the preparation of test sections. The Contractor shall prepare the test section surface to the specified level in accordance with the Swedish IVA Corrosion Committee visual standards supplied by the Engineer. These visual standards shall be used to determine the degree of conformance with the appearance requirements of the prepared surface. Prior to production surface preparation the Contractor shall prepare a test section on each structure to be painted in a location which the Engineer considers to be representative of the existing surface condition and steel type for the structure as a whole.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 153, 1999 Ill. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 28, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/genie-construction-co-v-state-ilclaimsct-1999.