G+ Communications, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. LTD.

District Court, E.D. Texas·Decided July 13, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-00078·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION

G+ COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:22-CV-00078-JRG SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. LTD., § SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, § INC., § § Defendants. § § CLAIM CONSTRUCTION MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER G+ Communications, LLC, alleges infringement by Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Samsung Electronics America, Inc., (together “Samsung”) of claims from U. S. Patents 8,761,776, 9,184,881, 10,448,430, 10,594,443, and 10,736,130. Generally, the patents relate to wireless com- munications, such as LTE systems. See ’776 Patent at 1:6–7 (“The present invention relates to the field of communications, particularly to a cell reselection method and terminal.”); ’881 Patent at 1:13–15 (“The present invention relates to communication field [sic], and in particular to a method for feeding back confirmation information on a physical uplink shared channel[.]”); ’430 Patent at 1:6–8 (“The present disclosure relates to . . . the field of communications, and in particular to a random access method, device and system.”); ’443 Patent at 1:16–20 (“The present disclosure relates to . . . wireless communication technology, particularly to a method for transmitting [and receiving HARQ] information[.]”); ’130 Patent at 1:7–10 (“The disclosure relates to an uplink control signal transmission technology, and in particular to a method and device for uplink control signal transmission, a user terminal and a storage medium.”). In their briefing, the parties dispute the scope of fifteen terms and phrases, with Samsung challenging many of the terms as indefinite. Having considered the parties’ briefing and arguments of counsel during a June 1, 2023 hearing, the Court resolves the disputes as follows. I. GENERAL LEGAL STANDARDS A. Generally

“[T]he claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). As such, if the parties dispute the scope of the claims, the court must determine their meaning. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), aff’g, 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Claim construction, however, “is not an obligatory exercise in redundancy.” U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Rather, “[c]laim construction is a matter of [resolving] disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to

explain what the patentee covered by the claims . . . .” Id. A court need not “repeat or restate every claim term in order to comply with the ruling that claim construction is for the court.” Id. When construing claims, “[t]here is a heavy presumption that claim terms are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning.” Aventis Pharm. Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–13). Courts must therefore “look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the scope of the patented invention.” Id. (citations omitted). The “ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. This “person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specifica- tion.” Id. Intrinsic evidence is the primary resource for claim construction. See Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312). For

certain claim terms, “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; see also Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution history.”). But for claim terms with less-apparent meanings, courts consider “those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean . . . [including] the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the

prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.” Id. B. Means-Plus-Function Claiming A patent claim may be expressed using functional language. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (pre- AIA); Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347–49 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant portion). Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6, a structure may be claimed as a “means . . . for performing a specified function,” and an act may be claimed as a “step for performing a specified function.” Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002). When it applies, § 112 ¶ 6 limits the scope of the functional term “to only the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347. But § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply to all functional claim language. There is a rebuttable pre- sumption that § 112 ¶ 6 applies when the claim language includes “means” or “step for” terms, and a rebuttable presumption it does not apply in the absence of those terms. Masco Corp., 303

F.3d at 1326; Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348. These presumptions stand or fall according to whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim with the functional language, in the context of the entire specification, to denote sufficiently definite structure or acts for performing the function. See Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply when “the claim language, read in light of the specifi- cation, recites sufficiently definite structure” (quotation marks omitted) (citing Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349; Robert Bosch, LLC v. Snap-On Inc., 769 F.3d 1094, 1099 (Fed. Cir.

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G+ Communications, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. LTD., (E.D. Tex. 2023).

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