G+ Communications, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. LTD.

District Court, E.D. Texas·Decided March 1, 2024·No. 2:22-cv-00078·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION

G+ COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:22-CV-00078-JRG § SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. LTD., § SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, § INC., § § Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION The Court issues this Memorandum Opinion and Order sua sponte. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court ORDERS a new trial on damages as to U.S. Patent Nos. 8,761,776 (the “’776 Patent”) and 10,736,130 (the “’130 Patent”). II. BACKGROUND On January 19, 2024, the Court empaneled a jury and commenced trial. (See Dkt. No. 597.) Plaintiff G+ Communications, LLC (“G+”) asserted that Defendants Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (collectively, “Samsung”) infringed Claims 1 and 2 of the ’776 Patent, Claim 20 of the ’130 Patent, and Claim 10 of U.S. Patent No. 10,594,443 (the “’443 Patent”). (Dkt. No. 560 at 1.) Samsung also asserted that all three asserted patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Dkt. No. 563 at 1.) The parties rested after five days of evidence. (See Dkt. No. 604 at 1319:5–10.) On January 26, 2024, the jury returned its unanimous verdict. (Dkt. No. 585 at 11.) The jury found that Claim 1 and/or Claim 2 of the ’776 Patent and Claim 1 of the ’130 Patent were infringed. (Id. at 4.) It also found that Claim 10 of the ’443 Patent was not infringed. (Id.) Additionally, the jury found that Claim 10 of the ’443 Patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a concept that is well-known, routine, and conventional given that the Court had previously found it was primarily directed towards an abstract concept. (See id. at 4.)

Consistent with the Court’s instructions, the jury awarded damages for the infringement of the ’776 Patent and the ’130 Patent, but not the ’443 Patent. (Id. at 7.) The jury awarded $45,000,000.00 for the infringement of the ’776 Patent, and $22,500,000.00 for the infringement of the ’130 Patent. (Id.) Importantly, the jury also indicated that these amounts were awarded as a running royalty, as opposed to a lump sum. (Id. at 8.) III. LEGAL STANDARD Rule 59(d) provides that “the court, on its own, may order a new trial for any reason that would justify granting one on a party’s motion.” “A new trial may be granted, for example, if the district court finds the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course.” Smith v.

Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985). Indeed, Rule 59 “confirms the trial court’s historic power to grant a new trial based on its appraisal of the fairness of the trial and the reliability of the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 612–13. IV. ANALYSIS The Court is persuaded that a new trial should be granted on the issue of damages for the ’776 and ’130 Patents because the Court has material concerns about jury confusion regarding the form of the reasonable royalty awarded herein—i.e., that the jury may have awarded damages in the form of a running royalty when it intended to award them as a lump sum. Damages in a patent case generally take the form of a reasonable royalty designated as either: a running royalty or a lump sum royalty.1 During this trial neither side addressed whether a reasonable royalty award should be a running royalty.2 Only upon the Court’s suggestion after the close of the evidence that some clarification was necessary for the benefit of the jury, did the parties

agree that the jury should decide and specify in their verdict whether any damages awarded would be a running royalty or a lump sum. (See Dkt. No. 585 at 8 (jury verdict form asking jury to decide the form of the reasonable royalty); Dkt. No. 592 at 25:22–25 (counsel for G+ and Samsung stating that they have no objection to a question in the verdict form regarding the form of the royalty).) Accordingly, the Court submitted that particular question to the jury as part of the verdict form. Had the Court not raised this issue, and had the jury awarded a reasonable royalty without specifying whether it was a running royalty or a lump sum, as the parties initially proposed, it is a given that Plaintiff would thereafter take the position that it was a running royalty and seek entry of a forward looking royalty at an enhanced rate for future infringing sales, while it is equally a given that Defendants would insist the reasonable royalty was a lump sum effectively giving them

a fully paid-up license for the remaining life of the patents. Though the parties never raised this in their proposed charge or verdict form, the Court was unwilling to be silent in the face of such a guaranteed “train wreck”.

1 “In a standard running royalty license, the amount of money payable by the licensee to the patentee is tied directly to how often the licensed invention is later used or incorporated into products by the licensee.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2009). On the other hand,

[a] lump-sum license “benefits the patentholder in that it enables the company to raise a substantial amount of cash quickly and benefits the target [i.e., the licensee] by capping its liability and giving it the ability, usually for the remainder of the patent term, to actually use the patented technology in its own products without any further expenditure.”

Id. (quoting Richard F. Cauley, Winning the Patent Damages Case 47 (2009)).

2 Plaintiff G+ rarely but occasionally sprinkled the phrase “lump sum” into its evidence without meaningful explanation. However, because of counsel’s failure to develop and educate the jury about these very different concepts during the trial, the jury’s verdict on damages is not sufficiently reliable. The words “running royalty” were spoken in front of the jury exactly four times prior to their deliberations, and these four instances came from the Court in its final instructions, never from the parties. (Dkt. No. 592 at 81:12–82:8.3 See Dkt. Nos. 597, 598, 600, 602, 604.) Importantly, neither

party addressed this issue in their closing arguments.4 (See Dkt. No. 592.) Counsel for G+ and Samsung equally failed throughout the trial to explain to the jury what constituted a running royalty or how it differed from a lump sum. Further, neither party’s damages expert substantially addressed this matter in their testimony. In fact, had the Court not raised this during the charge conference, after the evidence had closed, both sides would have been silent on this key issue throughout the entirety of the trial, guaranteeing the train wreck described above. Not only did the parties fail to present these concepts to the jury, they also contributed to the likely confusion on the jury’s part. During the evidence regarding damages, Samsung’s counsel cross-examined G+’s damages expert about how a sizeable portion of the damages G+ was seeking

3 The Court’s instruction on this topic was: And you may have heard references throughout the trial as to whether G+ should be entitled to a running royalty or a lump-sum royalty. If you find that G+ is entitled to damages, you must decide whether the parties would have agreed to a running royalty or a fully paid-up lump-sum royalty at the time of the hypothetical negotiation.

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G+ Communications, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. LTD., (E.D. Tex. 2024).

G+ Communications, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. LTD. (G+ Communications, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co. LTD.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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