Fruitstone v. Spartan Race Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 2, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-20836
StatusUnknown

This text of Fruitstone v. Spartan Race Inc. (Fruitstone v. Spartan Race Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fruitstone v. Spartan Race Inc., (S.D. Fla. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 1:20-cv-20836-BLOOM/Louis

AARON FRUITSTONE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SPARTAN RACE INC.,

Defendant. ________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT, CONDITIONALLY CERTIFYING A CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES, DIRECTING THE ISSUANCE OF CLASS NOTICE, AND SCHEDULING A FINAL APPROVAL HEARING THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, ECF No. [102] (“Motion”). The Parties and their respective counsel have entered into a Stipulation of Settlement and Release (the “Agreement”), which, with its incorporated exhibits, sets forth the terms of the Parties’ agreement to settle and dismiss this litigation on a class-action basis (“Settlement”), subject to the Court’s approval. The Court has considered the Motion, the Settlement,1 and the entire record of this case. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion, ECF No. [102], is GRANTED as follows: I. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT 1. Partial Stay of this Action. All non-settlement-related proceedings in the Action are stayed and suspended until further order of the Court.

1 The definitions in Section II of the Agreement are hereby incorporated as though fully set forth in this Order, and capitalized terms shall have the meanings attributed to them in the Agreement, ECF No. [102- 3]. 2. Jurisdiction. The Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this Action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), including jurisdiction to approve and enforce the Settlement and all orders and decrees that have been entered or which may be entered pursuant thereto. The Court also finds that it has personal jurisdiction over the Parties and, for purposes of consideration of the proposed Settlement, over each of the members of the Settlement

Class defined below, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), and venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 3. Conditional Class Certification for Settlement Purposes Only. The Court is presented with a proposed settlement prior to a decision on class certification and must therefore determine whether the proposed Settlement Class satisfies the requirements for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, albeit for purposes of settlement. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620-21 (1997). “In deciding whether to provisionally certify a settlement class, a court must consider the same factors that it would consider in connection with a proposed litigation class—i.e., all Rule 23(a) factors and at least one subsection of Rule 23(b)

must be satisfied—except that the Court need not consider the manageability of a potential trial, since the settlement, if approved, would obviate the need for a trial.” In re Checking Acct. Overdraft Litig., 275 F.R.D. 654, 659 (S.D. Fla. 2011). The Court must also be satisfied that the proposed class “is adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012). The Court conditionally finds and concludes, for settlement purposes only, that: a. The Settlement Class is an ascertainable one. A class is ascertainable if “the class definition contains objective criteria that allow for class members to be identified in an administratively feasible way,” such that identifying class members will be “a manageable process that does not require much, if any, individual inquiry.” Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015). Here, the proposed definition of the Settlement Class is based on objective criteria, all of which are determinable from Spartan’s business records. Individual, subjective inquiries to identify who may be a member of the Settlement Class are unnecessary. See Bohannan v. Innovak Int’l, Inc., 318 F.R.D. 525, 530 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (proposed class was

ascertainable where membership in the class was based on objective criteria and the defendant’s data could be used to easily identify the putative class members). b. The Settlement Class also satisfies the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). The Settlement Class is comprised of approximately one million individuals who paid a “Racer Insurance Fee” or “Insurance Fee” to Spartan between February 26, 2016 and December 31, 2020, inclusive. See Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pip Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hile there is no fixed numerosity rule, generally less than twenty-one is inadequate, more than forty adequate, with numbers between varying according to other factors.”). c. The commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) is also satisfied for purposes

of settlement. To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), there must be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Commonality is met when the claims of all class members “depend upon a common contention,” with “even a single common question” sufficing. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350, 359 (2011) (citation omitted); see also Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2009) (commonality of claims “requires that there be at least one issue whose resolution will affect all or a significant number of the putative class members” (internal citations omitted)). The key issues in the Action stem from the same alleged course of conduct: Defendant making various representations regarding and charging Settlement Class Members a mandatory, nonrefundable $14 “Racer Insurance Fee” or “Insurance Fee” when registering for a Spartan Race event. There are issues raised in this Action that are common to each Settlement Class Member, including, among other things: (a) whether Spartan’s description of the “Racer Insurance Fee” is deceptive, unfair, false and misleading; (b) whether Spartan retains any portion of the “Racer Insurance Fee”; (c) whether Spartan engaged in unfair and deceptive practices by collecting and retaining any portion of the “Racer Insurance Fee”; (d) whether

Spartan’s representations are objectively likely to mislead reasonable consumers to believe that the $14 “Racer Insurance Fee” is a direct pass-through charge, i.e., equal to the cost to Spartan of providing the accident medical insurance coverage; (e) whether Spartan’s practices in charging the “Racer Insurance Fee” violate M.G.L. Chapter 93A; (f) whether Spartan’s practices in charging the “Racer Insurance Fee” violate the FDUTPA; (g) whether Plaintiff and Class members have sustained monetary loss and the proper measure of that loss; (h) whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to injunctive relief; (i) whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to declaratory relief; and (j) whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to consequential damages, punitive damages, statutory damages, disgorgement, and/or other legal or equitable

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Fruitstone v. Spartan Race Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fruitstone-v-spartan-race-inc-flsd-2021.