Fruin-Bambrick Const. Co. v. Ft. Smith & W. R. Co.

140 F. 465, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4808
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Arkansas
DecidedSeptember 11, 1905
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 140 F. 465 (Fruin-Bambrick Const. Co. v. Ft. Smith & W. R. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fruin-Bambrick Const. Co. v. Ft. Smith & W. R. Co., 140 F. 465, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4808 (circtwdar 1905).

Opinion

ROGERS, District Judge

(after stating the facts). The depositions in this case contain more than 1,700 pages of typewritten matter, and the exhibits, books, correspondence, -maps, and other documents in evidence contain much more. The argument occupied more than a week. No general discussion of the facts will be attempted. The volume of the record does not admit of it. I shall content myself with a statement of the conclusions reached as briefly as possible, having regard to the nature of the case, referring to such of the evidence as may be necessary.

First. The case is embarrassed by the fact that Frederick W. Bond, the chief engineer of the railroad company at the time the contract was made, died before it was completed, and the railroad company then employed as chief engineer H. A. Schwanecke. At the time Bond died the grading was all done, and the classification and estimates were all made by the resident engineers, and the records were on file in Bond’s office. Copies of these had been furnished the complainant, with the money values extended. It is contended that Bond’s successor had no right or power, under the contract, to remeasure, reclassify, or re-estimate the work of his predecessor, but that Bond’s work was final and binding on both parties, except for gross error or fraud. The contention is not tenable. Schwanecke had all the power and authority under the contract in making the final estimate which Bond would have had if he had been alive; and it seems clear that while some of the graduation estimates returned by the resident engineers to Bond’s office were marked “final,” or “final as to graduation,” and the money values ascertained and extended in Bond’s office and copies thereof sent to the complainant, these estimates were not final, within the meaning of the seventh clause of the contract, supra, which expressly provides to the contrary. The case must therefore proceed, so far as Schwanecke’s power and authority under the contract in making the final estimate is concerned, as if he had been the chief engineer from the beginning.

Second. It is no longer an open question in the United States courts that where parties enter into an agreement like that contained in the thirteenth paragraph of the contract sued on, whereby the chief engineer is empowered to decide and his decision is made final and conclusive as to any dispute which may arise between the parties to the agreement relating to or touching the same, such an agreement is binding on the parties, and the courts will enforce it.

Third. The result is that before the complainant can establish its right to recover any sum in excess of the sum allowed in the final estimate of Schwanecke, the chief engineer, it must show that the latter, in making his final estimate, was guilty of collusion or fraud, or exhibited such an arbitrary and wanton disregard of the complainant’s plain rights under the contract as to be equivalent to fraud,' or committed errors or mistakes to the complainant’s prejudice so gross and palpable as to leave no doubt in the mind of the court that grave injustice was done it. Mundy et al. v. L. & N. Railroad Co., 67 Fed. 633, 14 C. C. A. 583; Lewis v. Chicago, S. F. & C. R. Co. (C. C.) 49 Fed. 708. Choctaw & Memphis R. R. Co. et al. v. Charles M. [469]*469Newton, as Receiver of the Magoon Construction Co., et al. (C. C. A. 8th Circuit, May Term, 1905) 140 Fed. 225.

Fourth. After a careful and painstaking investigation of the record I have concluded that the final estimate of Chief Engineer Schwanecke must be set aside and the estimate corrected in several particulars:

(a) The grubbing of 6J4 acres on section 77, off the right of way, for which the complainant claims pay as extra work, and was allowed by Chief Engineer Bond and paid, was subsequently, on making the final estimate, arbitrarily disallowed by Chief Engineer Schwanecke on the sole ground that it was forbidden by the terms of the contract, or by the terms of the contract no pay was to be allowed for “grubbing' in borrow pits.” This construction of the contract was, in the opinion of the court, clearly and palpably wrong, and the disallowance grossly unjust to the construction company. Section 16 of the contract reads as follows:

“Grubbing will be required the whole width between slope stakes in excavation and in embankments where three feet or less in height. Stumps and grubs to be removed. No allowance will be made for grubbing in borrow pits.”

But “borrow pits” under the contract were defined by the contract itself, and were limited to the right of way. See section 22 of the contract. It is not disputed that the grubbing done, and for which Bond in his April estimate made the complainant an allowance of $500, was for grubbing the 6% acres of land (at the price agreed on in the contract), and was entirely off the right of way. The grubbing was done to get sufficient dirt to construct the embankments of the road. The place from which it was taken was not a borrow pit at all, within the meaning of the contract, and none of the requirements of the contract as to the location, construction, and drainage of borrow pits were applicable to 'the place where the grubbing was done. No one can read the twenty-second section of the contract (see especially last paragraph), and the deposition of McNair, one of the defendant’s resident engineers, and that of Martin, vice president of the construction company, in regard to the disallowance, without instinctively concluding that Schwanecke’s action in disallowing it was arbitrary, without legal right under the contract, and palpably and grossly unjust, proceeding, it may be possible, from carelessness or gross negligence in the examination of the contract itself. Schwanecke’s estimate must be corrected in this regard, and the allowance of $500, made by Chief Engineer Bond to complainant in his final estimate, restored to the contractor.

(b) I have concluded that Schwanecke’s reclassification of sections 107, 108, and 120 should be set aside. The reasons therefor will now be stated as briefly as possible. A most significant fact, to begin with, is that of all the work done on this 120 miles of road Schwanecke, after investigation, never disturbed (and therefore approved) the measurement and classification of his predecessor, except as to these three sections. This statement should be qualified to this extent : That he examined several other sections, and made a slight reduction, inconsequential, as to one, and did not disturb the other. Why should Bond’s graduations and classifications on all the rest of the [470]*470120 miles of road be approved, and these three sections, to which Bond’s attention was specifically called at the very time the work was being done, be rejected? The signficance of this inquiry is emphasized when we remember that Engineer Evan's, who is not contradicted, says that similar material on the same road was classified as solid material, just as it was on these sections. The testimony is absolutely without question that Bond was a man of eminent ability in his profession, and a man of high character for integrity, while his correspondence between the officers of the railroad company and his subordinates along the line, and the construction' company, is absolutely free from any suspicion of want of moral courage in dealing with the construction company, its subcontractors, or his own subordinate engineers, and alike free from the slightest taint of disloyalty to the railroad company or of a disposition to deal either partially, unjustly, or arbitrarily with the contractors.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
140 F. 465, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4808, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fruin-bambrick-const-co-v-ft-smith-w-r-co-circtwdar-1905.