Judgment rendered August 8, 2022. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.
No. 54,892-CA
COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA
***** FRANCIS DEAL Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
ADRIAN PERKINS AND CADDO Defendants-Appellants PARISH CLERK OF COURT, MIKE SPENCE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY ***** Appealed from the First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana Trial Court No. 638,663
Honorable Brady D. O’Callaghan, Judge ***** OFFICES OF L. HAVARD SCOTT, III Counsel for Appellant, By: L. Havard Scott, III Adrian Perkins
MARTZELL BICKFORD & CENTOLA By: Scott R. Bickford Lawrence J. Centola, III Spencer R. Doody Jeremy J. Landry
HARPER LAW FIRM, APLC Counsel for Appellee, By: Jerald R. Harper Francis Deal Anne E. Wilkes
HUGO A. HOLLAND, JR.
BENNETT L. POLITZ Counsel for Appellee, Caddo Parish Clerk of Court, Mike Spence, in his Official Capacity ***** Before MOORE, STONE, and THOMPSON, JJ.
STONE, J., concurs with written reasons. THOMPSON, J., concurs with written reasons. MOORE, C.J.
This suit involves the disqualification of a candidate for the seat of
Mayor of the City of Shreveport on grounds that the candidate was not a
qualified elector and provided false statements on his Notice of Candidacy.
Adrian Perkins appeals the ruling of the trial court disqualifying his
candidacy in the November 8, 2022, primary election. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On July 22, 2022, Perkins signed and filed a Notice of Candidacy for
Mayor of the City of Shreveport in which he listed his domicile address as
9605 Stratmore Circle, within the City of Shreveport in Ward 00, Precinct
113. Perkins affirmed that he read the Notice of Candidacy, met the
qualifications of the office for which he was qualifying, and was a duly
qualified elector of Caddo Parish, Ward 00, Precinct 113. It is undisputed
that at the time of his qualification, Perkins was also registered to vote at the
Stratmore Circle address, while maintaining his homestead exemption at a
second residence he owns at 719 Marshall Street, also within the City of
Shreveport, but located in Ward 00, Precinct 5B. In that regard, on the
Notice of Candidacy Perkins further certified the following:
8) If I am a candidate for any office other than United States senator or representative in congress, that if I claim a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, I am registered and vote in the precinct in which that residence is located, unless I reside in a nursing home as defined in La. R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a veteran’s home operated by the state or federal government. On July 29, 2022, in accordance with La. R.S. 18:1401, Francis Deal,
a qualified voter, filed a petition and supplemental petition to object to
Perkins’s candidacy on two grounds. In his original petition, Deal alleged
that Perkins was not a qualified elector of the City of Shreveport: statutory
law mandated registered voters to vote only in the precinct where a
homestead exemption was claimed, but in his Notice of Candidacy Perkins
falsely swore under oath that he was registered to vote in the precinct where
he claimed a homestead exemption. In his supplemental petition, Deal
alleged that Perkins was not a qualified elector of the City of Shreveport
because he had failed to file his federal and/or state tax returns for each of
the previous five years; however, this claim was resolved during the hearing
on this matter, and is not before this court on review.
Perkins answered the petitions with a general denial, and attached his
affidavit, with supporting documentation, attesting to the following.1
Perkins asserted that he first registered to vote in the City of Shreveport in
2007, and has been registered to vote in the precinct of his Stratmore Circle
residence since “at least 2017.” He further stated that he purchased the
home at 719 Marshall Street in 2019 and claimed a homestead exemption on
it. He acknowledged that the two residences are not in the same precinct.
He then stated that he “mistakenly signed his Notice of Candidacy on July
22nd given that, as a matter of fact, his homestead exemption was located in
a different precinct than the precinct where he was registered to vote.”
1 Perkins simultaneously filed an exception of no cause of action which, after discussion at the hearing, was referred to the merits of the appeal. The written ruling is silent as to the exception, which is deemed denied and is not before this court on review. 2 Perkins argued that the exclusive list of disqualifying events in La.
R.S. 18:492 does not disqualify candidates for mistakenly certifying that the
candidate’s homestead exemption and voter registration are for the same
precinct and such mistake should be given “no legal significance as a matter
of law.” Perkins asserted that he has since “corrected his oversight” and
changed his voter registration, on July 30, 2022, to Ward 00, Precinct 5B, in
which the 719 Marshall Street address is located. He finally attested that his
voter registration has never been cancelled in accordance with La. R.S.
18:193 prior to his signing of the Notice of Candidacy, and thus, he
remained a qualified elector on the day he signed it.
The matter was heard on August 1, 2022. The parties stipulated to the
following facts: (1) proper service on the defendants; (2) petitioner is a
registered voter in Precinct 113; (3) Perkins’s voter registration at the
Stratmore Circle address in Precinct 113 was accurate until July 30, 2022, at
which time it was changed to the Marshall Street address in Precinct 5B; (4)
the Notice of Candidacy attached to the petition is a true and correct copy of
the one filed by Perkins; (5) the homestead exemption filing attached to the
petition is a true and correct copy; and (6) Precincts 113 and 5B are different
precincts and that Precinct 5B contains the Marshall Street address, but not
the Stratmore Circle address. The attendant voter registrations and Perkins’s
July 30, 2022, change thereof, homestead exemption documentation, and
Notice of Candidacy were introduced into evidence pursuant to the
stipulations.
3 Mayor Adrian Perkins was the only witness to testify.2 By way of
background, Perkins testified that he is a graduate of Captain Shreve High
School (2003), the Military Academy at West Point (2008), and Harvard
Law School (2018).3 Further, he was elected Mayor of the City of
Shreveport in 2018. Regarding qualification for the 2018 election, the
following colloquy occurred:
Q: Did you fill out a Notice of Candidacy in connection with that race?
A: I’m not sure what that document is. I filled out several documents to qualify for that race.
Q: Mr. Mayor, are you telling us you don’t know what a Notice of Candidacy is?
A: I filled out several documents for that race.
Q: Do you know what a Notice of Candidacy is?
A: I’m not sure exactly what’s on that document ….
Regarding the Notice of Candidacy for the November 8, 2022, election, the
Q: All right. Did you read the Notice of Candidacy before you signed it in 2022?
A: I did not read the entire document on that day. My team reviewed it with me, and we looked over multiple aspects of it. For instance, I had some fines that were outstanding that we had to pay. So, I made sure that we paid those fines.
2 Perkins’s counsel objected to Perkins testifying on the basis that, because all relevant facts had been decided by stipulation, the only issue was a legal one, i.e., the application of La. R.S. 18:492 to the stipulated facts. Counsel argued that under these circumstances, any testimony from Perkins would be for political rather than factual or legal purposes. The trial judge allowed the testimony over objection, noting that he would “regulate the questioning to keep it squarely on the appropriate legal issues, because this is a court of law, not a court of politics.” 3 Perkins testified that, while he does have a legal education, he has not taken the bar in any jurisdiction. 4 And as I was reading that document on the day of, there were multiple news cameras in my face, I was in the middle of a workday. And there were some lines that I did get a bit cross with while reading that particular document.
After reviewing the 2022 Notice of Candidacy, Perkins testified that he
understood he was under oath when he signed the document. He further
testified that “several members of [his] campaign team” helped him review
the document and, over strenuous objection of his counsel, Perkins stated
that he conferred with his personal attorney before signing the form. Perkins
agreed that he had to pay certain fines in order to comply with items 10, 11,
and 12 of the form,4 but also conceded that he did not personally read the
form the day that he signed it, or the week prior. Regarding item 8,
concerning voter registration and homestead exemption, Perkins testified
that he had conflated items 7 and 8 on the form, both of which begin with
the same phraseology.5 Perkins explained, “I thought that I read paragraph
8, but I read paragraph 7, and thought that it was paragraph 8, yes, correct.”
Perkins also testified that both the Stratmore Circle and Marshall
Street residences are within the City of Shreveport and that he has always
had just one domicile – the City of Shreveport.
Following argument, the trial court took the matter under advisement
and signed a written ruling on August 2, 2022, finding that under this court’s
recent analysis and holding in Sellar v. Nance, 54,617 (La. App. 2 Cir.
3/1/22), 336 So. 3d 103, Perkins was disqualified from seeking re-election in
the November 8, 2022, primary election.
4 These certifications concern the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act and Code of Governmental Ethics and affirm that the candidate owes no “fines, fees, or penalties.” 5 Item 7 certifies that the candidate has not been convicted of a felony. 5 Perkins has appealed. The matter lodged with this court on August 3,
2022, and has been resolved in strict compliance with the time constraints
set forth in La. R.S. 18:1409.
DISCUSSION
The issue for review before this court is purely a legal one. Appellate
review of questions of law is simply a review of whether the trial court was
legally correct or incorrect. Percle v. Taylor, 20-244 (La. App. 5 Cir.
8/5/20), 301 So. 3d 1219, 1224, writ denied, 20-00983 (La. 8/10/20), 300
So. 3d 878; Buford v. Williams, 11-568 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/14/12), 88 So. 3d
540, 545, writ denied, 12-264 (La. 4/27/12), 86 So. 3d 630. To the extent
any factual determinations are to be reviewed, such review would be for
manifest error. Sealy v. Brown, 53,541 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/4/20), 291 So. 3d
290, writ denied, 20-00226 (La. 2/7/20), 292 So. 3d 60.
Because election laws must be interpreted to give the electorate the
widest possible choice of candidates, a person objecting to candidacy bears
the burden of proving that the candidate is disqualified. Landiak v.
Richmond, 05-0758 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So. 2d 535; Russell v. Goldsby, 00-
2595 (La. 9/22/00), 780 So. 2d 1048. Once the party bearing the burden of
proof in an objection to candidacy case has established a prima facie case
that the candidate is disqualified, the burden shifts to the party opposing the
disqualification to rebut the showing. Sealy v. Brown, supra.
A candidate shall possess the qualifications for the office he seeks at
the time he qualifies for that office. La. R.S. 18:451.
A candidate sets out his qualifications in the initial filing of notice of
candidacy under La. R.S. 18:461. Kelley v. Desmarteau, 50,552 (La. App. 2
Cir. 9/28/15), 184 So. 3d 55. The purpose of the notice of candidacy is to 6 provide sufficient information to show a candidate is qualified to run for the
office he seeks. Sellar v. Nance, supra; Percle v. Taylor, supra; Trosclair v.
Joseph, 14-675 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/9/14), 150 So. 3d 315, writs not cons., 14-
1909, 1920 (La. 9/12/14), 148 So. 3d 572, 937.
La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2) sets forth the requirements for a notice of
candidacy, in relevant part, as follows:
(2)(a) The notice of candidacy also shall include a certificate, signed by the candidate, certifying all of the following:
***
(i) That he has read the notice of his candidacy. (ii) That he meets the qualifications of the office for which he is qualifying.
(viii) Except for a candidate for United States senator or representative in congress or a candidate who resides in a nursing home as defined in R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a veterans’ home operated by the state or federal government, that if he claims a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, he is registered and votes in the precinct in which that residence is located.
(ix) That all of the statements contained in it are true and correct.
La. R.S. 18:101(B) provides for the homestead exemption and voter
registration, in relevant part, as follows:
For purposes of the laws governing voter registration and voting, “resident” means a citizen who resides in this state and in the parish, municipality, if any, and precinct in which he offers to register and vote, with an intention to reside there indefinitely. If a citizen resides at more than one place in the state with an intention to reside there indefinitely, he may register and vote only at one of the places at which he resides. If a person claims a homestead exemption, pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, on one of the residences, he shall register and vote in the precinct in which that residence is located, except that a person who resides in a
7 nursing home as defined in R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a veterans’ home operated by the state or federal government may register and vote at the address where the nursing home or veterans’ home is located.
An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a
candidate in a primary election shall be based on specific grounds which
may include that the defendant does not meet the qualifications for the office
he seeks in the primary election under La. R.S. 18:492.
La. R.S. 18:492(A) states, in relevant part:
A. An action objecting to the candidacy of a person who qualified as a candidate in a primary election shall be based on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) The defendant failed to qualify for the primary election in the manner prescribed by law.
(3) The defendant does not meet the qualifications for the office he seeks in the primary election.
The record before us contains stipulations, expressly agreed to by
Perkins, that establish that at the time he signed, under oath, the Notice of
Candidacy, he was not registered to vote in the precinct in which he claimed
homestead exemption. La. R.S. 18:101(B). Indeed, Perkins was elected
Mayor in 2018 and bought the home on Marshall Street in 2019, at which
time he claimed homestead exemption on that residence. Thus, Perkins held
the office of Mayor of the City of Shreveport for approximately three years
without changing his voter registration to comply with the statute and
changed his voter registration only after the realization that he had falsely
signed the Notice of Candidacy. Against these undisputed facts, we do not
find compelling Perkins’s argument that his false certification was an honest,
8 technical, and immaterial mistake having no legal significance, for which he
should not be disqualified. As we stated in Sellar v. Nance, supra:
Considering the integrity necessary to the process of qualifying for public office, we agree with the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and analysis in Percle v. Taylor, supra. The manner of qualifying in La. R.S. 18:461 is by filing an accurate notice of candidacy, under oath. We agree with our colleagues of the Fifth Circuit that any information on the notice of candidacy required to be given by oath is substantive and/or material information and that “any inaccuracies, mistakes, or false statements” made under oath regarding this information are grounds for disqualification under La. R.S. 18:492(A), as a failure to qualify in the manner prescribed by law.
On this record, and under this court’s recent precedent, we find no
legal error on the part of the trial court. The outcome in this matter is
governed by and falls squarely within this court’s holding in Sellar v. Nance,
supra; La. R.S. 18:492(A). We note that Perkins seeks to distinguish this
matter from Sellar v. Nance on the grounds that one of the residences of
Nance was outside the district for which he was seeking qualification, thus
calling his residency into question, while both of Perkins’s residences are
located in the City of Shreveport. While this distinction is factually
accurate, our holding in Sellar v. Nance was not limited solely to the issue of
residence. This court expressly held that a false certification on a Notice of
Candidacy that the candidate was registered to vote in the same precinct in
which the candidate claims homestead exemption is a substantive and
materially false statement that is grounds for disqualifying the candidate.
Thus, the fact that both of Perkins’s residences at issue are located within the
City of Shreveport does not by itself warrant qualification for candidacy for
the office of Mayor where the candidate made false certifications on his
Notice of Candidacy.
9 Finally, Perkins contends that he met all qualifications for mayor
under Shreveport’s Home Rule Charter, Art. 5, § 5.01, which provides that
the mayor “shall be a qualified elector and a resident of the City of
Shreveport,” and does not mention that voter registration must be the same
as the homestead exemption. However, Perkins has provided no statute or
jurisprudence that would justify negating the mandates of the Election Code,
R.S. 18:463 A(2), in favor of the Home Rule Charter. In fact, the Charter
confers on the city all powers, rights, privileges, and immunities that are
“not expressly denied by * * * general state law[.]” Charter, Art. 2, § 2.01
(b). We decline to read R.S. 18:463 A(2) out of the law in favor of the
Charter.
For the reasons expressed, we hold that the trial court’s ruling
disqualifying Adrian Perkins from seeking re-election for the office of
Mayor of the City of Shreveport was proper.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Costs of this appeal are assessed to Adrian Perkins.
AFFIRMED.
10 STONE, J., concurring.
A candidate for office sets out his qualifications in the initial filing of
a Notice of Candidacy under La. R.S. 18:461. If a person claims a
homestead exemption, he shall register and vote in the precinct in which that
residence is located. La. R.S. 18:101.
It is undisputed that a citizen may reside at more than one place.
However, in Sellar v. Nance, 54,617 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/22), 336 So. 3d
103, 112-113, this Court stated, “[A]ny inaccuracies, mistakes, or false
statements made under oath are grounds for disqualification under La. R.S.
18:492.”
It is undisputed that, at the time Mr. Perkins filed his Notice of
Candidacy, he was registered to vote in one precinct, while claiming his
homestead exemption in another. Despite Mr. Perkins’ assertions, the error
cannot be trivialized as a mere “oversight” or “legally insignificant” because
Mr. Perkins is not the average layperson. He is a graduate of the United
States Military Academy at West Point and Harvard University School of
Law. Mr. Perkins testified that he and his campaign team reviewed the
Notice of Candidacy, and he conferred with his personal attorney prior to
submitting it.
Further, the form was signed under oath, and Mr. Perkins attested that
the information contained therein was correct. It is indeed telling that Mr.
Perkins did not immediately correct his error. He did not change his voter
registration to conform with the statutory requirements until July 30, 2022,
the day after the challenger filed the petition objecting to Mr. Perkins’
candidacy and after qualifying for the mayoral race had ended.
Additionally, Mr. Perkins’ testimony that the inaccurate attestation on the 1 Notice of Candidacy was attributable to the presence of “multiple news
cameras,” seems disingenuous because he invited the presence of the media,
and he is a combat veteran.
Furthermore, the evidence established that Mr. Perkins has a pattern
of utilizing the Stratmore Circle address in his bids for public office.
Although Mr. Perkins purchased the Marshall Street residence in 2019, he
used the address on Stratmore Circle when he qualified and ran for the
United States Senate in 2020. The use of that address may be political
strategy which has served him in the past. However, the false statement on
the Notice of Candidacy is grounds for disqualification.
For these reasons, I concur.
2 THOMPSON, J., concurring.
I concur in the opinion and write separately to emphasize the
significance and implications of the untrue certifications on the Notice of
Candidacy form. In the instant matter, over the years Perkins undertook
three affirmative acts, each with specific and exacting requirements, and
each with the consequence of rejection if the requirements were not strictly
met.
First, Perkins registered to vote in Shreveport, Caddo Parish. The
form to qualify to vote, as detailed in La. R.S. 18:104, has specific
information required, which if not satisfied results in denial of the
application to register to vote. The first step in protecting the integrity of the
election process is to make certain only qualified citizens are registered to
vote. To be a qualified citizen to register to vote you must, by definition,
meet certain specific and exacting qualifications. If those requirements are
not met, the resulting consequence is that you are not registered to vote until
those requirements are satisfied. Perkins successfully met these
requirements.
Second, Perkins purchased a residence and decided the significant tax
advantages of Louisiana’s homestead exemption laws were attractive
enough to undertake the steps necessary to apply for and obtain the
exemption, which certainly resulted in the lawful savings of thousands of
dollars in taxes over the years. As set forth in La. Const. art. 7, § 20 and La.
R.S. 47:1703, an applicant must certify the information provided about
himself and the property for which the exemption is sought. If the
requirements are not met, the resulting consequence is that the property
owner does not enjoy the homestead exemption and its favorable tax 1 implications until the requirements are timely satisfied. An application for
homestead exemption must occur before a certain date (December 31st) to be
effective for that corresponding tax year. Perkins successfully met these
Lastly, Perkins sought to qualify as a candidate for the office of
Mayor of the City of Shreveport, an office he currently holds. As addressed
in great detail in the opinion, that process is exacting and includes a sworn
certification of certain facts. In this instance, the office seeker must certify
that he is registered to vote in the precinct in which the residence enjoying
the benefit of the homestead exemption is located. La. R.S.
18:463(A)(2)(a)(viii). Perkins signed a sworn certificate that he was
registered to vote at the address where he claims a homestead exemption
when he qualified for office. That certification was not factual. The
resulting consequence of not qualifying in accordance with law is that the
candidate is excluded from the election unless he remedies the failure to
meet that qualification.
Louisiana has a three-day qualification period, and Perkins testified he
was aware of the requirement on the Notice of Candidacy that he had to
resolve all outstanding fines, fees, or penalties pursuant to the Code of
Governmental Ethics before qualifying for office, as that would serve as an
impediment to his being able to properly qualify, in the event there was a
challenge on those grounds. Perkins also had the option, before completing
the qualifying process, of either moving his voter registration or moving or
canceling his homestead exemption, and then qualifying. Unfortunately, he
testified he was unaware of all of the contents of the sworn and signed
Notice of Candidacy until after the qualifying period had ended. Signatures 2 are not mere ornaments. Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So. 2d 133 (La. 1983);
JPS Equip., LLC. v. Cooper, 50,506 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 188 So. 3d
1106. A person who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its
contents and cannot avoid its obligations by claiming that he did not read it,
that he did not understand it, or that it was not explained. Id.
Registering to vote, obtaining a homestead exemption, and qualifying
for elective office all have minimal hurdles which must be cleared to enjoy
the desired results and privileges provided by each. Failing to comply with
and satisfy the requirements has the natural consequence of not enjoying the
desired benefits. Unfortunately, Perkins realized the disqualifying
circumstances after the qualifying period had ended, and changing his voter
registration after the close of qualifying was untimely and insufficient to
remedy the problem. While he maintains his right to vote, his homestead
exemption, and current office, he has not qualified as provided by law and
therefore must be disqualified from the upcoming November, 2022 election.