Fox v. Abel

2 Conn. 541
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJune 15, 1818
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 2 Conn. 541 (Fox v. Abel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fox v. Abel, 2 Conn. 541 (Colo. 1818).

Opinion

Swot, Ch. J,

The question is, whether the statute, by the words « Lord’s day” means the natural, or solar day.

It is a well known rule of the common law, that a day comprises twenty-four hours, extending from midnight to midnight, including morning, evening and night, and is called the natural day. When a day is spoken of in law, it comprehends that period of time. When an act is to be done on a particular day, it may be done at any time between those hours. 2 Black. Comm. 141. And, of course, a prohibition to do an act on a particular day, must comprise the, same period. If the service of civil process should be prohibited on Monday, the prohibition would reach from midnight to midnight. Of course, when the statute declared, that if any civil process should be issued and served on the Lord’s day, it should be void, and of no effect, it must, ex vi termini, comprehend the whole twenty-four hours, unless something can be collected from the statute itself, to warrant a different construction.

It is contended, that from certain expressions in the statute, it is evident the legislature meant by the Lord’s day, a solar day, including only the time, from the rising to the setting of the sun, In the 6th section of the statute, Innkeepers are prohibited from entertaining people on Saturday night after sunset, on the Lord’s day, or on the evening following, Now, it is said, if the Lord’s day comprehends the whole rime till midnight, then the evening following cannot be the evening of the Lord's day, but of the succeeding day : but as it is manifest, the legislature meant the evening of the Lord’s day, the consequence follows, that they must have considered [543]*543Ihe Lori's day to be a solar day,ami then the evening following would be the evening of the Lord’s day, and make the statute consistent. But if this reasoning be correct, there can be no evening of a natural day. For when we say the Lord’s day, or the evening following, if the evening following cannot be the evening of the Lord’s day, because it extends till midnight; then if we use the expression, the evening of the Lord’s day, it will be equally incorrect; because the Lord’s day extends till midnight. The question, then, is reduced to this point — whether any part of the natural day can, with legal propriety, be called evening ? That the expression, evening of a day, with reference to the natural day, is proper, may be proved by the authority of Lord Coke. “ Of days, some are natural, and some are artificial : the natural day consists of twenty-four hours, and comprehends the solar day and the night; and therefore, in indictments of burglary, and the like, we say, in the night of the same day.” Co. Litt. 135. Here, the subject is fully explained. Though the natural day consists of twenty-four hours j yet, as it comprehends the solar day and the night, we speak of day and night within the period of the natural day, to distinguish the different parts of the day. Hence, the propriety of the expression, the evening of a day, or, the evening following a day ; and they have both the same import in common understanding, and are used with equal propriety in reference to the solar day, and the night, as comprehended in the natural day. We make use of language appropriate to the solar day, not because we adopt it, but for the purpose of distinguishing certain portions of the natural day. This is owing to the poverty of our language, but will warrant no inference, that when the legislature used the word day, they intended a solar day.

It is further objected, that on this construction these words can have no operation ; for the Lord’s day comprehends the everting. This, however, constitutes no objection. It is nothing but a repetition ; and nothing is more common in statutes, than repeated prohibitions of the same thing, in different words. In the statute under consideration, all secular business is forbidden on the Lord’s day, or any part thereof, These last words are but a repeated prohibition, and cannot affect the construction of the statute. Yet in the case under consideration, there seems to he some colour for this prohibition. The statute had prohibited certain things to be done [544]*544on Saturday niglit after sun-set, and on the Lord's day» Now, if the legislature had stopped here, it might possibly have been understood, from the words Lord's day, in connex-ion with Saturday night, that they did not mean "to extend the prohibition to Sunday evening; and to guard against the possibility of such a construction, this clause was added.

It may also be remarked, that if the legislature had intended to have prohibited secular business only within the period of the solar day, they would have made use of appropriate and definite language j and it cannot be supposed* that they would have used words proper to express the natural day, and then have left it to be inferred from a verbal criticism, that they intended the solar day. If any doubt, however, can be raised by this section, it is fully removed by another. In regulating the sailing of vessels, they are prohibited to depart from any harbour, &c., on the Lord's day, at any time between the morning light and the setting sun. This language clearly shews, that the legislature did not consider the period of time between the morning light and the setting sun to be the whole of the Lord’s day, but only a part of it. This, then, proves, that they did not in the statute mean the solar day. If the legislature, in the other parts of the statute, had, by the term Lord’s day, meant only a solar day, then there could have been no possible reason for the introduction of these expressions into this section ; for no one will believe, that they intended to restrain sailors between the morning light and sun-rise, when no other persons were restrained during that time. Indeed, it is evident if the legislature had considered the Lord’s day to be the solar day, they would never have made this restriction with Aspect to sailors, but left them on the same footing with every body else. It is, then, conclusive, that they could not have understood by the Lord’s day, the solar day. If the expression had been, between the, rising and the setting sun, then it might, with some plausibility, have been inferred, that the legislature contemplated only the Solar day, in the regulations of the statute ; and that this w as an exposition of their intent. But the extension of the prohibition to the time between the morning light and the rising sun, excludes such an inference, and demonstrates, that they never contemplated the solar day $ for there might be some reason why the prohibition should be [545]*545;-.ia\ed in favour of sailors ; but certainly none why it should be extended.

The ease of Carpenter v. Crane, 1 Root 98. has been referred to as an authority in point. Having been of manse! in that case, I am able to say the doctrine that Sunday comprehends only the solar day, was not then promulgated : it is a doctrine of a later date, and was drawn as a consequence from that decision ; which was probably owing to the imposing equity of that particular case; a circumstance, which lots often led to a deviation from principle productive of serious inconvenience in other cases.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2 Conn. 541, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fox-v-abel-conn-1818.