Eberhardt, Judge.
The question raised by this appeal is whether plaintiffs may lawfully pursue their businesses of selling-[242]*242liquor for beverage purposes by the drink for consumption on the premises under their licenses from the city between the hours of midnight Saturday and 2 a.m. Sunday morning. The answer to this question must be determined by consideration of several State statutes and the municipal ordinance involved. For convenience in handling we set them out at the outset.
The first having a possible bearing on the case is the old tippling house statute, Code § 26-6105 (Ga. L. 1865-6, p. 233), which provides: “Any person who shall keep open a tippling house on the Sabbath day or Sabbath night shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” This statute, while archaic in language, is still in force in this State, the phrase “tippling house” referring to “one where intoxicating beverages, including beer and liquor, are served in small quantities to be drunk on the premises.” Bolden v. State, 88 Ga. App. 871, 874 (78 SE2d 368). At this point in the history of our State, it was not unlawful to operate “tippling houses” but it became so only if operated in contravention of the statute. Werner v. State, 51 Ga. 426, 427. In reviewing the history of our liquor laws, the brief of defendants Sheriff of Fulton County and Solicitor General of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit point out that “the original prohibition of the Trustees of the Colony of Georgia against 'rum, slaves and lawyers’ was soon lifted, and throughout most of the life of the Colony and the early history of our State there were few, if any, regulations on the sale of spirituous liquors. However, in 1907 (Ga. L. 1907, p. 81) general prohibition against almost all types of alcoholic beverages was imposed by the General Assembly. This prohibition continued in force for almost thirty years. However, in 1935, first the sale of malt beverages (Ga. L. 1935, p. 73) and then the sale of wine (Ga. L. 1935, p. 492) were authorized. Almost three years later the sale of spirituous liquors was also authorized (Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).” Some of the salient features of prohibition in this State, through the Act of 1938, may be found in the editorial note at the beginning of Code Ann. Title 58, Intoxicating Liquors.
The Act of 1938 (Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103; Code Ann. Ch. 58-10), known as the “Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Alcoholic Beverages and Liquors,” is the second statute [243]*243which must be considered on this appeal. Particular portions of this Act will be cited as they appear in Code Ann. Title 58. It provides for the exemption (see Code Ann. §§ 58-124, 58-306, 58-1078) from the general prohibition laws (see Code Ann. Ch. 58-1, 58-2, and 58-3) on a local option basis of counties where the voters vote in favor of permitting the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages and liquors, including distilled spirits, in accordance with the provisions of .the Act. Code Ann. §§ 58-1004, 58-1008. The only types of licenses authorized (Code Ann. § 58-1023) are those to manufacturers (Code Ann. § 58-1024), wholesalers (Code Ann. § 58-1025) and retailers (Code Ann. § 58-1026). The retailer’s license authorized only what is generally known as a “package stores,” and the sale of liquor by the drink for consumption on the premises remained unlawful not only because such sales were not exempted by the Act from the general prohibition laws but also were clearly excluded from the operation of the Act. Code Ann. § 58-1026 provides: “A retailer’s license shall authorize the holder to sell only in the original and unbroken package or packages, which package or packages shall contain not less than one-half pint of distilled spirits or alcoholic beverages each, arid shall not permit the breaking of said package or packages on the premises where sold, and shall not permit the drinking of the contents of said package or packages on the premises where sold.” See also Code Ann. § 58-1011 (f) defining “retailer” or “retail distributor.” Code Ann. § 58-1027 provides: “It shall be unlawful for any retailer, as defined in this Chapter, to allow or permit the breaking of said package or packages on the premises where sold or to allow or permit the drinking of the contents of said package or packages on the premises where sold and any- violation thereof shall be a misdemeanor, and the offender thereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, be punished as for a misdemeanor.” In addition Code Ann. § 58-1022 (b) provides that it shall be mandatory on the State Revenue Commissioner, charged with the administration of the Act (Code Ann. § 58-1012), to revoke the license issued by him to anyone convicted of selling or serving spirituous liquors on the premises in unbroken (broken?) packages of any size; and Code Ann. [244]*244§ 58-10621 prohibits females from working in any liquor store as hostess, bar maid, or in any other manner.
The two provisions of the 1938 Act relating to Sunday sales of liquor are found in Code Ann. §§ 58-1079 and 58-1060. The former provides: “It shall be unlawful to sell any liquor in any of the counties specified by this Chapter [Act] between the hours of 12:00 o’clock, midnight, on Saturday night, until the hour of 12:00 o’clock, midnight, on Sunday night, at any time and at any time on election days. It is the purpose and intent of this section to prevent the sale of liquor on Sunday and election days, and any violation of same shall be a misdemeanor by the buyer and/or the seller.” The latter section provides: “Any person who shall sell or offer for sale any spirituous liquors as herein defined on Sundays or elections days shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished as for a misdemeanor as provided in section 27-2506.”
By Ga. L. 1964, p. 771 (Code Ann. § 58-1083), the 1938 Act was amended by renumbering (as it is numbered in the official Acts) Section 31, the repealer clause, as Section 32, and by inserting a new section 31. This new section reads: “(a) Anything in this Chapter [Act] to the contrary notwithstanding, every county in the State of Georgia where the sale of distilled spirits or alcoholic beverages is authorized by law [‘wet’ counties by referendums under the 1938 Act] and which such counties have a population of 40,000 or more, according to the United States decennial census of 1960 or any future such decennial census, and any city or municipality in that part of such cities lying within such counties may, through proper resolution or ordinance, authorize the issuance of licenses to sell distilled spirits or alcoholic beverages for beverage purposes by the drink, said sales to be for consumption only on the premises.
“ (b) Every county and city as set forth in this section shall have the full power and authority to adopt all reasonable rules and regulations governing the qualifications and criteria for issuance of any such license and shall further have the power [245]*245and authority to promulgate reasonable rules and regulations governing the conduct of any licensee provided for in this section, including but not being limited to the regulation of hours of business, types of employees, and other matters which may fall within the police powers of such municipalities or counties.
“(c) Those persons who are duly licensed as wholesalers under the provisions of this Chapter [Act] shall be authorized to sell to any person or persons licensed as provided in this section, distilled spirits at wholesale, and the persons so licensed under this section shall be authorized to purchase such distilled spirits from a licensed wholesaler at wholesale.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The remainder of the 1964 Act (Code Ann. § 58-1083 (d, e)) makes provision for a special referendum election in the “wet” counties and municipalities referred to in order to determine whether the Act shall become effective in such areas.
Upon a favorable vote the City of Atlanta enacted a comprehensive ordinance, attached to the petition as an exhibit, “Governing the Licensing and Regulation of the Sale and Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages in the City of Atlanta.” Among other things the ordinance defines “License” as “the authorization by the governing authority of the City of Atlanta to engage in the sale for consumption on the premises of alcoholic beverages.” Various rules and regulations are set forth governing the license for the sale of spirituous liquors by the drink, and Sections 30(d) and (g) provide as follows: “(d) Licensees for the sale of spirituous liquors by the drink or for the operation of a bottle house2 on their premises shall not engage in the sale or permit the consumption of spirituous liquors between the hours of 2:00 a.m. Sunday and 9:00 a.m. Monday and between the hours of 2:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. on other days. . .”
[246]*246“(g) Except as hereinabove provided, no licensee for the sale of spirituous liquors by the package at retail shall permit his place of business to be open for the sale of alcoholic beverages or to sell alcoholic beverages on Sundays, election days, Christmas day and Thanksgiving day. All other licensees shall not permit their places of business to be open for the sale of alcoholic beverages or sell alcoholic beverages on Sundays, election days and Christmas day.”
We turn now to the contentions made in the case.
The Ordinance. It is contended by defendants that the ordinance, since it only prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages between certain hours, cannot be construed as permitting by implication the sale of beverages during the hours not prohibited. If this contention be sound, then the entire ordinance is meaningless since the sale of alcoholic beverages would never be permitted. We cannot indulge in such sophistry. The ordinance provides that a license constitutes the authorization from the city to engage in the sale of alcoholic beverages, and the regulations in regard to hours of sale qualify and modify the authorization given. It is beyond question that the ordinance authorizes the sale of alcoholic beverages by the drink until 2 a.m. on Sunday.
The Tippling House Statute. It is contended that this statute forbids selling liquor by the drink between 12 midnight on Saturday and 2 a.m. on Sunday. Bolden v. State, 88 Ga. App. 871, supra, affirmed a conviction for keeping open a tippling house in violation of this statute (Code § 26-6105), and from page 873 of the opinion it appears that the raid on the premises occurred at about 2 a.m. on Sunday morning. However, the question was not raised or decided in that case as to whether the statute covers the hours between 12 midnight on Saturday night until 2 a.m. on Sunday, and, in the absence of any other authority in our courts, we regard the question as an open one.
The tippling house statute uses the phrase “Sabbath day or Sabbath night” to designate the time within which the house must be closed. Does this cover the period of time from midnight Saturday until dawn Sunday?3
[247]*247Generally the word “day,” when not qualified, means a calendar or civil day consisting of 24 hours from midnight to midnight. See Booker v. Chief Engineer of Fire Dept. of Woburn, 324 Mass. 264 (85 NE2d 766); People v. Breckenridge, 16 Mise. 2d 704 (190 NYS2d 122); Fisk Discount Corp. v. Brooklyn Taxicab Trans. Go., 270 App. Div. 491 (60 NYS2d 453); (Rose v. State, 107 Ga. 697 (33 SE 439) (election day includes period from 12 midnight to 12 midnight); City of Hayeville v. Jones, 194 Ga. 57 (a) (20 SE2d 599) (twenty days to amend are calendar days); Henderson & Son v. Reynolds, 84 Ga. 159 (2a) (10 SE 734, 7 LRA 327) (standard of time in computation of a day is from 12 midnight to 12 midnight rather than some arbitrary and artificial standard, such as railroad time); 11 Words & Phrases 108, “Day.” Thus if the words “Sunday” or “first day of the week, commonly called the Lord’s day, or any part thereof” are used in the sense of an entire 24-hour civil day of the week, it extends from 12 midnight to 12 midnight. See State v. Green, 37 Mo. 466; Shaw v. Dodge, 5 N. H. 462; 40A Words & Phrases, Sunday, pp. 309-310.
However, where the words “Sabbath day,” “Lord’s day” or “Sunday” are used without clear reference to a 24-hour civil or calendar day, different considerations come into play. As summarized in State v. Green, supra, p. 469: “At common law the natural and civil day consists of twenty-four hours, from midnight to midnight, and the artificial or solar day extends from sunrise to sunset. (Co. Litt. 135, o.) The Sabbath or Lord’s day, as one of the dies fasti, having its origin in the Christian Church, has sometimes been held to mean, both at common law [248]*248and under the statutes of some of the States, the artificial or solar day, extending from morning light to the setting sun. (Co. Litt. 135; Keilw. 75; Fox v. Abel, 2 Conn. 541; Hiller v. English, 4 Strobh. [S. C.] 486).” The subject was thoroughly explored in the cited cases of Fox v. Abel (1818) and Hiller v. English (1848), supra, where religious and common law authorities were examined at length. Trumbull, J. concludes: “From these authorities it seems evident, that neither by the Scriptures, nor by the common law, was. the time after midnight and before the dawn of the morning of the Sabbath Day, ever considered as included in, or constituting any part of, holy time.” Fox v. Abel, 2 Conn. 541, 547. On the same page he asserts: “By the Lord’s day, in the English statutes, and the language of the elementary writers, is technically meant the solar day, commencing at sunrise: and it is certain, that no part of the preceding night was ever included in it.” Thus the Connecticut court held, in an action of assault and battery and false imprisonment, in which defendants pleaded justification in serving civil process, that “The Lord’s day, on which service of civil process is prohibited by statute, comprises the solar day only” and does not include the period of time between midnight Saturday and dawn Sunday, when the defendants levied execution upon the body of plaintiff and committed him to prison. Similarly, the South Carolina court, supra, in holding that a verdict may be received and published between midnight Saturday and dawn Sunday, stated in the headnotes that “Although Sunday, when mentioned in a statute, begins and ends as another civil day, to it, as a common law festival, and as a holyday established by the usage of various sects of Christians disagreeing as to its beginning and end, common law prohibitions extend only from sunrise ’till sunset.”
In the case at bar had the statute used only the phrase “Sabbath day” we might be confronted with the problem of determining whether the phrase should be construed as referring merely to a civil day of 24 hours or, as the above cases indicate, to a special period of time defined and explained by its long history. The phrase in the tippling house statute, however, is “Sabbath day or Sabbath night;” and since the Sabbath is deemed to be [249]*249Sunday in this State (see Gunn v. State, 89 Ga. 341, supra, note 1), it only remains to be determined what is meant by the words “day” and “night.”
“Night” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed., unabridged) as “That part of the natural day when the sun is beneath the horizon, or the time from sunset to sunrise; esp., the time from dusk to; dawn, when no light of the sun is visible. Cf. DAY, 1.” “DAY, 1.” as just referred to defines “day” as “The time of light or interval between one night and the next; the time between sunrise and sunset, or from dawn to darkness.” Hence the word “day,” when contrasted with the word “night,” can mean only daylight hours or the hours between sunrise and sunset. As succinctly stated by Smith, J., in Fox v. Abel, 2 Conn. 541, 551: “We here find it made penal to convene and remain at public houses, drinking, or idly spending time, on Saturday night, after sunset, or on the Lord’s day, or on the evening following. Now, after reading this section, will anyone ask what period of time was intended by the Lord’s day, in this statute? Is it not a period altogether distinct from the evening? If not, why add a provision for the evening?”
The question thus boils down to whether 2 a.m. following midnight on Saturday is a part of the Sabbath night. Commonwealth v. Newton, 25 Mass. (8 Pick.) 234, is clear authority that it is not. That case held, on an indictment against a victualler for keeping his shop open on the evening of the Lord’s day, “that, by the words, 'any part of the Lord’s day or evening,’ the legislature intended Sunday and the evening immediately following sunset on that day; and not the evening immediately preceding Sunday.” A contrary holding in Kroer v. People, 78 Ill. 294, cannot be approved, since that case would mean that Sunday has two nights. Instead we approve the contention of the defendant in that case that the words “Sabbath night” mean the period of darkness following the Sabbath day. This construction is in accordance with the above-cited authorities and with the customary and ordinary meaning attributed to such phrases. As Shakespeare has it, “To thine own self be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, Thou canst not then be false to any man.” Hamlet, Act i, Sc. 3, l. 78. Or Milton [250]*250“Darkness now rose, As daylight sunk, and brought in low’ring Night, Her shadowy offspring.”
We can only conclude that the phrase “Sabbath day or Sabbath night” as used in the tippling house statute (Code § 26-6105) covers the period from dawn Sunday morning until midnight Sunday night. Consequently it is not relevant to this appeal.
The Act of 1938. The two sections of this Act prohibiting Sunday sales of liquor cannot be construed as laws of general application prohibiting the sale of liquor by the drink between midnight Saturday and 2 a.m. Sunday since they apply only to the sales authorized by that Act. Prior to the Act it was illegal to sell liquor at any time under the general prohibition laws, and obviously the two Sunday-sales sections, contained in the Act permitting sale of liquor on a local-option basis, apply only within the framework of that Act. This is indicated in the prohibitory sections themselves. Code Ann. § 58-1079 prohibits the Sunday sale of liquor “in any of the counties specified by this Chapter [Act].” Code Ann. § 58-1060 prohibits the sale of “any spirituous liquors as herein defined,” referring to the Act’s definition of “spirituous liquors,” contained in Code Ann. § 58-1011.
Since these two sections apply only to the sale of liquor authorized by the Act, it is important to note what sales the Act does not authorize. As previously seen it does not authorize the sale of liquor by the drink, such sales being illegal at any time both before and after passage of the Act. See Raines v. State, 96 Ga. App. 727 (101 SE2d 589). Thus the legislature, in enacting the Act of 1938, had no occasion to, and in fact did not, make the Sunday prohibitory sections applicable to the sales of liquor by the drink since these were not authorized by the Act and remained illegal at any time and at any place.
The question then is whether the Act of 1964, authorizing for the first time the sale of liquor by the drink, meshed itself into the Act of 1938 in such a way as to become subject to the Sunday-sales prohibitions. It does not upon its face, and perhaps no further discussion is needed. However, there are several cogent considerations which support the view that the 1964 Act, [251]*251to the extent covered by that Act, is a self-contained, treatment of the subject matter of liquor sales by the drink.
The 1938 Act provides (Code Ann. § 58-1023) that “Licenses which, may be issued under authority of this Chapter shall be as set forth in sections 58-1024 to 58-1026.” As previously seen these comprise only manufacturer’s, wholesaler’s, and package retailer’s licenses, and the regulatory provisions of the 1938 Act can apply only to these types of licenses. The 1964 Act does not amend § 58-1023 so as to refer to a new section providing for licenses for the sale of liquor by the drink, nor does it amend or repeal §§ 58-1026, 58-1027, 58-1022 (b), or 58-1062 which, as we have seen, exclude sales by the drink from the operation of the 1938 Act. Had some such procedure been followed we might well conclude that licenses for the sale of liquor by the drink were merely a fourth category of license fitted into the whole regulatory framework of the 1938 Act.
But on the contrary, the 1964 Act does not purport to change, to repeal, or to fit its provisions into any part of the 1938 Act but deals with a subject matter not previously covered by the Act; and, in doing so, it begins with the words, “Anything in this Act to the contrary notwithstanding,” and then proceeds to add an entirely new section seemingly dependent upon the 1938 Act only for a definition of counties where the sale of distilled spirits or alcoholic beverages is authorized (“wet” counties). Hence we can only conclude that the Sunday-sale prohibitions of the 1938 Act did not apply, when enacted, to the sale of liquor by the drink, and that the 1964 Act does not extend the 1938 prohibitions to the sale of liquor by the drink authorized by the latter Act. Thus there is no conflict between the provisions of the 1964 Act authorizing and empowering the municipalities to regulate the hours of business of licensees selling liquor by the drink and the Sunday-sales prohibitions of the 1938 Act.
If there could be any question of a conflict between the hours-of-sale provisions of the two Acts, however, the use of the words “Anything in this Act to the contrary notwithstanding” would render the hours-of-sale authorization of the 1964 Act supreme over the Sunday-sales prohibitions of the 1938 Act. [252]*252This phrase has a much broader meaning than a repealing clause or any other such language. Article 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States uses almost the same phraseology. It makes the Constitution of the United States and the laws passed pursuant thereto, and all treaties made, under the authority of the United States, the supreme law of the land, “anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” By this phrase a treaty made by the President of the United States and ratified by the Senate must be respected and honored even though in conflict with State constitutional provisions. When phrases of this type are used in statutes, they mean that the statute in which the phrase is used takes precedence over, and is intended to exclude and not include, the operation of other statutes which may not be in harmony therewith. Theodore Roosevelt Agency v. General Motors Acc. Corp., 156 Col. 237 (398 P2d 965); State v. Board of Education, 170 Ohio St. 415 (165 NE2d 918); State v. Christianson, 262 Wis. 262 (55 NW2d 20).
Defendants contend that since the phrase appears in Subsection (a) of the section added by the 1964 Act, it is operative only on Subsection (a) and not on Subsection (b) where the authorization as to regulation of horns of sale is found. The import of this argument is that each of the remaining Subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) would have to begin with the phrase in order for it to bring those sections within its ambit. A cursory reading of the 1964 Act readily reveals that the remaining subsections are dependent upon and relate to the authorization given in Subsection (a) to issue licenses for the sale of liquor for beverage purposes by the drink for consumption only on the premises, and to repeat the phrase in each of the subsections would be an exercise in redundancy. Ga. L. 1966, p. 340, also amends the 1938 Act in the same manner as did the 1964 Act, by adding a new section thereto, so as to authorize the sale of distilled spirits or alcoholic beverages for beverage purposes on the premises in certain counties and municipalities not covered by the 1964 Act. The only significant differences between the 1964 and 1966 Acts are that different counties are involved and there is no referendum requirement in [253]*253the 1966 Act. Otherwise Subsections (a), (b) and (c) of the 1964 Act are set forth practically verbatim in the 1966 Act with the exception that “(a)/’ “(b)” and “(c)” are not inserted between the sentences. The section added by the 1966 Act begins: “Any provision of this or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding. . .” Certainly it cannot be contended that this phrase is operative only upon the sentence in which it is contained and not upon the succeeding sentences; and we are not prepared to say that the phrase contained in the 1964 Act has no reference to the succeeding sentences merely because “(a),” “(b),” etc. are inserted between those sentences. Such a construction would be strained, to say the least, particularly in view of the fact that the 1964 Act does not repeal, modify or change provisions of the 1938 Act not in harmony with provisions of Subsections (b) and (c) of the 1964 Act, such as those of the 1938 Act relative to administration, regulation, licensing and bonding by the State Revenue Commissioner (Code Ann. §§ 58-1012, 58-1022, 58-1045). Under the 1964 Act those matters appear to be left to the local governments. In particular, Subsection (c) of the 1964 Act authorizes wholesalers to sell to persons “licensed as provided in this section,” referring to the local license which is the only one required under Subsection (b), whereas wholesalers are allowed by the 1938 Act (Code Ann. § 58-1025) to sell only to holders of wholesale or package retail licenses which must be obtained from the Commissioner under the 1938 Act (Code Ann. § 58-1022). A further inconsistency between the 1938 Act and Subsection (b) of the 1964 Act occurs where the former (Code Ann. § 58-1062)4 prohibits females from working in liquor stores as hostesses, bar maids, or in any other manner, whereas Subsection (b) of the 1964 Act provides that the local governments may prescribe rules and regulations governing the types of employees in the beverage-by-the-drink establishments, which would include females.
With this confusion and apparent conflict between Subsections (b) and (c) of the 1964 Act and the 1938 Act, and no attempt having been made to alter or modify the 1938 Act, the phrase [254]*254“Anything in this Act to the contrary notwithstanding” in the 1864 Act must necessarily apply to the Act of 1938, thereby making Subsections (b) and (c) of the 1964 Act controlling as to their subject matter. As stated in State v. Board of Education, 170 Ohio St. 415, supra: “‘Notwithstanding’ is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d Ed.) as meaning “without prevention or obstruction from or by; in spite of.’ [citations omitted.] It is axiomatic in statutory construction that words are not inserted into an Act without some purpose. The General Assembly enacted Sections 3311.26 and 3311.261, Revised Code, at the same time. With full knowledge that these acts had been adopted and that conflicts might arise thereunder, the General Assembly inserted the word ‘notwithstanding,’ and by so doing clearly indicated its intent that proceedings under Section 3311.261, Revised Code [containing the phrase ‘Notwithstanding sections 3311.22,’ etc.], should take precedence over pending proceedings previously instituted under the other enumerated sections.” To the same effect see Theodore Roosevelt Agency v. General Motors Acc. Corp., 156 Col. 237, and State v. Christianson, 262 Wis. 262, supra.
We conclude that in the event of any conflict between the Act of 1938 and that of 1964, the 1964 Act must take precedence. As previously indicated, however, we see no conflict between the Sunday-sales prohibitions of the 1938 Act and the hours-of-sale authorization of the 1964 Act, since the legislature has seen fit to give separate and different treatment to “package” sales and sales by the drink.
Constitutional Questions. It is urged that courts in construing statutes susceptible of two meanings, one of which would be unconstitutional, should adopt the construction which would render them constitutional. While we do not think the 1964 Act is susceptible of two meanings in regard to the hours of sale authorization, we nevertheless consider the constitutional arguments.
One group of arguments attacking the 1964 Act assumes as the major premise that the tippling house statute and the Sunday-sales prohibitions of the 1968 Act are laws of general application prohibiting the sale of liquor by the drink between [255]*255midnight Saturday and 2 a.m. Sunday. Since in our view the premise is not true, the 1964 Act authorizing such sales does not empower the City of Atlanta to adopt rules and regulations pertaining thereto which are in conflict with other laws of the State.
Nor do we think that it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to permit bottle house operators5 and licensees for the sale of liquor by the drink for beverage purposes for consumption only on the premises to remain open for business from midnight Saturday until 2 a.m. Sunday morning while “package store” operators must close at midnight Saturday, or to allow licensees other than package store operators to remain open on Thanksgiving. See § 30 (g) of the ordinance, supra. It would appear to us that the business of package stores' — selling liquor in the unbroken package to be taken away and consumed off the premises — is essentially a different one from that of selling liquor by the drink for beverage purposes for consumption only on the premises in night clubs, bars, restraurants, etc. Whatever may be the wisdom or desirability of the classification system and the rules and regulations applicable thereto, we cannot say that the classification is arbitrary upon its face or that there is no reasonable basis for it. A different question might be presented if there were patent discrimination as to hours of sale of package liquor between businesses selling package goods only and businesses selling by the drink and in the package. See Mayhue v. City of Plantation, 375 F2d 447 (5th Cir.).
Conclusion. Under the view we have taken the 1964 Act does not raise any question of repeal by implication. The tippling house statute does not cover the period of time from 12 midnight Saturday until 2 a.m. Sunday, and the Sunday-sales prohibitions of the 1938 Act do not apply to sales by the drink as authorized by the 1964 Act. The 1964 Act authorizes the municipalities involved to regulate the hours of business of sale-by-the drink licensees, and the ordinance of the City of Atlanta permitting such licensees to remain open until 2 a.m. on Sunday is a valid exercise of the authority conferred. Consequently, it was error to sustain the general demurrers and dismiss the petition.
[256]*256
Judgment reversed.
Hall, J., concurs both generally and specially. Whitman, J., concurs. Bell, P. J., and Quillian, J., concur in the judgment. Felton, C. J., Jordan, P. J., Pannell and Deen, JJ., dissent.