[207]*207Levine, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Cole, J., dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 220 infra.
Pursuant to Maryland Code (1974), § 12-601 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has certified two questions for resolution by this Court: First, whether a release in which a defendant accused of committing the crime of shoplifting has discharged the complaining party from all civil liability is void as a matter of public policy because it was executed in consideration of a nolle prosequi entered by the State’s Attorney. Secondly, if such a release is not void as against public policy, do the circumstances under which it was executed constitute duress as a matter of law? We hold that under the facts of this case, the release was neither in contravention of public policy nor the product of duress.
The episode which spawned this dispute occurred on August 4,1975, when a security guard employed by appellant at its supermarket in Glen Burhie arrested appellee who was then shopping for groceries in the company of her two little girls. According to the employee, he had observed appellee place a package of luncheon meat in her shoulder bag before proceeding through the checkout line and then leave the store without paying for the item. He further stated that on being confronted, appellee returned to the interior of the store, removed the package from her purse and placed it on a shelf. She allegedly offered to pay for the merchandise, valued at $2.49, after the special police officer placed her under arrest. At all times appellee denied committing the offense, claiming instead that she had returned the package of meat to a shelf in the canned vegetable aisle after deciding not to buy it, and only then moved toward the checkout line. She subsequently reentered the store at the request of the officer solely for the purpose of returning the merchandise to its proper location in the meat cooler, but was placed under arrest before she could do so.1
[208]*208After being detained at the store, appellee was taken to Anne Arundel County police headquarters at Millersville, where she was formally charged with the crime of shoplifting. She then retained counsel who informed the prosecuting attorney of her willingness to submit to a polygraph test with -the understanding that the results would be offered without objection at the criminal trial. With the agreement of the prosecutor, the Maryland State Police administered such a test, the outcome of which, according to appellee’s then counsel, was consistent with her claim of innocence. Subsequently, the prosecutor apparently refused to stipulate to the admissibility of the test, but instead wrote to defense counsel in January 1970 that he would dismiss the charge if a “civil release were to be given to the Complainants.” Alternatively, he offered to enter a dismissal even without such a release on the condition that he receive a written statement from appellant indicating that it did not object to that action being taken. Defense counsel forwarded the offer of the State’s Attorney to appellant, but received no response to his request for the statement suggested by the prosecutor.
On May 25, 1976, the date on which the criminal case was to be tried, appellee executed the. release in question and the State’s Attorney entered the nolle prosequi in open court. Several weeks later, appellee brought a diversity action against appellant in the federal court, seeking damages for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and slander. Appellant responded with a motion for summary judgment founded upon the release executed by appellee. The resulting dispute as to the validity of the release eventuated in this certification proceeding.
[209]*209(1)
We recognize at the outset that virtually all agreements by a prosecuting attorney to enter a nolle prosequi in a criminal case are affected by considerations of public policy. This is particularly the case where it appears that such action is taken by the prosecutor as part of a bargain that has the effect of resulting in a private gain. The rule traditionally followed in this country is that bargains which tend to stifle criminal prosecution, whether by suppressing investigation of crime or by deterring citizens from their public duty to assist in the detection or punishment of crime, are void as against public policy. 14 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1718 (3d ed. 1972); 6A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1421 (1962). Since public policy dictates that violations of the criminal laws be duly prosecuted, agreements to refrain from instituting criminal prosecutions are deemed inimical to the impartial administration of justice.2
The foregoing principles were recognized long ago by this Court in Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273, 61 Am. Dec. 346 (1854). There a mortgage was given as security for five promissory notes which were delivered as partial consideration for a promise by the mortgagee-payee to procure from the governor a nolle prosequi of an indictment pending against the maker of the notes. In affirming a decree sustaining exceptions to the ratification of a sale under the mortgage, the Court held that the agreement to seek the nolle prosequi contravened public policy, not because the agreement to obtain executive clemency was itself illegal, but because of the possibility that the governor might have been “induced to act upon considerations suggested by a party having an [210]*210interest to produce false impressions on his mind.” 7 Md. at 279 (emphasis added).
Similarly in Schirm v. Wieman, 103 Md. 541, 545, 63 A. 1056, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 175 (1906), holding that a contract entered into by the victim of a theft for the return of his stolen property did not offend public policy, we nevertheless reaffirmed our adherence to the venerable rule:
“[I]t is of public interest and in accordance with public policy that the laws for the protection of property shall be effective, in order that the offenders may be promptly apprehended and convicted. Therefore all proposed agreements made with the thief or with anyone, by which the apprehension of the criminal, his trial or conviction may be prevented or obstructed, are contrary to public policy and absolutely void.”
Inasmuch as the release in dispute here was executed in reliance upon the State’s Attorney’s promise to enter a nolle prosequi on the shoplifting charge, an argument might be made that the public policy against contracts which obstruct criminal prosecutions ought to bar enforcement of the compromise agreement in the present case. In our opinion, however, the general rule does not govern the outcome of this case for reasons that follow.
No reported decision in Maryland or elsewhere has come to our attention in which an agreement for the entry of a nolle prosequi under circumstances similar to those present here has been challenged on. grounds of public policy. This case, for example, is unlike those iix which an agreement has been struck down where a private party — typically the civilian complainant — has agreed to refrain from initiating or pressing criminal charges. In Wilson v. United States Lines, 114 N.J. Super. 175, 275 A. 2d 457, 459 (1971), where the complainant and a criminal defendant charged with theft agreed that the prosecution would be discontinued in return for restitution of the stolen property and a general release of all civil claims, the court held that the release did not bar recovery for maliciousjmosecution, applying the general rule [211]*211that “an agreement to forbear prosecution of a criminal case is void as against public policy.” See Baker v. Citizens Bank of Guntersville, 282 Ala. 33, 208 So. 2d 601, 606 (1968); Bowyer v. Burgess, 54 Cal. 2d 97, 4 Cal. Rptr. 521, 351 P. 2d 793, 794 (1960); Hazen v. Rich’s, Inc., 137 Ga. App. 258, 223 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1976); Murphy v. Rochford, 55 Ill. App. 3d 695, 13 Ill. Dec. 543, 371 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1977); Groening v. Nowlen, 369 Mich. 28, 118 N.W.2d 998, 1001 (1963). In each of these cases the victim himself attempted “to wrest the criminal proceedings, open to him, from their proper purpose, and make use of them as a means of coercing the defendant” into an agreement. Portner v. Kirschner, 169 Pa. 472, 32 A. 442, 443 (1895).
In the instant case, however, we are faced with an agreement between the criminal defendant and the prosecuting attorney, who, having correctly determined that there was probable cause for bringing the charge, elected in good faith to exercise his discretion by entering a nolle prosequi in exchange for the defendant’s release of the complainant from all civil liability. Particularly significant in this respect is the absence of any evidence that appellant participated in the decision, directly or indirectly. On the contrary, the record reflects only that the State’s Attorney acted for himself in conducting the negotiations with counsel for appellee.3
Clearly, then, this is not a case where an alleged victim of a crime attempts to apply the leverage of a criminal prosecution — supported by probable cause or not — to his own advantage, either by extracting some form of compensation from the accused or by securing a release from civil liability. Thus, the very purpose which lies at the core of the public policy rule — to prevent perversion of the [212]*212administration of justice — would in no way be furthered by nullifying the release in question here.
Furthermore, since it was the State’s Attorney himself who entered into the agreement with the accused, this case is distinguishable from-those decisions involving agreements to influence or solicit public officials. E.g., Wildey v. Collier, supra, 7 Md. 273; Tremont Trust Co. v. Brand, 244 Mass. 421, 138 N. E. 564, 566 (1923); Buck v. First Nat. Bank of Paw Paw, 27 Mich. 293, 302-303, 15 Am. Rep. 189 (1873). This case is also unlike those in. which entry of the nolle prosequi was conditioned upon a civil release of a police officer or the state itself. E.g., Boyd v. Adams, 513 F. 2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975); MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F. 2d 373 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 852 (1970); Gray v. City of Galesburg, 71 Mich. App. 161, 247 N.W.2d 338 (1976). But cf. Leonard v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. App.3d 473, 107 Cal. Rptr. 378, 381 (1973) (stipulation by defendant before dismissal of criminal case that probable cause existed available as defense in civil action against city since court entered dismissal). Compelling reasons of public policy exist for denying validity to such agreements. “[A] desire on the part of the prosecuting authority to extract police officers from possible liability offers an undeniable temptation to concoct or exaggerate the charges against the defendant to enhance his bargaining position.” Gray v. City of Galesburg, 247 N.W.2d at 340; see Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F. 2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“these agreements suppress complaints against police misconduct which should be thoroughly aired in a free society”).
[213]*213None of the objectives served by the above public policy principles is present here. Appellee makes no contention that the State’s Attorney was actuated by a desire to protect a fellow law enforcement officer from civil liability or that he relied on contrived charges for the purpose of coercing execution of the release.
Critical to the distinction between agreements which are made at the instance of a complaining witness and those, like the release in this case, which are initiated by a prosecuting attorney, is the broad discretionary role played in Maryland by the State’s Attorney, whose powers are nowhere specifically enumerated or defined. Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 489, 495, 348 A. 2d 837 (1975). Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1977 Cum. Supp.) Art. 10, § 34, the only statute which purports to delimit the authority of the State’s Attorney, merely provides that he “shall... prosecute and defend, on the part of the State, all cases in which the State may be interested.” Thus this Court has said:
“In such prosecutions of persons accused of crime, [the State’s Attorney] must exercise a sound discretion to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. He must be trusted with broad official discretion to institute and prosecute criminal causes, subject generally to judicial control. The office is one not purely ministerial, but involves the exercise of learning and discretion.... As a general rule, whether the State’s Attorney does or does not institute a particular prosecution is a matter which rests in his discretion.” Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A. 2d 319 (1944) (citation omitted).
Accord, State’s Atty v. City of Balto., 274 Md. 597, 608-609, 337 A. 2d 92 (1975). But cf. Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 254, [214]*214260, 363 A. 2d 468 (1976) (prosecuting attorney with pecuniary interest in related civil matter, impairing obligation , to act impartially, disqualified by public policy from initiating or participating in prosecution; decision to prosecute “must be in accord with tbe fair and impartial administration of justice, untainted by any contaminating influence”). .
Embraced within the broad discretion vested in the State’s Attorney is the decision whether or not to enter a nolle prosequi in a criminal case. Brady v. State, 36 Md. App. 283, 290, 374 A. 2d 613 (1977); State v. Hunter, 10 Md. App. 300, 304, 270 A. 2d 343 (1970), remanded, 263 Md. 17, 278 A. 2d 608 (1971); see Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 694-95, 381 A. 2d 1146 (1978). From a procedural standpoint, former Maryland Rule 711, which was in effect when the prosecution was terminated here by the State’s Attorney, mandated only that the nolle prosequi be entered in open court, a requirement which was met in this instance.4 Given the discretionary power which the State’s Attorney has in deciding whether a nolle prosequi should be entered, it follows that he may attach reasonable conditions in agreeing to such a disposition, Williams v. State, 7 Md. App. 241, 245, 254 A. 2d 376 (1969), cert. denied, 256 Md. 749 (1970); cf. State v. Morgan, 33 Md. 44, 46-47 (1870) (entry of nolle prosequi conditioned upon payment of costs of indictment), provided, of course, that the conditions imposed in no event violate the Constitution, statutes or public policy of this state.
In his affidavit contained in the record before us, the State’s Attorney, after succinctly noting the observations made by the store detective, furnished two reasons for agreeing to appellee’s request that a nolle prosequi be entered: “Because of the very insignificant value of the item alleged to have been shoplifted and assurance that the Defendant had no prior criminal record.” In conditioning his action upon a release of appellant from any potential civil action, he was observing his “established policy” in cases where, as here, there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the original [215]*215charging document.5 Since he was exercising his prosecutorial discretion, he considered it his “obligation to protect and insulate [appellant] for [sic] bogus law suits,” particularly since the complainant was without redress to question his authority to nolle prosse. Had he determined, he continued, “that there was insufficient probable cause for the issuance of the charge, [he] would have authorized the nolle prosse but not have requested the release,” since he regarded himself under no obligation to protect a complainant who has in fact brought charges unsupported by probable cause.
Although public policy dictates that the State’s Attorney duly prosecute violations of the criminal law, Schirm v. Wieman, supra, 103 Md. at 545, he is nevertheless bound to recognize, in exercising his prosecutorial discretion, that in our present day society no prosecutor can meet his responsibilities to the public without the cooperation and support of private citizens. Accordingly, it is in the public interest that legitimate victims of crime report such offenses freely and not be discouraged from doing so by an understandable concern that the State’s Attorney might, by deciding to refrain from prosecuting, subject complainants to civil liability. It would seem that this responsibility is owed the authentic victim of crime no matter how well-intentioned the prosecutor might have been in arriving at his decision to drop the criminal charges.
Conversely, the State’s Attorney should be free to consider the plight of the first time offender in minor criminal cases [216]*216without fear of subjecting the innocent victim to a civil suit for damages. If the prosecutor is prompted by humanitarian considerations to relieve a defendant of even the mere stigma of prosecution in circumstances such as existed here, it is in the public interest that he be free to do so; and that he not be shackled by the chilling prospect that the victim will be sued. “[A] promise not to prosecute is not illegal ‘where it is made, not for the sake of gain, but from motives of kindness and compassion----" O’Neil v. Dux, 257 Minn. 383, 101 N.W.2d 588, 593 (1960). To hold that a civil release executed in this context is unenforceable as a matter of public policy would be to place an unwarranted constraint upon the prosecutor, who might for wholly justifiable reasons, despite the existence of probable cause for a criminal prosecution, wish to extend a compassionate hand to a first time offender.
Since the arguments advanced by appellee against implementation of the disputed compromise arrangement do not “clearly and unequivocally outweigh” the important considerations militating in favor of enforcement, we hold that under the facts of this case, the release from civil liability executed by appellee was not void as a matter of public policy. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission et al. v. Washington National Arena, 282 Md. 588, 607, 386 A. 2d 1216 (1978).
(2)
Appellee urges us to hold that the release was executed under such circumstances as to constitute duress as a matter of law. We do not agree. An early test applied by this Court to determine whether a written instrument had been signed under duress was whether execution of the document had been “induced by harshness and threats, and the exercise of an unwarrantable authority, so excessive as to subjugate and control the freedom of [the signatory’s] will.” Central Bank v. Copeland, 18 Md. 305, 319, 81 Am. Dec. 597 (1862); accord, Spoerer v. Wehland, 130 Md. 226, 230, 100 A. 287 (1917); see Rockville v. Brookeville, 246 Md. 117, 133-34, 228 A. 2d 263 [217]*217(1967). Similarly, the Restatement of Contracts § 492 (1932) defines “duress” in these terms:
“(a) [A]ny wrongful act of one person that compels a manifestation of apparent assent by another to a transaction without his volition, or
“(b) [A]ny wrongful threat of one person by words or other conduct that induces another to enter into a transaction under the influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and judgment, if the threat was intended or should reasonably have been expected to operate as an inducement.”
Thus, under this test, duress is essentially composed of two elements:
“(1) A wrongful act or threat by the opposite party to the transaction or by a third party of which the opposite party is aware and takes advantage, and (2) a state of mind in which the complaining party was overwhelmed by fear and precluded from using free will or judgment.” Plechner v. Widener College, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 1282, 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see generally D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 10.2 (1973).
With respect to the first element, the acts or threats must be wrongful. Restatement of Contracts § 492, Comment g. An act, whether it be performed or threatened, may be wrongful even though not unlawful. Eckstein v. Eckstein, 38 Md. App. 506, 515, 379 A. 2d 757 (1978); Bell v. Bell, 38 Md. App. 10, 17, 379 A. 2d 419 (1977). Means in themselves lawful, however, must be so oppressively used as to constitute an abuse of legal remedies. McBride v. Atlantic City, 146 N.J. Super. 498, 370 A. 2d 69, 71 (1974), aff’d per curiam, 146 N.J. Super. 406, 370 A. 2d 20 (1975), aff’d, 72 N. J. 201, 370 A. 2d 1 (1976) (offer to drop criminal charges against police officer in return for resignation). A threat to institute criminal proceedings becomes wrongful within the meaning of this rule “if made with the corrupt intent to coerce a transaction [218]*218grossly unfair to the victim and not related to the subject of such proceedings----” Link v. Link, 278 N. C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697, 705 (1971) (citations omitted).
Courts, however, have traditionally placed less emphasis on the wrongfulness element than on the effect of the wrongful act or threat'upon the person claiming to have been thereby coerced. “[T]he controlling factor is the condition, at the time,. of the mind of the person subjected to the alleged coercive measures, rather than the means by which the given state of mind was induced, and thus the test is essentially subjective.” McBride v. Atlantic City, 370 A. 2d at 71. The decisive question in this regard is whether the person claiming duress entered the particular transaction in such fear as to preclude his exercise of free will and judgment. Restatement of Contracts § 472, Comment a (1932).
Under the most recent formulation of the American Law Institute, however, there has been a marked shift in emphasis from the subjective effect of a threat to the nature of the threat itself.6 The earlier requirement that the threat arouse such fear as to preclude an exercise of “free will and judgment” has been omitted “because of its vagueness and impracticability.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 12,1977). Manifestly, application here of the test now advocated by the Institute would serve only to attenuate appellee’s claim of duress.
Regardless of which definition is applied, none of the elements constituting duress is established as a matter of law on the record before us. Clearly there was nothing in the institution of the criminal prosecution itself that would be suggestive of unlawful or even wrongful conduct. Given the [219]*219existence of probable cause, the State’s Attorney was merely complying with his statutory mandate. Nor does the record here reflect any conduct on his part in the manner in which he communicated the offer to appellee’s attorney that would establish duress as a matter of law. Missing here are those efforts to exploit or oppress — or to misuse the power of the prosecutor’s office — which normally characterize this species of duress. Probable cause being present, a mere offer by a prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi of a pending criminal case conditioned upon a release of the complainant from civil liability simply cannot be equated with a threat, improper or not, of prosecution or imprisonment.
Furthermore, whatever the effect of this unfortunate experience on appellee, we cannot say as a matter of law on this record that the not unjustifiable fear of a possible conviction, whether prompted by the prosecutor’s actions or not, left her in such a state of mind as to preclude the exercise of her free will or judgment in signing the release. A fact which cannot be ignored in this regard is the lapse of almost four months between the day the State’s Attorney first disclosed his offer to enter a nolle prosequi in return for the civil release and appellee’s appearance.in court — the occasion on which she finally signed the compromise agreement.
We hold only, then, that the release was not the product of duress as a matter of law.
Questions of law answered as herein set forth; costs to be paid by appellee.
. In support of its position, the dissent relies almost exclusively on the three “police cases” cited in the text accompanying this footnote. It matters not, in the dissent’s view, that the beneficiaries of the bargained-for releases in each of those cases were police officers as opposed to private complainants. Thus, the dissent has unfortunately failed to peroeive a most' crucial distinction between these cases and the matter at hand. ‘
A police officer and a prosecuting attorney are both agents of the state. It is precisely this commonality of interest which casts a taint of illegality upon any agreement with an accused by which one state agent, the prosecutor, seeks to bestow a benefit upon another state agent, the police officer, in the form of a release of the latter from civil liability for torts allegedly committed against the accused. In such cases there is an extraordinarily high probability that the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed to trial will be motivated by improper considerations.
[213]*213Patently, there is no such risk of abuse of prosecutorial power in the present cáse. The record is absolutely devoid of even a trace of evidence tending to support an inference of collusion between the State’s Attorney and appellant. To the contrary, the prosecutor appears to have acted in the utmost good faith and out of genuine concern for appellee. In short, the fatal identity of interest which quite correctly brought about invalidation of the release agreements in the “police cases” is totally absent here.