[120]*120Hammond, C. J.,
delivered the majority opinion of the Court. Barnes and Marbury, JJ., dissent. Dissenting opinion by Barnes, J., at page 135, infra.
This, case has spawned some red herrings which the parties and the Chancellor have dropped across an essentially simple trail of fact and controlling law.
The City of Rockville sought below to enforce specifically a written contract dated January 1962 between the City and an owner who was trying to transform raw land mostly within, but partly without, the City limits into over four hundred apartment units. The City agreed “to- act, insofar as it is permitted by law, to annex” that part of the land outside its corporate limits in return for the promises of the landowner (a) to dedicate by December 28, 1962, approximately half an acre of delineated land for a street, (b) to set aside and develop two specified areas within the development for the recreational use of its residents, and (c) to attempt to purchase an additional defined three-acre parcel of land adjacent to that outside Rockville and, if successful, to dedicate the purchased parcel “permanently to recreational use” or, if unsuccessful by July 1, 1962, to pay the City $10,000 in four annual installments, “the said sums to be used by the City for the purpose of acquiring and developing additional public recreation area.”
The City proceeded to annex the land but the developer (which will sometime hereinafter be called Gingery as it was a corporate alter ego of its president, D. E. Gingery, who consistently acted and spoke for it) refused to perform its promises except as to the payment under protest of a $3,000 installment; indeed, Gingery testified in the City’s suit for specific performance that he had never intended to honor the contract.
In its appeal from the Chancellor’s denial of specific performance, the City has tossed us at least one red herring in an effort to picture itself as undeviatingly without hint of reproach. In return, Gingery drew more of the ruddy aquatic vertebrates across the trail in order to paint himself as the helpless and hapless victim of governmental injustice and oppression, compelled by the evil municipal pressure of economic duress and coercion of frustrating delay to fight fire with fire by signing an agree[121]*121ment he did not intend to honor. More of the fishes emerged from the Chancellor’s expressed reasons for denying the City relief. He said, entirely accurately in the abstract, that specific performance is an extraordinary remedy which is within the sound discretion of the court to grant or refuse and that a determination to grant this extraordinary remedy must be supported by a contract that is “fair, just, reasonable, bona fide, mutual, useful, made upon a good and valuable consideration consistent with a well regulated society and * * * in its effect ultimately tend to produce a just end” and held that the contract in question lacked mutuality, was illegal as beyond the power of the City, unconscionable as setting up at auction to the highest bidder the exercise of the City’s power to annex land, and extortionate in that the City by delaying action on the request for annexation compelled the developer to accede to its illegal demands.
We do not agree, finding that the City had the power and the right to exact the agreements made by Gingery in return for its promise to annex his land, that the contract was voluntarily entered into and that it did not lack mutuality.
In 1958 Gingery bought some nineteen acres of land, somewhat more than fifteen acres of which were within the City of Rockville and 3.55 acres of which were not, being under the zoning and other controls of Montgomery County. The tract was all zoned C-2. In October 1959 application was made to the City to rezone that part of the land within the City to R-20 (medium density residential). In November the application came before the Mayor and Council. A member of a firm of architects and engineers presented a site plan which showed the entire nineteen acres as developed for garden apartments. The plan showed the dedication of a street along one boundary of the property designated as Edmonston Road and several small play areas and a large recreation area within the project. Gingery testified that he intended later to apply to have the 3.55 acres in Montgomery County annexed to Rockville. In reply to a question from Mayor Greene, Gingery said that the large recreation area on the plat would not be dedicated but would remain in private ownership as part of the tract. He also said, in explaining the site plan, that provision was made for “the [122]*122location of parking, the location of Edmonston Drive, so that this could be dedicated, and the location of the recreational areas.”
On January 19, 1960, the request for rezoning of the land within the City was granted without condition or reservation. Soon thereafter the Rockville Planning Commission approved a use permit for the apartment house project in accordance with a plat submitted. This plat also, showed Edmonston Drive with the notation “to be dedicated” to a width of seventy feet.
Gingery, as sole owner of the property, later filed a petition for annexation of the 3.55 acre parcel and, simultaneously, requested its rezoning to R-20. After review the Planning Commission in writing recommended annexation and at the same time recommended placing the acreage in an R-S (Suburban Residential) zoning classification until the City “has had an opportunity to investigate whether there is a need to locate a playground on a portion of the subject tract which would serve the immediate area.” The Commission went on to say:
“The Planning Commission notes with concern that no provision has been made by the developers of the adjoining properties of the subject tract or by the City of Rockville to provide a playground for the occupants of the existing and proposed apartments within the immediate area. Approximately four hundred ten (410) apartment dwellings are being built within the area bounded by Rockville Pike on the east, commercial development on the south, Woodmont Country Club on the west and West Edmonston Drive on the north. It is the view of the Commission that consideration should be given by the Mayor & Council regarding the need for, and the acquisition of, a playground of approximately two (2) acres in size to serve this area, prior to giving the subject tract a permanent zone classification.”
Mayor Greene testified before the Chancellor that the general policy of the City was to require a community being annexed to provide interior and access streets, utilities, and “to provide recreational areas to serve that particular community” [123]*123on the theory that it would be an unfair burden on those citizens already living in the City to “support the heavy capital investment which a new section of the community brings with it.” If the developer is required to provide the basic initial capital improvements, “you start at even points on capital investment and everybody's taxes are applied to the operations of this new community—everybody starts on an equal basis. * * * Otherwise the problem of obtaining any growth would be so burdensome to the existing community there would be a total rejection of growth. Your taxes would be infinitely increased.” This, he concluded, makes it equitable to require that one who brings in a new community bring it up to the standard of the existing community at his expense, if he desires it to become part of the City.
Mayor Greene also testified that the standard of size the City used for neighborhood parks or recreational areas was one acre per hundred dwelling units, a downgrading of the standard “established by the National Association of Recreation which uses one acre per hundred people.”
On January 16, 1961, a public hearing on the applications for annexation and rezoning was held before the Mayor and Council. Gingery and his lawyer attended. The lawyer pointed out that the 3.55 acres “could very easily (and will) become an integral part of the apartment project in the event it is zoned and annexed.” In connection with the rezoning, he referred to the recommendation of the Planning Commission for recreational areas and said: “We have planned for a recreational area; we are going to install one in there to serve the residents of the apartments being constructed and to be constructed” and then suggested that the 3.55 acre plot would be unsuitable because it would require considerable grading and “it is very expensive ground. By using that for a recreation area, we would, of course, have to absorb that cost into that of the apartments, which would mean higher rents * * *. I do not feel that this wmuld be a justifiable proposition.”
The architect then spoke, suggesting that a six-acre parcel, which was a part of a twenty-four acre tract Gingery owned, formed by the extension of Jefferson Street and Julian Place, be used for an undedicated recreational site for the over four [124]*124hundred apartments and some five hundred homes Gingery intended to build on the twenty-four acres.
Gingery said: “This came about all to the credit of Mayor Greene. * * * It must have been at least a year ago, he asked me about recreation for apartments. I said ‘Alex, we are going to provide recreation for that area.’ * * * I made that promise. * * * There has never been any question of our living up to what we said.”
Mayor Greene replied that in addition to the six acres there would still have to be dedicated public facilities to serve the area if the National Recreation Association standards were to be met.
Gingery’s lawyer then agreed to suggestions from the Council that the prior approval of the use permit of the fifteen acres in the City was not “a tacit approval of the over-all project.”
A councilman, Mr. Ecker, asked about the future Edmonston Drive. Gingery replied: “Frank, * * * may I explain * * *. On Exhibit IB, it was done this way; then they asked that it be done another way. So we did that. This is the final way.”
Mr. Tuchton, another councilman, asked whether there was “a time table which Mr. Gingery is prepared to talk about here, in terms of this recreational development.” Gingery said: “It would have to be executed basically along about the same time this project over yonder [the twenty-four acres] was proposed to go ahead.” Mayor Greene asked if this meant that the recreational area depended “on the rezoning of the other piece of property” and whether if rezoning were not granted on that property the recreation area would go ahead. Mr. Gingery replied: “I do not know.” Mayor Greene said: “If the public interest decides a recreation center is necessary, the public interest has to be considered * * * and that this raised a question whether action should be taken “with respect to the development of recreation land contingent upon some future legislative action.”
Gingery contends on appeal that after the public hearing he kept urging action because the delay was causing him financial loss. The City took no action because, it must necessarily be [125]*125inferred, Gingery did not convey to it the land for Edmonston Drive nor create or provide the large recreational area he had suggested, nor any other. Gingery claims he had “considered but never promised,” prior to the agreement sued on, to dedicate a right-of-way for the proposed Edmonston Drive when it touched the northern boundary of the entire nineteen-acre tract (actually, as the facts recited above show he did promise just what he says he did not) and did not agree to dedicate any part of the 3.55 acres for either road or recreation (actually he did promise to provide a six-acre recreation area if the twenty-four acre tract he also owned was rezoned and since the rezoning has never been granted he never did provide it).
In any event, Gingery continued to try to persuade the City to annex his land. Mayor Greene testified that Gingery made many calls and visits because he was concerned that the City would either annex the 3.55 acres with a zoning status of R-S or that it would not act at all, and that Gingery “was well aware of the reticence we had to merely bring this property in without adequate provision for the recreational needs of those four hundred units of property * * Gingery’s argument continued to be that he “simply couldn’t live with having the two acres taken out of his development [out of the 3.55 acres].” Finally, after Mayor Greene had walked over the property, he and Gingery had further conversations and Gingery agreed he would see if he could acquire a recreational area from a neighboring owner and that “he wanted us [the City] to move very quickly” because he would get the land for the recreational area. Mayor Greene told him, in answer to his direct question, that the Rockville Council would want the recreational land in hand or hard assurance it would be soon provided. Gingery suggested to Greene that if he, Gingery, could not buy the neighboring land by a certain date “he would be glad to put up enough dough, which was equivalent to the cost of obtaining the land, in an escrow account, so * * * the city could move using its powers of eminent domain to acquire the property * * Greene replied that this sounded like a good idea and to take it up with “the staff” and present it to the Mayor and Council. His recollection was that thereafter “the discussions were between Mr. Gingery and his attorney and the staff of the City [126]*126until it was presented to the Mayor and Council and the agreement was entered into.”
On December 18, 1961, the City Manager wrote the Mayor and Council that on that morning Gingery had conferred with the City Manager, the City Attorney, the Director of Public Works and the Director of Planning “to resolve, if possible, the remaining questions concerning the pending annexation and zoning of the 3.55 acre tract at the rear of Court House Square Apartments * * * [and that] all except one of the open issues was resolved * * *.” The tentative agreements arrived at were:
“1. Mr. Gingery will set aside areas for recreation to be used by residents of Court House Square Apartments, as shown on the sketch plan prepared by the Department of Planning and Urban Renewal, and reviewed by the Council at its last meeting.
“2. Mr. Gingery will enter into' a written agreement that not later than February 1, 1963 the realigned right-of-way of West Edmonston Drive will be deeded by him to the City in lieu of the existing right-of-way, and the City will deed back to him the old right-of-way for use as a recreation area. (This was agreed to because an immediate conveyance of these properties would be extremely costly to Mr. Gingery on account of his current mortgage release terms, and because it is extremely unlikely that the City would need the right-of-way prior to February 1, 1963.)
“3. Mr. Gingery will attempt to acquire for recreation purposes the area between the rear lot line of the Court House Square parcel and the northerly boundary of East Jefferson Street, from West Edmonston Drive to the point at which the property line of his parcel departs on an angle from Jefferson Street. In the event of his failure to obtain this parcel by voluntary sale prior to- July 1, 1962, he is to pay to the City the sum of $10,000 as follows:
$3,000 on July 1, 1962
$3,000 on June 1, 1963
$3,000 on June 1, 1964
$1,000 on June 1, 1965
[127]*127The City is to use the proceeds of this fund to acquire the tract in question by voluntary sale or condemnation. If Mr. Gingery acquires it through voluntary sale, it is to be used as a private recreation area; if the City is required to acquire it, it will be a public recreation area. (The installment provisions were agreed to on the basis of Mr. Gingery’s statement that they had previously been conveyed to Mayor Greene.)
“4. The Mayor and Council will act to annex the 3.55 acre tract.
“5. The two recreation areas to be set aside out of property owned by Mr. Gingery’s corporation at the present time are to be developed substantially in accordance with the plan submitted by him and entitled ‘Proposed Playground Layout—November 1961’, prepared by Joseph P. Kondis, Landscape Architect.
The question left unresolved by the staff in its discussion with Mr. Gingery related to the density of the 3.55 acre tract. Mr. Gingery indicated to the staff that unless he could develop this tract at the same density at which the balance of the tract had been developed, he would not be interested in an agreement of the type proposed. This matter was therefore left for resolution between him and the Council. Should the tentative agreement outlined above be satisfactory to the Council, and should it be possible to resolve this one remaining issue, the staff would recommend that the City Attorney be directed to^ prepare a written agreement embodying these terms, for execution by the parties concerned.”
On January 15, 1962, Gingery wrote the Mayor and Council as follows:
“We enclose herewith an agreement dated January 15, 1962 between the Mayor and Council of Rockville and the undersigned pertaining to the above referenced [128]*128property. It is our understanding that you will retain this agreement in your possession until we are permitted to go ahead with 100 apartment units on the annexed land referred to in the agreement. Upon receipt of the use and building permits, this agreement shall be considered delivered. It is entirely satisfactory to us and our attorneys for you to be the depositary for this agreement.
“We have rewritten the agreement to make the minor changes I discussed with you on the phone on Saturday.
“If you will notice in paragraph 3, we took out the clause wherein the City agreed to convey a certain right-of-way on Edmonston Drive. The reason for deleting this paragraph is that this right-of-way has never been deeded to the City by Brookeville Turnpike Construction Company because we were set to transfer this deed until the construction loan on Section 2 became a permanent loan.
“Our attorneys, Wheeler, Korpeck & Clark, have not examined this agreement, but will do so on Tuesday, January 16, 1962. Although on the face of it via phone conversation, it appeared to them to be okay as corrected. I leave this matter in your hands for completion, and I assume that this is satisfactory.
“I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your kind cooperation in this matter.”
It is conceded that the agreement as executed and forwarded by Gingery became effective and that the City duly annexed the 3.55 acres on January 22, 1962. No question was raised below and none is raised here as to the mechanical or procedural aspects of the City’s powers, legislative or contractual, or as to the manner or mode of their exercise. What is challenged is the legal power of the City to do what it did, not how it proceeded to do it, and the legality and effectiveness of the contract, not its form or execution.
The extension of the boundaries of a municipality is a political matter to be regulated by the constitution or the legislature of the State. Customarily, the power to annex is delegated [129]*129to the city or town by statute, since those political entities have no inherent powers to add to their size. 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §§ 7:10 and 7:13 (3d Ed.). The Maryland Legislature has provided in Code (1957), Art. 23A, § 19, lor the power to annex and the manner of exercising that power. Every municipal corporation may annex contiguous land not within the boundaries of another municipality, either on the initiative of the city or town or of the residents of the area, including, if less than twenty people live in the area proposed to be annexed, any person, firm or corporation. In every case the residents or the person, firm or corporation have a final veto by way of a referendum election. Section 19 (a) makes it plain that the grant of power to annex is permissive only and not mandatory. It reads:
“Legislative body authorised to enlarge -corporate boundaries.—The legislative body, by whatever name known, of every municipal corporation in this State may enlarge the corporate boundaries thereof as in this subheading provided; but this power shall apply only as to land which is contiguous and adjoining to the existing corporate area.”
There was no common law right to compel annexation. Scheuer v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. (Ill. App.), 70 N. E. 2d 876, 880, and the Legislature did not give the inhabitants or owners of an area contiguous to a municipal corporation that right. They can seek annexation and forbid annexation but they cannot compel it. The option is that of the municipal corporation.
Since a municipality may or may not annex as the exercise of its honest judgment dictates, it seems only logical that it may, as prerequisites to granting annexation, impose reasonable, bona fide conditions for the public good and public welfare if they are related to the area to be annexed and nearby areas. This view was taken recently by the Supreme Court of Colorado in City of Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Develop. Co., 392 P. 2d 467, 471, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 379 U. S. 647. There the plaintiff desired to use city utilities to develop land outside the city limits. The city would not agree to furnish the [130]*130utilities unless the land were annexed and the developer complied with ordinances regarding land to be annexed requiring the setting aside of eight per cent of the land for public purposes or the payment of eight per cent of the value of the land to a special city fund for use in the acquisition of substitute public lands. The developer paid the city some $25,000 and then, when he got what he had bargained for, sued to recover the payment, alleging that its exaction was unconstitutional and illegal. The Court denied him relief. It rejected the argument relied on by the Chancellor below that this was a contract made for the purpose of unduly controlling or affecting official conduct and so opposed to public policy, reasoning that “no governmental power was bargained for here, nor was any constitutional right surrendered,” because the developer had no constitutional or statutory right to compel annexation and the resulting utility services. The Court went on to say:
“We find nothing in the general law of this state or in the Constitution prohibiting the imposition of conditions by a municipality upon one seeking annexation. A municipality is under no legal obligation in the first instance to annex contiguous territory, and may reject a petition for annexation for no reason at all. It follows then that if the municipality elects to accept such territory solely as a matter of its discretion, it may impose such conditions by way of agreement as it sees fit. If the party seeking annexation does not wish to annex under the conditions imposed, he is free to withdraw his petition to annex and remain without the city. Annexation can take place only when the minds of the city and the owners of the land contiguous to the city agree that the property shall be annexed and upon the terms upon which such annexation can be accomplished.” (392 P. 2d at 472)
See also Schlarb v. North Suburban Sanitation District (Colo.), 357 P. 2d 647. We find the Kitty Hawk decision to be sound and persuasive and in harmony with the decisions of this Court in analogous matters. In County Council v. Lee, 219 Md. 209, the Public Works Department of Montgomery County issued [131]*131a developer a permit to pave a road through his project specifically conditioned on his acquiring an easement lor a storm drain. The owner of the property which was to become subject to the easement would not sell, at least not for the price the developer was willing to pay. The developer then indicated he had never intended to do more than what was “within his ability” and sued to enjoin the foreclosure of his performance bond, and for a declaration of rights. The Court held that the county could lawfully impose conditions on the granting of the permit even if those conditions were not specifically prescribed or authorized by statute. Tudge Horney, for the Court, said (at. pg. 215 of 219 Md.) :
“Thus, the real question, as we see it, is whether the County had authority to prescribe the terms and conditions it imposed before it consented to grant permission for the paving of Galena Road. We think it is clear that it did.”
We found the condition imposed to be a reasonable and valid exercise of the County’s police power and that “the right to grant or withhold its permission for the paving of Galena Road carries with it the right to prescribe reasonable terms and conditions upon which the permit would issue other than those specifically prescribed by § 93-15 * *
In Krieger v. Planning Commission, 224 Md. 320, the Commission refused to approve a subdivision plat because it did not meet its requirements as to the width of roads, proper vehicular access and size of lots. The developer argued that the refusal was illegal and arbitrary and deprived him of his property without due process. This Court found no indication of bad faith, no taking and no abuse of discretion in properly exercising the police power. Judge Henderson, for the Court, said (224 Md. at 324) :
“Other courts have reached the conclusion that planning requirements under which developers record plats and obtain approval of roads and strips bordering on roads are within the police power and not compensable. See Newton v. American Sec. Co., 148 S. W. [132]*1322d 311 (Ark.); Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 217 N. W. 58 (Mich.); Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 207 P. 2d 1 (Cal.) ; Bringle v. Board of Supervisors of County of Orange, 351 P. 2d 765 (Cal.) ; cf. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N. E. 2d 230, 233 (Ill.). See also the cases in 11 A. L. R. 2d 524.”
See also Baltimore v. Steam Packet Co., 164 Md. 284, 289.
In the Ayres case, cited in Krieger above, the Supreme Court of California, in Bank, held that absent a specific limitation on the power of a city to impose conditions in approving a subdivision map, conditions which were imposed (that there be dedicated a ten-foot strip for widening a boulevard, that another ten-foot strip in the rear of the lots be restricted to the planting of trees and shrubbery to prevent direct access between the lots and a boulevard, that an extension of a street be dedicated to a width of eighty feet rather than sixty feet and that an area covered by the extension of another street be dedicated for street use) should be deemed lawful if not inconsistent with any ordinance and if reasonably required by the subdivision type and use as related to the neighborhood.
The developer in the case before us argues that the correct law is that of cases such as Haugen v. Gleason (Ore., En Banc), 359 P. 2d 108; Kelber v. City of Upland (Cal. Ct. App.), 318 P. 2d 561; and Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove (Ill.), 167 N. E. 2d 230, where subdividers of land were required to pay so many dollars a lot for approval of their subdivision plans and the money, although earmarked for public use, was not necessarily to be used in the subdivision involved directly or indirectly, or was not computed on the basis of subdivision needs. The Court in Haugen said this could not be approved because it was not an exercise of the police power but a tax on one class of landowners for a public purpose which may be, but need not be, related to the activity being regulated. It said (at p. 111 of 359 P. 2d) : “The regulation cannot stand because it fails to limit the use of the money so produced to the direct benefit of the regulated subdivision.” Kelber condemned such fund raising because it was not to be used for the [133]*133needs of the area and so was not reasonably related to the subdivision making the payment. Rosen said it is permissible to require a developer to dedicate or alternatively to pay the costs of streets and public areas “which are specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which would otherwise be cast upon the public,” but it is not permissible if the funds are to be used for general public purposes.
This Court reached the same conclusion in Baltimore County v. Security Mtge., 227 Md. 234, where we held that a developer could not, in the absence of express or implied statutory authority, be required as a prerequisite to approval of a subdivision plat, to defray the cost of improvements which are on land beyond the development and owned by others. See, however, Gerczak v. Todd, 233 Md. 25, 27-28, where this Court agreed with the rule in the Security Mtge. case but said that merely because the zoning authorities cannot require a builder to defray the cost of public improvements beyond the boundaries of his own property, “this does not mean that the developer may not validly contract to do so.”
The cases relied on by Gingery are to be distinguished from the case before us. Here Rockville reasonably, [airly and in good faith could have determined that the dedication of Edmonston Drive and of a recreational area were required by Gingery’s apartment house project and were closely related to it and to be used by those in it, as in Lee and Krieger.
We find no merit in the claim that the contract before us was the result of duress which makes it invalid. The earlier recital of the facts makes it plain that Gingery knew before he started his development that Rockville would require a dedication for Edmonston Drive and for recreational areas. A fair reading of the evidence discloses further that Gingery knowingly and voluntarily went ahead with the development within the City and attempted later to secure annexation of the acreage outside the City by suggesting or intimating dedications and recreational areas that he would not bindingly promise to make or create in the hope the City would accept less than assured performance. He negotiated at arm’s length, on a friendly basis, until the very moment he signed the final agreement. Even then he made the delivery of the signed agreement depend [134]*134on his being allowed the density of population on the 3.55 acres he had fought for all along. The City was fair and open with Gingery in its unfailing insistence on its conditions for annexation. No doubt Gingery understood the City’s position for he had been on the Planning Commission of Montgomery County for fifteen years and was fully knowledgeable as to zoning and governmental ways and practices, and whatever bind he found himself in was of his own making. There was no evidence of the economic duress he claims. See Gregory Manor v. City of Clifton (Super. Ct. N. J.), 147 A. 2d 595; Montauk Corp. v. Seeds, 215 Md. 491, 501-02.
Gingery suggests that the exaction of the conditions for annexation constituted illegal and forbidden contract zoning. It is clear that one seeking annexation may require a particular zoning classification as a condition of his agreeing finally to annexation, Beshore v. Town of Bel Air, 237 Md. 398, 416; Tanner v. City of Boulder (Colo.), 405 P. 2d 939, 941-42, and this is what Gingery did. He insisted on R-20 zoning. The conditions the City insisted on were prerequisite to annexing, not to rezoning, as to which there was no significant controversy, and the fact that an agreed upon zoning classification would accompany the annexation as a condition of the annexee does not bring the rezoning within the Maryland rule that rezoning cannot be granted conditionally.
There was no lack of mutuality in the contract either of obligation or of remedy. Rockville could have been required to annex the land it agreed to annex had it failed to do so. Specific performance was required of Harford County which had failed to improve a road it had obligated itself to improve in Board of County Comm. v. MacPhail, 214 Md. 192, and of Baltimore County in a similar obligation in Cohen v. Baltimore County, 229 Md. 519. In any event since Rockville has fulfilled its promise to annex the land, it does not lie in Gingery’s mouth now to claim lack of mutuality of remedy, a doctrine which of late has been severely criticized. See Stamatiades v. Merit Music, 210 Md. 597, 605-15 ; Ligget Co. v. Rose, 152 Md. 146, 154.
Since we have found the contract sued on to have been legal, fair, reasonable and certain it comes within the rule that it is as much a matter of course for an equity court to decree its [135]*135specific performance as it would be for a law court to award damages for its breach, and that in such a case it is the duty of the court to enter the decree. Md. City Realty v. Vogts, 238 Md. 290, 302 ; Pollin v. Perkins, 223 Md. 532, 544 ; Perlmutter v. Bacas, 219 Md. 406, 411-12.
The Chancellor ordered the City to repay Gingery the $3,000 installment due July 1, 1962, which he paid the City in October of that year under “protest” because, he says, the City would not turn on the gas for his apartments unless he did (the “protest” written on the check was that the payment would be returned to him if he was able to buy the neighboring land for the recreational area). Whatever the fact, the view we have taken of the contract requires that this part of the decree appealed from also be reversed, since the payment was called for under Gingery’s valid agreement.
Decree reversed, with costs, and case remanded for entry of a decree conforming to this opinion.