Fleming v. Palmer

123 F.2d 749, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2812
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedNovember 18, 1941
Docket3659
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 123 F.2d 749 (Fleming v. Palmer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fleming v. Palmer, 123 F.2d 749, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2812 (1st Cir. 1941).

Opinion

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, as Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, brought this action to enjoin the defendants from violating the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, U.S.C.A. Title 29, § 201 et seq.

The lower court refused to enjoin the defendants, Santiago R. Palmer, Magdalena J. Palmer and the Caribbean Embroidery Cooperative, Inc., with respect to members of the cooperative, but did enjoin the Caribbean Embroidery Cooperative, Inc., and not the defendant Palmers, as to non-members. It found as a fact that the cooperative was voluntarily formed, owned and controlled by the member-workers, who agreed to pool their labor and split the profits; and held that there was no employer-employee relationship as to members within the meaning of the Act.

No appeal was taken by the cooperative from the injunction granted against it. The plaintiff, however, has appealed from the refusal of the district court to enjoin the Palmers and the cooperative with respect to members of the cooperative. It is agreed that the cooperative and its members are engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce. It is also agreed that the defendants have violated the wage-hour and record provisions of the Act, if it is applicable to them.

The plaintiff contends: (1) That the Act applies because an employer-employee relationship exists between the Palmers and the cooperative on the one hand and the members of the cooperative on the other, since in reality the Palmers control the business and the cooperative; and (2) that even if the workers control the business, still the Act applies to a member-controlled cooperative. The defendants contend: (1) that the cooperative is a “labor organization” within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act and thus exempt from its provisions; and (2) that even though the cooperative may not be such an organization, the Act does not apply to them because the defendants are not employers, and the members are not employees within its meaning.

The case involves the applicability of Sections 3(a), 3(e), 3(g), 6, 7, 11(c), 15 (a) (1), 15(a) (2) and 15(a) (5) of the Act. The main issue is one of fact: Is this business controlled by the Palmers or is it controlled by the workers ? If the cooperative is controlled by the Palmers then the simple, economic fact is that the members are working for the Palmers and hence are employees of the Palmers and the cooperative' within the meaning of the Act. The district judge’s finding that the business is controlled by the workers and not by the Palmers must stand unless it is clearly erroneous, due regard being given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the clear weight of the evidence. It does not suffice that it be supported by evidence. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Kepler, 8 Cir., 1941, 116 F.2d 1; State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bonacci, 8 Cir., 1940, 111 F.2d 412; Manning v. Gagne, 1 Cir., 1939, 108 F.2d 718; Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure and The American Bar Institute Proceedings, p. 316 et seq. (Cleveland, 1938) ; Clark & Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 190 (1937). In determining whether the finding was correct, we shall examine documentary evidence which we are as competent to consider as the trial court, testimony on which there is no conflict, and for the most part only the testimony of Palmer and Soltero, so that the element of credibility will not be seriously involved. This examination reveals the following history:

From 1931 or 1932 up until the day the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 went into effect, Santiago R. Palmer and Magdalena Juan Palmer operated and controlled the Caribbean Embroidéry Company at 101 Calle Luna, San German, Puerto Rico, and manufactured handmade needlework products, particularly handmade handkerchiefs. Business was solicited from manufacturers and wholesalers through Julio Garcia in New York. The raw materials were sent from the United States to the company’s plant in Puerto Rico, where the cloth was cut and stamped with a pattern. It was then distributed to women needleworkers *752 to embroider the handkerchiefs in their homes. The handkerchiefs were returned to the company where they were checked, repaired, laundered, ironed, folded and packed and then shipped back to the United States.

The Fair Labor Standards Act was ap-, proved by Congress on June 25, 1938, to become effective on October 24, 1938. Juan Enrique Soltero, a Puerto Rican lawyer, made a study of the Act and concluded that it would apply to the needlework industry as then set up in Puerto Rico, but that it would not apply if the industry were to be conducted by the workers themselves as the members of a cooperative. He discussed coopera'tivism with some employers in the industry, and the Sabana Grande Workshop of Mr. Jose Antonio Castillo was reorganized into a cooperative under Soltero’s direction.'

In June, 1938, Soltero discussed with the defendant, Santiago R. Palmer, head of the Caribbean Embroidery Company, the possibilities of establishing a cooperative. Shortly thereafter Palmer informed the workers in his company of his conversations with Soltero and suggested that they hear Soltero “make a full explanation to them.” Palmer advised the formation of a laborer’s cooperative and told the workers “without menacing them” that they would be without work if they didn’t form a cooperative.

On August 15, 1938, Palmer wrote to Julio Garcia, his New York agent, telling him that “we are taking the necessary steps to continue our business after the minimum wage, law goes into effect” “but, naturally on the basis of dealing only and exclusively with me”. 1 Meanwhile, Palmer also distributed a circular to. his workers telling them it was necessary to form the cooperative to avoid the effects of the Act but that the cooperative would be dissolved when it should be no longer necessary for' employers to meet the requirements of the Act. 2

During this period of the formation of the cooperative, Palmer conferred with his workers “constantly”, telling them that he would help them set up the cooperative. *753 At the same time Soltero was also constantly conferring with the workers and with Palmer. Soltero advised the workers to “get the laborers in a public place, all that could be assembled, and invite distinguished citizens, because I was convinced that this had to be done in an honest way, otherwise it could not be sustained”.

The public meeting was arranged by a committee of workers composed of Elva Nazario Grant, head of the company’s shipping department; Juana Gonzalez Negron, supervisor of the ironing and washing department; Gregoria Quinones Ramirez, supervisor of the cutting department; and Carmen Mujica Guzman. The meeting was held at the Teatro Sol in San German.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Marilyn Wheeler v. Main Hurdman
825 F.2d 257 (Tenth Circuit, 1987)
Horace Case v. Arthur E. Morrisette
475 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Circuit, 1973)
Hodgson v. Rancourt
336 F. Supp. 1119 (D. Rhode Island, 1972)
Sanabria v. Heirs of González Martínez
82 P.R. 851 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1961)
Sanabria v. Sucn. de González Martinez
82 P.R. Dec. 885 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1961)
Mitchell v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc.
170 F. Supp. 743 (D. Maine, 1959)
Skinner v. Parnell
257 F.2d 345 (Tenth Circuit, 1958)
Mitchell v. Nutter
161 F. Supp. 799 (D. Maine, 1958)
Mitchell v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.
160 F. Supp. 628 (D. Maine, 1958)
Rivera v. Crescioni
77 P.R. 43 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1954)
Jiménez Montalvo v. Jiménez Font
76 P.R. 673 (Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 1954)
Durkin v. Shone
112 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Tennessee, 1953)
Wabash Corp. v. Ross Electric Corp.
187 F.2d 577 (Second Circuit, 1951)
McComb v. Homeworkers' Handicraft Cooperative
176 F.2d 633 (Fourth Circuit, 1949)
Devine v. Joshua Hendy Corporation
77 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. California, 1948)
McComb v. Hunt Foods, Inc.
167 F.2d 905 (Ninth Circuit, 1948)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
123 F.2d 749, 1941 U.S. App. LEXIS 2812, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fleming-v-palmer-ca1-1941.