Sanabria v. Heirs of González Martínez

82 P.R. 851
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedJune 8, 1961
DocketNo. 10726
StatusPublished

This text of 82 P.R. 851 (Sanabria v. Heirs of González Martínez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sanabria v. Heirs of González Martínez, 82 P.R. 851 (prsupreme 1961).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Belaval

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action of filiation filed by a natural daughter against the legitimate heirs of her father. The three main allegations are as follows: That “about the years 1903, 1904, and 1905, Manuel González Martínez and Monserrate Sanabria, also known as Isilé Sanabria, lived in concubinage in the town of Salinas, and as a result of these relations plaintiff herein was born on February 1, 1905”; that “at [854]*854the time of plaintiff’s conception and for some time prior to and after said date, Manuel González Martínez and Monserrate Sanabria were not married and there was no impediment at all for them to marry, with or without dispensation, and during all that time Monserrate Sanabria was known to be living in concubinage with Manuel Gon-zález Martínez”; that “during the entire period of time between plaintiff’s conception and birth and the date of the death of Manuel González Martínez, he held plaintiff as his daughter, took care of her support and education, referred to her as his daughter in conversations, always maintained with her relations of father and daughter, regarded her publicly and privately as his own daughter, and during all that time plaintiff was always in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural daughter of Manuel González Martínez, which was expressed and justified by acts performed by Manuel González Martínez as well as by acts performed by his relatives.”

The petitioner in this case was born on March 8, 1905, when the grounds for requesting filiation were governed by § 189 of the Revised Civil Code of Puerto Rico of 1902, whereupon the father was bound to acknowledge his child: “1. Where there be an authentic statement in writing made by him expressly recognizing its paternity; 2. When publicly or privately he has shown that it is his child, or has called it as such in conversation, or looks after its education and maintenance; 3. When the mother was known to have lived in concubinage with the father during the pregnancy or birth of the child, or when the child was born while his parents were engaged to be married (relaciones amorosas).”

As may be noted, at the time petitioner was born there existed in our legislation as grounds for requesting filiation, the following: (1) the authentic statement in writing; (2) when publicly or privately the father has shown that it is his child; (3) when he has called it as such in con[855]*855versation; (4) when the father looked after its education and maintenance; (5) when the mother was known to have lived in concubina ge with the father during the time of pregnancy; (6) when the mother was known to have been living in concubinage with the father at the time the child was born; (7) when the child was born while his parents were engaged to be married (relaciones amorosas).

There is no doubt that the second ground for requesting such action: “when publicly or privately he has shown that it is bis child” constitutes a more elastic rule than the famous “uninterrupted possession of the status of natural child of the father” of our latter legislation. Likewise, the seventh ground: “When the child was bom while the parents were engaged to be married” is not as strict as the rule established by our subsequent legislation which provides for the acknowledgment if “the mother was known to be living in concubinage with the father during the pregnancy or birth of the child”.

From 1902 until 1911, the rules governing the cases for requesting an illegitimate filiation — which included the natural filiation — were much more comprehensive, for during that period our law was set free from the former Spanish dogmatic which generally prohibited the inquiry into the paternity. This being so, it is not difficult to conclude that the interpretation of the evidence should be different: Alicea v. Antuñano, 50 P.R.R. 880, 889 (Travieso) (1937).

On the other hand, at the time of deciding this case the trial court did not have the benefit of our subsequent decisions as to the nature and quantum or quality of the evidence necessary to establish the paternity: Figueroa v. Diaz, 75 P.R.R. 152 (1953), (Negrón Fernández), (Marrero), (Ortiz), (Sifre), at 163-164, 173, 179, 181, 184. In Figueroa v. Díaz, suprra, we held that filiation should be decided according to the preponderance of the evidence, as any other [856]*856civil suit, disregarding the former doctrine which required the filing of a “strong and convincing evidence.”

It is unquestionable that in this case the trial court, at the time of weighing the evidence, applied the former view of “strong and convincing evidence” and by virtue of said application it disregarded the testimonies which implied clear acts of acknowledgment. Besides, there are certain expressions of the trial court that lead us to conclude that following the language of Torres v. Heirs of Caballero, 39 P.R.R. 654, 659, (Aldrey), (1929), it examined the evidence with “suspicion” because this action was filed after the death of the natural father.

The language used by Mr. Justice Aldrey in the Torres case could not be fully understood without bearing in mind that the illegitimate child was born on December 3, 1895, when the declaration of his status was governed by subdivision 2 of § 135 of the Spanish Civil Code. It is difficult for us today to transfer said spirit to an interpretation of our present filiation system.

In any way, if within the scientific nomenclature of a jurisprudence the principle established in Torres v. Heirs of Caballero, supra, as to the point here under consideration, may be considered as still in force, the same should be overruled.

Furthermore, as a question of law, if the right to request the filiation is extended to a period of time subsequent to the death, it is our duty as triers to give force and effect to the legislative rule, for without indulging in speculations it is possible to think of a set of moral, social, economic, and even merely sentimental circumstances by virtue of which a natural child does not wish to institute an action of filiation .during the lifetime of his father.

The petitioner complains that the trial court did not attempt to reconcile the evidence of both parties, pursuant [857]*857to the rule established by us in Meléndez v. Cividanes, 63 P.R.R. 4, 10 (De Jesús), (1944). There is a certain perceptible tendency in the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial judge which seem to indicate that he undertook to establish a sharp separation as to the credibility of the testimony, giving excessive credit to the witnesses for the defendants and hardly any or none to the witnesses for the natural daughter.

Examining carefully the degree of interest or disinterest of each witness for the defendant heirs in the present case —family nexus, social relations, friendship relations, master and servant relations, benefits received in the past or in the present, such as dowries, gifts, pensions, royalties, trips or mere interest of litigant — we realize that it is impossible to establish the sharp division in the credibility made by the trial court Likewise, it is not difficult to conclude that the cautious position in which the judge placed himself, undoubtedly influenced by the principle laid down in the Torres case, did not permit him, upon weighing the evidence, to reach the truth of the facts.

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Bluebook (online)
82 P.R. 851, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sanabria-v-heirs-of-gonzalez-martinez-prsupreme-1961.