SUHRHEINRICH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CLAY, J., joined.
SUTTON, J. (pp. 857-63), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge.
In this statutory interpleader action, the district court awarded more than $53,000 in attorney’s fees to the interpleader plaintiff, First Trust Corporation (“First Trust”), the former trustee of a pension plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”). Appellant, Intervenor-Defendant, Kay Hamlin, (“Kay”), is the beneficiary of that plan. She contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to First Trust and in limiting the amount she received.
For the following reasons, we REVERSE the award of attorney’s fees to First Trust. -We further hold that although the district court appropriately awarded Kay attorney’s fees, it inappropriately limited, her to only those associated with her motion to intervene.
[844]*844I. Facts
W.D. Bryant & Sons, Inc., offered an ERISA-covered pension plan benefit to its employees, known as the “W.D. Bryant & Sons, Inc., Money Purchase Pension Plan” (“Plan”). First Trust served as the non-discretionary, directed trustee (“directed trustee”) of the Plan until shortly after it filed this action and the employer appointed a successor. Elvin Bryant (“Elvin”), a co-owner of the company, serves as the Plan Administrator and authorizes First Trust to make payments to beneficiaries. Marvin L. Bryant, Sr., Elvin’s brother, was an employee of the company and a plan participant until his death in 1995.
On July 1, 1982, Marvin designated as his beneficiary his then-wife Kay Bryant, now Kay Hamlin (“Kay”), the Appellant in this case. Marvin and Kay had two sons, Lorren M. Bryant (“Lorren”) and Marvin Lee Bryant, Jr. (“Lee”), who were also parties to the action below. Marvin and Kay divorced in June 1985. Marvin later remarried. On the date of his death, he was married to Brenda Fusion Petry Bryant (“Brenda”), also an interpleader defendant. However, Marvin never changed his designated beneficiary after his divorce from Kay. Upon his death, a family dispute arose over who was entitled to his pension benefits, with claims to the pension plan benefit funds ultimately being made by his two sons, his widow, and his first wife.1
In August 1995, a Kentucky state probate court entered an agreed order between Lorren, Lee', and Brenda that essentially divided the pension plan assets into thirds. However, in March 1996, the state probate court issued a new order that ordered about one half of the funds to be distributed to Brenda and the rest to be split between the sons. The order nevertheless directed that “no party” was to have access to the pension plan benefits “except by a written Court Order executed by a Judge of competent jurisdiction.”
Aftér each court order, First Trust received beneficiary distribution election forms from Elvin authorizing First Trust to make payments to Brenda, Lorren, and Lee in the proportions ordered by the court. At some point, First Trust also received a copy of an antenuptial agreement between Marvin and Brenda that provided she would receive all sums in excess of $200,000 in his pension plan should he die during the marriage. Over, time, First Trust received repeated telephone calls from all three claimants.
Finally, in January 1997, about a year and one-half after Marvin’s death, First Trust wrote to Elvin as the Plan Administrator outlining the multiple requests for distributions and the conflicting court orders. It insisted on a resolution of who was the beneficiary by February 7, 1997, or it would have no alternative but to interplead the assets into court for such a determination.
Prior to actually filing its interpleader suit, First Trust repeatedly discussed venue with the attorney for Marvin’s sons, who requested that the action be filed in Kentucky, where one of the sons resided. First Trust attempted, unsuccessfully, to [845]*845settle the venue issue. First Trust proposed to Lee and Lorren that they sign a release and reimburse First Trust for its attorney’s fees, and in exchange, First Trust would bring the interpleader suit in Kentucky. In the sons’ view, this proposal was “blackmail” and they refused to accept it.
A. The Colorado Proceedings
On May 9, 1997, First Trust filed this statutory interpleader action in the' United States District Court of Colorado. It named as defendants Marvin’s second wife, Brenda, and his two sons, Lorren and Lee. First Trust invoked the court’s jurisdiction under the federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, and the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. First Trust contended venue was appropriate in Colorado under 28 U.S.C. § 1397, which governs, venue, for interpleader actions, because it was a “claimant” to the funds and a citizen of Colorado. First Trust’s status as claimant was based solely on its Prayer for Relief requesting attorney’s fees to be paid from the Plan assets attributable to Marvin pri- or to their distribution. In support of its fee request, First Trust alleged that the attorney’s fees incurred were “for the ordinary and necessary administration and operation of the Pension Plan, have been reasonably incurred, and have not been paid by [the employer].”
Significantly, First Trust did not name Kay Hamlin as a defendant. It nevertheless acknowledged in the complaint that “[o]n or about July 1, 1982, while he was married to his first wife, Kay Bryant, Mr. Bryant designated Kay Bryant as the primary beneficiary.” First Trust attached to its complaint the beneficiary designation form showing that Marvin had designated Kay as his beneficiary. The complaint also explained that Kay had not made any claim to the assets. First Trust later claimed that it did not join Kay because it thought that under Treasury Regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-20, Marvin’s marriage to Brenda invalidated the designation of Kay as the beneficiary.
On First Trust’s motion, the court ordered the interpleaded funds to be deposited into the court’s registry. Those funds were tendered on May 21, 1997, in the amount of $305,459.28. In its tender, First Trust stated they “represent[ed] all funds ... attributable to Marvin L. Bryant.” In filing the complaint and tendering the funds, First Trust incurred modest attorney’s fees and costs-about $2,700.
On June 6, 1997, when the interpleader suit was in its initial stages, the employer’s board of directors dismissed First Trust as directed trustee of the Plan, effective immediately, and appointed First National Bank and Trust, (“FNBT”), as successor trustee. FNBT was never joined as a party.
On July 14, 1997, Lorren and Lee opposed the interpleader action, seeking its dismissal or a change of venue on the ground that venue was improper in Colorado because no true claimant resided in Colorado. They argued that First Trust was not a claimant to the funds based on its demand for attorney’s fees. They also contended that First Trust’s request for attorney’s fees and costs should be denied.
' On August 5, 1997, First Trust opposed a transfer, contending that it was a proper claimant to the funds based on its request for attorney’s fees. It further argued that litigation in Kentucky would be inconvenient and would be an “additional expense to be paid out of the Pension Plan assets.” J.A. 156 (emphasis added).
On August 14, 1997, Brenda moved to compel First Trust to join as a party Kay Hamlin, Marvin’s first wife. She noted that nothing prevented Kay, the only [846]*846named beneficiary, from challenging the distribution under provisions of ERISA so that without her presence there could not be complete relief.
On September 29, 1997, First Trust moved for its dismissal from the case, an injunction against further suits, and attorney’s fees and costs. It further argued that the award of fees should be made out of the funds at issue, as is typical for interpleader suits. Both Brenda and Marvin’s sons opposed First Trust’s motion. The sons noted that the court had not yet ruled on Brenda’s pending counterclaim or the transfer motion. They further argued that an award of attorney’s fees would be improper given First Trust’s bad faith conduct in the litigation, citing First Trust’s selection of an improper venue and demands for attorney’s fees in exchange for a settlement. Brenda, on the other hand, argued that First Trust had failed to deposit all the funds at issue into the court’s registry. She also alleged that First Trust was an ERISA trustee, and that, as First Trust had violated various provisions of ERISA, it was not entitled to any attorney’s fees.
On October 16, 1997, Brenda filed her answer, and asserted counterclaims against First Trust for breach of its fiduciary duties under ERISA. She also sought attorney’s fees from First Trust under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).2 In reply to Brenda’s counterclaims, First Trust, admitted it was the trustee, but asserted the named fiduciary was the president or other designee of the employee. In defense, First Trust stated it did not act as a fiduciary when it filed the inter-pleader complaint.
On November 12, 1997, the District Court for the District of Colorado rejected First Trust’s argument that it was a claimant to the funds based on its demand for attorney’s fees and held that venue in Colorado was improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1397 because none of the true claimants resided in Colorado. The court therefore ordered the case transferred to the Eastern District of Kentucky. The court denied as moot First Trust’s motion to for dismissal and for an injunction and roughly $16,000 in attorney’s fees. The Colorado court never ruled on Brenda’s motion to join Kay as a defendant.
B. The Kentucky Proceedings
After the case was transferred to the Kentucky district court, First Trust tendered an additional $35,959.27 into the court registry because they were additional funds disputed in Brenda’s counterclaims. This brought the amount of inter-pleaded funds to $341,418.55.
On April 7, 1998, Kay moved to intervene. First Trust did not oppose her motion to intervene, but did not explain why it failed to join her in the first place. On June 4, 1998, the Kentucky district court granted Kay’s motion to intervene.
Having successfully intervened, Kay filed an answer and a counterclaim under ERISA. In her counterclaim she sought a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to all the proceeds of Marvin’s account because she was his only designated beneficiary. She also sought her attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). In response to Kay’s counterclaim, First Trust argued it had been replaced as trustee and had no control or authority over the Plan assets. It also argued that the funds had already been deposited into the court’s registry so [847]*847that it therefore could not comply with an order directing it to pay funds to her.
On June 15, 1998, Kay moved for summary judgment. She argued there was no genuine issue of material fact that she was entitled to all the funds attributable to Marvin’s pension plan account as the only designated beneficiary. Brenda opposed Kay’s motion on a number of grounds.
On December 31, 1998, First Trust moved for summary judgment on Brenda’s counterclaims and for attorney’s fees against Brenda, arguing it was entitled to its fees under ERISA’s fee-shifting provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). On January 14, 1999, First Trust also moved separately to be dismissed from the interpleader action, for an injunction, and for attorney’s fees. It argued the court had authority to award it fees under the general rule that interpleading plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees and that the award should be from the interpleaded funds, as is the general practice.
On January 22, 1999, the district court granted Kay’s motion for summary judgment, resolving the merits of the inter-pleader suit. The court held that Kay was entitled to all of Marvin’s pension benefits because she was his designated beneficiary.
Thereafter, Kay and the sons, along with the Plan and Elvin, jointly opposed First Trust’s motion for dismissal. They also opposed First Trust’s request for attorney’s fees, noting First Trust’s improper choice of forum, its decision to file the action under the interpleader statute rather than ERISA, and its failure to name Kay as a defendant. Lastly, they noted the inequity in awarding First Trust fees from Kay’s benefits. They asserted that it was First Trust’s postures in the case that prolonged the litigation and made it more costly and difficult. On January 29, 1999, Kay moved for final judgment and distribution of the Plan assets, as well as her attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,813.69. By separate motion, the sons also sought attorney’s fees in the amount of $39,046.89.
First Trust objected to the attorney’s fees affidavits filed by Kay and the sons. As to Kay’s, it insisted that Kay had not prevailed against First Trust, but against Brenda instead, so that she was not entitled to any fees. First Trust also argued that it should not have to pay attorney’s fees that Kay “incurred in the ordinary course of pursuing her claims” because it was not First Trust that caused the dispute over Marvin’s pension benefits.
On April 23, 1999, the district court issued a series of four orders disposing of most of the remaining issues in the case. In one order, the district court ruled that First Trust would be entitled to its attorney’s fees as a disinterested stakeholder who “protected the interests of the fund’s beneficiary and aided the parties in resolving their ongoing dispute over the decedent’s estate.” In a second order, the court denied the sons’ motion for attorney’s fees. In so doing, it found that the bank had “not engaged in culpable conduct or other acts constituting bad faith.” The court specifically rejected the sons’ arguments that filing in the wrong venue or First Trust’s attempt to settle evidenced bad faith.
In a third order issued on April 23, the district court granted First Trust’s motion for summary judgment on Brenda’s counterclaims. Although it held that Brenda lacked standing since Kay was the proper owner of the funds, it nonetheless remarked in dicta that First Trust was not a fiduciary of the Plan because, under its terms, First Trust did not have discretionary control over the plan assets, citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). The court also denied Brenda’s request for attorney’s fees [848]*848because summary judgment was awarded to. First Trust on all her claims. The court then ordered Brenda to pay First Trust’s attorney’s fees.
Finally, in a fourth order, the district court granted Kay’s motion for attorney’s fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), and ordered the clerk to disburse to her the funds from Marvin’s pension plan that had been deposited with the court, but only after subtracting attorney’s fees requested by First Trust. Regarding Kay’s fees, the court granted her attorney’s fees, but limited her to only those fees accumulated in her efforts to intervene.
On May 12, 1999, Kay moved the court to reconsider its April 23 order awarding attorney’s fees to First Trust, arguing that the anti-alienation provision in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), precluded an award out of the pension plan benefits.
Meanwhile, First Trust submitted its fee request in the amount of $68,588.91. It argued that $12,455.72 of the fees it incurred were attributable directly to Brenda’s counterclaim and should be paid by her. It argued that the remainder, $56,133.19, should be paid from the funds deposited into the court. In justifying its high requested award, First Trust laid the blame for the protracted proceedings at the feet of the sons and Brenda. First Trust did not accuse Kay of improper conduct in the case, however.
Kay then submitted her fee request in the amount of $3,184.37, which reflected the court’s order restricting her fees request to those incurred in intervening. She also requested an upward adjustment, as is done in civil rights cases, to reflect the' success she obtained, arguing that an upward adjustment of 100% was appropriate. Her total request was therefore $6,368.74. Her attorney’s affidavit acknowledged that some billing entries did not specify that work was done on behalf of Kay alone and may represent work also done for his other clients, the sons, Elvin, and the Plan. However, he averred that $1,000 was incurred for work done solely on Kay’s behalf. He did not mention a contingency fee agreement.
On July 6, 1999, by agreed order, the district court ordered the pension plan benefits and interest to be disbursed to Kay, except for $56,133.19, the amount of attorney’s fees still at issue. On July 29, 1999, by agreed order, the court dismissed all claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims among Brenda, the sons, Elvin, the Plan, and Kay.
On September 29, 1999, the court reversed itself regarding the award of fees to First Trust on April 23, 1999, granting Kay’s motion for reconsideration based on ERISA’s anti-alienation provision. In denying attorney’s fees to First Trust, the court ruled that § 1056(d)(1)’s prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits barred an award of attorney’s fees here.
On October 18, 1999, First Trust moved for reconsideration of the September 29 order, arguing that ERISA’s anti-alienation provision did not apply because the funds had been deposited into the court’s registry. Alternatively, First Trust argued that ERISA’s provisions clearly allow for plan administration costs and attorney’s fees. Thus, First Trust requested that the court reinstate its earlier decision of April 23, 1999.
On May 18, 2000, the district court reversed itself again, this time granting First Trust’s motion for reconsideration. It concluded that § 1056(d)(1) was inapplicable on the ground that ERISA’s anti-alienation provision was not implicated once pension funds are removed from the fiduciary responsibility of the plan manager. The court held that the deposit into the [849]*849court’s registry was “equivalent to” benefits having been paid to and received by the beneficiary, and therefore, a fee award would not be a right enforceable against the Plan. The district court further reasoned that an award was permissible notwithstanding the provision because the case had always been tried as an ERISA case, despite the fact that the complaint did not specifically mention ERISA, and Kay herself sought attorney’s fees under § 1132. The court therefore held:
The record, as detailed above, clearly shows that this case was practiced under § 1132 and that statute controlled the substantive disposition of the case. § 1132 does not bar an award of attorneys’ fees such as those granted in the court’s order of April 23, 1999 and, in fact, authorizes fee awards. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Thus, the court will reinstate its April 23, 1999 order granting First Trust attorneys’ fees.
The court further remarked that ERISA expressly authorized plan assets to be used for plan administration costs in a number of provisions, citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(c)(1) (authorizing plan assets to be used for plan administration costs), 1104(a)(l)(A)(ii) (to defray reasonable expenses of administering the plan), and 1108(c) (for compensating a fiduciary for services rendered in performance of his duties with the plan), and that these provisions permit a reasonable award of attorney’s fees for service to the plan. The court concluded that because First Trust had filed the interpleader action as part of its plan administration duties, the lawsuit’s costs were incurred as part of plan administration and it was therefore entitled to its fees. Finally, the court reiterated that Kay’s award of fees was limited to the expenses of intervening.
On May 22, 2002, after a period of inaction by the court, Kay moved for distribution of her remaining assets still held by the court. First Trust had also moved for a decision on the amount of attorney’s fees.
On July 3, 2002, the district court entered judgment, dismissed the case, and assessed fees and costs in a supplemental order. The order directed that First Trust be paid $53,555.29, plus interest, out of the funds in the court’s registry. The order further directed that all sums remaining in the registry be disbursed to Kay Hamlin. .It held that the amount requested by First Trust was reasonable as to time spent and hourly rates charged, but reduced First Trust’s request to the extent that the fees sought trying to recover its attorney’s fees were excessive. The court also shifted some of the amounts First Trust requested from Kay to Brenda because they were attributable to work pertaining to Brenda’s counterclaims. Finally, the court offset First Trust’s award by the amount awarded to Kay. The court determined that her fee award, which the court had previously limited to those fees associated with her efforts to intervene, amounted to $1,000 for her motion to intervene, answer and counterclaim. This amount was based on ten hours of work at an hourly rate of $100. In so doing, the court noted that Kay had failed to rebut the various objections raised by First Trust. Finally, the court ordered Brenda to pay $18,559.50 to First Trust.
Kay appeals.
II. Analysis
In its final ruling of May 18, 2000, the district court reinstated its April 23, 1999 order granting First Trust attorney’s fees under the interpleader statute. In its May 18, 2000 ruling, the district court also stated that the attorney’s fees provision of the ERISA statute, § 1132(g), authorizes fee awards such as. those granted in the April 23 order. Finally, the court held that the [850]*850anti-alienation provision was not an impediment to the award of attorney’s fees because ERISA itself includes exceptions to § 1056, expressly authorizing plan assets to be used for plan administration costs.
Kay challenges this holding on a number of grounds. First, she contends that the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to First Trust, payable out of her benefits, violates ERISA’s anti-alienation provision. Kay also asserts that only a prevailing party may. be awarded fees under § 1132(g). Further, she argues that the district court failed to consider the appropriate factors in awarding attorney’s fees to First Trust, and in limiting those awarded to her.
First Trust counters that the anti-alienatioii provision. does not apply after pension funds are removed from the fiduciary responsibility of the plan manager. In other words, it contends that § 1056(d)(1) is inapplicable once funds are no longer under the “control” of the Plan, having been deposited in the court’s registry pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335. First Trust further alleges that, as a trustee of the Plan, it was a fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA, and entitled to attorney’s fees as part of its administrative duties. First Trust also maintains that the district court had discretion under both ERISA and statutory interpleader to award it fees.
Although these arguments raise a number of interesting and complex issues3, we [851]*851decline to address them today, as this matter is easily resolved under ERISA’s attorney’s fee provision, because First Trust is not entitled to attorney’s fees in any event.
A. Attorney’s Fees
In an action by a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court, in its discretion, “may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (emphasis added). See also Foltice v. Guardsman Prods., Inc., 98 F.3d 933, 936 (6th Cir.1996). This Court has rejected a presumption that attorney’s fees should ordinarily be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff. Id.See also Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210 F.3d 491, 500-03 (5th Cir.2000) (same; discussing precedent from other circuits).
We utilize a five-factor test in assessing whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in awarding fees:
(1) the degree of the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith; (2) the opposing party’s ability to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees; (3) the deterrent effect of an award on other persons under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting fees sought to confer a common benefit on all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or resolve significant legal questions regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.
Id. at 936-37 (quoting King, 775 F.2d at 669). These factors are not statutory and therefore not dispositive. Rather, they are simply considerations representing a flexible approach. Id. at 937.
We review the district court’s determination of an attorney’s fee award under § 1132(g) for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 939. “An abuse of discretion exists only when the court has the definite and firm conviction that the district court made a clear error of judgment in its conclusion upon weighing relevant factors.” Id. (quoting Sec. of Dept. of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir.1985)).
1. First Trust
a. Bad Faith
The district court held that First Trust had not engaged in bad faith or culpable conduct. We disagree. It is undisputed that First Trust filed in the wrong venue, failed to join Kay as a party even though it knew of her existence as a claimant, and then got embroiled in a dispute with the various claimants, which further entangled it in the litigation, by demanding that the claimants agree to stipulate that they be enjoined from asserting claims against First Trust relating to the funds deposited with the court. Had First Trust properly followed the in-terpleader procedures, sued in the proper venue, and impleaded all of the claimants of which it was aware, as it was legally obligated to do, it would not have gotten entangled in the litigation.
[852]*852We can discern no valid reason why First Trust did not join Kay as a party since it clearly knew that she was the designee, as evidenced by its attachment to the complaint.4 Furthermore, First Trust cannot excuse the fact that it proceeded as it did on the basis that it mistakenly believed that under a particular treasury regulation, Bryant’s marriage to Brenda Bryant invalidated the earlier designation of his first wife as beneficiary; that is precisely the sort of determination which is supposed to be made in the course of litigation after the parties are interpled and First Trust, as disinterested stakeholder, is out of the case.
We also cannot fathom why First Trust did not join Kay once Brenda moved for her to be joined. Kay was needlessly put to the expense of having to move to intervene. More importantly, First Trust , never offered an explanation for why it failed to join Kay as a defendant. Full disclosure in the complaint of her status as the designated beneficiary is simply not equivalent to joining her as a defendant, because it shifted the onus to Kay. Likewise, First Trust’s decision not to oppose Kay’s motion to intervene is not equivalent to joining her as a party, as First Trust lamely implies. At, a minimum, First Trust is culpable for this pointless failure to add Kay initially and for repeatedly failing to correct it.
We also agree with Kay that the court abused its discretion by not basing its award on First Trust’s failure to file in the proper venue. First Trust’s contention that a request for attorney’s fees transforms a purportedly disinterested stakeholder into a true claimant within the meaning of the interpleader statute is unreasonable.5 First Trust did not file this action under ERISA, and indeed repeatedly disclaimed that it was a fiduciary under ERISA. For example, when Brenda filed her counterclaim against First Trust, it stated that it had not acted as a fiduciary when it filed the interpleader complaint. Furthermore, First Trust is a sophisticated entity, not unfamiliar with the concepts of interpleader, disinterested stakeholder, and claimant.6 Finally, the venue provi[853]*853sion of the interpleader statute is clear on its face.7
First Trust’s seemingly inexplicable litigation strategy may perhaps best be understood by the following letter sent by First Trust’s counsel to counsel for Brenda and counsel for the sons on May 15, 1997:
As I have discussed with each of you, First Trust is willing to cooperate with you to reach an agreement whereby the case can be transferred from Colorado to the federal district court in Kentucky. This would eliminate the need for you to hire local counsel here in Colorado. My client is willing to agree to such a transfer, provided that (i) First Trust receives all of its attorneys’ fees, (ii) the court enters a permanent injunction preventing any of the defendants from filing or pursuing any claims against First Trust in state or federal court, and (iii) First Trust is dismissed with prejudice from the interpleader action. I have reached such an agreement in other cases. I have enclosed copies of pleadings from another interpleader action, First Trust Corp. v. Olesko, which show the specifics of the agreement I am proposing.
We think the foregoing attempt to work a deal with Marvin’s sons to voluntarily transfer venue to Kentucky in exchange for attorney’s fees and a signed release dispels any assertion by First Trust that its actions were innocent and not calculated. Thus, its litigation tactics in this case cannot be dismissed as an “honest mistake.” See Foltice, 98 F.3d at 937 (stating that “[h]onest mistakes are bound to happen from time to time, and fee awards are likely to have the deterrent effect where deliberate misconduct is in the offing”). In light of this letter, First Trust’s claim that it was merely seeking to extract itself from a complicated and potentially litiga-tious situation, given the multiple requests for distributions and conflicting court orders, is simply untenable.
Furthermore, although First Trust apparently sought fees under § 1132(g)(1), it has never identified any fault on Kay’s part, even though the assets from which the district court deducted First Trust’s attorney’s fees were indisputably Kay’s. In its request for fees, First Trust claimed that $56,000 in fees stem from litigation thrust upon it principally by the sons and Brenda. The trouble is that First Trust was already awarded attorney’s fees against Brenda for fees incurred in litigating Brenda’s counterclaim and those fees are not at issue in this appeal. All references to Brenda’s counterclaim in First Trust’s present fee request, therefore, are wholly irrelevant and disingenously presented. See id. (occasionally mentioning Brenda’s counterclaim in reference to its request for fees from the assets earmarked for Kay).
As, for fees incurred in litigating against the sons, First Trust remarkably appears [854]*854to attribute' these funds to litigation surrounding the venue issue in Colorado. See id. at 972-75. It strains credulity to consider even for a moment First Trust’s argument that it should be awarded attorney’s fees for litigation that inevitably resulted from its own obviously erroneous choice of forum. In any event, it cannot be contended that the litigation pursued by the sons-even if proven to be in bad faith (which First Trust did not demonstrate)'— is an appropriate basis for an award of attorney’s fees against Kay, rather than against the sons individually.
b.Ability to Pay
c.Deterrence
d.Common Benefit
These three factors also weigh against the district court’s ruling requiring Kay to pay First Trust’s attorney’s fees. Kay demonstrated that she has a net worth of less than $500,000. There cannot possibly be any deterrent effect in awarding a fee against Kay, since Kay did nothing wrong. Kay merely sought benefits that were rightfully hers, and moreover, properly employed the judicial machinery in seeking the funds. See Gibbs, 210 F.3d at 505 (holding that .district court erred in using deterrent factor as a sword to discourage beneficiaries from pursuing a claim, “rather than as this factor was intended to be used, as a shield, to protect beneficiaries from the fear of having to pay to pursue an important ERISA claim in the event of failing to prevail”). Further, the award to First Trust does not confer a common benefit, because First Trust is no longer the directed trustee of the Plan.
e.Relative Merits of Position
Quite simply, Kay prevailed — cleanly, unequivocally, and absolutely. First Trust has taken the losing position in virtually every significant issue involved in this case, from the venue matter to the valuation matter, to whether Kay should be joined, and even to advising the court on which claimant had superior rights to the benefits,8 not to mention the fact that First Trust is aggressively seeking its attorney’s fees when it knew or should have known from the outset that the source of reimbursement for its fees should be from “the Trust Fund” or the employer. Apart from merely filing the interpleader suit for a court to resolve the ownership dispute, First Trust cannot be said to have taken meritorious positions.
Furthermore, we cannot help but note the considerable inequity of extracting from Kay’s benefits First Trust’s attorney’s fees that were related to virtually the entire proceedings in this case — fees that First Trust jacked up with numerous arguments, ' as ‘ this opinion reflects. Yet the district court made no attempt to limit fees when they were related to issues on which First Trust plainly lost, like the venue issue and the valuation issue, matters that did not even involve Kay because she was not a party until after the case had been transferred to Kentucky and she moved to intervene.9 Indeed, the award of such [855]*855substantial fees was particularly inequitable given that First Trust did not accuse Kay of improper conduct. The court seemed oblivious to the fact that First Trust was a sophisticated entity that could foresee and plan for interpleader suits, unlike Kay, an individual who likely initially had no knowledge of her rights under ERISA, probably did not know about the Plan, and had to hire an attorney to protect her interests. In awarding fees to First Trust, the court also seemed oblivious to the glaring omission by First Trust in failing to join Kay as a defendant, which undermined the very purpose of bringing an interpleader suit — to join all the claimants in one forum to avoid the vexation of multiple suits and liability for disbursing the funds to the wrong person.
Furthermore, in its May 19, 1999 fee request, First Trust' claimed that $56,000 in fees stemmed from litigation thrust upon it principally by the sons and Brenda, not Kay.
In short, all of the equities favor Kay, and all five Foltice factors weigh against an award of attorney’s fees to and costs to First Trust. We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion in awarding any attorney’s fees to First Trust. Had First Trust behaved as a truly disinterested stakeholder, it would have been reasonable to award it the $2700 in attorney’s fees for the cost of bringing the interpleader action. However, given its actions throughout this litigation, we see no reason why First Trust should not be required to bear all of its own costs.
We now consider whether Kay was entitled to all of her attorney’s fees.
2. Kay
The first and fifth Foltice factors clearly favor an award to Kay, for the reasons discussed above. As the' district court found, First Trust does not contest that it has the ability to pay a fee award. And, as the district court stated, “such an award may help to ensure that designated beneficiaries are included in future suits, making such suits simpler to litigate and more likely to protect the interests of such beneficiaries.” An award to Kay. will hopefully serve to deter First Trust from litigating in this manner in future cases. Finally, although only Kay will benefit directly from a fee award, a common benefit will be conferred upon future litigants in Kay’s shoes vis-a-vis First Trust.
Thus, we hold that the district court committed a clear error in judgment in limiting Kay’s request for attorney’s fees. Without explanation, the district court limited Kay to the fees and expenses associated with her efforts to intervene. The court thereby prohibited the rightful beneficiary from pursuing fees related to all issues pertaining to her claim, including protecting herself from First Trust’s improper requests for attorney’s fees which she would not have had to incur but for First Trust’s litigating tactics. In creating this limitation, the court seems to have been persuaded by First Trust’s argument that it should not have to pay attorney’s fees to a claimant that are “incurred in the ordinary course of.pursuing her claims.” For' all of reasons discussed, First Trust’s conduct took the proper claimants well beyond the ordinary course of interpleader actions. We therefore hold that the district court’s limitation on Kay’s fee request was clearly an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.
B. Interpleader
The district court also awarded attorney’s fees under the interpleader stat[856]*856ute.10 The federal interpleader statute consists of three separate provisions pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1335; venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1397; and service of process, 28 U.S.C. § 2361. The interpleader statute does not contain an attorney’s fee provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Courts have merely relied on language in 28 U.S.C. § 2361, which provides for service of process and personal jurisdiction for statutory interpleader, to the effect that the “district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge the plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment,” to award attorney’s fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (emphasis added). Federal Practice and Procedure, supra, § 1719, at 674. 4 Moore’s Federal Praotice, supra, § 22.06, at 22-98.11 Despite the lack of explicit statutory authorization, “modern federal practice follows the traditional equity rule that gives the trial court discretion to allow a disinterested stakeholder to recover attorney’s fees and costs from the stake itself.” Id. at 22-98 to 22-99 & n. 4.
Again, at a minimum, for all the reasons discussed in this opinion, equity does not favor an award of attorney’s fees to First Trust, and the district court abused its discretion in holding otherwise. Moreover, such a result on equitable grounds would be inconsistent with our decision that First Trust is not entitled to attorney’s fees under an express statutory provision that authorizes fees in certain circumstances.
C. Contingency Fees
As for Kay’s request to have her contingency fee agreement considered, it is without merit. First, she did not raise her contingency agreement until long after the court limited her fees to those incurred in intervening. Moreover, her attorney’s fee affidavit acknowledged that calculation of attorney’s fees is made by the lodestar method even when there is a contingency agreement. Even if she properly presented this issue below, our law is clear that fee awards may not be enhanced for the risks of contingency. See Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 253 (6th Cir.1992) (citing City of Burlington v. [857]*857Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 567, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992)); see also Murphy v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir.2001).
Accordingly, on remand the' district court is to reconsider Kay’s initial request for attorney’s fees, if she is able to substantiate the hours worked solely on her behalf, without limiting them to' her efforts to intervene.
D. Fees and Costs on Appeal
Finally, Kay argues she is entitled to her attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. An award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) may also be made for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. See King, 775 F.2d at 670; see also Schwartz v. Gregori, 160 F.3d 1116, 1119 n. 5 (6th Cir.1998). The analysis we undertook above regarding the appropriateness of awarding her attorney’s fees applies equally to whether Kay is entitled to her attorney’s fees on appeal. Accordingly, on remand, the district court is directed to award reasonable attorney’s- fees to Kay in connection with this appeal in an amount to be determined by the district court.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the award of attorney’s fees to First Trust. We also REVERSE the award of attorney’s fees to Appellant Kay Hamlin only to the extent that she was improperly limited to her efforts to intervene.' Finally, we award the fees and costs of this appeal to Appellant and REMAND this matter to the district court for an expeditious determination.