MANION, Circuit Judge.
Petitioners Florencio Victor Jimenez-Mateo, Julio Calderon, and Omar Cende-jas-Fernandez (collectively “petitioners”) were ordered removed from this country. The orders of removal were based on findings that petitioners’ most recent state-court convictions for drug possession offenses constituted aggravated felonies under § 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), because each of the petitioners had previously been convicted of a controlled substance offense. The petitioners have filed' timely petitions for review in this court. They assert that their first and second state-court convictions for simple drug possession cannot amount to an “aggravated felony” under § 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA. Because we have already found in United States v. Pacheco-Diaz, 506 F.3d 545 (7th Cir.2007), that such convictions do constitute an “aggravated felony” under § 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA, we deny their petitions for review.
I.
We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of each of the petitioners’ cases below.
A. Julio Calderon
Calderon is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States illegally. He is also a documented member of the Latin Kings street gang, a national criminal organization based in Chicago. See generally United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 661-62 (7th Cir.2006) (describing the organization of the Latin Kings). As one might expect of a member of the Latin Kings, Calderon has had several run-ins with the law. Most relevant to this opinion, however, are Calderon’s convictions for marijuana possession: an October 30, 2002 conviction for marijuana possession in violation of 720 ILCS 550/4(a), and an August 8, 2006 conviction for two counts of [864]*864marijuana possession in violation of 720 ILCS 550/4(a) and (b).
In October 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings against Calderon. DHS charged that Calderon was subject to removal under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in § 101(a)(43) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). DHS listed Calderon’s three marijuana possession offenses as the basis for the aggravated felony charge. On November 8, 2006, DHS issued a final administrative removal order finding that Calderon was an aggravated felon and ordering him removed from the United States to Mexico. Calderon timely filed a petition for review of DHS’s order in this court.
B. Omar Cendejas-Fernandez (“Fernandez”)
Fernandez is a citizen of Mexico who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. On September 28, 2001, Fernandez was convicted of two counts of cocaine possession in violation of 720 ILCS 570/402(c). On November 7, 2005, Fernandez again was convicted of cocaine possession in violation of 720 ILCS 570/402(c).
On March 29, 2006, DHS initiated removal proceedings against Fernandez. DHS charged that Fernandez was removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in § 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). Fernandez was ordered to appear before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). After a hearing on May 22, 2006, the IJ issued an oral decision ordering that Fernandez be removed to Mexico. In reaching that decision, the IJ first cited this court’s decision in Ali v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 722 (7th Cir.2005), wherein we stated that any alien who has been convicted of a state controlled substance offense that is also a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) has, for immigration purposes, been convicted of an aggravated felony. The IJ then noted that Fernandez had been convicted of possessing a controlled substance in 2005 after a previous conviction for possessing a controlled substance in 2001. Because § 844(a) of the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), makes drug possession punishable by more than one year of imprisonment — and hence a felony, see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5) — for those who have previously been convicted of a controlled substance offense, the IJ found by clear and convincing evidence that Fernandez had been convicted of an aggravated felony and was removable on that basis. In addition, the IJ found Fernandez statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3).
Fernandez appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”). He argued that the IJ should not have found that his convictions qualified as an aggravated felony. The Board, however, agreed with the IJ that a state offense for possession of a controlled substance that occurred after a prior drug conviction qualified as a “drug trafficking crime” under § 101 (a)(43)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B), because, under § 844(a) of the CSA, the most recent conviction would be defined as a felony. Consequently, the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision. Fernandez filed a timely petition in this court for review of the Board’s decision.
C. Florencio Victor Jimenez-Mateo (“Mateo”)
Mateo is a citizen of the Dominican Republic who was admitted to the United States on an immigrant visa in October [865]*8651966. On December 23, 1989, Mateo was convicted of possessing a controlled substance in violation of New York Penal Law § 220.03. On April 26, 2002, Mateo was convicted of attempted possession of a controlled substance in violation of 720 ILCS 5/8-4. On April 12, 2006, Mateo received his third controlled-substance conviction, this time for possession of a controlled substance in violation of 720 ILCS 570/402(c).
After his conviction in April 2006, DHS filed a notice to appear charging that Ma-teo was removable under § 237(a)(2)(B)(I) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)®, because of his April 2006 conviction for possession of a controlled substance. At a hearing before an IJ, Mateo through counsel conceded that he was removable as charged, but sought cancellation of removal. In an oral decision, the IJ found that Mateo was removable from the United States as an alien convicted of a controlled substance violation. The IJ also found that Mateo was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. In particular, the IJ classified Mateo’s 2006 drug possession offense as an aggravated felony, since that offense occurred after Mateo had been convicted previously of two controlled substance offenses. Ma-teo appealed the IJ’s aggravated felony finding to the Board, but the Board affirmed the IJ’s decision. Mateo then filed a timely petition for review of the Board’s order affirming the IJ.
II.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the second (or, as is the case with Mateo, third) of each of the petitioners’ multiple state-court convictions for drug possession was accurately characterized as an aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA. Section 101(a)(43) of the INA provides an extensive list of crimes that qualify as aggravated felonies. Specifically, subsection 101(a)(43)(B) adds “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance ... including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18) ... whether in violation of Federal or State law” to that list. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Section 924(c), in turn, defines the term “drug trafficking crime” as, among other things, “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). As the Supreme Court has stated, a state drug offense is considered “analogous” to a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act,” and, as a result, an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA, “only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under that federal law.” Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 127 S.Ct. 625, 632 n. 8, 633, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006).
In this case, the petitioners argue that their state convictions were wrongly classified as aggravated felonies because the state statutes under which they were convicted only proscribe simple possession, which is not a felony under the CSA. In response, the government contends that the petitioners’ most recent convictions for drug possession are analogous to what the courts refer to as “recidivist possession” under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), which is a felony under the CSA, because those convictions were preceded by at least one prior drug possession conviction. The pertinent portion of § 844(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance.... Any person who violates this subsection may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year, and shall be fined a minimum of $1,000, or both, except that if he commits such offense after a prior conviction under this subchapter or sub-chapter II of this chapter, or a prior conviction for any drug, narcotic, or chemical offense chargeable under the law of any State, has become final, he [866]*866shall be sentenced to a terra of imprisonment for not less than 15 days but not more than 2 years, and shall be fined a minimum of $2,500....
21 U.S.C. § 844(a). The second sentence in the portion of § 844(a) quoted above transforms what would ordinarily be a misdemeanor offense for simple possession into a felony where the current offense was preceded by a prior conviction for a controlled substance offense. However, for the government to obtain a felony conviction under § 844(a), it has to, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, file notice of the prior conviction and, if challenged, prove to the judge the existence of the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. The petitioners therefore counter the government’s argument by asserting that the Illinois statutes under which the petitioners were most recently convicted are not the state “counterparts” to a felony violation of § 844(a), since none of those statutes required the state of Illinois to give notice of the petitioners’ prior convictions or prove the existence of those convictions, as § 851 would have required had petitioners been prosecuted in federal court. While Illinois law does provide for a sentencing enhancement for recidivist drug possession, 720 ILCS 570/408(a), none of the petitioners’ sentences for their most recent possession offenses was enhanced under that provision.1 Thus, the real question in this case is whether an alien’s second (or subsequent) state conviction for simple drug possession amounts to an aggravated felony in terms of a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” when the state did not treat the alien as a recidivist.
In this circuit, that question has already been answered, albeit in a different context. Just before oral argument in this case, this court decided United States v. Pacheco-Diaz (Pacheco I), 506 F.3d 545 (7th Cir.2007). In Pacheco I, this court addressed the question of whether an alien’s second state conviction for simple possession of marijuana constituted an aggravated felony for purposes of determining a sentencing enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.2 Section 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) of the guidelines instructs a sentencing court to enhance a defendant’s offense level eight levels if the defendant previously was deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony. The application notes to § 2L1.2 explain that, for purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), the term “aggravated felony” has the same meaning as given in § 101(a)(43) of the INA. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 application note 3(A) (2007). The district court had found that the sentencing enhancement applied because, among other things, Pacheco-Diaz’s January 2002 conviction for marijuana possession, following as it did an October 2000 conviction for marijuana possession, would be treated as a federal felony under the recidivist enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Pacheco I, 506 F.3d at 548.
This court in Pacheco I agreed with that reasoning. In our opinion, we first referenced footnote six of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lopez v. Gonzales, wherein the Supreme Court noted that Congress had indeed classified a § 844(a) felony offense as “illicit trafficking,” thus bringing that offense within the definition of an aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA. Pacheco I, 506 F.3d at 548. We recognized that a circuit split existed in [867]*867the sentencing context regarding the treatment of § 844(a) with respect to the INA’s aggravated felony definition. We sided with those circuits that analogized a second state conviction for drug possession to § 844(a) when determining whether that state conviction constituted an aggravated felony for purposes of the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 549 (citing United States v. Palacios-Suarez, 418 F.3d 692, 700 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Sanchez-Villalobos, 412 F.3d 572, 576-77 (5th Cir.2005); United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir.2002)). “Had Pacheco been charged in federal court with his second drug possession charge,” we stated, “he would have been eligible for a recidivist enhancement under section 844(a).” Id. at 550. The second state possession conviction was analogous to a felony under the CSA because § 844(a) would have exposed Pacheco to a possible sentence of imprisonment of two years had it been charged in federal court. That made the conviction analogous to a “drug trafficking crime” under § 924(c), and, as a consequence, an aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA. Id.
Pacheco later petitioned for rehearing. Citing the oral argument in this case, Pacheco argued that rehearing should be granted because he had raised the same argument that petitioners raise here, namely, that a second state drug-possession offense cannot be treated as a federal felony under § 844(a) when the alien was not charged in state court as a recidivist. The opinion in Pacheco I, Pacheco asserted, overlooked that argument. Pacheco also argued that this court in Pacheco I did not fully consider the application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006), in rendering its decision. Finally, Pacheco argued that rehearing should be granted because two other circuits had decided the issue differently after Pacheco I had been submitted.
We denied Pacheco’s motion for rehearing. United States v. Pacheco-Diaz (Pacheco II), 513 F.3d 776 (7th Cir.2008) (per curiam). This court was not swayed by the fact that Pacheco’s Illinois convictions were not based on that state’s recidivist statute. Lopez, we said, held that classification of an offense for the purpose of § 101(a)(43) depends on how the defendant’s conduct would be treated under federal law:
If the conduct of which the defendant has been convicted would be a felony under federal law, then it comes within [§ 101(a)(43) of the INA] if it meets that statute’s requirements concerning the subject-matter of the crimes and the length of the sentence.... In a hypothetical-federal-felony approach, it does not matter whether the defendant was charged in state court as a recidivist; indeed, it does not matter whether the state has a recidivist statute in the first place. What provides the classification under [§ 101(a)(43) ] is federal rather than state law.
Id. at 778-79. We concluded: “Looking at the conduct reflected in the state convictions, as opposed to the precise state crime charged, is the only way to implement the hypothetical-federal-felony view that Lopez adopted as its holding.” Id. at 779.
Shortly after oral argument, we ordered supplemental briefing on the application of Pacheco I to this case. In their supplemental brief, the petitioners make several arguments as to why Pacheco I does not apply to this case, all of which we reject. First, the petitioners argue that Pacheco I does not apply because it was a sentencing case, while this is an immigration case. In support of that argument, petitioners point out that this court in Pacheco I cited only sentencing cases from other circuits on the question of whether a second state possession conviction amounted to an aggravated [868]*868felony; no reference was made to any of the immigration cases dealing with this issue. ■ Compare Pacheco I, 506 F.3d at 549 (citing sentencing cases that have dealt with this issue), with In re Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I & N Dec. 382, 385 (BIA 2007) (en banc) (citing both immigration and sentencing cases). The lack of citations to immigration cases in Pacheco I is insignificant. We interpret the identical statutory provisions in this case as the court did in Pacheco I. Our interpretation of the same statutes should be consistent, regardless of the context. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005) (“To give these same [statutory] words a different meaning for each category [of aliens] would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.”); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12 n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004) (stating that statute must be interpreted consistently whether it is encountered in a criminal or an immigration context).
Relying on dicta in Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532, 535-36 (7th Cir.2006), petitioners nevertheless insist that immigration cases call for a different interpretation of the aggravated felony definition than sentencing cases. The dicta in Gonzales-Gomez to which petitioners refer was made in the context of distinguishing sentencing decisions in other circuits from holdings in this court. Regardless of what was said in Gonzales-Gomez, any distinction between sentencing and immigration for purposes of interpreting identical provisions of the aggravated felony definition is foreclosed after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 127 S.Ct. 625, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006). In Lopez, the Supreme Court drew no distinction between sentencing cases and immigration cases. Though Lopez itself was an immigration ease, the Supreme Court cited — and its opinion abrogated — lower court sentencing cases. See Lopez, 127 S.Ct. at 629 n. 3 (citing, among other sentencing cases, United States v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506 (4th Cir.2003), and United States v. Simon, 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.1999)). Thus, the Court clearly signaled that it meant any interpretation of § 101(a)(43) of the INA to apply uniformly, regardless of the context.
Second, petitioners cite the Board’s decisions in In re Carachuri-Rosendo, 24 I & N Dec. 382 (BIA 2007), and In re Thomas, 24 I & N Dec. 416 (BIA 2007), as a reason to distinguish Pacheco I. Those cases were decided after the Pacheco I opinion was released. In them, a majority of the Board held that, absent controlling federal circuit precedent to the contrary, an alien’s state conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance “will not be considered an aggravated felony conviction on the basis of recidivism unless the alien’s status as a recidivist drug offender was either admitted by the alien or determined by a judge or jury in connection with a prosecution for that simple possession offense.” Carachuri, 24 I & N Dec. at 394. Board Member Roger Pauley filed a concurring opinion in Carachuri, joined by Acting Vice Chairman Gerald Hurwitz, taking the opposite view. See id. at 400.
We fail to see how the Board’s decision to spurn Pacheco I affects the outcome in this case. This court in Pacheco II was unconcerned about the Board’s about-face in Carachuri. We not only explicitly stated in Pacheco II that we agreed with the reasoning of Board Member Pauley’s concurring opinion, but also that we disagreed with the majority of the Board’s conclusion that a state possession offense could only be an aggravated felony if the alien was treated as a recidivist in state court.3 Pa[869]*869checo II, 513 F.3d at 778. We see no reason to deviate from that view.
Next, the petitioners argue that Pacheco I should not apply here because the court in Pacheco I was not presented with what, according to the petitioners, is the “key legal issue” raised in this case, namely, “whether an immigrant who was not charged and convicted as a recidivist in criminal court” can nevertheless be labeled an aggravated felon. Petitioners argue that Lopez mandates a “strict categorical approach” that allows courts to examine only what the state statutory offense under which the immigrant was charged proscribes when determining whether federal law defines the offense as a felony. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). Because none of the petitioners was charged as a recidivist in state court, petitioners argue that their state possession offenses cannot be treated as “analogous” to recidivist possession under § 844(a) for purposes of the aggravated felony definition.
There are two problems with that line of argument. First, arguably raised in both Pacheco’s initial and reply briefs,4 it was treated by the court in the passages of the Pacheco II opinion we have quoted above. Second, and more importantly, it does not survive scrutiny on the merits. Ordinarily, in order to determine whether a state offense is “analogous”5 to a federal offense listed in the INA’s definition of an aggravated felony, this court and others categorically compare the elements of the state offense with the elements of the federal offense. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 127 S.Ct. 815, 818-19, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007); see also Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir.2005). We explained the operation of the so-called “categorical” approach in Gattem: “one looks to the elements of the state offense in question and, where necessary, to the charging document pursuant to which the petitioner was convicted, to determine whether the offense corresponds to one of the crimes described as aggravated felonies in the INA.” 412 F.3d at 765.
While that approach works for many cases, applying a strict categorical approach in this case does not resolve the issue of whether the petitioners’ multiple drug offenses qualify as aggravated felonies. The elements of the Illinois possession offenses the petitioners committed and the elements of both a felony and a misdemeanor violation of § 844(a) are the same. Compare United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 834 (11th Cir.1998) (describing elements of a § 844(a) possession offense), with People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill.2d 326, 168 Ill.Dec. 108, 589 N.E.2d 508, 524 (1992) (describing elements of a violation of 720 ILCS 570/402), People v. Davis, 165 Ill.App.3d 648, 116 IlLDec. 513, 519 N.E.2d1111 103, 105 (1988) (describing elements of Illinois offense of possession of a controlled substance), and 2 Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction-Criminal 17.02 (4th ed.2000) (de[870]*870scribing elements of possession of cannabis in violation of 720 ILCS 550/4). Recidivism is the key ingredient in differentiating between a felony and a misdemeanor offense for drug possession under federal law. However it is not an element of the offense of drug possession, but instead is simply a penalty provision. It enhances the maximum possible sentence for a drug possession offense from one to two years if the defendant commits the offense after a prior conviction for a controlled substance offense has become final. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (“Congress ... has never, to our knowledge, made a defendant’s recidivism an element of an offense where the conduct proscribed is otherwise unlawful.”); Stone, 139 F.3d at 834. Thus, the fact that the state offense of conviction did not contain a recidivist element is irrelevant. What makes a state offense for drug possession analogous to a federal felony (and thus an aggravated felony) as opposed to a federal misdemean- or is the heightened penalty for recidivism, which is not an element of the offense.
The dissent points out that Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Apprendi signals that Almendarez-Torres may not be the law of the land much longer. Infra at 879 n. 3. But until the Supreme Court explicitly overrules that case, we are bound by it. See United States v. Hendrix, 509 F.3d 362, 375 (7th Cir.2007) (“[W]e have held that unless and until the Supreme Court chooses to overrule Almendarez-Torres, we are bound by it.” (citing cases)); see also Calloway v. Montgomery, 512 F.3d 940, 946 (7th Cir.2008) (“Almendarez-Tor-res still lives.”); see generally Saban v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 509 F.3d 376, 378 (7th Cir.2007) (“The Supreme Court has told the lower courts that they are not to anticipate the overruling of a Supreme Court decision, but are to consider themselves bound by it until and unless the Court overrules it, however out of step with current trends in the relevant case law the case may be.”). Almendarez-Torres, along with the language and structure of § 844(a), makes clear that the heightened penalty for recidivism is not an element of a § 844(a) offense. Because recidivism is not an offense element, a categorical comparison of the elements of § 844(a) and the petitioners’ most recent state possession offenses is inconclusive.
Although the categorical approach does not settle the matter, Lopez does. The Supreme Court in Lopez held that a state drug felony was not an aggravated felony where the conduct proscribed by the state felony would have only been penalized as a misdemeanor under federal law. According to Lopez, what counts is the classification of the analogous federal offense as a felony. The state’s decision to classify the offense as a felony or a misdemeanor is beside the point. See Lopez, 127 S.Ct. at 632-33 (“We cannot imagine that Congress took the trouble to incorporate its own statutory scheme of felonies and misdemeanors if it meant courts to ignore it whenever a State chose to punish a given act more heavily.”).
In this case, the increased penalty that converts a simple misdemeanor offense for drug possession into a felony, like the lesser penalty for the offense that was the subject of Lopez, 127 S.Ct. at 628, is purely a matter of federal law. Again, Lopez tells us that, when it comes to determining the consequences of a state offense for purposes of federal immigration law, federal law, not state law, counts. While the state of Illinois conceivably could have enhanced the petitioners’ state sentences under the Illinois provision similar to § 844(a),6 that is beside the point. The question is [871]*871whether the petitioners would have been subject to the increased penalty for having committed a prior drug offense had they been charged in federal court. As none of the petitioners disputes the existence of their prior convictions, the answer to that inquiry here must be “yes”; the petitioners’ most recent state possession offenses are therefore properly classified as aggravated felonies.
What the petitioners really object to, of course, is this court looking at the petitioners’ prior drug convictions in order to determine that their most recent convictions constitute aggravated felonies. They say that our going beyond the record of the most recent state offense is not allowed by Lopez, and that we are in effect “retrying” those offenses by doing so. But transcending the state offense in order to determine its analogous federal counterpart is exactly what the aggravated felony statute and Lopez require. Section 101(a)(43) of the INA states that the term aggravated felony “applies to an offense described in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). In order to determine if a state offense is “described” by a federal offense incorporated into § 101(a)(43), we necessarily have to view the state offense through the lens of federal law, since “it is just not plausible that Congress meant to authorize a State to overrule its judgment about the consequences of federal offenses to which its immigration law expressly refers.” Lopez, 127 S.Ct. at 633.
Moreover, going beyond the fact of the most recent possession conviction to make that determination is entirely consistent with Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In Taylor, the Court adopted a “modified” categorical approach, under which, where a defendant was convicted of a state law burglary offense that was broader than the generic definition of burglary, a sentencing court could “go beyond the mere fact of conviction” to determine whether the “jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Thus, where a state statute permitted a defendant to be convicted of burglary for stealing from a place other than a building (such as an automobile), the government could still use that conviction for purposes of obtaining an enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act if it could show, from the charging document and the jury instructions, that the defendant was actually convicted of stealing from a building (and not an automobile). Id.7
This case is simply a corollary application of the approach explicitly recognized as permissible in Taylor. Here, because the definition of the Illinois possession offenses under which petitioners were convicted are overbroad — i.e., conduct punishable under those Illinois statutes could constitute either a federal misdemeanor or federal felony, depending on whether those offenses occurred after a previous drug conviction became final — we must look at the records of the petitioners’ prior convictions to determine the federal consequences of the petitioners’ offenses. Importantly, in so doing, we, consistent with Taylor, need not delve into the underlying facts of the petitioners’ state convictions. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (“Congress intended the sentencing court [872]*872to look only to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and - not to the facts underlying the prior convictions.”); Pacheco II, 513 F.3d at 778-79.
The dissent is rightly concerned with the danger of “hypothetical ‘what-ifing.’ ” Infra at 876. But that concern is not present in this case. In finding that the petitioners’ state court offenses qualify as aggravated felonies, we are not looking at the real offense conduct underlying the petitioners’ state offenses in order to conjure up a hypothetical state offense that is then analogous to a hypothetical federal offense. Rather, we are only looking at the state offenses for which the petitioners were in fact convicted: a state drug possession offense after a previous drug offense. (Notably, none of the petitioners contest the fact that they have such a record.)
We respectfully suggest that it is only the dissent that is dealing in hypothetical. The offense that the dissent implies the petitioners ought to have been convicted of in state court to qualify as aggravated felons — i.e., a possession offense with a recidivist element — does not currently exist in Illinois. Illinois’s sentencing enhancement for recidivist drug possession, like § 844(a), does not create a separate offense for “recidivist possession.” See 720 ILCS 570/408(a); 725 ILCS 5/lll-3(c) (“[T]he fact of such prior conviction and the State’s intention to seek an enhanced sentence are not elements of the offense and may not be disclosed to the jury during trial .... ”); see also People v. Bradford, 187 Ill.App.3d 903, 135 Ill.Dec. 350, 543 N.E.2d 918, 930 (1989).
Petitioners bring to our attention two immigration cases from other circuits, not cited in either Pacheco I or Pacheco II, that have decided this issue differently. See Berhe v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 74 (1st Cir.2006); Steele v. Blackman, 236 F.3d 130 (3d Cir.2001).8 In those cases, the courts decided that subsequent state possession offenses were not aggravated felonies because the records of conviction for those state offenses did not reveal that the state courts followed procedures analogous to those outlined in 21 U.S.C. § 851. Steele, 236 F.3d at 137-38; see also Berhe, 464 F.3d at 85-86. (Recall that § 851 requires the government to file an information alleging the prior drug conviction and prove it, if contested, beyond a reasonable doubt to a judge.) The Third Circuit in Steele based its decision in large part on its concern about ■ the fairness of transforming two state misdemeanors into an aggravated felony. According to the Third Circuit, defendants do not address misdemeanor charges with the same caution and care as a felony indictment. If states did not have procedures similar to § 851 in place, the Third Circuit reasoned, then defendants would not realize the grave immigration consequences that would attach to their misdemeanor plea.9 Steele, 236 F.3d at 137.
[873]*873We “carefully consider the opinions of our sister circuits.” Klein v. DePuy, Inc., 506 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir.2007). In this instance, we are unpersuaded by what, in our view, is a misdirected approach to the issue before us. The Third Circuit’s fairness concern is inconsistent with Lopez; Lopez holds clearly that state felony-misdemeanor classifications are meaningless for purposes of determining whether a state offense is an aggravated felony under the immigration laws. Moreover, the First and Third Circuits, in requiring the record of an alien’s most recent state-court possession conviction to demonstrate that some form of the procedures outlined in § 851 were followed in state court, essentially elevate those procedures to the level of an element of the offense. See Steele, 236 F.3d at 137 (“While the status of being ‘a one time loser’ is not technically an element of the offense proscribed by § 844, we agree with the District Court that it can be treated as such.”); see also Berhe, 464 F.3d at 85-86; Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 317 (3d Cir.2002). The problem with that approach is that the § 851 procedures are clearly not an element of a § 844(a) offense.10 We do not doubt, of course, that a federal defendant charged under § 844(a) could not receive a felony sentence unless the government complied with the procedures in § 851 for providing notice and proof of a prior drug conviction. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 754 n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 137 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997); Harris v. United States, 149 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir.1998). But we do not see any reason to require that a state have followed the exclusively federal procedures set forth in § 851 in order for a state offense to qualify as an aggravated felony. Such a requirement, to us, would run contrary to the aggravated felony statute’s clear language that an “offense described in” that statute qualifies as an aggravated felony “whether in violation of Federal or State law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Thus, we respectfully disagree with those circuits that hold otherwise.
Petitioners make one other argument that merits attention. They argue that, if we follow the rule of Pacheco I here, then a second federal misdemeanor conviction for simple drug possession could be treated as if it were a federal felony, despite the fact that such a conviction is clearly not a felony under federal law. They argue that such a result “turn[s] the Lopez standard on its head.” We are quite skeptical that such a result follows from reaffirming Pacheco I. The petitioners’ argument presumes that one could analogize misdemeanor violations of a federal offense specifically incorporated into the aggravated felony definition to a felony violation of the same incorporated federal offense. Analogizing makes sense when determining whether a state conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. The statute says that offenses described in the aggravated felony definition count “whether in violation of Federal or State law.” Id. As most of the offenses listed in or incorporated into the aggravated felony definition (besides the generic offenses such as murder and rape) are strictly federal, some mode of comparing state crimes to those federal crimes is necessary. But analogizing makes little sense when dealing with a conviction for a federal offense, like § 844(a), that is specifically incorporated into the aggravated felony definition. Since those federal statutes are specifically referenced in the aggravated felony definition, there is no need to compare anything. [874]*874A violation of one of those statutes either is, or is not, a felony, and thus is, or is not, an aggravated felony.
We need not pursue the matter any further. The hypothetical the petitioners pose implicates other concerns not present in a case, such as this one, where the main question revolves around analogizing a state offense to a federal offense specifically incorporated into the aggravated felony definition.
Finding none of the petitioners’ arguments persuasive, we conclude that the rule of Pacheco I does apply, and that the Board and DHS did not err in finding that the petitioners were statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal on the basis of their having been convicted of an aggravated felony.
III.
Pacheco-Diaz, 506 F.3d 545 (7th Cir.2007), controls this case. Thus, each of the petitioners’ most recent state court convictions for drug possession constituted an aggravated felony under the INA because each occurred after a previous drug conviction became final. We Affirm.