PER CURIAM.
On this appeal of various district court orders granting and refusing to vacate an injunction,1 The Lubrizol Corporation raises the question of whether the United States patent in suit was validly issued on the issue date reported in the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office when on that date, and for a substantial period thereafter, the patent document was not printed, the patent grant was not signed by or on behalf of the Commissioner, the official seal was not affixed, a copy of the specification and claims was not available to the public, and access to the prosecution history was denied. Under these circumstances, Lubrizol asserts, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as there was no valid patent and therefore the injunction can not stand. Because as a matter of law jurisdiction is established by the complaint which pleads a valid patent, we affirm.
[1264]*1264
Background
The September 19,1989 issue of the Official Gazette listed, among patents issued that day, Patent No. 4,867,890 (“the ’890 patent”). The Official Gazette entry stated the title “Lubricating Oil Compositions Containing Ashless Dispersant, Zinc Dihy-drocarbyldithiophosphate, Metal Detergent and a Copper Compound”, gave the names and addresses of the inventors, listed the filing and priority dates, printed the text of patent Claim 1, and stated that there were 32 claims. The same day, September 19, 1989, Exxon Chemical Patents (“Exxon”) filed suit against The Lubrizol Corporation (“Lubrizol”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, charging Lubrizol with infringement of the ’890 patent.
On October 4, 1989 Lubrizol filed a declaratory judgment action against Exxon in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, requesting that the ’890 patent be declared invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed. On October 13, 1989 Lubrizol filed a motion in the Texas court to stay or transfer the suit filed by Exxon, on the basis that Ohio was a more suitable forum than Texas. Personal jurisdiction in the Texas court was not contested by Lubrizol.
Meanwhile, despite frequent requests (twice a day, according to Lubrizol), the PTO was unable to provide a copy of the ’890 patent. On October 19, 1989, one month after the Official Gazette date, a print marked “Department Proof” was provided by the PTO.2 On October 23, 1989 Lubrizol moved the Texas court to dismiss the Exxon suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the basis that the ’890 patent had not issued when Exxon filed suit on September 19, 1989, and still had not issued. With its motion papers Lubrizol submitted the affidavit of a former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, who described delays that occurred from time to time in the printing of patents after their listing in the Official Gazette.
Another affiant on behalf of Lubrizol averred that on requesting the application file for the '890 patent during the first week of October, 1989, he was told that the file was “not available”. Although the PTO wrote to Exxon’s counsel on November 8, 1989 that the ’890 patent file was available as of September 19, 1989 in the Office of Publications, it was undisputed that this arrangement was irregular, see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1309 (1990), and was not communicated to Lubrizol’s agent in response to his inquiries.
On November 1,1989 the PTO affixed, to a copy of the printed patent, a printed cover sheet with the text, inter alia, that “it has been determined that a patent on this invention shall be granted under the law” and “[gjrants ... the right to exclude ... for the term of seventeen years from the date of this patent”. The cover sheet bears the seal of the PTO, and the facsimile signature of Donald J. Quigg in the space designated for signature by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. Below the facsimile signature, in the space designated “Attest”, is the signature of Melvinia Gary, not identified by title. The printed patent bears the words “Date of Patent: Sep. 19, 1989”. The PTO stated, in a November 15, 1989 letter to Lubrizol, that this document was mailed on November 1, 1989.
On November 6 Exxon moved the Texas court to enjoin Lubrizol’s Ohio suit. On November 15 Exxon filed a First Amended Complaint in the Texas suit. The First Amended Complaint quoted the November 15 letter which stated
the Seal of the Patent and Trademark Office and the attesting signature were placed on the grant on November 1, 1989.
and that
the records of the Patent and Trademark Office indicate that [the ’890 patent] is[1265]*1265sued on September 19, 1989. The records referred to are the PTO’s PALM data base and the Patent File.
The several motions were heard by the Texas court on November 16, 1989. In colloquy with the court Lubrizol agreed that any flaw in jurisdiction was cured on November 1, but argued that Exxon’s First Amended Complaint could not relate back to the time the original complaint was filed and did not cure the jurisdictional defect of the original complaint. Lubrizol also continued to press the argument that Ohio was the preferable venue.
Following the hearing the Texas judge telephoned the Ohio judge; the records of both courts show their agreement on the management of this litigation. In harmony with this agreement, on November 21, 1989 the Texas court denied Lubrizol’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, enjoined Lubrizol from litigating the same issues concurrently in any other court, adopted the discovery schedule that had been set by the Ohio court, provided for further discovery under the supervision of the Texas court, and postponed decision of the transfer request. Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., Civil Action No. H-89-3203 (S.D. Texas November 21, 1989) (Order). Upon denial of its motion to vacate or alter or amend that judgment Lubrizol appealed, basing appellate jurisdiction on the district court’s injunction against prosecution of the Ohio suit.
It was soon recognized that although Commissioner Quigg’s facsimile signature was affixed and attested on November 1, 1989, he had resigned as Commissioner effective October 31, 1989. Based on this new asserted defect Lubrizol filed renewed motions to dismiss or transfer, again asserting lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.
At Exxon’s request, on January 26, 1990 Acting Commissioner Samuels personally countersigned the cover sheet of the patent grant, after which Exxon moved to file a Supplemental and/or Amended Complaint stating this event. On March 8, 1990 the district court granted Exxon’s motion, denied Lubrizol’s motions to vacate the injunction barring prosecution of the Ohio action and to dismiss the Texas action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and continued to hold “under advisement” Lubri-zol’s request to transfer the action to Ohio. Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., No. H-89-3203 (S.D. Texas March 8, 1990) (Order). Lubrizol also appeals these rulings.
Discussion
The district court’s jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1338
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PER CURIAM.
On this appeal of various district court orders granting and refusing to vacate an injunction,1 The Lubrizol Corporation raises the question of whether the United States patent in suit was validly issued on the issue date reported in the Official Gazette of the Patent and Trademark Office when on that date, and for a substantial period thereafter, the patent document was not printed, the patent grant was not signed by or on behalf of the Commissioner, the official seal was not affixed, a copy of the specification and claims was not available to the public, and access to the prosecution history was denied. Under these circumstances, Lubrizol asserts, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as there was no valid patent and therefore the injunction can not stand. Because as a matter of law jurisdiction is established by the complaint which pleads a valid patent, we affirm.
[1264]*1264
Background
The September 19,1989 issue of the Official Gazette listed, among patents issued that day, Patent No. 4,867,890 (“the ’890 patent”). The Official Gazette entry stated the title “Lubricating Oil Compositions Containing Ashless Dispersant, Zinc Dihy-drocarbyldithiophosphate, Metal Detergent and a Copper Compound”, gave the names and addresses of the inventors, listed the filing and priority dates, printed the text of patent Claim 1, and stated that there were 32 claims. The same day, September 19, 1989, Exxon Chemical Patents (“Exxon”) filed suit against The Lubrizol Corporation (“Lubrizol”) in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, charging Lubrizol with infringement of the ’890 patent.
On October 4, 1989 Lubrizol filed a declaratory judgment action against Exxon in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, requesting that the ’890 patent be declared invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed. On October 13, 1989 Lubrizol filed a motion in the Texas court to stay or transfer the suit filed by Exxon, on the basis that Ohio was a more suitable forum than Texas. Personal jurisdiction in the Texas court was not contested by Lubrizol.
Meanwhile, despite frequent requests (twice a day, according to Lubrizol), the PTO was unable to provide a copy of the ’890 patent. On October 19, 1989, one month after the Official Gazette date, a print marked “Department Proof” was provided by the PTO.2 On October 23, 1989 Lubrizol moved the Texas court to dismiss the Exxon suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the basis that the ’890 patent had not issued when Exxon filed suit on September 19, 1989, and still had not issued. With its motion papers Lubrizol submitted the affidavit of a former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, who described delays that occurred from time to time in the printing of patents after their listing in the Official Gazette.
Another affiant on behalf of Lubrizol averred that on requesting the application file for the '890 patent during the first week of October, 1989, he was told that the file was “not available”. Although the PTO wrote to Exxon’s counsel on November 8, 1989 that the ’890 patent file was available as of September 19, 1989 in the Office of Publications, it was undisputed that this arrangement was irregular, see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1309 (1990), and was not communicated to Lubrizol’s agent in response to his inquiries.
On November 1,1989 the PTO affixed, to a copy of the printed patent, a printed cover sheet with the text, inter alia, that “it has been determined that a patent on this invention shall be granted under the law” and “[gjrants ... the right to exclude ... for the term of seventeen years from the date of this patent”. The cover sheet bears the seal of the PTO, and the facsimile signature of Donald J. Quigg in the space designated for signature by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. Below the facsimile signature, in the space designated “Attest”, is the signature of Melvinia Gary, not identified by title. The printed patent bears the words “Date of Patent: Sep. 19, 1989”. The PTO stated, in a November 15, 1989 letter to Lubrizol, that this document was mailed on November 1, 1989.
On November 6 Exxon moved the Texas court to enjoin Lubrizol’s Ohio suit. On November 15 Exxon filed a First Amended Complaint in the Texas suit. The First Amended Complaint quoted the November 15 letter which stated
the Seal of the Patent and Trademark Office and the attesting signature were placed on the grant on November 1, 1989.
and that
the records of the Patent and Trademark Office indicate that [the ’890 patent] is[1265]*1265sued on September 19, 1989. The records referred to are the PTO’s PALM data base and the Patent File.
The several motions were heard by the Texas court on November 16, 1989. In colloquy with the court Lubrizol agreed that any flaw in jurisdiction was cured on November 1, but argued that Exxon’s First Amended Complaint could not relate back to the time the original complaint was filed and did not cure the jurisdictional defect of the original complaint. Lubrizol also continued to press the argument that Ohio was the preferable venue.
Following the hearing the Texas judge telephoned the Ohio judge; the records of both courts show their agreement on the management of this litigation. In harmony with this agreement, on November 21, 1989 the Texas court denied Lubrizol’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, enjoined Lubrizol from litigating the same issues concurrently in any other court, adopted the discovery schedule that had been set by the Ohio court, provided for further discovery under the supervision of the Texas court, and postponed decision of the transfer request. Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., Civil Action No. H-89-3203 (S.D. Texas November 21, 1989) (Order). Upon denial of its motion to vacate or alter or amend that judgment Lubrizol appealed, basing appellate jurisdiction on the district court’s injunction against prosecution of the Ohio suit.
It was soon recognized that although Commissioner Quigg’s facsimile signature was affixed and attested on November 1, 1989, he had resigned as Commissioner effective October 31, 1989. Based on this new asserted defect Lubrizol filed renewed motions to dismiss or transfer, again asserting lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.
At Exxon’s request, on January 26, 1990 Acting Commissioner Samuels personally countersigned the cover sheet of the patent grant, after which Exxon moved to file a Supplemental and/or Amended Complaint stating this event. On March 8, 1990 the district court granted Exxon’s motion, denied Lubrizol’s motions to vacate the injunction barring prosecution of the Ohio action and to dismiss the Texas action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and continued to hold “under advisement” Lubri-zol’s request to transfer the action to Ohio. Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., No. H-89-3203 (S.D. Texas March 8, 1990) (Order). Lubrizol also appeals these rulings.
Discussion
The district court’s jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which grants the district courts original jurisdiction of any civil action “arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents”. Section 1338(a) jurisdiction inures when a well-pleaded complaint establishes that
federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims.
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2173, 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 7 USPQ2d 1109, 1113 (1988). The proper focus is on whether the plaintiff actually pleaded the elements required by the patent laws for a patent infringement claim. Kunkel v. Topmaster International, Inc., 906 F.2d 693, 695, 15 USPQ2d 1367, 1369 (Fed.Cir.1990). When a challenge to jurisdiction is in fact directed only to the merits of a question of patent law, it is proper for the district court to accept jurisdiction under § 1338(a). See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946). Thus the district court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
We decide the interlocutory appeal before us by holding that the trial judge correctly assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the well-pleaded complaint. At this stage the question of validity (including the date of its validity) of the patent remains to be tried as a question of patent law.
[1266]*1266Accordingly, the district court’s orders, granting and refusing to vacate the injunction, are affirmed.3
Costs
Taxable costs in favor of Exxon.
AFFIRMED.