Western Electric Co. v. North Electric Co.

135 F. 79, 67 C.C.A. 553, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4314
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 12, 1905
DocketNo. 1,315
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 135 F. 79 (Western Electric Co. v. North Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Western Electric Co. v. North Electric Co., 135 F. 79, 67 C.C.A. 553, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4314 (6th Cir. 1905).

Opinion

SEVERENS, Circuit Judge.

The Westérn Electric Company complains in its bill of the infringement by the appellees of the rights secured by three several letters patent which it claims to own, namely, one numbered 357,538, granted to Charles E. Scribner, February 8, 1887, one numbered 488,033, granted to Scribner and Warner, December 13, 1892, and one numbered 552,729, granted to Scribner, January 7, 1896, all of which relate to improvements in spring-jack switches for telephone switch boards; and prays for an injunction and an accounting.

The appellees, who were the defendants in the court below, appeared, and interposed a plea, which, in substance, denied the allegation in the bill that the public had generally recognized the validity of the patent No. 357,538, and averred that the public refrained from contesting its validity because the Bell Telephone Company and the complainant in this suit claimed a complete monopoly of all telephonic inventions, and the public believed they had such a monopoly, and not because of the supposed validity of this particular patent. And, further, the plea denied that the invention of the patent had gone into extensive use, alleged that it had been anticipated, and denied infringement.

As to the patents Nos. 488,033 and 552,729, the plea alleged that they severally bear a date more than six months later than the time when notice was given by the Patent Office of the allowance of the applications, respectively. The complainant set this plea down for argument, and upon the hearing the court held the plea insufficient, and granted the defendants leave to answer, but without prejudice to the defendants’ right to raise by answer the defenses made by the plea. We will observe, in passing, that, so far as this [81]*81plea relates to the patent No. 357,538, it is quite manifest that, except as to the defenses of lack of invention and noninfringement, it presented no defense to the bill, and with respect to those defenses it is also quite clear that they cannot be taken by plea, but only by answer. Walker on Patents, §§ 599, 600. Besides, a plea, to be maintainable, must present some single definite point on the maintenance of which the bill will be disposed of. Story’s Eq. Plead. § 654. The plea as regards this patent is multifarious, in that it states several defenses to the bill. In fact, it covers the principal grounds of an answer.

The plea, in so far as it relates to patents Nos. 488,033 and 552,-729, would seem to be good in form. It alleges the fact that the date of each of the patents is more than six months later than the notice given to the applicant of the allowance of the application, and states the date on which such notice was given. Section 4885 of the Revised Statutes [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3382], provides that “every patent shall bear date as of a day not later than six months from the time at which it was passed and allowed and notice thereof was sent to the applicant or his agent; and if the final fee is not paid within that period the patent shall be withheld.” The question thus raised is an important one, for the chief of the Issue and Gazette Division of the Patent Office, whose testimony is in the record, states that great numbers of patents have been issued, the dates of which are more than six months later than the time when notice of allowance was sent to the applicant. He states that it is the practice of the Patent Office, and has been for more than 20 years, to transmit to the patentee the notice of allowance as soon as may be after all the proceedings except the payment of the final fee have been taken, and the notice of allowance contains a requirement that the final fee be paid. On receiving the final fee within the six months, the patent issues. But on account of the accumulation of business in the office a considerable period of time must elapse, after the final fee is paid, before the patent can be prepared and signed. And when the final fee is paid so near the expiration of the six months that the office cannot have the patent ready for issue within that time, the office issues a notice to the applicant, which contains a receipt for the fee, and a formal notice that the application has been examined and again allowed. And it appears that this latter was the course of proceeding in .the case of both the patents Nos. 488,033 and 552,729. In each case the final fee was paid, and notice of the reallowance mailed to the applicant within the six months after the original allowance; but the patents were dated and issued more than six months after the date of the original allowance, but shortly after the reallowance. It is contended for the appellees that these patents are therefore void. It is urged that the date .of the patents is imperatively required by the statute, and that the Patent Office has no authority to adopt a practice which shall dispense with that requirement. There is some plausibility in the argument supporting this contention, but we think the weight of opposing reasons compels a different con[82]*82elusion, and that the requirement should be regarded as directory, rather than absolutely essential. The full six months are allowed by the statute to the applicant, and it can hardly be supposed that Congress intended that this period could be cut short by the exigencies of the Patent Office. He has no power to coerce its proceedings. Delays in a public office are not generally allowed to prejudice the right of one who has performed all that the law requires of him to secure official action. The object which Congress had in view was to compel the applicant to follow up his application by the reasonable performance of the conditions precedent to the issue of the patent. If he entitles himself to have the patent issue within six months, that object is subserved. Said Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the court in French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506, 20 L. Ed. 702:

“There are undoubtedly many statutory requisitions Intended for the guide of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them, which do not limit their power, or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual. Such, generally, are regulations designed to secure order, system, and dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights of parties interested cannot be injuriously affected. Provisions of this character are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless accompanied by negative words importing that the acts required shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated.”

And in 2 Sutherland, Stat. Construction, § 612 (2d Ed.), it said:

“In other words, as the cases universally hold, a statute specifying a time within which a public officer is to perform an official act regarding the rights and duties of others is directory, unless the nature of the act to be performed or the phraseology of the statute is such that the designation of time must be considered as a limitation of the power of the officer.”

Again, the statute declares that, if the final fee is not paid within the six months, the patent shall be withheld, but it does not declare that, if not dated as directed, the patent shall not issue, or, if issued, shall be void. Besides all this, the officers charged with the administration of the law have for many years construed the law as giving power to the office to exercise control over applications until the patent should finally issue, and that it was justified in resorting to a matter of form in order that the right of the citizen should not be sacrificed.

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Bluebook (online)
135 F. 79, 67 C.C.A. 553, 1905 U.S. App. LEXIS 4314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/western-electric-co-v-north-electric-co-ca6-1905.