McGarrahan v. Mining Co.

96 U.S. 316, 24 L. Ed. 630, 1877 U.S. LEXIS 1666
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 18, 1878
Docket72
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 96 U.S. 316 (McGarrahan v. Mining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGarrahan v. Mining Co., 96 U.S. 316, 24 L. Ed. 630, 1877 U.S. LEXIS 1666 (1878).

Opinion

Mr.- Chief Justice Waite

delivered the opinion of the court.. ■

The Pederal question in this case-is, whether the record in the volume kept at the General Land-Office at Washington for the recording of patents of the United States issued upon California confirmed Mexican grants, relied upon by McGarrahan as evidence of his title, proves a conveyance by the United States of the land in controversy to Vicente P. Gomez, his grantor. In his behalf, it is contended that the record is itself the grant; or; if not, that it proves‘the issue-to Gomez of a patent which does grant' the legal title to the' property described.

*319 That the record is not. itself the grant of title is evident. The thirteenth section of the act “ to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of California ” (9 Stat. 631) provides, that, “ for all claims finally confirmed, ... a patent shall issue to the claimant upon his presenting to the General Land-Office an authentic copy of such confirmation and a plat of the survey,” &c. By sect. 8 of the “ act for the establishment of a general land-office in the Department of the Treasury ” (2 id. 717), it is enacted, that “ all patents issuing from tile said office shall be issued in the name of the United States -and under the seal of said office, and be signed by the President of the United States, and countersigned by the commissioner of said office, and shall be recorded in said office in books to' be kept for the purpose.” Thus the patent executed in the prescribed form which issues from the General Land-Office is made the instrument of passing title out of the United States. The record of this patent is evidence of the grant, but not the grairt itself. It is evidence of equal dignity with the patent, because, like the patent, it shows that a patent containing the grant has been issued.

The record called for by the act of Congress is made by copying the patent to be issued into the book kept for that purpose. The effect of the record, therefore, is- to show that an instrument such, as is there copied has actually been prepared for issue from the General Land-Office. If the instrument as recorded is sufficient on its face to pass the' title, it is to be presumed that the grant has actiially been made;' but if it is not sufficient, no such presumption arises. In short, the record, for the purposes of evidence, stands in the same position and has the same effect as the instrument of which it purports to be a copy. The same defences can be made, against the record as could be made against the instrument recorded. The public records of the executive departments of the government are not, like those kept pursuant to ordinary registration laws, intended for notice, but for preservation of the evidence of the transactions of the department.

This brings us to inquire whether this record shows upon its. face the execution of a patent sufficient in law to transfer the title of the premises in controversy from the United States. *320 And ■ here it may not be improper to note, that although the case shows that, in July, 1870, before this suit was commenced, the commissioner of the General Land-Office and the recorder caused to be entered upon the face of the record, over their official signatures, a statement to the effect that the instrument in question was never in fact executed or delivered, McGarrahan rests his whole case upon the record and the evidence it furnishes. This he has the undoubted right to do; but, if he does, he must stand or fall by what it proves. It is his own fault, if, having a valid patent in his possession, he fails to produce it.

■ By the first section of the “ Act to reorganize the General Land-Office ” (5 Stat. 107), it was provided that the executive duties -relating “ to private claims of land, and the issuing of patents for all grants of 'land under the authority of the government of the United States, shall be subject to the supervision. and control of the commissioner of the General Land-Office, under the direction of the President of the United States; ” and by the fourth section, “ that there shall be appointed by .the President, by and with the consent of the Senate, a recorder of the General Land-Office, whose duty it shall be, in pursuance of instructions from the commissioner, to certify and affix the seal of the General Land-Office to all patents for public lands, and he shall attend to the correct engrossing and recording and transmission of such patents. He shall prepare alphabetical indexes of the names of patentees, and of persons entitled to -patents. . . .” By the sixth section, it was further provided 'that “ it shall be lawful fori the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint a secretary, . . . whose duty it shall be, under the direction of the President, to sign, in his name and for him, all patents for lands sold or granted under the authority of the . United States.” By the second section of the act of Match 3, 1841 (id. 416), the .duty of countersigning patents was transferred from the commissioner of the General Land-Office to the recorder. Thus it appears that a patent for lands must be\signed in the name of the.President, either by himself or- by his duly appointed secretary,’ sealed with the seal of the General Land-Office, and countersigned by the i’ecorder. Until all these things have been done, the United States has not *321 executed a patent for a grant of lands. Each and every one of the integral parts of the execution is essential to the perfection of the patent. They are of equal importance under the law, and one cannot be dispensed with more than another. Neither is directory, but all are mandatory. The question is not what, in the absence of statutory regulations, would constitute a valid grant, but what the statute requires. Not what other statutes may prescribe, but what this does. Neither the signing nor the sealing nor the countersigning can be omitted, any more than the signing or the sealing or the acknowledgment by a grantor, or the attestation by witnesses, when by statute such forms are prescribed for the due execution of deeds by private parties for the conveyance of lands. It has never been doubted that in such cases the omission of any of the statutory requirements invalidates the deed. The legal title to lands cannot be conveyed except in the form provided by law.

But if either óf the requisites to the due execution of a patent may.be considered as directory, the countersigning by tbe recorder should not be permitted to occupy that position. The President may sign by his secretary, but the recorder must sigh himself. He countersigns, that is to say, signs opposite to and after the President, by way of authentication. Being specially charged with the duty of attending to the issue of patents, it is peculiarly appropriate that his attestation should be the last act to be performed in the perfection of the instrument, and that he should do it personally.

The record in this case shows an instrument in the form of a patent, signed in the name of the President, and sealed. The place for the signature of the acting recorder is left blank. The name of the President is signed by his secretary. The claim which is made, that Stoddard, the secretary, also countersigned as acting recorder, is not sustained by the evidence. His signature appears only as secretary, and there is nothing whatever to indicate that he attempted to act as recorder.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
96 U.S. 316, 24 L. Ed. 630, 1877 U.S. LEXIS 1666, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgarrahan-v-mining-co-scotus-1878.