IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
RYAN ADAM DIXON, No. 87160-9-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JENNI HALLACK and HALLACK LAW, PLLC
Respondent.
BIRK, J. — The superior court dismissed Ryan Dixon’s complaint against
Jenni Hallack and Hallack Law, PLLC (collectively Hallack Law), because Dixon’s
claim for unjust enrichment was time barred. The superior court also awarded
attorney fees to Hallack Law under CR 11. Dixon argues the superior court erred
in allowing untimely filings, converting Hallack Law’s motion to dismiss into a
summary judgment motion, and awarding fees to Hallack Law when Dixon had
filed a notice of appeal. We affirm and deny Hallack Law’s request for fees.
I
In April 2024, Dixon filed pro se a complaint against Hallack Law for unjust
enrichment, alleging Hallack Law did not fully refund him for legal services he had
paid for in advance. Hallack Law moved to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6), and several
days later Dixon moved for summary judgment.
At the initial hearing on the parties’ motions, the court explained to Dixon
that asking the court to consider evidence not in the complaint in response to CR No. 87160-9-I/2
12(b)(6) motion converts the motion to one for summary judgment. At the same
hearing, the court continued the matter to provide Dixon an opportunity to file a
reply to Hallack Law’s response to his summary judgment motion. Hallack Law
had acknowledged it untimely responded to Dixon’s motion for summary judgment,
and Dixon had indicated he had not had time to reply to its response before the
noted hearing. At the continued hearing, the court converted Hallack Law’s motion
to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and granted it, dismissing Dixon’s
motion for summary judgment. The court ruled Dixon’s claims were time-barred
and did not make a ruling on whether Dixon’s claims were frivolous.
Hallack Law moved for attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185 and CR 11. The
court denied Hallack Law’s claim for fees under RCW 4.84.185 for being untimely
and granted Hallack Law’s claim under CR 11, concluding the three CR 11
elements had been met. Dixon unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration.
Dixon appeals the order granting Hallack Law’s motion for summary
judgment.
II
A
Dixon argues the superior court lacked jurisdiction to award fees after a
notice of appeal had been filed. A trial court order awarding attorney fees under
CR 11 after appeal of final judgment does not modify the judgment and may be
entered consistent with RAP 7.2(e). Leen v. Demopolis, 62 Wn. App. 473, 484-
85, 815 P.2d 269 (1991). Dixon's reliance on Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 876
P.2d 448 (1994) is unavailing. Biggs emphasized that parties accused of violating
2 No. 87160-9-I/3
CR 11 are entitled to notice. Id. at 198. But Biggs upheld sanctions under CR 11
entered after mandate, id. at 196, 199-200, and Dixon had adequate notice to
respond to Hallack Law’s motion for CR 11 sanctions. For the first time in reply,
Dixon argues that Hallack Law’s motion for CR 11 sanctions violated CR 54(d)(2).
This court generally does not consider arguments raised for the first time in reply.
SYNNEX Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 34 Wn. App. 2d 857, 875, 572 P.3d 1214
(2025).
B
Dixon argues the superior court improperly converted Hallack Law’s CR
12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment without providing proper notice.
However, the trial court did not err in converting Hallack Law's CR 12(b)(6) motion
to a CR 56 summary judgment motion. When a CR 12 motion is converted to a
CR 56 motion, the court does not necessarily need to newly afford parties the
precise time periods for response set forth in CR 56. Zurich Servs. Corp. v. Gene
Mace Constr., LLC, 26 Wn. App. 2d 10, 27, 526 P.3d 46 (2023). Here, after
observing that the CR 12 motion relied on materials outside the pleadings, and for
other reasons, the court set a new hearing to take place three weeks after the
original hearing. And, Dixon sought summary judgment determining the action,
suggesting he believed the evidence was sufficiently developed and available for
the court to rule summarily on the merits. Dixon argues in this court that the three
week postponement was inadequate for him to gather evidence appropriate to a
summary judgment motion. But he presents this argument in purely conclusory
terms, never explaining what evidence he believed he needed to develop but
3 No. 87160-9-I/4
lacked time to do so. Given the absence of Dixon pointing to any evidence he
needed more time to develop, the trial court's handling of the conversion of the
motion was within its discretion.
C
Dixon next contends that the trial court violated his rights to due process
under the federal and state constitutions because, he says, the trial court strictly
enforced procedural rules against Dixon but demonstrated leniency to Hallack
Law. The alleged leniency towards Hallack Law included considering its allegedly
late-filed materials and allowing it to argue a statute of limitations defense despite
not having pleaded it. The alleged strict enforcement against Dixon, to the extent
explained in Dixon’s briefing, appears to be that the court did not in his view show
him similar leniency.
We have reviewed the trial court’s handling of the proceedings, and it was
consistent with the Civil Rules. The purpose of the Civil Rules, including the policy
of liberally allowing amendment of the pleadings, is to facilitate proper decisions
on the merits. Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d 500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999). Dixon
shows no error in the trial court’s reaching the merits of the controversy while
allowing Dixon at all times reasonable opportunity to respond to the merits of his
opponent’s contentions.
D
Dixon next asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
to Hallack Law. However, Dixon does not assert any error in the substantive
decision granting the motion—i.e., Dixon does not challenge the trial court’s
4 No. 87160-9-I/5
analysis that the evidence showed he knew of the alleged discrepancy in the
refund amount no later than January 2021, he filed suit more than three years later
in April 2024, and he asserted only an unjust enrichment claim subject to at most
a three year limitation period. See RCW 4.16.080(2) (“The following actions shall
be commenced within three years: . . . (2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring
personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any
other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated.”).
Rather, Dixon repeats generally the same procedural arguments addressed
above, claiming the trial court improperly allowed Hallack Law to assert the
limitations defense, misapplied procedural rules, and improperly considered
Hallack Law’s allegedly late filings.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
RYAN ADAM DIXON, No. 87160-9-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION JENNI HALLACK and HALLACK LAW, PLLC
Respondent.
BIRK, J. — The superior court dismissed Ryan Dixon’s complaint against
Jenni Hallack and Hallack Law, PLLC (collectively Hallack Law), because Dixon’s
claim for unjust enrichment was time barred. The superior court also awarded
attorney fees to Hallack Law under CR 11. Dixon argues the superior court erred
in allowing untimely filings, converting Hallack Law’s motion to dismiss into a
summary judgment motion, and awarding fees to Hallack Law when Dixon had
filed a notice of appeal. We affirm and deny Hallack Law’s request for fees.
I
In April 2024, Dixon filed pro se a complaint against Hallack Law for unjust
enrichment, alleging Hallack Law did not fully refund him for legal services he had
paid for in advance. Hallack Law moved to dismiss under CR 12(b)(6), and several
days later Dixon moved for summary judgment.
At the initial hearing on the parties’ motions, the court explained to Dixon
that asking the court to consider evidence not in the complaint in response to CR No. 87160-9-I/2
12(b)(6) motion converts the motion to one for summary judgment. At the same
hearing, the court continued the matter to provide Dixon an opportunity to file a
reply to Hallack Law’s response to his summary judgment motion. Hallack Law
had acknowledged it untimely responded to Dixon’s motion for summary judgment,
and Dixon had indicated he had not had time to reply to its response before the
noted hearing. At the continued hearing, the court converted Hallack Law’s motion
to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and granted it, dismissing Dixon’s
motion for summary judgment. The court ruled Dixon’s claims were time-barred
and did not make a ruling on whether Dixon’s claims were frivolous.
Hallack Law moved for attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185 and CR 11. The
court denied Hallack Law’s claim for fees under RCW 4.84.185 for being untimely
and granted Hallack Law’s claim under CR 11, concluding the three CR 11
elements had been met. Dixon unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration.
Dixon appeals the order granting Hallack Law’s motion for summary
judgment.
II
A
Dixon argues the superior court lacked jurisdiction to award fees after a
notice of appeal had been filed. A trial court order awarding attorney fees under
CR 11 after appeal of final judgment does not modify the judgment and may be
entered consistent with RAP 7.2(e). Leen v. Demopolis, 62 Wn. App. 473, 484-
85, 815 P.2d 269 (1991). Dixon's reliance on Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 876
P.2d 448 (1994) is unavailing. Biggs emphasized that parties accused of violating
2 No. 87160-9-I/3
CR 11 are entitled to notice. Id. at 198. But Biggs upheld sanctions under CR 11
entered after mandate, id. at 196, 199-200, and Dixon had adequate notice to
respond to Hallack Law’s motion for CR 11 sanctions. For the first time in reply,
Dixon argues that Hallack Law’s motion for CR 11 sanctions violated CR 54(d)(2).
This court generally does not consider arguments raised for the first time in reply.
SYNNEX Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 34 Wn. App. 2d 857, 875, 572 P.3d 1214
(2025).
B
Dixon argues the superior court improperly converted Hallack Law’s CR
12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment without providing proper notice.
However, the trial court did not err in converting Hallack Law's CR 12(b)(6) motion
to a CR 56 summary judgment motion. When a CR 12 motion is converted to a
CR 56 motion, the court does not necessarily need to newly afford parties the
precise time periods for response set forth in CR 56. Zurich Servs. Corp. v. Gene
Mace Constr., LLC, 26 Wn. App. 2d 10, 27, 526 P.3d 46 (2023). Here, after
observing that the CR 12 motion relied on materials outside the pleadings, and for
other reasons, the court set a new hearing to take place three weeks after the
original hearing. And, Dixon sought summary judgment determining the action,
suggesting he believed the evidence was sufficiently developed and available for
the court to rule summarily on the merits. Dixon argues in this court that the three
week postponement was inadequate for him to gather evidence appropriate to a
summary judgment motion. But he presents this argument in purely conclusory
terms, never explaining what evidence he believed he needed to develop but
3 No. 87160-9-I/4
lacked time to do so. Given the absence of Dixon pointing to any evidence he
needed more time to develop, the trial court's handling of the conversion of the
motion was within its discretion.
C
Dixon next contends that the trial court violated his rights to due process
under the federal and state constitutions because, he says, the trial court strictly
enforced procedural rules against Dixon but demonstrated leniency to Hallack
Law. The alleged leniency towards Hallack Law included considering its allegedly
late-filed materials and allowing it to argue a statute of limitations defense despite
not having pleaded it. The alleged strict enforcement against Dixon, to the extent
explained in Dixon’s briefing, appears to be that the court did not in his view show
him similar leniency.
We have reviewed the trial court’s handling of the proceedings, and it was
consistent with the Civil Rules. The purpose of the Civil Rules, including the policy
of liberally allowing amendment of the pleadings, is to facilitate proper decisions
on the merits. Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d 500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999). Dixon
shows no error in the trial court’s reaching the merits of the controversy while
allowing Dixon at all times reasonable opportunity to respond to the merits of his
opponent’s contentions.
D
Dixon next asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
to Hallack Law. However, Dixon does not assert any error in the substantive
decision granting the motion—i.e., Dixon does not challenge the trial court’s
4 No. 87160-9-I/5
analysis that the evidence showed he knew of the alleged discrepancy in the
refund amount no later than January 2021, he filed suit more than three years later
in April 2024, and he asserted only an unjust enrichment claim subject to at most
a three year limitation period. See RCW 4.16.080(2) (“The following actions shall
be commenced within three years: . . . (2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring
personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any
other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated.”).
Rather, Dixon repeats generally the same procedural arguments addressed
above, claiming the trial court improperly allowed Hallack Law to assert the
limitations defense, misapplied procedural rules, and improperly considered
Hallack Law’s allegedly late filings. We have rejected those arguments above.
Dixon fails to show that resolution of the action on limitations grounds involved any
genuine issue of material fact or that the trial court erred in granting summary
E
Dixon challenges the trial court’s postjudgment order requiring that he pay
Hallack Law’s reasonable attorney fees as a sanction under CR 11. Dixon argues
that a self-represented litigant who does not incur attorney fees may not recover
fees. Pro se litigants are generally not entitled to attorney fees for their work
representing themselves. Price v. Price, 174 Wn. App. 894, 905, 301 P.3d 486
(2013). But lawyers who represent themselves may recover fees because they
must take time from their practice to prepare and appear as would any other
lawyer. Leen, 62 Wn. App. at 487.
5 No. 87160-9-I/6
Dixon argues that the standard for sanctions under RCW 4.84.185 was not
met, but the trial court denied sanctions under RCW 4.84.185 so we need not
address this argument.
Dixon argues the trial court erred by ruling that his complaint violated CR
11 because it was not “objectively unreasonable.” To comply with CR 11(a), a
pleading must be well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law, and not interposed for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. The rule applies to pro se parties as well as attorneys. See West v.
Wash. Ass’n of County Offs., 162 Wn. App. 120, 136, 252 P.3d 406 (2011). Courts
should employ an objective standard in evaluating an attorney’s conduct, and the
appropriate level of prefiling investigation is to be tested by inquiring what was
reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or legal memorandum was
submitted. Biggs, 124 Wn.2d at 197. We review a CR 11 ruling for abuse of
discretion. Id.
The trial court reasonably concluded that there was never a proper basis to
suggest that the alleged discrepancy meant that Dixon should have received a
greater refund, as opposed to the allegedly discrepant statement to the court
representing only a proposed resolution rejected by Dixon. Further, any
reasonable inquiry would have shown that the complaint was time-barred when
filed. The trial court tenably concluded that Dixon’s complaint violated CR 11.
6 No. 87160-9-I/7
Finally, citing Matthews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 96 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d
18 (1976), Dixon argues that the trial court’s order that he pay his opponent’s
reasonable attorney fees because his complaint violated CR 11 was an inequitable
burden warranting reversal “under the principles of fairness and equity.” There is
no colorable basis for arguing that it violates due process for a court to require a
party filing a lawsuit in violation of CR 11 to pay their opponent’s reasonable
attorney fees. Mounting a defense to even a frivolous lawsuit may consume a
defendant’s time and resources. Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S.
379, 390, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 180 L. Ed. 2d 408 (2011).
F
Hallack Law seeks attorney fees on appeal. Hallack Law argues that
Dixon’s appeal was frivolous, he has filed numerous motions in this court which
“dramatically increased the time and resources” Hallack Law was required to
devote to the matter, and Dixon failed to follow the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RAP 18.9(a) allows a court to order a party or counsel who, among other
things, files a frivolous appeal to pay compensatory damages or sanctions.
Appropriate sanctions include an award of attorney fees and costs. Kinney v.
Cook, 150 Wn. App. 187, 195, 208 P.3d 1 (2009). An appeal is frivolous if,
considering the entire record, the court is convinced that the appeal presents no
debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ and that it is so devoid
of merit that there is no possibility of reversal. Id. But an appeal that is affirmed
merely because the arguments are rejected is not frivolous. Id at 195-96. All
doubts as to whether the appeal is frivolous should be resolved in favor of the
7 No. 87160-9-I/8
appellant. In re Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514
(2013).
With doubts resolved in his favor, Dixon raises at least a colorable challenge
to the trial court’s award of CR 11 sanctions against him, such that we cannot say
his appeal meets the standard of frivolousness of RAP 18.9(a). We deny Hallack
Law’s request for reasonable attorney fees.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: