Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Serio

809 N.E.2d 651, 2 N.Y.3d 166, 777 N.Y.S.2d 422, 2 N.Y. 166, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 640
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 6, 2004
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 809 N.E.2d 651 (Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Serio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Serio, 809 N.E.2d 651, 2 N.Y.3d 166, 777 N.Y.S.2d 422, 2 N.Y. 166, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 640 (N.Y. 2004).

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

Read, J.

This appeal calls upon us to decide whether the Superintendent of Insurance may exercise his premium rate review and approval authority to disapprove or modify rate increases or decreases deemed approved under file and use provisions. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that he may not.

I.

In 1995, the Legislature enacted Insurance Law §§ 4321 and 4322 (L 1995, ch 504, § 12), which were intended to make affordable health care coverage available to individuals who buy their own health insurance. These provisions mandate all Insurance Law article 43 not-for-profit health insurers and health management organizations (HMOs) certified under Public Health Law article 44 (for purposes of this decision, referred to collectively as “insurers”) to offer, on an open enrollment,1 community-rated basis,2 individual direct-payment HMO contracts and point-of-service (POS) contracts providing comprehensive and standardized benefits.3

At the time sections 4321 and 4322 were enacted, Insurance Law § 4308 required the Superintendent to approve all insur[169]*169anee contracts as well as initial premium rates and subsequent rate modifications before they became effective. As is relevant on this appeal, subsection (b) authorized the Superintendent to disapprove proposed initial premiums upon finding that they were “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory” (see Insurance Law § 4308 [b]). After approval, premiums could only be modified after public hearings and the Superintendent’s prior written approval, a lengthy and often costly process prescribed by subsection (c) (see Insurance Law § 4308 [c] [l]-[3]).

As part of the 1995 amendments, however, the Legislature enacted new subsections (g) through (j), dubbed the file and use provisions. Under the file and use methodology, insurers seeking to increase or decrease premiums may submit a rate filing or application to the Superintendent, which “shall be deemed approved, provided that . . . the anticipated incurred loss ratio for [the] contract form [falls within prescribed minimum and maximum loss ratios (between 80% and 105% for individual direct-payment contracts) as certified by an actuary]” (Insurance Law § 4308 [g] [1]; [j] [emphasis added]).

A loss ratio is determined by dividing claims incurred by premiums earned. The “anticipated incurred loss ratio” is an actuarial prediction of the loss ratio for the upcoming calendar year. Insurers annually report their actual loss ratio for the previous calendar year (see Insurance Law § 4308 [h] [1]). If the actual loss ratio is below 80% the insurer must issue a refund to its subscribers or credit a dividend against future premiums by September 30th of the year following the year in which the loss ratio requirements were not satisfied (see Insurance Law § 4308 [h] [2]). Conversely, if the actual loss ratio exceeds 105% the insurer must increase its premium rates accordingly (see id. § 4308 [h] [3]).

Because the file and use provisions require insurers to give each subscriber at least 30 days written , notice of a premium rate increase (see Insurance Law § 4308 [g] [2]), insurers typically submit rate filings to the Superintendent and notify their subscribers simultaneously at year-end. A cap limiting premium increases or decreases to 10% per year was in force from 1996 through 1999 (id.).

By letter dated November 13, 2001, the Superintendent informed Excellus, which provides health care coverage in 45 upstate counties, that he was modifying his review procedures for certain file and use rate applications “to provide [him] with [170]*170sufficient time to make the necessary determination that the requested premium rates [were] in compliance with the requirements of Section 4308.” The Superintendent also advised Excellus that premium rate adjustments for individual direct-pay HMO and POS contracts could “not be implemented until the [Superintendent’s] review [was] completed and the company [was] so advised in writing”; however, Excellus “should continue to provide the required 30 day written notice to [its] subscribers based upon the requested effective date.”

In late November 2001, Excellus submitted its rate filing for new premium rates effective January 1, 2002, accompanied by the required actuarial certifications. On November 30, 2001, the Superintendent acknowledged receipt of Excellus’s submission; stated that the requested rates were being reviewed for compliance with section 4308; asked for further information; and cautioned that “the requested premium adjustments . . . may not be implemented until the [Superintendent’s] review is completed and [Excellus] receives a written confirmation that the requested rates have been placed on file.”

By letter dated January 10, 2002, the Superintendent notified Excellus that he had reviewed the rates and was modifying some of them by reducing increases and, in two instances, denying any increase at all. Excellus thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge the Superintendent’s actions.

Excellus argued that the Superintendent’s actions ran afoul of the file and use statutory scheme by improperly conditioning a premium rate change on his review and approval. The Superintendent took the position that he acted properly because section 4308 (b) authorizes him to disapprove any premium that is “excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.” He asserted that he properly reviewed Excellus’s filed rates under subsection (b), given the “steep” increases and wide discrepancies in premium rates, the sharp decline in direct-pay subscribers and the largely competition-free insurance market involved. The Superintendent also argued that his review was necessary because many rate filings were based on extremely small populations, not reflecting a true basis for community rating. Since insurers use certain market stabilization mechanisms, which may provide them with additional funds to offset losses, the Superintendent further contended that he needed to verify whether the actuaries properly accounted for recoveries from these programs in their rate analysis.

[171]*171Supreme Court annulled the Superintendent’s letters and determined that Excellus’s filed rates were approved as a matter of law, effective on January 1, 2002. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, relying on a plain language analysis (303 AD2d 864 [3d Dept 2003]). The Court observed that “[h]ad the Legislature wished to require [the Superintendent’s] subsequent approval of a rate filing or application, it could have done so through appropriate wording” and concluded that “[the Superintendent’s] interpretation, however laudable its purpose, imports a policy not expressed in the plain words of the statute” (id. at 868). We granted the Superintendent leave to appeal.

II.

When interpreting a statute, we turn first to the statutory text as the best evidence of the Legislature’s intent. “As a general rule, unambiguous language of a statute is alone determinative” (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 [2000] [citation omitted]). Further, although an agency’s rational construction of a statute is normally entitled to deference, “a determination by the agency that runs counter to the clear wording of a statutory provision is given little weight” (Matter of Raritan Dev. Corp. v Silva,

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Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Serio
809 N.E.2d 651 (New York Court of Appeals, 2004)

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Bluebook (online)
809 N.E.2d 651, 2 N.Y.3d 166, 777 N.Y.S.2d 422, 2 N.Y. 166, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 640, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/excellus-health-plan-inc-v-serio-ny-2004.