OPINION
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge.
This is a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07, V.AC.C.P. Applicant was convicted of capital murder in cause number 346935 in the 180th District Court of Harris County, and after the jury affirmatively answered the special issues he was sentenced to death. Article 87.071, V.AC.C.P. This Court affirmed applicant’s conviction and sentence of death. Thomas v. State, 701 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Applicant’s allegation contending that he was denied the right to represent himself before this Court, as well as his allegation contending that he was forcibly medicated, thus causing a deprivation of due process, a trial while applicant was incompetent without a separate hearing on competency, and ineffective assistance of counsel were filed and set by this Court in an order delivered October 3,1994. Applicant’s motion to stay execution pending disposition of this application was also granted in that same order.
Applicant first alleges that he was denied his right to represent himself on direct appeal. Applicant claims that our decision in Hubbard v. State, 739 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), is controlling on this issue. In Hubbard the appellant had been “energetically flooding the courts with pro se motions since his conviction.” See Hubbard, 739 S.W.2d at 343. We held that allowing the appellant to file his pro se briefs in that case would not unduly hamper the administration of justice based upon the unusual facts of the case and the delay already caused to that appellant. Id. at 345.
The record shows that in the instant ease applicant was sentenced on March 19, 1982. Applicant’s attorneys filed an appellate brief on December 11, 1984. On January 3, 1985, applicant for the first time asserted his desire to represent himself before this Court by filing a “Motion to Strike Counsel’s Brief on Appeal”.
[24]*24The right of an accused to reject the services of counsel and instead represent himself extends beyond trial into the appellate process. Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). However, it is incumbent upon an accused to clearly and unequivocally inform the trial court of his desire to prosecute his appeal without the aid of counsel. Id. at 786. The right of self-representation is not a license to capriciously upset the appellate timetable or to thwart the orderly and fair administration of justice. Allowing applicant untimely to assert his right of self-representation after nearly three years and only after he had read his appellate counsel’s briefs would unduly hamper the administration of justice. See Hubbard, 739 S.W.2d at 343. Accordingly, applicant’s first allegation is found to be without merit.
Applicant next alleges that he was forcibly medicated at trial thus causing a deprivation of due process, a trial while applicant was incompetent without a separate hearing on competency, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel. Citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992), applicant asserts that the State has failed to meet the three-part test1 required by the United States Supreme Court in order forcibly to treat him with antipsychotic drugs.
In Riggins, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, said:
“The record in this case narrowly defines the issues before us. The parties have indicated that once the District Court denied Riggins’ motion to terminate use of the Mellaril, subsequent administration of the drug was involuntary. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 6 (medication was ‘forced’); Brief for Respondent 14, 22, 28 (describing medication as ‘unwanted,’ ‘over objection,’ and ‘compelled’).” (emphasis added). Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133,112 S.Ct. at 1814.
The threshold question must therefore be whether applicant was forcibly medicated.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court reveal that prior to the applicant’s trial he was transferred to the forensic unit of the Harris County Jail where he initially received Thorazine. Applicant later began receiving Prolixin at his own request2. The only evidence of a possible objection to applicant being medicated was defense counsel Ron Hayes’ testimony at the evidentiary writ and recusal hearing. According to Hayes’ court-ordered affidavit, defense counsel made a strategic trial decision to take an opposing stance regarding medicating the applicant regardless of the court’s position and such stance was not predicated on any alleged incompetency of the applicant to stand trial. Defense counsel claims that an objection to applicant’s being medicated during trial was made prior to voir dire, however, there is no evidence in the record of this objection.
The record in the case now before us clearly demonstrates that applicant failed to make a motion to terminate use of the medication or that he even lodged an objection to being medicated. The burden of proof in a writ of habeas corpus is on the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his factual allegations. Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). However, applicant fails to show anywhere in the record that he was forced to take the medication or that there was even an objection to his being medicated at trial. Since the record does not demonstrate that the applicant’s treatment with antipsychotic drugs was involuntary, Riggins is inapplicable and applicant’s due process contention is without merit. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133, 112 S.Ct. at 1814.
Applicant also contends that his “forced” medication rendered him incompetent to stand trial. The findings of the trial court reveal that two mental health practitioners found applicant competent before trial. Ron Hayes, one of applicant’s defense attorneys, stated at the evidentiary hearing that applicant answered questions and [25]*25seemed to understand them, gave his version of the events and discussed the facts of the offense, and was aware of the crime with which he was charged and what the possible results could be. As noted above, Hayes stated in his affidavit that it was trial strategy to take an opposing stance regarding how the trial court ruled on the continued medication of the applicant and that such stance was not predicated on any alleged incompetency of the applicant to stand trial. Co-counsel Charles Rice Young stated that he believed applicant was competent. The trial court also found that applicant was competent during his trial. The record supports the fact that there was no bona fide doubt as to applicant’s competence to stand trial, and therefore the trial court was not required to conduct a separate hearing sua sponte. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; Ex parte Johnston, 587 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex.Cr.App.1979);
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OPINION
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge.
This is a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07, V.AC.C.P. Applicant was convicted of capital murder in cause number 346935 in the 180th District Court of Harris County, and after the jury affirmatively answered the special issues he was sentenced to death. Article 87.071, V.AC.C.P. This Court affirmed applicant’s conviction and sentence of death. Thomas v. State, 701 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Applicant’s allegation contending that he was denied the right to represent himself before this Court, as well as his allegation contending that he was forcibly medicated, thus causing a deprivation of due process, a trial while applicant was incompetent without a separate hearing on competency, and ineffective assistance of counsel were filed and set by this Court in an order delivered October 3,1994. Applicant’s motion to stay execution pending disposition of this application was also granted in that same order.
Applicant first alleges that he was denied his right to represent himself on direct appeal. Applicant claims that our decision in Hubbard v. State, 739 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), is controlling on this issue. In Hubbard the appellant had been “energetically flooding the courts with pro se motions since his conviction.” See Hubbard, 739 S.W.2d at 343. We held that allowing the appellant to file his pro se briefs in that case would not unduly hamper the administration of justice based upon the unusual facts of the case and the delay already caused to that appellant. Id. at 345.
The record shows that in the instant ease applicant was sentenced on March 19, 1982. Applicant’s attorneys filed an appellate brief on December 11, 1984. On January 3, 1985, applicant for the first time asserted his desire to represent himself before this Court by filing a “Motion to Strike Counsel’s Brief on Appeal”.
[24]*24The right of an accused to reject the services of counsel and instead represent himself extends beyond trial into the appellate process. Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). However, it is incumbent upon an accused to clearly and unequivocally inform the trial court of his desire to prosecute his appeal without the aid of counsel. Id. at 786. The right of self-representation is not a license to capriciously upset the appellate timetable or to thwart the orderly and fair administration of justice. Allowing applicant untimely to assert his right of self-representation after nearly three years and only after he had read his appellate counsel’s briefs would unduly hamper the administration of justice. See Hubbard, 739 S.W.2d at 343. Accordingly, applicant’s first allegation is found to be without merit.
Applicant next alleges that he was forcibly medicated at trial thus causing a deprivation of due process, a trial while applicant was incompetent without a separate hearing on competency, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel. Citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992), applicant asserts that the State has failed to meet the three-part test1 required by the United States Supreme Court in order forcibly to treat him with antipsychotic drugs.
In Riggins, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, said:
“The record in this case narrowly defines the issues before us. The parties have indicated that once the District Court denied Riggins’ motion to terminate use of the Mellaril, subsequent administration of the drug was involuntary. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 6 (medication was ‘forced’); Brief for Respondent 14, 22, 28 (describing medication as ‘unwanted,’ ‘over objection,’ and ‘compelled’).” (emphasis added). Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133,112 S.Ct. at 1814.
The threshold question must therefore be whether applicant was forcibly medicated.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court reveal that prior to the applicant’s trial he was transferred to the forensic unit of the Harris County Jail where he initially received Thorazine. Applicant later began receiving Prolixin at his own request2. The only evidence of a possible objection to applicant being medicated was defense counsel Ron Hayes’ testimony at the evidentiary writ and recusal hearing. According to Hayes’ court-ordered affidavit, defense counsel made a strategic trial decision to take an opposing stance regarding medicating the applicant regardless of the court’s position and such stance was not predicated on any alleged incompetency of the applicant to stand trial. Defense counsel claims that an objection to applicant’s being medicated during trial was made prior to voir dire, however, there is no evidence in the record of this objection.
The record in the case now before us clearly demonstrates that applicant failed to make a motion to terminate use of the medication or that he even lodged an objection to being medicated. The burden of proof in a writ of habeas corpus is on the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his factual allegations. Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). However, applicant fails to show anywhere in the record that he was forced to take the medication or that there was even an objection to his being medicated at trial. Since the record does not demonstrate that the applicant’s treatment with antipsychotic drugs was involuntary, Riggins is inapplicable and applicant’s due process contention is without merit. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 133, 112 S.Ct. at 1814.
Applicant also contends that his “forced” medication rendered him incompetent to stand trial. The findings of the trial court reveal that two mental health practitioners found applicant competent before trial. Ron Hayes, one of applicant’s defense attorneys, stated at the evidentiary hearing that applicant answered questions and [25]*25seemed to understand them, gave his version of the events and discussed the facts of the offense, and was aware of the crime with which he was charged and what the possible results could be. As noted above, Hayes stated in his affidavit that it was trial strategy to take an opposing stance regarding how the trial court ruled on the continued medication of the applicant and that such stance was not predicated on any alleged incompetency of the applicant to stand trial. Co-counsel Charles Rice Young stated that he believed applicant was competent. The trial court also found that applicant was competent during his trial. The record supports the fact that there was no bona fide doubt as to applicant’s competence to stand trial, and therefore the trial court was not required to conduct a separate hearing sua sponte. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173, 95 S.Ct. 896, 904, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; Ex parte Johnston, 587 S.W.2d 163, 165 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); see also Article 46.02, Section 2, V.A.C.C.P. Applicant’s contentions that the “forced” medication rendered him incompetent at trial and the absence of a separate hearing on competency are without merit.
Finally applicant contends that his “forced” medication was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The record reveals that defense counsel argued during the guilt/innocence stage of trial that the applicant exhibited no psychotic activity because he was being treated with antipsychotic medication. The record also reveals that during the punishment phase of the trial defense counsel argued to the jury that they had seen the applicant while he was receiving medication and the medication obviated any future dangerousness. It is clear that the trial strategy of the defense was to use appellant’s medication to their advantage. The trial court made a finding of fact that defense counsel was effective under the guidelines established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We agree, and therefore, applicant’s final contention is found to be without merit.
Having found each of applicant’s contentions without merit, we deny all relief, and applicant’s motion to stay execution pending disposition of this application which was granted by this Court on October 3, 1994 is withdrawn.
OVERSTREET, J., dissents.