Estate of Manship v. United States

232 F.R.D. 552, 2005 WL 3627335
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Louisiana
DecidedDecember 8, 2005
DocketNo. 04-91-C-M2
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 232 F.R.D. 552 (Estate of Manship v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Estate of Manship v. United States, 232 F.R.D. 552, 2005 WL 3627335 (M.D. La. 2005).

Opinion

RULING AND ORDER

NOLAND, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Compel Response to Interrogatories, or Alternatively, Motion for Leave to Propound Interrogatories in Excess of Numerical Limit, and Motion for Leave to Propound Requests for Admission in Excess of Numerical Limit (R. Doc. 67) filed on behalf of plaintiffs, the Estate of Douglas L. Man-ship, Deceased (the “Estate”), appearing herein through its duly authorized Independent Co-Executors, David C. Manship, Richard F. Manship, Douglas L. Manship, Jr., and Dina Manship Planche, each also appearing individually as a residuary legatee of the Estate (collectively “plaintiffs”), and the Motion to Compel Production of a Privilege Log and to Produce Documents received from Third Parties filed by Plaintiffs (R. Doc. 77). Defendant, the United States of America (“United States”), has filed oppositions to both of plaintiffs’ motions. (R. Docs. 75 and 85 respectively). ■

LAW & ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Response to Interrogatories, or Alternatively, Motion for Leave to Propound Interrogatories in Excess of Numerical Limit, and Motion for Leave to Propound Requests for Admission in Excess of Numerical Limit (R. Doc. 67):

In this motion, plaintiffs contend that the United States has refused to answer more [554]*554than twenty-five (25) interrogatories and more than twenty-five (25) requests for admissions. First, plaintiffs argue that the United States has miscounted the number of interrogatories, as the number does not exceed twenty-five (25). Secondly, plaintiffs contend that, even if the number of interrogatories exceeds twenty-five (25), the issues involved in this “complicated estate tax case” provide sufficient cause for leave to exceed the twenty-five (25) interrogatory threshold. Alternatively, plaintiffs seek leave of court to propound interrogatories in excess of the numerical limit of twenty-five (25) embodied in Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 and also seek leave to propound requests for admission in excess of the numerical limit of twenty-five (25) provided in Local Rule 36.2.

The United States contends in its opposition that the plaintiffs served it with two sets of interrogatories, which contain more than twenty-five (25) interrogatories when the discrete subparts are counted. The United States objected to the plaintiffs’ first set of interrogatories as violating the numerical limit but nevertheless responded. It also timely objected to, but refused to answer, the second set of interrogatories on the ground that the numerical limit had been exceeded, and the plaintiffs made no attempt to obtain a stipulation from the Government or Court approval for the excessive interrogatories. The United States also argues that, in contravention of Local Rule 36.2M, the plaintiffs have served it with thirty-five (35) requests for admission without first obtaining leave of Court. The United States objected to the excessive requests for admission and responded to only the first twenty-five (25) requests.

At a discovery conference on July 28, 2005, plaintiffs’ counsel asked whether the United States would retroactively waive the numerical limitations on interrogatories and requests for admissions; however, the United States declined to do so. The plaintiffs then filed the motion to compel which is presently before the Court.

(a) Do the number of interrogatories exceed the numerical limit of twenty-five (25)?

Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a) governs the numerical limitation on interrogatories and provides in pertinent part:

Without leave of court or written stipulation, any party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number including all discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served ...

Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a).1 Athough Rule 33(a) states that “discrete subparts” should be counted as separate interrogatories, it does not define “discrete subparts.” The Advisory Committee addressed this issue and provided some guidance as to when subparts are to be considered separate interrogatories:

Each party is allowed 25 interrogatories upon any other party, but must secure leave of court (or stipulation from the opposing party) to serve a larger number. Parties cannot evade this presumptive limitation through the device of joining as ‘subparts’ questions that seek information about discrete separate subjects. However, a question asking about communications of a particular type should be treated as a single interrogatory even though it requests that the time, place, persons present, and contents be stated separately for each such communication.

Advisory Committee’s Notes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a).2

Thus, the issue in this motion is whether the interrogatory subparts are “logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary [interrogatory] question.” Dang v. Cross, 2002 WL 432197 (C.D.Cal.2002); Kendall v. GES Exposition Services, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 684 (D.Nev.1997). In making this determination, the Court [555]*555should decide whether the first question is primary and subsequent questions are secondary to the primary question; or whether the subsequent question could stand alone and is independent of the first question?3 Id. at 685. In other words, “[i]f the first question can be answered fully and completely without answering the second question, then the second question is totally independent of the first and not ‘factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary question’.” Krawczyk v. City of Dallas, 2004 WL 614842 (N.D.Tex.2004).

(i) Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories:

The Court will now consider the two sets of interrogatories propounded by plaintiffs (counted by plaintiffs as 20 interrogatories in the first set and 5 interrogatories in the second set) in light of these jurisprudential standards. Interrogatory Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 12A, 13, and 15 of the first set do not contain subparts and therefore are not at issue in this motion. Furthermore, Interrogatory No. 14 of the first set will not be counted because it asks the United States to explain why it did not admit requests for admissions; however, no requests for admission were actually propounded with the first set of interrogatories. Thus, Interrogatory No. 14 was clearly submitted by the plaintiffs by mistake and will not be considered in counting the number of interrogatories in plaintiffs’ first set of discovery. Accordingly, the interrogatories in the first set which are in question in this motion are: Interrogatory Nos. 3, 3A, 4, 5 and 6.4

Interrogatory No. 3 requests information about certain communications that the United States had with persons before and after the date on which this suit was filed, and subparts (a), (e), (d), and (e) of Interrogatory No.

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232 F.R.D. 552, 2005 WL 3627335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/estate-of-manship-v-united-states-lamd-2005.