Young v. United Financial Casualty Company

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedFebruary 29, 2024
Docket2:23-cv-00707
StatusUnknown

This text of Young v. United Financial Casualty Company (Young v. United Financial Casualty Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. United Financial Casualty Company, (E.D. La. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA ROY YOUNG * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 23-707

UNITED FINANCIAL CASUALTY * SECTION “T” (2) COMPANY, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Pending before me is Plaintiff Roy Young’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses. ECF No. 30. The parties timely filed Opposition and Reply Memoranda. ECF Nos. 34, 36. No party requested oral argument, and the court agrees that oral argument is unnecessary. Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the applicable law, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (ECF No. 30) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons stated herein. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Roy Young filed this personal injury suit after an October 8, 2021 collision with a truck driven by Defendant Marcellus Kipruto and performing work for Defendant DoubleOne Logistics, LLC (“DoubleOne”). ECF Nos. 1-4, 13. Plaintiff issued amended discovery requests to DoubleOne and Kipruto on November 8 and 13, 2023 respectively but has not received any written responses from either Defendant, and thus, seeks to compel full and complete responses.1 ECF No. 30.

1 Defendants contend that Plaintiff issued his original discovery requests on February 14, 2023, before his case was removed to this Court, and that the original requests contained 50 interrogatories directed to each Defendant, not counting subparts, and an excessive number of document requests. ECF No. 34 at 2-3. After counsel conferred on July 24, 2023, Plaintiff issued amended discovery requests in November of 2023, which requests are the subject of this motion. Id. In Opposition, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s requests are unduly burdensome and duplicative because Marcello Kipruto is the sole owner and operator of DoubleOne, both sets of interrogatories exceed 25 questions, and both sets of document requests seek irrelevant information beyond the scope of discovery in this case. ECF No. 34. Defendants contend that their counsel

expressed these concerns to Plaintiff’s counsel on numerous occasions but, instead of amending the requests, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Compel. Id. at 3-4. Citing the Louisiana and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants argue that Plaintiff “abuses” the discovery process because his Interrogatories exceed the permitted number when counting distinct subparts and the discovery seeks irrelevant information “not reasonably calculated to the needs and facts of this case.” Id. at 6. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Requests for Production are likewise unduly burdensome, excessive, and seek irrelevant information. In Reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are engaging in delay tactics to “run out the clock,” his discovery requests are properly addressed to Kipruto both individually and as a representative of DoubleOne, and Defendants are obligated to provide written responses to the

requests. ECF No. 36. II. APPLICABLE LAW A. Scope of Discovery Under Rule 26, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 1. Number of Interrogatories Under Rule 33(a), a party may not serve more than 25 interrogatories, including discrete subparts, upon another party unless stipulated or ordered by the court.2 As the comments to Rule

33(a)(1) make clear, a party cannot evade the 25-interrogatory limit through the use of “subparts” that seek information about discrete separate subjects.3 This numerical limitation on the number of interrogatories is intended to protect against potentially excessive use of interrogatories, not to prevent necessary discovery.4 It forces a party to narrow their requests to the important issues in the case, to avoid cumulative or duplicative requests, and to seek relevant information from more convenient, less burdensome sources, including depositions.5 Although there is no “clear and easily applied rule” for counting discrete subparts, courts look to whether the subparts are logically or factually “subsumed within” or “necessarily related to” the “primary question.”6 In other words, courts assess whether subsequent questions within a

single interrogatory are subsumed and related by examining whether the first question is primary and subsequent questions are secondary to the primary question or whether the subsequent question could stand alone, independent of the first question.7 If the subsequent question stands

2 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1). 3 FED. R. CIV. P. 33, advisory committee’s note to the 1993 amendment. 4 Estate of Manship v. U.S., 232 F.R.D. 552, 554 n.1 (M.D. La. 2005); Lower River Marine, Inc. v. USL-497 Barge, No. 06-04083, 2007 WL 4590095, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (“The aim is not to prevent needed discovery, but to provide judicial scrutiny before parties make potentially excessive use of this discovery device.”). 5 King v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.C., No. 08-1060, 2008 WL 11353694, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2008) (Wilkinson, M.J.) (citations omitted). 6 Safeco of Am. v. Rawstron, 181 F.R.D. 441, 444 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Kendall v. GES Exposition Servs., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 684, 685 (D. Nev. 1997); Ginn v. Gemini, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 320, 321 (D. Nev. 1991); Clark v. Burlington N.R.R., 112 F.R.D. 117, 120 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Myers v. U.S. Paint Co., 116 F.R.D. 165, 165–66 (D. Mass. 1987)); FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) advisory committee’s note to the 1993 amendment; 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2168.1, at 261 (2d ed. 1994). 7 Manship, 232 F.R.D. at 554. alone or is independent of the first question, it would be considered a discrete or separate question even when joined by a conjunctive word and related to the primary question.8 Genuine subparts, however, are not counted as separate interrogatories. For instance, “a question asking about communications of a particular type should be treated as a single interrogatory even though it

requests that the time, place, persons present, and contents be stated separately for each such communication.”9 Courts have recognized that a party receiving excessive interrogatories may respond to the “first” 25 Interrogatories that constitute discrete questions, and strike the rest.10 B. Duties in Responding to Discovery

1. Full and Complete Responses “Discovery by interrogatory requires candor in responding. . . . The candor required is a candid statement of the information sought or of the fact that objection is made to furnishing the information. A partial answer by a party reserving an undisclosed objection to answering fully is not candid. It is evasive.”11 The fact that an interrogatory calls for a thorough response—one that will take time and effort to answer—does not make it improper.12 Where an interrogatory answer ‘‘‘as a whole disclose[s] a conscientious endeavor to understand the question[] and to answer fully [that question],' a party's obligation under Rule 33 is satisfied.”13 A party is not required to make an extensive investigation in responding to interrogatories, but must review all sources of

8 Safeco, 181 F.R.D at 445 (quoting Kendall, 174 F.R.D. at 685). 9 FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to the 1993 amendment. 10 Stephens v. Fla.

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Related

In Re United States of America
864 F.2d 1153 (Fifth Circuit, 1989)
Estate of Manship v. United States
232 F.R.D. 552 (M.D. Louisiana, 2005)
DL v. District of Columbia
251 F.R.D. 38 (District of Columbia, 2008)
Heller v. City of Dallas
303 F.R.D. 466 (N.D. Texas, 2014)
Areizaga v. ADW Corp.
314 F.R.D. 428 (N.D. Texas, 2016)
Clark v. Burlington Northern Railroad
112 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Mississippi, 1986)
Myers v. U.S. Paint Co.
116 F.R.D. 165 (D. Massachusetts, 1987)
Ginn v. Gemini Inc.
137 F.R.D. 320 (D. Nevada, 1991)
Kendall v. Ges Exposition Services, Inc.
174 F.R.D. 684 (D. Nevada, 1997)
Safeco v. Rawstron
181 F.R.D. 441 (C.D. California, 1998)

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Young v. United Financial Casualty Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-united-financial-casualty-company-laed-2024.