Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp.

22 F.R.D. 494, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 517, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312, 1958 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,081
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 12, 1958
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 22 F.R.D. 494 (Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Erone Corp. v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 22 F.R.D. 494, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 517, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312, 1958 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,081 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

Opinion

DIMOCK, District Judge.

This is a motion by defendants pursuant to Rule 33, F.R.Civ.P., to strike or modify interrogatories propounded by plaintiffs dated December 19, 1957, and modified by a memorandum of plaintiffs’ attorney dated March 3, 1958.

[497]*497The action is one for treble damages and injunctive relief under the anti-trust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.

Five of the plaintiffs each own or owned a motion picture theatre which it leased to defendant Metropolitan Playhouses, Inc. or its predecessor in intérest and which was operated by defendant Skouras Theatre Corporation. The rental paid to plaintiffs was measured in part by a percentage of gross operating receipts. These plaintiffs are referred to hereinafter as the landlord plaintiffs.

Five other plaintiffs are or were operators or owners and operators of two other motion picture theatres.1 2These plaintiffs are referred to hereinafter as the operator plaintiffs.

All of the theatres involved are located in or near Nassau County, New York.

Defendants are in the business of owning, leasing and managing motion picture theatres and exhibiting motion pictures. The defendants will be referred to hereinafter as the “Skouras defendants”2 and the “Century defendants” 3.

The last amended complaint alleges in substance that defendants formed in 1934, and continued until the date of the filing of the complaint, a combination and conspiracy to eliminate competitors in the exhibition of motion pictures and in the operation, management, leasing, and ownership of theatres in Nassau County, New York and the Metropolitan New York area. The alleged effect of the combination and conspiracy was in part to deprive plaintiffs’ theatres of the more favorable runs and clearances to which each would have been entitled in a competitive market.

Although this is an action against operators and owners of theatres and no distributors are involved, the opinions of the Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L.Ed. 1260, and cases arising out of it illustrate the wide scope of issues that may be relevant here. For example there are many detailed factors, such as admission prices, operational policies, and the character and location of the theatres, which are necessary to a proper determination of whether plaintiffs are entitled to the runs and clearances which they claim the conspiracy deprived them of. United States v. Paramount Pictures, supra, 334 U.S. at pages 145-146, 68 S.Ct. at pages 923-924. Theatre Enterprises, Inc., v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 74 S.Ct. 257, 98 L.Ed. 273.

The scope of the possible issues covered by the information sought by the interrogatories is generally within the bounds of relevancy in a case of this nature. Defendants’ general objection on the ground that the question of damages is premature must be rejected since information relevant to damages overlaps information relevant to priority of runs and clearances.

The geographical area covered, which is Nassau County and part of Suffolk and Queens Counties, is sufficiently limited and defendants’ objections in this respect are denied. See Hopkinson Theatre v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 18 F.R.D. 379, 382-383.

■ Considering the amendments made by plaintiffs’ memorandum dated March 3, 1958, defendants’ scattered ob[498]*498jeetions on the ground of vagueness are denied. General objections on the ground that the information sought is a matter of public record and that “opinions, conclusions and contentions” are called for are without merit. Blau v. Lamb, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 20 F.R.D. 411, 415; Gagen v. Northam Warren Corp., D.C. S.D.N.Y., 15 F.R.D. 44, 46.

The interrogatories as amended are not overly burdensome or oppressive as defendants contend. Much of the information will undoubtedly be available because defendants will need it in the preparation of their defense. In light of the liberal interpretation that must be given to the rules of discovery procedure and the wide scope of possible issues in the case the interrogatories are not subject to the general objection that they are burdensome and oppressive. See e. g. Caldwell-Clements, Inc., v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 12 F.R.D. 531.

This leaves the specific objections of defendants which I proceed to discuss.

Defendants first object to a definition at the beginning of the interrogatories stating that:

“Reference herein or in these interrogatories to any defendant or to ‘you’ or ‘your’ is intended to include each defendant referred to, its subsidiaries and corporations controlled by it and the predecessors in name of such defendant or such subsidiaries or controlled corporations; and corporations consolidated or merged with such defendant or with any such subsidiaries, controlled corporations or predecessors in name, and subsidiaries of or corporations controlled by such merged or consolidated corporations.”

Defendants contend that because of this statement the interrogatories are in effect addressed to persons who are not parties, contrary to Rule 33. I do not so construe it; it merely requires defendants to supply information which may be known to other corporations yet available to defendants. Rule 33 provides :

“Any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association, by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is available to the party.”

If subsidiaries or controlled corporations possess the desired information and defendants’ control over them is such that the information is “available” to defendants, defendants may not refuse to answer because the source of the information is a separate corporate entity. If the information sought is not “available” to defendants they may so state. Greenbie v. Noble, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 18 F.R.D. 414; see Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 18 F.R.D. 503, 506.4

Defendants object to all interrogatories relating to first run theatres as irrelevant to a determination of the rights of second run theatres, citing T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 16 F.R.D. 173, and Vilastor Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, D. C.S.D.N.Y., 18 F.R.D. 199. These cases hold merely that records of first [499]*499run theatres are irrelevant to a claimed deprivation of second runs. -In this case, however, defendants concede that plaintiffs claim deprivation of first runs ahead of all other theatres for the Calderone and the Rivoli Theatres. See Broadway & Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Loew’s Inc., D.C.S.D.N.Y., 21 F.R.D. 347, 356.

Defendants object to interrogatories 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20 and 29, which ask for information running back to 1926. The period barred by the statute of limitations runs up to 1949.

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22 F.R.D. 494, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 517, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4312, 1958 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,081, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/erone-corp-v-skouras-theatres-corp-nysd-1958.