Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co.

12 F.R.D. 531, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3533, 1952 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,261
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 31, 1952·Published·Cited by 32 cases

Opinion

DIMOCK, District Judge.

This is a motion by defendant McGrawHill Publishing Company, Inc. to strike interrogatories served upon it by the plaintiff Caldwell-Clements, Inc. The action is brought by the plaintiff charging McGrawHill Publishing Company, Inc., and James H. McGraw, Jr., with, among other things, a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and monopolization or attempted monopolization in the publishing business and particularly in the electrical trade and industry magazine fields. It is also charged that defendants have acquired interests in other publishing businesses in violation of the anti-trust laws.

The interrogatories cover a wide range of matters and the objections raised to them are extensive. Probably the simplest manner of dealing with the objections will be to consider the interrogatories in the order generally in which they appear but, wherever it appears that particular points have application to other parts of the interrogatories as well, to consider together all of the interrogatories to which the points are applicable if that can conveniently be done.

The interrogatories are propounded to the corporate defendant which will be hereinafter referred to as the defendant.

Both plaintiff and defendant are engaged in publishing trade or business magazines, plaintiff’s publication being “Radio and' Television Retailing” and defendant’s. “Electrical Merchandising”. Defendant publishes a large number of such magazines as well as other matter and has been, in the publishing business for a long time.. Plaintiff describes itself as an independent publisher and has been publishing trade-magazines in the electrical and radio fields. It was founded in 1935 by two former employees of the defendant.

The parties have had a long history of complicated and varying relationships including prior litigation. Suffice it to say that, for present purposes, they are competitors in the fields where plaintiff has-been active. It also appears that this competition has been intensified recently. A number of the interrogatories deal with claims made by defendant in connection, with “Electrical Merchandising”, the magazine that it publishes.

The General Objection to All Interrogatories.

The first point made by the defendant is that the interrogatories should be-stricken in toto because it is said that they-are designed to and do submit defendant to. oppression, undue annoyance, and expense. Defendant’s view is that they constitute per se an annoyance and oppression, of defendant. The interrogatories take up-53 pages and by defendant’s computation. [535] involve 9,769 separate paragraphs. Much is made of the defendant’s claim that by its own computation more than 293,000 answers are required. Defendant admits, however, that 264,000 of these answers are to be made under Interrogatory XI, which, aside from a few minor questions, asks for the names and addresses of persons appearing on some seven lists, the names and addresses of the individuals charged with duty of compiling and maintaining such mailing lists, the names of the persons actually preparing the .answers, and identification of all sources consulted by defendant’s representatives for the purpose of preparing such answers and of all sources of information actually used in preparing such answers. The lists are regularly maintained and reproduced by defendant in its business. The burden claimed in answering these 264,000 questions, at least, is not impressive. In a few instances, the defendant attempts to indicate the amount of time and effort required to answer certain interrogatories but only in one instance does it show the number of man-days that will be necessary and even there no estimate of expense is offered. No doubt these interrogatories impose some burden on the defendant. Interrogatories generally do, but the burden here is far from constituting such a hardship as to require striking the entire set of interrogatories on the basis of annoyance, expense and oppression. Further consideration of the objection of annoyance and oppression will be given, however, where appropriate to particular interrogatories.

Defendant also makes the general objection that the interrogatories are designed to maneuver defendant into an unfavorable position. The support for this contention in the affidavit submitted with the objections is the statement that, in view of the burden of the interrogatories, it can •only be concluded that the sole purpose of the plaintiff in serving the interrogatories is to harrass, oppress and vex the defend•ant. That conclusion I cannot accept nor •can I say, considering the entire set of interrogatories, that they are designed to maneuver defendant into an unfavorable tactical position such as Judge Holtzoff discussed in Aktiebolaget Vargos v. Clark, D.C., 8 F.R.D. 635, 636.

Interrogatory I and the Question of the Period With Respect to Which Interrogatories are Proper.

Defendant has made general objections as to various interrogatories which concern facts which have occurred subsequent to the commencement of the action or in a period with respect to which the statute of limitations has run.

The objection as to inquiry into matters subsequent to the commencement of the action is frequently and effectively met by the point that the interrogating party can normally supplement its pleading so as to include that period and it is pure formalism in such cases therefore to bar such an inquiry. Conmar Products Corp. v. Lamar Slide Fastener Corp., D.C., 2 F.R.D., 154. The better practice seems to be to allow such questions and in this case to a large extent the objection has become moot since supplemental pleadings dealing with most of these matters have recently been allowed by Judge Bondy, D.C., 12 F.R.D. 403.

From the second objection, that as to matters occurring beyond the period of the statute of limitations, the defendant has already retreated. It now urges that this court consider the time limitation objection as addressed to the discretion of the court. It then points to the restriction placed on the admission of evidence antedating 1935 in the case of U. S. v. Morgan, Civ. 43-757, presently pending in this district, and suggests that 1935 would be a suitable date with which to limit discovery in this case.

Of course, there are tremendous differences between the Investment Bankers’ Case and this one. Restrictions which may be deemed necessary in a case of the proportions of the Investment Bankers’ Case, may well have little or no application in a case like this. At the least, the differences between the cases constitute an important factor in considering the application of this precedent. Beyond this, the ruling in the Investment Bankers’ Case was not an abso[536] lute bar to the pre-1935 evidence; it still left it open to the plaintiff under some circumstance to introduce evidence antedating 1935, providing it met certain requirements, e. g. Id. Tr. 9167-9168, Oct. 4, 1951, Tr. 9511, Oct. 11, 1951 and Judge Medina’s recent ruling of Feb. 4, 1952 Tr. 12135-12139. This brings us to the other important distinction between this case and the Investment Bankers’ Case. The ruling in the latter case dealt with the introduction of evidence upon the trial and not, as here, a proposed limitation on discovery. It may well be that upon the trial of this action a similar restriction upon the introduction of evidence should be imposed. The question before the court now, however, is whether such a restriction should be imposed upon discovery.

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Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 12 F.R.D. 531, 1952 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3533, 1952 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,261 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

12 F.R.D. 531 (Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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