Sikes Co. v. Swift & Co.

9 F.R.D. 19, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3117
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 19, 1949
DocketCiv. No. 3774
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 9 F.R.D. 19 (Sikes Co. v. Swift & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sikes Co. v. Swift & Co., 9 F.R.D. 19, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3117 (W.D.N.Y. 1949).

Opinion

KNIGHT, Chief Judge.

This action was commenced in Supreme Court: Erie County, New York, but was removed to this court. After removal, defendant, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 33, 28 U.S.C.A., propounded interrogatories'which plaintiff answered and to which objection is now made.

The verified complaint, demanding $500,-000 damages, alleges three causes of action. The first, based on breach of express warranty, alleges that, between June 14 and December 1, 1946, plaintiff purchased from defendant two 5-gallon drums and 15 barrels or drums containing about 50 gallons each of synthetic glue to be used in plaintiffs business for manufacture of chairs and other furniture, and particularly for gluing certain joints in chairs made by plaintiff and known as the “Bank of England” ; that plaintiff, before purchasing, expressly made known to defendant the particular purpose for which the glue was needed and defendant warranted that the glue was reasonably fit and plaintiff relied on defendant’s skill and judgment; that defendant’s synthetic glue was not fit for the purpose for which it was purchased; that a large number of plaintiff’s “Bank of England” chairs, glued with defendant’s glue, were returned to plaintiff because of defects and it has and will suffer great business losses. The second cause of action, apparently based on breach of express contract, contains substantially the same factual allegations as the first. The third cause of action, based on the same facts, stresses plaintiff’s resulting loss of business.

Defendant’s answer, besides general denials, sets up eight separate defenses. After the service of the answer, defendant propounded 21 interrogatories which plaintiff answered.

Defendant at first urged that this action be dismissed, pursuant to Rule 37(d), because none of the answers to the interrogatories are under oath, as required by Rule 33. This defect has been corrected by stipulation and the objection withdrawn. This leaves the second phase of defendant’s motion, namely, an order “2. Precluding plaintiff from offering at the trial any evidence pertaining to the subject matter of the interrogatories numbered hereinbelow, or in the alternative, striking the answers and directing full, complete, adequate and direct answers to interrogatories numbered 2(d), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 6(a), 6(d), 7(b), 7(c), 8(a), 8(c), 8(d), 9(b), 9(d), 10(e), 11(a), 11(d), 13(a), 18(a), 18(b), 18(c), 18(d), and 21, on the grounds that said answers are evasive, irresponsive, incomplete, inadequate and insufficient.”

Rule 33 requires that the interrogatories be answered “fully”. Defendant’s objection will now be considered in detail.

Interrogatory 2(d) — “State whether there were any oral arrangements or negotiations relating to any such returns and refunds and, if so, state when and where each was made, the full name of each person present on each occasion, and the full substance of the conversation of each such person.” Answer — “Arrangement for return and refund made at 20 Churchill Street, Buffalo, N. Y. between William Sengpiel for plaintiff and Mr. Cox for defendant. In response to a complaint regarding oily substance in glue Mr. Cox called on plaintiff on December 4, 1946 and accepted return of two barrels with request that their actual shipment back to the defendant be held until Spring because the product would not ship properly in cold weather.”

Interrogatory 2 arises from the allegations in defendant’s fourth and fifth defenses set up in its answer, to wit, “That on or about the 5th day of May, 1947, plaintiff returned to defendant two 50-gallon tierces or drums of unused Glu-Bond and it thereupon requested the return of the price paid [21]*21therefor, which request was • granted and the purchase price thereupon refunded.”

In its answers to subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of this interrogatory, to which no specific objection is taken, plaintiff states that on May 7, 1947, two drums were returned; that on October 31, 1947, $294.-20 payment was received and that there was no correspondence between the parties relating to any such returns or refunds. The answer to subdivision (d), therefore, appears to be sufficient.

Interrogatory 3(c) — -“State upon what particular items of plaintiff’s line of furniture the same (synthetic glue) was used, describing each item by trade name or other description.” Answer- — -“Office chairs.” Interrogatory 3(d) — “State what part or parts, of each were joined with said synthetic glue.” Answer — “Initially all parts, except seats.” Interrogatory 3(e)— “State whether any part or parts of any such items were joined by any adhesive or glue other than said synthetic glue and, if so, what part or parts were so joined.” Answer — “Initially seats, and later all parts except Bank of England top and arm assembly.”

The answer to Interrogatory 3(c) is not “fully” made. The complaint alleges and realleges “That plaintiff is and a-t all times herein mentioned has been engaged in * * * manufacturing and selling an extensive line of office furniture, including particularly a chair known as the ‘Bank of England’ * * * that the plaintiff is one of the largest producers of office chairs in the country and one of the largest producers of office chairs of the ‘Bank of England’ type.”

The term “office chairs” is indeterminate. It may mean all office chairs or only some. If it means only the “Bank of England” type, plaintiff must say so. If it comprises other types, plaintiff must designate each of these types by trade name or other description. The complaint does not limit the allegations of defective glue to the “Bank of England” type. The uncertainty of 3(c) invades 3(d) and 3(e), which are further obscured by the adverb “initially.” Plaintiff in these two answers must give dates and, if the revised answer to 3(c) specifies lines of furniture other than “Bank of England” type of office chairs, these dates must be separately stated for each line.

Interrogatory 5(a) — “State what tests, trials or experiments were made of and with said synthetic glue, the date each was made, and the full name of each person who made or participated in the making of each.” Answer — “Tests and trials having to do with the preparation, application and use of defendant’s glue were made and had by and under the direction of the defendant’s representatives, including Mr. Cox, commencing at or about the time the first order for said glue was given and continuing on several occasions thereafter, and the plaintiff commenced the use of said glue in production under the direction and supervision of said representatives of the defendant and in reliance upon their representations, warranties and statements that the said glue was suitable for use in the business of the plaintiff.”

The latter part of this answer beginning with the words “and the plaintiff commenced” is irresponsive.

Defendant in its eighth defense set up in its answer alleges that plaintiff’s alleged damage was due solely to its negligence in using the Glu-Bond “(a) without having made and conducted competent tests and inspections thereof as should have revealed and disclosed the defects and imperfections alleged in the complaint.”

Plaintiff alleges breach of warranty but this is denied by defendant. Plaintiff’s examination of the glue is a vital matter and plaintiff must give a fuller answer to 5(a), relating to its “tests and trials.”

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Related

Brown v. United States Lines Co.
15 F.R.D. 127 (S.D. New York, 1953)
Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.
10 F.R.D. 477 (W.D. Missouri, 1950)
Sikes Co. v. Swift & Co.
10 F.R.D. 68 (W.D. New York, 1949)

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Bluebook (online)
9 F.R.D. 19, 1949 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sikes-co-v-swift-co-nywd-1949.