Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp.

59 F.R.D. 500, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 504
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMay 17, 1973
DocketNo. 72 C 2330
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 59 F.R.D. 500 (Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 59 F.R.D. 500, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 504 (N.D. Ill. 1973).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BAUER, District Judge.

This cause comes on the defendants’ motion for an order compelling answer to four interrogatories and plaintiff’s motion for an order compelling discovery.

This is an anti-trust action instituted under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 1px solid var(--green-border)">2, and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14. The plaintiff, Sargent-Welch Scientific Company (“Sargent-Welch”) is an Illinois corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing, and selling educational equipment, laboratory instruments, scientific instruments and other products. The defendants are Ventrón Corporation (“Ventrón”) and Ventrón Instruments Corporation (“VIC”). Ven-trón is a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing and selling chemicals, electronic materials, and research, laboratory and scientific instruments. VIC is a Massachusetts corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Ventrón engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing and selling sophisticated research, laboratory and scientific instruments.

The plaintiff, Sargent-Welch, is a former distributor of “Electrobalance” [502]*502products manufactured by the Cahn Instruments Division of defendant VIC. Plaintiff was terminated as a distributor in 1971 and has filed a three count complaint seeking damages of $1,100,-000.00 for alleged violations of the antitrust laws.

Count I charges that defendants have monopolized and attempted to monopolize trade and commerce in six “markets”. Count II charges that defendants have entered into exclusive dealing and tying arrangements with certain distributors. Count III charges. that the defendants fixed resale prices and imposed customer and territorial restrictions on Cahn distributors.

I. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES

The defendants in support of their motion for an order compelling proper answers to four interrogatories contend:

1. Plaintiff’s objections are without substance and its conelusory answers are totally inadequate under Rule 33(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. In light of the basic information sought and the need for additional answers, plaintiff’s refusal to furnish proper answers to Interrogatories, 16, 17, 18 and 19 is particularly egregious.

The plaintiff, in opposition to the instant motion, contends that:

1. To the extent the interrogatories seek properly discoverable matters, they have been answered to the full extent of plaintiff’s present knowledge.
2. To the extent which defendants seek to elicit from plaintiff’s counsel their legal theories regarding this action, such interrogatories clearly extend to issues of “pure law” which under no interpretation of Rule 33(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are discoverable by an interrogating party.

It is the opinion of this Court after examining the relevant Interrogatories and Answers thereto that the plaintiff should state more responsive answers to the defendants’ interrogatories in order that the defendants might better know the facts upon which the plaintiff’s claim is founded.

The thrust of plaintiff’s objection to answering four of the defendants’ interrogatories is that a more complete answer to the interrogatories would require plaintiff’s attorneys to state their legal theories regarding this action. The interrogatories to which plaintiff so objects are Nos. 16,17, 18 and 19.

It is well settled that an interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it calls for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact. Radzik v. Chicagoland Recreational Vehicle Dealers Assn., 1972 Trade Cases, Paragraph 73, 848 (N.D.Ill.1972); Ballard v. Allegheny-Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 67 (D.C.Pa.1972); Joseph v. Norman’s Health Club, Inc., 336 F.Supp. 307 (E.D.Mo.1971). See also the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 33(b) regarding the 1970 Amendment.

The clear trend of recent cases has been to inquire “factual opinions” or opinions calling for the application of law to fact since this type of discovery can be most useful in narrowing and sharpening the issues, which is a major purpose of discovery. Diversified Products Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R. D. 3 (D.C.Md.1967). An interrogatory which inquires into the facts upon which certain vague and general allegations of a complaint are founded and the claimed relationship between such facts is not objectionable on the ground that it calls for a legal conclusion. B-H Transportation Company, Inc. v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 44 F.R. D. 436 (N.D.N.Y.1968).

[503]*503The defendants, in their four interrogatories, seek to inquire into the factual basis of allegations in the complaint charging them with anti-trust violations.1 It is clear that the defendants are entitled to know the facts upon which plaintiff’s claim is founded. Mutual knowledge of the relevant facts is essential to proper litigation. Either party may compel the other to disclose what relevant facts he has in his possession. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); Radzik v. Chicagoland Recreational Vehicle Dealers Assn., supra.

Thus the plaintiff should appropriately respond to the instant interrogatories by disclosing the requested “factual opinions”- — the factual basis or source of the allegations contained in the complaint. However, this does not mean, nor can it be construed to mean, that the plaintiff has to respond to questions whose answers extend to issues of “pure law” unrelated to the facts of the case.

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY

The plaintiff, in support of its motion to compel discovery, contends:

1.Information and documents coming into existence or into defendant’s possession after September 20, 1972, the date of the complaint, may be relevant, and a blanket refusal to produce by defendants is improper.
2. Documents and information relating to future marketing and business plans are appropriate subject matter for discovery.
3. Defendants have .refused to answer several specific and proper interrogatories, namely Interrogatories Nos. 13, 20(b), and 29(c).

The defendants, in opposition to the instant motion, have represented to this Court:

1.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Savitt/Adler Litigation
176 F.R.D. 44 (N.D. New York, 1997)
Schaap v. Executive Industries, Inc.
130 F.R.D. 384 (N.D. Illinois, 1990)
McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc.
85 F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1979)
Flour Mills of America, Inc. v. Pace
75 F.R.D. 676 (E.D. Oklahoma, 1977)
Shires v. Magnavox Co.
74 F.R.D. 373 (E.D. Tennessee, 1977)
Cornaglia v. Ricciardi
63 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1974)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
59 F.R.D. 500, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 504, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sargent-welch-scientific-co-v-ventron-corp-ilnd-1973.