Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kamehameha Schools/bishop Estate

990 F.2d 458
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 10, 1993
Docket91-16586
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 990 F.2d 458 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kamehameha Schools/bishop Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Kamehameha Schools/bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).

Opinion

JAMES R. BROWNING, Circuit Judge:

I. Overview.

Bernice Pauahi Bishop was a member of the Hawaiian royal family and, at the time of her death in 1884, the largest landowner in Hawaii. Mrs. Bishop’s will provided that the bulk of her estate should be placed in a charitable trust “to erect and maintain in the Hawaiian Islands two schools, each for boarding and day scholars, one for boys and one for girls, to be known as, and called the Kamehameha Schools.” Mrs. Bishop’s will also directed that “the teachers of said schools shall forever be persons of the Protestant religion.” 1

Carole Edgerton, who is not a Protestant, contacted the Schools to apply for an advertised position as a substitute French teacher. Edgerton was informed of the Protestant-only requirement and filed a charge of religious discrimination with EEOC. EEOC attempted conciliation, but the Schools informed the Commission they were bound by Mrs. Bishop’s will.

EEOC filed suit, alleging religious discrimination in employment in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). 2 The Schools conceded Mrs. Bishop’s will requires discrimination in employment contrary to § 2000e-2(a)(l), but sought to bring themselves within three exemptions provided elsewhere in the Act: (1) § 2000e-l, which provides that the equal employment provisions of the Act do not apply to employment by a “religious ... educational institution” of individuals of a particular religion to carry on its activities; (2) § 2000e-2(e)(l), which provides that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of [ ] religion” if religion is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise;” and (3) § 2000e-2(e)(2), which provides that “it shall not be ah unlawful employment practice for a school ... to hire and employ employees of a particular religion ... if the curriculum of such school ... is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.”

The parties agreed to litigate the applicability of the three exceptions before considering the merits of Edgerton’s claim. EEOC and the Schools filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found the Schools exempt on all three grounds. EEOC v. Kamehameha *460 Schools/Bishop Estate, 780 F.Supp. 1317 (D.Haw.1991).

Ordinarily, “[w]e review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo." EEOC v. Townley Eng. & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir.1988). However, here we are reviewing, at least in part, conclusions of ultimate fact reached by a district court when granting summary judgment in a non-jury case. We need not decide whether a different standard of review applies with respect to such conclusions; the result would be the same whether we applied a de novo or clearly erroneous standard.

We construe the statutory exemptions narrowly, Korherr v. Bumb, 262 F.2d 157, 162 (9th Cir.1958), and the Schools bear the burden of proving they are exempt, see United States v. First City Nat’l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366, 87 S.Ct. 1088, 1092, 18 L.Ed.2d 151 (1967) (party seeking benefit of exemption from statute bears burden of proof); EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir.1988) (party seeking benefit of bona fide occupational qualification exception bears burden of proof).

We conclude the Schools failed to establish their entitlement to any of the three exemptions claimed, and reverse.

II. Exemption for Religious Educational Institutions.

The district court weighed the religious characteristics of the Schools against their secular characteristics and concluded the Schools were exempt under § 2000e-l as religious educational institutions because the purpose and character of the Schools is primarily religious. 3 780 F.Supp. at 1324-26. In applying § 2000e-l the district court adopted the approach approved by this court in Townley, 859 F.2d at 618, of weighing “[a]ll significant religious and secular characteristics ... to determine whether the corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious.” We reaffirm that approach. We differ from the district court only in evaluating the facts of this case in light of Congress’ intention as to the scope of the exemption for religious organizations.

We stated in Townley that § 2000e-1 does not exempt an institution that is “merely ‘affiliated’ with a religious organization.” Id. at 617. We also observed, “Congress’s conception of the scope of [§ 2000e-l] was not a broad one. All assumed that only those institutions with extremely close ties to organized religion would be covered. Churches, and entities similar to churches, were the paradigm.” Id. at 618. 4 We then held that, in determining whether an institution falls within the limited exemption for religious institutions under § 2000e-l, “each case must turn on its own facts. All significant religious and secular characteristics must be weighed to determine whether the corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious. Only when this is the case will the corporation be able to avail itself of the exemption.” 859 F.2d at 618. “Our inquiry here,” we said, “is to determine whether the ‘general picture’ of the institution is primarily religious or secular.” Id. at 619 n. 14. 5

*461 The ownership and affiliation, purpose, faculty, student body, student activities, and curriculum of the Schools are either essentially secular, or neutral as far as religion is concerned, 6 and we conclude the general picture of the Schools reflects a primarily secular rather than a primarily religious orientation.

1. Ownership and Affiliation — No religious organization has ever controlled or supported the Schools, and the Schools are not affiliated with any denomination of Protestants or with any organization or association of religious schools. 7 The Schools are a part of the Bishop Trust, which is a large and overwhelmingly secular business. Recent annual reports for the Blsh°P Estate mak® 110 mention of religion. Recent annual reports by the Schools to the trustees mention religion only as a form of “ancillary support.” 8

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990 F.2d 458, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/equal-employment-opportunity-commission-v-kamehameha-schoolsbishop-estate-ca9-1993.