Duo-Flex Corp. v. Building Service Co.

322 F.2d 94, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 542
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedAugust 22, 1963
DocketNo. 20080
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 322 F.2d 94 (Duo-Flex Corp. v. Building Service Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Duo-Flex Corp. v. Building Service Co., 322 F.2d 94, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 542 (5th Cir. 1963).

Opinion

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

These appeals are from the judgment of the district court that all five claims of the Stanley patent,1 a combination patent for the construction of suspended acoustical ceilings, are valid but were not infringed by the defendants.2 The plaintiff, holder of the Stanley patent, appeals from that part of the judgment holding that claims 2, 3, and 4 of the patent were not infringed by the defendants, and the defendants appeal from that part of the judgment holding the patent to be valid. The plaintiff alleged below, in essence, that the defendant Builders Service had wilfully infringed Stanley in the construction of two office buildings in Fort Worth, Texas, one of which is owned by the defendant First National Building Corporation.

The factual complexities of the case are exceeded only by the length, variety, and technicalities of the arguments advanced on both sides. We think, however, that the wheat may be readily separated from the chaff and summary disposition made of the case. We affirm the judgment insofar as it held Stanley valid but reverse insofar as it held that defendants had not infringed claims 2, 3, and 4.

Stanley discloses and claims a suspended acoustical ceiling construction. The ceiling is composed of sound absorbing, flat oblong tiles. These are supported so as to present a downwardly facing ceiling, by special hollow longitudinally extending main support members. That result is achieved in the following manner. The main support panel members are clipped to rigid metal C-channels which are, in turn, hung from the unfinished ceiling of a building by wires and clips in such a manner that a series of the main support members are disposed parallel to, and spaced from, each other. Each main support panel member is provided with an upwardly facing shoulder on the upper portion of each of its sides. Auxiliary support members, called T-splines, are laid transversely of the main support members, with their ends resting upon the upwardly facing shoulders of the main support members. The tiles are horizontally slotted along their side edges, and those slots receive the laterally extending portions of the T-splines. Thus, the tiles are directly supported by the T-splines, and the ends of those T-splines rest upon, and are thus supported by, the shoulders of the main support panel members. The slotting is so located that, when the ceiling is assembled, the tile face is flush with the lower faces of the main support panels.

The field is admittedly a crowded one. The prior art is at least partially disclosed by five patents introduced into evidence: Brown, Rader, Olson, Jacobson 667, and Jacobson 102. The pioneer patents have all expired. Rader, for example, dates back some sixty years and expired some thirty-five years ago. In holding the Stanley combination valid, the trial judge found that nine features distinguish it from the prior art: (1) simplicity and ease of installation; (2) easy removal and replacement of the tiles to the surface area above the tiles; (3) use of standard components T-splines and tiles; (4) a neat ceiling appearance; (5) adaptability to inclusion of lighting fixtures and air conditioning vents and ducts; (6) modular unit construction; (7) stability; (8) prevention of tile sagging; and (9) flush mounting of tiles to facilitate the sealing of rooms over vertical partitions. He found further, in essence, that Stanley was not anticipated by the prior art and that the subject matter of the invention as a whole would not have been obvious on the basis of the [96]*96prior art to a person having ordinary skill in the art.3

Warranting discussion here are only those arguments that the trial court erred in holding that the prior art did not anticipate Stanley, that the subject matter of Stanley is not obvious within the meaning of the statute,4 and that Stanley was a patentable combination rather than a mere aggregation of old elements.

The two contentions relating to anticipation and obvious subject matter are based upon a detailed comparison of Stanley with the prior art. Essentially, defendants’ principal effort is devoted to showing that with varying degrees of modification — all within the ordinary skill of the art — each of the prior art patents would disclose a system similar in structure and function to Stanley.

It is, of course, settled that it “is not sufficient to constitute an anticipation that the device relied upon might, by modification, be made to accomplish the function performed by the patent in question, if it were not designed by its maker, nor adapted, nor actually used, for the performance of such functions.” Topliff v. Topliff, 1892, 145 U.S. 156, 161, 12 S.Ct. 825, 827-828, 36 L.Ed. 658. Rather, anticipation by a modified prior art structure is shown only if the modification was suggested to a mechanic of ordinary intelligence. We might even concede that each of the elements of the Stanley combination is disclosed by the prior art, but such single revelation would not preclude patentability. Cameron Iron Works v. Stekoll, 5th Cir., 1957, 242 F.2d 17. The trial court did not err in finding that the Stanley combination was not anticipated by the prior art.

It appears to us that the thrust of the argument that the subject matter of Stanley is obvious is based primarily on hindsight. The fact is that the prior art was long extant before Stanley claimed his combination, but the invention, [97]*97now so obvious, was never made. Here, as in Diamond Rubber Co. of N. Y. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 1911, 220 U.S. 428, 435, 31 S.Ct. 444, 447, 55 L.Ed. 527, it may be said that:

“Knowledge after the event is always easy, and problems once solved present no difficulties, indeed, may be represented as never having had any, and expert witnesses may be brought forward to- show that the new thing which seemed to have eluded the search of the world was always ready at hand and easy to be seen by a merely skillful attention. * * * ”

Confronted with an adverse finding of fact, the defendants have failed to establish that the finding was clearly erroneous

We think, further, that the defendants have shown no reason for reversal in their argument that Stanley is nothing more than an aggregation of elements contained in the prior art — that the parts of Stanley are only standard mechanical parts assembled to produce only expected results — and is hence invalid. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 1950, 340 U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L.Ed. 162; see also Glikin v. Smith, 5th Cir., 1959, 269 F.2d 641. It is contended that Stanley simply covers a routine assembly of parts— tiles, cross-T “auxiliary supports,” “main support,” and, in claims 1 and 5, flat splines along the side of the main supports — and that Stanley’s assembly of these parts performs no new function and exhibits no new feature; but, rather, each of the elements performs exactly the same function as it did in the prior art.

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322 F.2d 94, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 542, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/duo-flex-corp-v-building-service-co-ca5-1963.