Donald M. Drake Co. v. United States

153 Ct. Cl. 433, 1961 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 88, 1961 WL 8670
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 3, 1961
DocketNo. 501-57
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 153 Ct. Cl. 433 (Donald M. Drake Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Donald M. Drake Co. v. United States, 153 Ct. Cl. 433, 1961 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 88, 1961 WL 8670 (cc 1961).

Opinion

PeR Curiam;

: This case is before us on the findings of fact and recommendation for conclusion of law of Trial Commissioner C. Murray Bernhardt, supported by an opinion. We adopt the Trial Commissioner’s recommendation and his findings of fact, with a slight correction, and judgment will be entered accordingly.

The correction in the Trial Commissioner’s findings is this: He finds that the parties agreed that the amount of damage suffered by plaintiff amounted to $11,439.62. In fact, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff’s evidence would show, if introduced, that it had suffered damages in the amount of $11,439.62, but defendant introduced no evidence to contradict plaintiff’s evidence. There was, therefore, an implied admission by defendant, but no express admission. Finding 35 has been corrected to more accurately state the facts as to the stipulation on the amount of damages.

The opinion of the Trial Commissioner, without correction, is hereinafter set forth.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover $11,439.62, and judgment for this amount will be entered.

It is so ordered.

OPINION OP THE COMMISSIONER

The critical question in this case is whether the defendant acted reasonably in partially halting the plaintiff’s use of questionable concrete for a one month period in 1955 in the course of performance of two contracts for the construction of several concrete structures at the Klamath Falls Air Force Base in Oregon, thereby delaying the plaintiff and causing it damages in the agreed amount of $11,439.62. Plaintiff has exhausted its administrative remedies, its appeal to the head of the department having been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In 1955 and 1956 eleven prime contracts were underway, let by the Navy for the use and benefit of the Air Force, to convert the Klamath Falls Municipal Airport into an urgently needed airbase for the United States Air Force. [435]*435Two of the eleven contracts were let to the plaintiff, who was directed to proceed on June 27, 1955, and was scheduled to finish on November 24, 1955. The plaintiff mobilized and commenced the jobs with reasonable diligence, as illustrated in part by the fact that the first concrete was poured on July 15, and the defendant’s contentions to the contrary are not persuasive.

The contracts contained detailed specifications for the concrete to be used. The plaintiff contracted with the Miller Construction Company, a local supplier of concrete and aggregate, to supply transit mixed concrete that would comply with all specifications. The plaintiff had requested beforehand the defendant’s approval of Miller as a source of concrete for the jobs, and the defendant had given its approval “providing it [the Miller Company concrete] meets the subject specifications and contract requirements.” The plaintiff contends that this approval by the defendant absolved the plaintiff from responsibility for deficiencies in the concrete which developed subsequently. The plaintiff cannot shed so easily its contract obligation of providing all labor, equipment and materials in strict accordance with specifications.

On August 2, 1955, when forms were stripped from concrete which the plaintiff had poured in late July, some of the concrete was badly “spalled”, that is to say, in places the concrete had formed a stronger bond with the wooden forms than with its own mass so that facings had sheared off leaving pockmarks, holes, cracks and rough surfaces. A large piece had come off altogether and still more could be pulled off manually. Representatives of both parties attributed the condition to the use of dirty aggregate (i.e., in this case the crushed stone) in mixing the concrete, which had the effect of preventing a bond between the aggregate and the cement. The defendant’s resident officer in charge of construction had the contract right to require the plaintiff to remove and replace all defective concrete, but he felt this instance to be the result of an accidental contamination of an isolated batch and, anxious not to delay completion, he permitted a partial replacement of one broken pilaster and the patching of other defects. Later Miller Com[436]*436pany paid the plaintiff $417.56 representing the agreed cost of certain ingredients which had been omitted from the defective concrete misture, and this amount was deducted by the defendant from the plaintiff’s vouchers. Both parties considered this defective concrete to be clearly the result of dirty aggregate, and Miller Company was instructed on August 3 that it would have to wash its aggregate carefully to prevent recurrences. On August 10 Miller Company installed a temporary, makeshift method of washing its aggregate which, while crude, seemed to accomplish the job satisfactorily judging from a virtual lack of defective concrete poured after August 10 as shown in subsequent cylinder tests. The plaintiff continued to pour concrete throughout August without hindrance by the defendant.

Each time a batch of concrete was poured the plaintiff filled one or more test cylinders with samples from that batch. These test cylinders were allowed to cure for 28 days and then were broken open and their hardened concrete contents were subjected to so-called compressive strength tests to determine their compliance with the compressive strength requirements of the specifications. Thus, the concrete poured in the last half of July and early August was not ripe for testing until the last half of August and early September, and when tested it was revealed that the contents of the test cylinders representing nine out of 25 batches of concrete poured prior to August 10 were deficient in compressive strength. In a sense this merely corroborated what the parties had reason to suspect on August 2 when the forms were first stripped, namely, that certain of the concrete poured in late July was defective due to the use of dirty aggregate in its mixing.

To further corroborate this alarming condition the defendant’s resident officer directed the plaintiff on August 31 to cut sample concrete cores from specified parts of the suspected structures. This was done and again confirmed what was already known.

Most or all of the other contractors performing the other nine prime contracts at the airbase were also procuring their concrete from Miller Company, and at least some of them were experiencing the same spotty results as the plaintiff, [437]*437though, in lesser degree. It was known that aggregate procured from local sources was excessively alkaline due to natural geology, and that this condition unless controlled affected the durability and other characteristics of concrete. The defendant’s resident officer was naturally concerned for fear that the prevalent use of Miller Company’s concrete might cause basewide problems in all the contracts underway, including the two in suit. Therefore, the contracting officer dispatched a concrete expert to the scene to survey the problem and advise as to what to do. After investigating conditions at the jobsite from August 30 to September 2, he found that the Miller Company’s crushed rock aggregate was mixed with a great deal of dirt while being quarried, that it was reasonably clean after being washed in Miller’s makeshift facilities, but that it became heavily recontaminated with dirt during the concrete mixing process due to the dirt which had accumulated in the mixer bins over a long period. To this latter condition he attributed the concrete failures in the instant contracts.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
153 Ct. Cl. 433, 1961 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 88, 1961 WL 8670, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/donald-m-drake-co-v-united-states-cc-1961.