BELL, Chief Judge.
The issue this case presents,1 which involves the voir dire process, had its genesis in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, in the trial, for robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon and related charges, of the petitioner, Ricky Dingle and two co-defendants.2 During the voir dire process, the petitioner sought to have the trial court inquire of the venire panel whether any of them had certain experiences or associations.3 While the court agreed to, and did, make the inquiries the petitioner requested, it did so by joining with each of the petitioner’s requested inquiries, one suggested by the State, namely an inquiry into whether the experience or association posited would affect the prospective juror’s ability to be fair [4]*4and impartial.4 Thus, the inquiry the court conducted to satisfy the petitioner’s concerns consisted of a series of two part questions, the answers to which, the court instructed, need not be revealed unless a member of the venire panel answered both parts in the affirmative.5 As to that, the venire panel was instructed as follows:
[5]*5“You should only stand if your answer is yes to both parts of the question. If your answer is no to either part of the question, then you should not stand. So once again, only stand if your answer is yes to both parts of the question.”
The prospective jurors who stood and confirmed that their answer to the second part of the question was in the affirmative, thus indicating that they could not be fair, were, if reached, excused for cause, either on motion of the State or of the defense. What occurred during the inquiry into the prospective jurors’ experience with crime victimization is illustrative:
“THE COURT: Again, a number of two-part questions, ladies and gentlemen. Only stand if your answer is yes to both parts of the question.
“Have you or any family member or close personal friend ever been a victim of a crime, and if your answer to that part of the question is yes, would that fact interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial in this case in which the state alleges that the defendants have committed a crime?
“So again, have you or any family member or a friend been the victim of a crime, and if the answer to that part of [6]*6the question is yes, would that fact interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial in this case? If so, please stand.
“All right. The gentleman in the white shirt.
“MR. BLANEY: Bruce Blaney, 639.
“THE COURT: And because of some involvement with a — a crime, you feel you couldn’t be fair and impartial, sir?
“MR. BLANEY: A friend of mine—
“THE COURT: Nope, I didn’t — please just answer the question.
“MR. BLANEY: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Thank you very much. You may be seated.
“Again, ladies and gentlemen, if you’d please simply answer the question without elaborating, it would be very helpful.
“Yes, ma’am.
“MS. CARRIGAN: 679, Barbara Carrigan.
“THE COURT: Miss Carrigan, you’re saying because of some exposure to crime, you couldn’t be fair and impartial?
“MS. CARRIGAN: I could be fair. I’m sorry.[6]
“THE COURT: Okay. You could be fair. Then you may be seated.
“Again, only stand if your answer is yes to both parts of the question.
‘Yes, sir.
“MR. MARSHALL: Tom Marshall, 643.
“THE COURT: All right. Mr. Marshall, you’re saying that you could not be fair and impartial as a result of some exposure to crime?
“MR. MARSHALL: That’s correct.
“THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Be seated.
[7]*7“All right. The gentleman in the gray sports shirt.
“MR. FLANNIGAN: George Flannigan, 329.
“THE COURT: And you’re saying you couldn’t be fair and impartial, Mr. Flannigan?
“MR. FLANNIGAN: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated.
“The other gentleman in the gray sports shirt.
“MR. WORTH: James Worth, 637.
“THE COURT: And your answer is the same, sir?
“MR. WORTH: Yes.
“THE COURT: All right. You may be seated. Thank you.
“Ma'am.
“MS. MALICKI: Joan Malicki, number 658.
“THE COURT: All right. Miss Malicki, your answer is the same?
“MS. MALICKI: Yes.
“THE COURT: Be seated.
“MS. KNIGHT: Jeannine Knight, number 321.
“THE COURT: And Miss Knight, your answer is the same?
“MS. KNIGHT: Yes.
“THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You may be seated.
“Ma’am? Your name and juror number?
“MS. SPOHN: Suzanne Spohn, number 76.
“THE COURT: All right. Miss Spohn, your answer is the same?
“MS. SPOHN: I don’t think I could be impartial in this crime.
“THE COURT: Well, again, you can’t be fair and impartial then. Thank you. You may be seated.
“All right. The gentleman in the white shirt.
“MR. FAKERI: Alexander Fakeri, number 87.
“THE COURT: And Mr. Fakeri, your response is the same?
“MR. FAKERI: Yes, sir.
[8]*8“THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Be seated.
“Ma'am?
“MS. BURMAN: Pamela Burman, 673.
“THE COURT: And Miss Burman, you also feel the same way?
“MS. BURMAN: Correct.
“THE COURT: Thank you. Be seated.”
The petitioner objected to the use of the two part format on a number of grounds, principally because he believed, and therefore argued, that asking compound questions and requiring an answer only if the prospective juror thought that he or she could not be fair, would, and, in fact did, result in a jury in which the venire persons themselves, by “unilateral decision,” determined their fitness to serve on the jury. The petitioner also argued that conducting the voir dire in the manner the trial court did would, and in fact did, deprive the petitioner of information relevant and critical to the exercise of his challenges for cause. The objections were overruled. The court’s rationale for the ruling is instructive:
“The court has asked the questions which the defense has presented' in the two-part format I described on many occasions, and on many occasions we’ve had people stand up in response to those questions and say, Yes, Judge, I can’t be fair and impartial, so it would appear to the court that the only reason for calling up the venire men here to the bench for individual voir dire is to allow the defense to develop more information which the defense intends to use in exercising its peremptory challenges, and therefore, the court declines to do so.”
The petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Special Appeals was unsuccessful. That court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court in an unreported opinion. We shall reverse the judgment of the intermediate appellate court, in the process confirming that the trial judge is charged with the impaneling of the jury and must determine, in the final analysis, the fitness of the individual venire persons. We shall hold that the voir [9]*9dire procedure utilized in this case usurped the court’s responsibility in this regard.
Voir dire, the process by which prospective jurors are examined to determine whether cause for disqualification exists, see Boyd v. State, 341 Md. 431, 435, 671 A.2d 33, 35 (1996), is the mechanism whereby the right to a fair and impartial jury, guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,7 see Grogg v. State, 231 Md. 530, 532, 191 A.2d 435, 436 (1963), is given substance. See Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 280, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995); Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 116 (1989). The overarching purpose of voir dire in a criminal case is to ensure a fair and impartial jury. See Boyd, 341 Md. 431, 435, 671 A.2d 33, 35 (1996); Hill, 339 Md. 275, 279, 661 A.2d 1164, 1166 (1995); Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 34, 633 A.2d 867, 871 (1993); Bedford, 317 Md. 659, 670, 566 A.2d 111, 117 (1989); Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 605, 143 A.2d 627, 631 (1958); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952). In Davis, 333 Md. at 33, 633 A.2d at 871, quoting Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 340, 378 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1977) (citing Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430, 436 (1879)), we said, “a fundamental tenet underlying the practice of trial by jury is that each juror, as far as possible, be impartial and unbiased.”
We recognized in Davis that:
There are two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1) an examination to determine whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service, see Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol., 1992 Cum.Supp.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 8-207; or (2) “ ‘an examination of a juror ... conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of [10]*10the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.’ ”
Id. at 35-36, 633 A.2d at 871-72, quoting Bedford, 317 Md. at 671, 566 A.2d at 117 (quoting Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343 (1946)). Thus, we said in Hill, 339 Md. at 279, 661 A.2d at 1166 (quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959), in turn quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952)):
Undergirding the voir dire procedure and, hence, informing the trial court’s exercise of discretion regarding the conduct of the voir dire, is a single, primary, and overriding principle or purpose: “to ascertain ‘the existence of cause for disqualification.’ ”
In so doing, the questions should focus on issues particular to the defendant’s case so that biases directly related to the crime, the witnesses, or the defendant may be uncovered.8 See Alexander v. R.D. Grier & Sons Co. Inc., 181 Md. 415, 419, 30 A.2d 757, 758 (1943), in which the trial court’s refusal to ask “whether or not [jurors] or any of their immediate family [were assessables] in the Keystone Indemnity Exchange,” where the issue at trial was the enforcement of an assessment against a subscriber by Keystone and the juror’s financial interest “would theoretically incline him in favor of recovery of a verdict for the liquidator,” was held to be an abuse of discretion, the question being directed at determining whether any juror was biased or prejudiced. See also Mor-[11]*11ford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258, 70 S.Ct. 586, 94 L.Ed. 815 (1950) (finding that where panel from which the jury was selected consisted of almost entirely government employees, refusal to allow questions pertaining to possible influence of the federal loyalty oath was error). Indeed, as we held in Bedford, “any circumstances which may reasonably be regarded as rendering a person unfit for jury service may be made the subject of questions and a challenge for cause.” 317 Md. at 671, 566 A.2d at 117, quoting Corens v. State, 185 Md. at 564, 45 A.2d at 343. In addition, we have also held that,
“If there is any likelihood that some prejudices in the jurors’ mind which will even subconsciously affect his decision of the case, the party who may be adversely affected should be permitted questions designed to uncover that prejudice. This is particularly true with reference to the defendant in a criminal case. Otherwise, the right of trial by an impartial jury guaranteed to him ... might well be impaired----“
Bedford, 317 Md. at 671, 566 A.2d at 117; quoting Brown v. State, 220 Md. 29, 35, 150 A.2d 895, 897-98 (1959), quoting State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 142, 120 A.2d 152, 154 (1956).
Contrary to the State’s suggestion, the critical issues in this case are not simply whether the trial court abused its discretion in electing to ask the questions involved in the present case in compound form and to the venire at large, the form of the questions asked, or even the scope of voir dire. Nor has it to do only with the principles that underlie or drive the voir dire process. There is an issue that is much more basic and fundamental. It relates to the role of the trial judge in the jury selection process and, perhaps most important, how the principles that are the “very end and aim,” Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), of the voir dire procedure are to be applied. And the issue this case presents is not new.
Although not the central issue in that case, it was a part of the debate in which this Court engaged in Davis. There, where the scope of the voir dire examination was at issue, this [12]*12Court recognized the proper focus of voir dire as being “on the venire person’s state of mind, and whethér there is some bias, prejudice, or preconception,” 333 Md. at 37, 633 A.2d at 872. It also noted the necessity that the inquiry be directed toward determining “the venire person’s ability to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented.” Id. The majority of this Court, in that case, holding that it was not an abuse of discretion,, upheld the trial court’s refusal to ask the venire panel, in addition to the six omnibus questions it had already propounded, one further question, whether any member of the venire or a close friend or relative, was, or had been, a member of the law enforcement community. The refusal was premised on its conclusion that the inquiry “[did] not relate to cause for disqualification,” id. at 36, 633 A.2d at 872, the Court pointing out that an affirmative answer to the question would not have established such cause. Id. at 36-37, 633 A.2d at 872. The majority reasoned further:
“First, the fact that a prospective juror is or was a member of a law enforcement body does not automatically disqualify that venire person. See Harris v. State, 82 Md.App. 450, 470, 572 A.2d 573, 583 (trial judge did not err when he failed to strike former state trooper for cause where trooper indicated that he was able to render fair and impartial judgment despite earlier employment), cert. denied, 320 Md. 800, 580 A.2d 218 (1990). Likewise, the mere fact that a prospective juror is related to or associated with members of the law enforcement community does not constitute cause for disqualification.. Goldstein v. State, 220 Md. 39, 45, 150 A.2d 900, 904 (1959); Shifflett v. State, 80 Md.App. 151, 156, 560 A.2d 587, 589 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, 319 Md. 275, 572 A.2d 167 (1990); Baker v. State, 3 Md.App. 251, 254, 238 A.2d 561, 564 (1968). In general, the professional, vocational, or social status of a prospective juror is not a disppsitive factor establishing cause to disqualify. Rather, the proper focus is on the venire person’s state of mind, and whether there is some bias, prejudice, or preconception. Short of those instances where there is a demonstrably strong correlation between the status in question and a [13]*13mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification, mere status or acquaintance is insufficient to establish cause for disqualification of a prospective juror. The fact that a prospective juror is employed as, related to, or associated with a law enforcement officer does not establish that the prospective juror has any undue bias or prejudice that will prevent that person from fairly and impartially determining the matter before them. See Goldstein, 220 Md. at 44-45, 150 A.2d at 904. The inquiry must instead focus on the venire person’s ability to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented.”
Id. at 37, 633 A.2d at 872.
Although the dissenting opinion in that case disagreed, that disagreement did not relate to the principles governing jury voir dire. Rather, the majority and the dissent “part[ed] company only on the question of whether the inquiry sought to be made ... was for the purpose of ascertaining ‘the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose.’ ” Id. at 57, 633 A.2d at 882 (Bell, J. dissenting), quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959) (quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952)). It argued that the majority misapplied the relevant principles and, indeed, misapprehended the trial court’s role in the voir dire process. This Court has subsequently recognized, explicitly, what the dissent in Davis posited, that the impaneling of a fair and impartial jury is “[t]he task of the trial judge.” Boyd, 341 Md. at 436, 671 A.2d at 35.
To be sure, Maryland has adopted, and continues to adhere to, limited voir dire. See Davis, 333 Md. at 40-46, 633 A.2d at 873-74. It is also well settled that the trial court has broad discretion in the conduct of voir dire, most especially with regard to the scope and the form of the questions propounded, see Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 293, 696 A.2d 443, 463 (1997); Perry v. State, 344 Md. 204, 218, 686 A.2d 274, 280 (1996); Boyd, 341 Md. at 436, 671 A.2d at 35; Hill, 339 Md. at 279, 661 A.2d at 1166; Davis, 333 Md. at 34, 633 A.2d at 870-71, and that it need not make any particular inquiry of the prospective jurors unless that inquiry is directed toward re[14]*14vealing cause for disqualification. See Burch, 346 Md. at 293, 696 A.2d at 463; Davis, 333 Md. at 34-35, 633 A.2d at 871, quoting McGee, 219 Md. at 58-59, 146 A.2d at 196 (“Questions not directed to a specific ground for disqualification but which are speculative, inquisitorial, catechising or ‘fishing, asked in the aid of deciding on peremptory challenges, may be refused in the discretion of the court, even though it would not have been error to have asked them.”). As Davis, and now this case, demonstrate, there may be, and often is, a conflict between keeping the voir dire process limited and the goal of ferreting out cause for disqualification. This case presents a good example: the trial judge recognized the relevance of the questions, that they were designed to uncover prejudice that would, if not discovered, deny the petitioner a fair trial. Expediency and the perceived need to limit the process, however, led the court to find a way to avoid examination of each affected venire person as -to the admittedly relevant matters and allow each such person to make his or her own call as to his or her qualification to serve.
The broad discretion of the trial court and the rigidity of the limited voir dire process are tempered by the importance and preeminence of the right to a fair and impartial jury and the need to ensure that one is impaneled. Thus, we have made clear that “this Court will prescribe the juror voir dire process ... as is necessary ... to uncover disqualifying bias.” Boyd, 341 Md. at 433, 671 A.2d at 34.
Because the task of the trial judge is to impanel a fair and impartial jury and, for the achievement of that purpose, he or she has been entrusted with broad discretion in the conduct of voir dire, it is clear that it is the trial judge that controls the process: the trial judge determines the content and scope of the questions on voir dire; how voir dire will be conducted, i.e. whether, and when, to allow counsel to ask follow-up questions; and whether, and when, a prospective juror is dismissed for cause. It follows, therefore, that it is the trial judge that must decide whether, and when, cause for disqualification exists for any particular venire person. That is not a position occupied, or a decision to be made, by either the venire or the [15]*15individual venire persons. In short, the trial judge is the focal point in the process.
As the focal point in the process, the trial judge’s “predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be discerned from an appellate record.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429, 105 S.Ct. 844, 855, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 855 (1985). The Supreme Court in Witt noted explicitly that “excluding prospective capital sentencing jurors because of their opposition to capital punishment is no different from excluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which result in bias.... ” Id. Thus, voir dire, whether in a capital case or in the more usual situation, to be meaningful, must uncover more than “the jurors” bottom line conclusions [to broad questions], which do not in themselves reveal automatically disqualifying biases as to their ability fairly and accurately to decide the case, and, indeed, which do not elucidate the bases for those conclusions.... ” Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 23, 595 A.2d 448, 459 (1991).
Bias is a question of fact. See Davis, 333 Md. at 38, 633 A.2d at 873 (quoting Borman v. State, 1 Md.App. 276, 279, 229 A.2d 440, 441-42 (1967))(“ ‘[B]ias on the part of prospective jurors will never be presumed, and the challenging party bears the burden of presenting facts ... which would give rise to a showing of actual prejudice.’ ”). See Deinhardt v. State, 29 Md.App. 391, 397-98, 348 A.2d 286, 290 (1975) (noting that if the court had permitted the cross-examination, the prosecutrix’s answers may have persuaded the court that the witness was not credible). Confession by a venire person is one way of establishing bias, but it is not the only way; “the strike for cause process encompasses the situation where the motion to strike is made on the basis of information developed during the voir dire process, not simply where the prospective juror admits an inability to be fair and impartial.” Davis, 333 Md. at 63, 633 A.2d at 885 (Bell, J. dissenting). Evidence of bias may be offered on the basis of which the trial court could find its existence as a matter of fact. Also, it is well established that, where there are similarities between the juror’s experi-[16]*16enees and the facts on trial, the juror’s bias may be presumed. See Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir.1992) (“Courts have presumed bias in cases where the prospective juror has been the victim of a crime or has experienced a situation similar to the one at issue in the trial.”); Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir.1991) (determining that bias presumed where juror who was victim of spousal abuse sat in a murder trial and the defendant’s defense was battered wife syndrome); United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir.1979) (concluding that bias presumed where juror’s sons were heroin users and in the case being tried defendants were charged with distributing heroin); United States ex rel. De Vita v. McCorkle, 248 F.2d 1, 8 (3rd Cir.1957) (finding that in a robbery case bias presumed where juror was a victim of robbery).
The majority opinion in Davis made the point, admitting an experience or an association does not automatically disqualify the venire person.9 333 Md. at 35, 633 A.2d at 872. That is, of course, true. Indeed, the dissenting opinion in that case admitted as much. It also is true, however, that, while not dispositive of a venire person’s qualification to serve, as the dissent in Davis pointed out, the venire person’s professional, vocational, or social status “does tend to prove bias; that a venire person has been, or is, a member of the group to which the principal witness for the State belongs is relevant to the determination of that person’s partiality or bias.” 333 Md. at 61, 633 A.2d at 884 (Bell, J., dissenting). The same [17]*17reasoning applies when the venire person has had certain experiences akin to those at issue in this case.
Unlike the trial judge in Davis, as previously noted, the trial judge in this case apparently recognized the relevance of the experiences and associations to the venire persons’ qualification to serve on the jury. Id. Thus, rather than inquiring into the prospective juror’s mind set in a vacuum, the trial judge, presumably understanding that “it is the correlation between the juror’s status and his or her state of mind that is dispositive when the venire person’s status [or experience] is relevant to his or her bias,” id., linked the question whether the venire person could be fair and impartial with the venire person’s status or experience.
The trial judge’s mistake was that he failed to appreciate that, should there be a challenge, he had the responsibility to decide, based upon the circumstances then existing, i.e. “in addition to the venire person’s bottom line conclusion in that regard, as reflected in the answers he or she gives, the character and duration of the position, the venire person’s demeanor, and any and all other relevant circumstances,” id., or, in other words, whether any of the venire persons occupying the questioned status or having the questioned experiences should be discharged for cause, or whether “a demonstrably strong correlation [exists] between the status [or experience] in question and a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification.” Id. Because he did not require an answer to be given to the question as to the existence of the status or experience unless accompanied by a statement of partiality, the trial judge was precluded from discharging his responsibility, i.e. exercising discretion, and, at the same time, the petitioner was denied the opportunity to discover and challenge venire persons who might be biased.
The effect on the petitioner is particularly egregious: as we have seen, the party who would challenge a venire person for cause has the burden of presenting facts demonstrating the disqualification. As already pointed out, “the strike for cause process encompasses the situation where the motion to strike is made on the basis of information developed during the voir [18]*18dire process, not simply where the prospective juror admits an inability to be fair and impartial.” 333 Md. at 63, 633 A.2d at 885 (Bell, J., dissenting). Without adequate voir dire, there simply can be no such showing. The ability to challenge for cause is empty indeed if no way is provided for developing or having access to relevant information. What the dissent said in Davis applies just as forcibly to the case sub judiee:
“When the inquiries that constitute proper voir dire are restrictively interpreted, so that the voir dire process does not produce any information other than that which is automatically disqualifying, the defendant may be deprived of the right to a fair and impartial jury; he or she is completely at the mercy of the good faith, objectivity, and astuteness of the individual venirepersons. I believe that it is an abuse of discretion for the court to so restrict the voir dire process.”
Id.
The State emphasizes the fact that much of the input with respect to the process will come from the prospective jurors themselves and often will, of necessity, represent those persons’ self-assessment. It submits that prospective juror sincerity and veracity must, and should, be accepted as a matter of course by the parties and the court alike. We are not persuaded. Indeed, if the State’s argument is correct, then all that is needed to, or could, be done is rely on the venire to be truthful and sincere. The dissent in Davis got it right when it pointed out:
“Under the rationale underlying the majority’s view of voir dire, taken to its logical conclusion, all that would be necessary to empanel a legally sufficient jury is that the trial court ask the prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. Only those jurors who confessed that they could not would, or could, be challenged for cause. Because the voir dire has not produced any other information, the others would be absolutely insulated from challenge.”
333 Md. at 63, 633 A.2d at 885 (Bell, J. dissenting).
It is true, of course, that when, on voir dire, attitudes are the subject of the inquiry, in the usual case, other than its [19]*19observation of the venire persons, the venire person’s answers will be all that the court will have. Thus, those statements necessarily will play an important role in the court’s decision-making process. That, however, does not mean that the court is bound by the answers or is relieved of its responsibility to make the ultimate decision as to the effect of an answer or of a prospective juror’s fitness to serve. Where a prospective juror is challenged on the basis of his or her statement of partiality (although it is difficult, of course, to conceive of a situation in which a party will undertake to dispute a venire person’s confession of partiality), it is still the trial court that must resolve the matter. When the venire person’s attitudes are the subject of inquiry, and a dispute arises, that becomes a factual matter — ordinarily one involving credibility as to whether the venire person actually holds that attitude — which the court is required to resolve to the same extent as if the issue involved concrete factual matters such as associations and statuses. The court simply can not rely merely on what the venire person says. Moreover, the court is well equipped to make such factual determinations and, in fact, is required to do so. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 854, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 854 (1985) (noting that the voir dire strike for cause process involves credibility determinations); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770, 131 L.Ed.2d 834, 843 (1995) (stating that in determining for cause strike, trial court will discard implausible or fantastic justifications).
This Court’s opinion in Bowie is not to the contrary. There, the trial court questioned prospective jurors as follows:
“Ladies and gentlemen, the State of Maryland has filed a request before the court that if found guilty, Mr. Damon Bowie be put to death. Is there any member of the prospective jury panel who has any feelings whatsoever about such a request, and I don’t care which way you feel about it, that it would interfere with your ability to fairly and truly judge this matter based only on the evidence before the court? Said another way, is there anybody in this room who has such feelings about the death penalty one [20]*20way or the other that it would affect you emotionally or to the extent that it would override your ability to judge this matter based only on the evidence brought out in the courtroom and the instructions of the court to you and the application of that evidence to law? If you have a positive response, please stand in place.”
Id. at 16, 595 A.2d at 455.
The appellant argued, and we agreed, that the question was substantively and procedurally inadequate for failure to identify the state of mind necessary for striking a venire person for cause and to determine whether the prospective jurors were able to obey instructions given by the court in spite of their personal views. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 841 (1985), quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980) (“Whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ”). We concluded:
Where, as here, the trial court excuses prospective jurors, whether for predisposition in favor of, or against, the death penalty, on the basis of broad questions calling for the jurors’ bottom line conclusions, which do not in themselves reveal automatically disqualifying biases as to their ability fairly and accurately to decide the case, and, indeed, which do not elucidate the bases for those conclusions, the trial court has not made a factual determination as contemplated by Witt, to which we must defer.
Bowie at 23-24, 595 A.2d at 459.
What we said in Bowie certainly does not demonstrate that the questions as proposed by the petitioner in this case, unsupplemented by the court, were substantively and procedurally inadequate. But, in any event, the petitioner does not claim that the answer to his questions would result in automatic disqualification; rather, he simply argues that he should have had the benefit of the information that the questions would elicit so that, if warranted, he could have made chai-[21]*21lenges for cause, which the trial judge would have been required to address.
By upholding a voir dire inquiry in which a venire person is required to respond only if his or her answer is in the affirmative to both parts of a question directed at discovering the venire persons’ experiences and associations and their effect on that venire person’s qualification to serve as a juror, and producing information only about those who respond, the holding of the Court of Special Appeals endorses a voir dire process that allows, if not requires, the individual venire person to decide his or her ability to be fair and impartial. Moreover, in those cases where the venire person has had the questioned experience or association, but believes he or she can be fair, the procedure followed in this case shifts from the trial judge to the venire responsibility to decide juror bias. Without information bearing on the relevant experiences or associations of the affected individual venire persons who were not required to respond, the court simply does not have the ability, and, therefore, is unable to evaluate whether such persons are capable of conducting themselves impartially. Moreover, the petitioner is deprived of the ability to challenge any of those persons for cause. Rather than advancing the purpose of voir dire, the form of the challenged inquiries in this case distorts and frustrates it.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY.