Turner v. Murray

476 U.S. 28, 106 S. Ct. 1683, 90 L. Ed. 2d 27, 1986 U.S. LEXIS 148, 54 U.S.L.W. 4411

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: April 30, 1986
• Docket: 84-6646
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice White

announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and III, and an opinion with respect to Parts II and IV, in which Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, and Justice O’Connor join.

Petitioner is a black man sentenced to death for the murder of a white storekeeper. The question presented is whether the trial judge committed reversible error at voir dire by refusing petitioner’s request to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice.

I

On July 12, 1978, petitioner entered a jewelry store in Franklin, Virginia, armed with a sáwed-off shotgun. He demanded that the proprietor, W. Jack Smith, Jr., put jewelry and money from the cash register into some jewelry bags. Smith complied with petitioner’s demand, but triggered a silent alarm, alerting the Police Department. When Alan Bain, a police officer, arrived to inquire about the alarm, petitioner surprised him and forced him to surrender his revolver.

Having learned that Smith had triggered a silent alarm, petitioner became agitated. He fired toward the rear wall of the store and stated that if he saw or heard any more police officers, he was going to start killing those in the store.¹ When a police siren sounded, petitioner walked to where Smith was stationed behind a counter and without warning shot him in the head with Bain’s pistol, wounding Smith and causing him to slump incapacitated to the floor.

Officer Bain attempted to calm petitioner, promising to take him anywhere he wanted to go and asking him not to shoot again. Petitioner angrily replied that he was going to kill Smith for “snitching,” and fired two pistol shots into Smith’s chest, fatally wounding him. As petitioner turned away from shooting Smith, Bain was able to disarm him and place him under arrest.

A Southampton County, Virginia, grand jury indicted petitioner on charges of capital murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a murder, and possession of a sawed-off shotgun in the commission of a robbery. Petitioner requested and was granted a change of venue to Northampton County, Virginia, a rural county some 80 miles from the location of the murder.

Prior to the commencement of voir dire, petitioner’s counsel submitted to the trial judge a list of proposed questions, including the following:

“‘The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro race. The victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian. Will these facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence?’” Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 522, n. 8, 273 S. E. 2d 36, 42, n. 8 (1980).

The judge declined to ask this question, stating that it “has been ruled on by the Supreme Court.”² App. 15. The judge did ask the venire, who were questioned in groups of five in petitioner’s presence, whether any person was aware of any reason why he could not render a fair and impartial verdict, to which all answered “no.” Id., at 17, 78. At the time the question was asked, the prospective jurors had no way of knowing that the murder victim was white.

The jury that was empaneled, which consisted of eight whites and four blacks, convicted petitioner on all of the charges against him. Id., at 97 and Addendum. After a separate sentencing hearing on the capital charge, the jury recommended that petitioner be sentenced to death, a recommendation the trial judge accepted. Id., at 18, 19.

Petitioner appealed his death sentence to the Virginia Supreme Court. Among other points, he argued that the trial judge deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury by refusing to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument. Relying on our decision in Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589 (1976), the court stated that a trial judge’s refusal to ask prospective jurors about their racial attitudes, while perhaps not the wisest decision as a matter of policy, is not constitutionally objectionable in the absence of factors akin to those in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973).³ Turner v. Commonwealth, supra, at 523, 273 S. E. . The court held that “[t]he mere fact that a defendant is black and that a victim is white does not constitutionally mandate ... an inquiry [into racial prejudice].” Ibid.4

Having failed in his direct appeal, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. App. 97. Again he argued without success that the trial judge’s refusal to ask prospective jurors about their racial attitudes deprived him of his right to a fair trial. Id., at 102-104. The District Court noted that in Ristaino, supra, which involved a crime of interracial violence,⁵ we held that inquiry into racial prejudice at voir dire was not constitutionally required because the facts of the case “ ‘did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the defendant’s] trial.’” App. 103 (quoting 424 U. S., at 598). The court found the present case like Ristaino and unlike Ham in that “racial issues [are] not ‘inextricably bound up with the facts at trial.’” App. 103.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief for petitioner. Turner v. Bass, 753 F. 2d 342 (1985). Like the Virginia Supreme Court and the District Court, the Fourth Circuit found no “special circumstances” in this case analogous to those in Ham. The court rejected the idea that “the nature of the crime or punishment itself is ... a special circumstance.” 753 F. 2d, at 345. Relying on Ristaino, the court likewise found no special circumstance in the fact that petitioner is black and his victim white.⁶

We granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision that petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to have potential jurors questioned concerning racial prejudice. 471 U. S. 1098 (1985). We reverse.

II

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion correctly states the analytical framework for evaluating petitioner’s argument: “The broad inquiry in each case must be . . . whether under all of the circumstances presented there was a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice, the jurors would not be indifferent as [they stand] unsworne.” 753 F. 2d, at 345-346 (internal quotation omitted). The Fourth Circuit was correct, too, in holding that under Ristaino the mere fact that petitioner is black and his victim white does not constitute a “special circumstance” of constitutional proportions. What sets this case apart from Ristaino, however, is that in addition to petitioner’s being accused of a crime against a white victim, the crime charged was a capital offense.

In a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury, the jury is called upon to make a “highly subjective, ‘unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves.’” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 340, n. 7 (1985) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)). The Virginia statute under which petitioner was sentenced is instructive of the kinds of judgments a capital sentencing jury-must make. First, in order to consider the death penalty, a Virginia jury must find either that the defendant is likely to commit future violent crimes or that his crime was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim.” Va. Code §19.2-264.2 (1983). Second, the jury must consider any mitigating evidence offered by the defendant. Mitigating evidence may include, but is not limited to, facts tending to show that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional or mental disturbance, or that at the time of the crime the defendant’s capacity “to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired.” § 19.2-262.4(B). Finally, even if the jury has found an aggravating factor, and irrespective of whether mitigating evidence has been offered, the jury has discretion not to recommend the death sentence, in which case it may not be imposed. § 19.2-264.2.

Virginia’s death-penalty statute gives the jury greater discretion than other systems which we have upheld against constitutional challenge. See, e. g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262 (1976). However, our cases establish that every capital sentencer must be free to weigh relevant mitigating evidence before deciding whether to impose the death penalty, see, e. g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 597-609 (1978) (plurality opinion), and that in the end it is the jury that must make the difficult, individualized judgment as to whether the defendant deserves the sentence of death.

Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected. On the facts of this ease, a juror who believes that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating factors specified under Virginia law. Such a juror might also be less favorably inclined toward petitioner’s evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror’s decision in this case. Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner’s crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty.⁷

The risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence. “The Court, as well as the separate opinions of a majority of the individual Justices, has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.” California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 998-999 (1983). We have struck down capital sentences when we found that the circumstances under which they were imposed “created an unacceptable risk that ‘the death penalty [may have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously’ or through ‘whim . . . or mistake.’” Caldwell, supra, at 343 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citation omitted). In the present case, we find the risk that racial prejudice may have infected petitioner’s capital sentencing unacceptable in light of the ease with which that risk could have been minimized.⁸ By refusing to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice, the trial judge failed to adequately protect petitioner’s constitutional right to an impartial jury.⁹

Ill

We hold that a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.¹⁰ The rule we propose is minimally intrusive; as in other cases involving “special circumstances,” the trial judge retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on the subject, including the decision whether to question the venire individually or collectively. See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S., at 527. Also, a defendant cannot complain of a judge’s failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry.

IV

The inadequacy of voir dire in this case requires that petitioner’s death sentence be vacated. It is not necessary, however, that he be retried on the issue of guilt. Our judgment in this case is that there was an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice infecting the capital sentencing proceeding. This judgment is based on a conjunction of three factors: the fact that the crime charged involved interracial violence, the broad discretion given the jury at the death-penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing in a capital case.¹¹ At the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the jury had no greater discretion than it would have had if the crime charged had been noncapital murder. Thus, with respect to the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, we find this case to be indistinguishable from Ristaino, to which we continue to adhere.¹² See n. 5, supra.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment.

1 In addition to Smith and Bain, a store employee and two customers were present at this time.

2 Whether the trial judge was referring to this Court’s decision in Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589 (1976), or to a decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, is unclear.

3 In Ham, a young black man known in his small South Carolina hometown as a civil rights activist was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana. We held that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to honor Ham’s request to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice. In Ristaino, supra, we specified the factors which mandated an inquiry into racial prejudice in Ham:

“Ham’s defense was that he had been framed because of his civil rights activities. His prominence in the community as a civil rights activist, if not already known to veniremen, inevitably would have been revealed to the members of the jury in the course of his presentation of that defense. Racial issues therefore were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial. Further, Ham’s reputation as a civil rights activist and the defense he interposed were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of the jury might harbor.” 424 U. S., at 596-597.

4 The court also rejected petitioner’s reliance on a statistical study showing that black defendants who kill white victims are sentenced to death with disproportionate frequency. The court stated that the study, which is based on statistics compiled in other States, has little utility in establishing the potential for racial prejudice in Virginia. 221 Va., at 523, n. 9, 273 S. E. 2d, at 42, n. 9.

5 In Ristaino, the defendant was one of three black men charged with assaulting a white security guard with intent to murder him. The assault occurred in the course of a robbery. 424 U. S., at 590.

6 To the suggestion that it is a special circumstance that black murderers whose victims are white are executed with disproportionate frequency, the court responded by quoting our opinion in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U. S. 182 (1981), for the proposition that “‘[t]here is no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups.’” 753 F. 2d, at 345 (quoting 451 U. S., at 190).

7 In referring to the facts of petitioner’s crime, we do not retreat from our holding in Ristaino. The fact of interracial violence alone is not a “special circumstance” entitling the defendant to have prospective jurors questioned about racial prejudice. It should be clear, though, that our holding in Ristaino was not based on a blind belief that the facts presented in that case could not evoke racial prejudice. As we stated in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U. S., at 192: “It remains an unfortunate fact in our society that violent crimes perpetrated against members of other racial or ethnic groups often raise [a reasonable possibility that racial prejudice would influence the jury].” Ristaino does not condone this possibility, but simply leaves it to the trial judge’s discretion to decide what measures to take in screening out racial prejudice, absent a showing of “significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the] trial.” 424 U. S., at 598.

8 Justice Powell’s dissent takes issue with what he terms the “singularly unwise and unjustified presumption that capital jurors harbor latent racial bias.” Post, at 53. This remark fails to distinguish between our recognition that jurors in a capital case may harbor racial bias, and the presumption, which we do not make, that any particular capital jurors are in fact racially prejudiced. Justice Powell implicitly recognizes such a distinction, but only when it suits his purposes; thus, he does not say that in a case like Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973), the jurors are presumed to be prejudiced, but rather that there is “an unacceptable risk that racial prejudice will ‘distort the trial.’ ” Post, at 50.

Once rhetoric is put aside, it is plain that there is some risk of racial prejudice influencing a jury whenever there is a crime involving interracial violence, see n. 7, supra; the only question is at what point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable. Notwithstanding Justice Powell’s attempt to minimize the significance of the discretion entrusted to the jury at a capital sentencing hearing, post, at 50-52, we are convinced that such discretion gives greater opportunity for racial prejudice to operate than is present when the jury is restricted to factfinding. This, together with the special seriousness with which we view the risk of racial prejudice influencing a capital sentencing decision, is what distinguishes this case from Ristaino.

9 The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and by principles of due process. Ristaino, 424 U. S., at 595, n. 6.

10 Justice Powell contends that inquiry into racial prejudice “in the absence of circumstances that make clear a need for it could well have the negative effect of suggesting to the jurors that race somehow is relevant to the case.” Post, at 48-49, n. 5. Whether such a concern is purely chimerical or not is a decision we leave up to a capital defendant’s counsel. Should defendant’s counsel decline to request voir dire on the subject of racial prejudice, we in no way require or suggest that the judge broach the topic sua sponte.

11 We find it unnecessary to evaluate the statistical studies which petitioner has introduced in support of the proposition that black defendants who kill whites are executed with disproportionate frequency.

12 Justice Brennan incorrectly reads into our opinion a suggestion that “the constitutional entitlement to an impartial jury attaches only at the sentencing phase. ” Post, at 43. The real question is not whether there is a constitutional right to an impartial jury throughout a criminal trial, see n. 9, swpra, but what prophylactic rules the Constitution imposes on the States in furtherance of that right. What we held in Ristaino, and reaffirm today, is that absent'“special circumstances” that create a particularly compelling need to inquire into racial prejudice, the Constitution leaves the conduct of voir dire to the sound discretion of state trial judges.

The implication of Justice Brennan’s opinion is that every crime of interracial violence is a “special circumstance.” Over Justice Brennan’s dissent, however, Ristaino squarely rejected this approach. Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Justice Brennan’s view that “the opportunity for racial bias to taint the jury process is . . . equally a factor at the guilt [and sentencing] phase[s] of a bifurcated capital trial.” Post, at 41. As we see it, the risk of racial bias at sentencing hearings is of an entirely different order, because the decisions that sentencing jurors must make involve far more subjective judgments than when they are deciding guilt or innocence.