Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores

District Court, D. New Hampshire·Decided October 8, 1997·No. CV-95-534-SD·Published

Opinion

Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores CV-95-534-SD 10/08/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

James Desilets, et al v. Civil No. 95-534-SD Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

O R D E R

This complaint seeks recovery of damages for alleged violations of federal, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., and state. Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 570-A, "wiretap" laws. Plaintiffs allege that in August of 1995, while employed at defendant's store in Claremont, New Hampshire, certain of their private oral conversations were intercepted on secreted audiotape recorders placed upon the premises by other employees of defendant.

Trial of this action is scheduled to commence with jury selection on October 21, 1997. This order addresses the issues raised by certain pretrial motions.1

1The order does not address requests for voir dire questions, objections to exhibits or instructions, nor the most recently filed (on October 6, 1997) motion in limine of the defendant. The court will allow some of the voir dire at trial and will take up objections to exhibits as exhibits are proffered, and objections to instructions at the close of the trial. The most recent motion in limine must await a response from plaintiffs' counsel.

1. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence with Respect to Plaintiffs' Claims for Emotional Distress Damages Barred Under New Hampshire RSA 281-A, document 19 One of the four plaintiffs, James Desilets, makes claim here for recovery of psychological damages. Defendant seeks to bar evidence concerning this claim, and plaintiffs object, contending that the complaint refers to intentional torts and also contending that the federal statute preempts any ruling to the contrary. Document 41.

This court has previously held that the exclusivity provision of the New Hampshire workers' compensation law bars both intentional and nonintentional claims for emotional distress, which gualifies as a "personal injury." Miller v. CBC Cos., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1054, 1068 (D.N.H. 1995); see Censullo v. Brenka Video, 989 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1993). And with respect to the claim of preemption, which is based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,2 it is, of course, a presumption, applicable in both express and implied preemption analyses, that state regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated under that Supremacy Clause. Phillip

2Article VI of the Constitution provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

Morris, Inc., et al v. L. Scott Harshbarqer, Attorney General, et al, Nos. 97-8022, 8023, slip op. at 23-24 (1st Cir. Aug. 18, 1997). Clearly, the workers' compensation law of New Hampshire and interpretations thereof concern matters related to health and safety of the working population.

Accordingly, the court finds itself unpersuaded by the authorities upon which plaintiffs rely and herewith grants the motion. Counsel for all parties are instructed that no attempt is to be made and no evidence is to be introduced concerning any claim of psychological damages sustained by plaintiff James Desilets, as the court finds that any such claim is barred by the provisions of the workers' compensation law of New Hampshire, RSA 2 81-A.

2. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiff Ricky Ordwav, document 23 Contending that plaintiff Ricky Ordway admitted in deposition that he could not hear his recorded voice on the three audiotapes produced by defendant, the defendant moves to bar Ordway's claims. Plaintiff Ordway objects. Document 44.

Plaintiff has produced for the court evidence which indicates that more than the three tapes currently available were

made,3 and the law is clear that a plaintiff need only show interception of communication, not that particular conversations were intercepted. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir. 1990) (Edmondson, J., concurring). Because the intentional tort of wiretapping is obviously one which by its very nature is unknown to the plaintiff, Awbrev v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea C o ., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (N.D. G a . 1980), direct evidence may well not have been available based on the stealthiness of the invasion, and, accordingly, a wiretapping claim may be established by means of circumstantial evidence. Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 1987) .

It follows that, as plaintiff Ordway has sufficient circumstantial evidence to give rise to a guestion of fact for the jury, the defendant's motion to dismiss his claim must be and it is herewith denied.

3A statement of Mike Kirkpatrick, the store manager, indicates his knowledge of at least two additional tapings. Depositions of other witnesses who were employed at relevant times at the Claremont store confirm the location of a tape recorder at or near the customer service desk. Plaintiff himself will testify as to his presence at or near the various locations at which the tape recorders were installed.

3. Defendant's Motion in Limine re: Calculation of Statutory Damages Under the Federal Wiretap Statute, document 24 By virtue of this motion, defendant seeks to have the court rule that each plaintiff who is able to establish a right to civil damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 may recover at most $10,000, regardless of whether more than one of the different types of violations of the statute occurred. Plaintiffs object. Document 40 .

It has been held in this circuit that under the federal wiretap statute "the disclosure and/or use of information obtained through a wrongful invasion amounts to a separate injury prohibited by statute, and makes a person subjected to such a disclosure and/or use 'a victim, once again, of a federal crime.'" Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 290 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing and guoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 52 (1972)). Accordingly, although defendant strives gallantly to distinguish them, the rulings in Romano v. Terdik, 939 F. Supp. 144, 150 (D. Conn. 1996) and Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F. Supp. 283, 284-85 (D.P.R. 1993), are correct and, with respect to the recovery of damages under the federal statute, $10,000 may be awarded each plaintiff for interception and $10,000 for disclosure because they are considered two separate violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Of course, the number of conversations that

are intercepted or the number of disclosures is irrelevant and the statutory amount applies, regardless of the number of interceptions or uses.

The motion must be and accordingly is herewith denied.

4. Defendant's Motion in Limine Reguestinq the Court to Rule that Plaintiffs Can Recover Damages Under the State or Federal Statute, But Not Both, document 25 This motion seeks a ruling from the court that the remedy of each plaintiff will be either actual damages as proven or the federal statutory measure. The motion further seeks to reguire election by plaintiffs prior to trial as to which of these remedies they will seek. Plaintiffs object. Document 42.

The record before the court will not allow it to rule favorably on this motion. There is no law known to the court, and the parties cite none, that reguires an order of election such as is here sought by the defendant. Accordingly, the motion is denied. The court, of course, will take all efforts necessary to avoid duplication of damages if such are awarded to any of the plaintiffs.

5. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Its Actions After Discovery of the Audiotapes Except as Related to Plaintiffs' Claims of "Interception or Use of the Contents", document 2 6 The audiotapes which are the focus of this litigation were discovered on August 23, 1995. Defendant suggests that evidence of certain actions taken by it after that date should be barred for irrelevance or unfair prejudice or because they concern subseguent remedial measures. Plaintiffs object. Document 45.

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Related

Gelbard v. United States
408 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Williams v. Poulos
11 F.3d 271 (First Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Ralph H. Carty
993 F.2d 1005 (First Circuit, 1993)
Miller v. CBC Companies, Inc.
908 F. Supp. 1054 (D. New Hampshire, 1995)
Romano v. Terdik
939 F. Supp. 144 (D. Connecticut, 1996)
Menda Biton v. Menda
812 F. Supp. 283 (D. Puerto Rico, 1993)
Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., Inc.
505 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Georgia, 1980)
Scutieri v. Paige
808 F.2d 785 (Eleventh Circuit, 1987)