Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores CV-95-534-SD 10/08/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
James Desilets, et al
v. Civil No. 95-534-SD
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
O R D E R
This complaint seeks recovery of damages for alleged
violations of federal, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., and state.
Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 570-A, "wiretap" laws.
Plaintiffs allege that in August of 1995, while employed at
defendant's store in Claremont, New Hampshire, certain of their
private oral conversations were intercepted on secreted audiotape
recorders placed upon the premises by other employees of
defendant.
Trial of this action is scheduled to commence with jury
selection on October 21, 1997. This order addresses the issues
raised by certain pretrial motions.1
1The order does not address requests for voir dire questions, objections to exhibits or instructions, nor the most recently filed (on October 6, 1997) motion in limine of the defendant. The court will allow some of the voir dire at trial and will take up objections to exhibits as exhibits are proffered, and objections to instructions at the close of the trial. The most recent motion in limine must await a response from plaintiffs' counsel. 1. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence with Respect
to Plaintiffs' Claims for Emotional Distress Damages Barred Under
New Hampshire RSA 281-A, document 19
One of the four plaintiffs, James Desilets, makes claim here
for recovery of psychological damages. Defendant seeks to bar
evidence concerning this claim, and plaintiffs object, contending
that the complaint refers to intentional torts and also
contending that the federal statute preempts any ruling to the
contrary. Document 41.
This court has previously held that the exclusivity
provision of the New Hampshire workers' compensation law bars
both intentional and nonintentional claims for emotional
distress, which gualifies as a "personal injury." Miller v. CBC
Cos., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1054, 1068 (D.N.H. 1995); see Censullo
v. Brenka Video, 989 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1993). And with
respect to the claim of preemption, which is based on the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,2 it is, of course, a
presumption, applicable in both express and implied preemption
analyses, that state regulation of matters related to health and
safety is not invalidated under that Supremacy Clause. Phillip
2Article VI of the Constitution provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
2 Morris, Inc., et al v. L. Scott Harshbarqer, Attorney General, et
al, Nos. 97-8022, 8023, slip op. at 23-24 (1st Cir. Aug. 18,
1997). Clearly, the workers' compensation law of New Hampshire
and interpretations thereof concern matters related to health and
safety of the working population.
Accordingly, the court finds itself unpersuaded by the
authorities upon which plaintiffs rely and herewith grants the
motion. Counsel for all parties are instructed that no attempt
is to be made and no evidence is to be introduced concerning any
claim of psychological damages sustained by plaintiff James
Desilets, as the court finds that any such claim is barred by the
provisions of the workers' compensation law of New Hampshire, RSA
2 81-A.
2. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiff
Ricky Ordwav, document 23
Contending that plaintiff Ricky Ordway admitted in
deposition that he could not hear his recorded voice on the three
audiotapes produced by defendant, the defendant moves to bar
Ordway's claims. Plaintiff Ordway objects. Document 44.
Plaintiff has produced for the court evidence which
indicates that more than the three tapes currently available were
3 made,3 and the law is clear that a plaintiff need only show
interception of communication, not that particular conversations
were intercepted. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th
Cir. 1990) (Edmondson, J., concurring). Because the intentional
tort of wiretapping is obviously one which by its very nature is
unknown to the plaintiff, Awbrev v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
C o ., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (N.D. G a . 1980), direct
evidence may well not have been available based on the
stealthiness of the invasion, and, accordingly, a wiretapping
claim may be established by means of circumstantial evidence.
Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 1987) .
It follows that, as plaintiff Ordway has sufficient
circumstantial evidence to give rise to a guestion of fact for
the jury, the defendant's motion to dismiss his claim must be and
it is herewith denied.
3A statement of Mike Kirkpatrick, the store manager, indicates his knowledge of at least two additional tapings. Depositions of other witnesses who were employed at relevant times at the Claremont store confirm the location of a tape recorder at or near the customer service desk. Plaintiff himself will testify as to his presence at or near the various locations at which the tape recorders were installed.
4 3. Defendant's Motion in Limine re: Calculation of Statutory
Damages Under the Federal Wiretap Statute, document 24
By virtue of this motion, defendant seeks to have the court
rule that each plaintiff who is able to establish a right to
civil damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 may recover at most $10,000,
regardless of whether more than one of the different types of
violations of the statute occurred. Plaintiffs object. Document
40 .
It has been held in this circuit that under the federal
wiretap statute "the disclosure and/or use of information
obtained through a wrongful invasion amounts to a separate injury
prohibited by statute, and makes a person subjected to such a
disclosure and/or use 'a victim, once again, of a federal
crime.'" Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 290 (1st Cir. 1993)
(citing and guoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 52
(1972)). Accordingly, although defendant strives gallantly to
distinguish them, the rulings in Romano v. Terdik, 939 F. Supp.
144, 150 (D. Conn. 1996) and Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F. Supp.
283, 284-85 (D.P.R. 1993), are correct and, with respect to the
recovery of damages under the federal statute, $10,000 may be
awarded each plaintiff for interception and $10,000 for
disclosure because they are considered two separate violations of
18 U.S.C. § 2511. Of course, the number of conversations that
5 are intercepted or the number of disclosures is irrelevant and
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Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores CV-95-534-SD 10/08/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
James Desilets, et al
v. Civil No. 95-534-SD
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
O R D E R
This complaint seeks recovery of damages for alleged
violations of federal, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., and state.
Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 570-A, "wiretap" laws.
Plaintiffs allege that in August of 1995, while employed at
defendant's store in Claremont, New Hampshire, certain of their
private oral conversations were intercepted on secreted audiotape
recorders placed upon the premises by other employees of
defendant.
Trial of this action is scheduled to commence with jury
selection on October 21, 1997. This order addresses the issues
raised by certain pretrial motions.1
1The order does not address requests for voir dire questions, objections to exhibits or instructions, nor the most recently filed (on October 6, 1997) motion in limine of the defendant. The court will allow some of the voir dire at trial and will take up objections to exhibits as exhibits are proffered, and objections to instructions at the close of the trial. The most recent motion in limine must await a response from plaintiffs' counsel. 1. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence with Respect
to Plaintiffs' Claims for Emotional Distress Damages Barred Under
New Hampshire RSA 281-A, document 19
One of the four plaintiffs, James Desilets, makes claim here
for recovery of psychological damages. Defendant seeks to bar
evidence concerning this claim, and plaintiffs object, contending
that the complaint refers to intentional torts and also
contending that the federal statute preempts any ruling to the
contrary. Document 41.
This court has previously held that the exclusivity
provision of the New Hampshire workers' compensation law bars
both intentional and nonintentional claims for emotional
distress, which gualifies as a "personal injury." Miller v. CBC
Cos., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1054, 1068 (D.N.H. 1995); see Censullo
v. Brenka Video, 989 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1993). And with
respect to the claim of preemption, which is based on the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,2 it is, of course, a
presumption, applicable in both express and implied preemption
analyses, that state regulation of matters related to health and
safety is not invalidated under that Supremacy Clause. Phillip
2Article VI of the Constitution provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
2 Morris, Inc., et al v. L. Scott Harshbarqer, Attorney General, et
al, Nos. 97-8022, 8023, slip op. at 23-24 (1st Cir. Aug. 18,
1997). Clearly, the workers' compensation law of New Hampshire
and interpretations thereof concern matters related to health and
safety of the working population.
Accordingly, the court finds itself unpersuaded by the
authorities upon which plaintiffs rely and herewith grants the
motion. Counsel for all parties are instructed that no attempt
is to be made and no evidence is to be introduced concerning any
claim of psychological damages sustained by plaintiff James
Desilets, as the court finds that any such claim is barred by the
provisions of the workers' compensation law of New Hampshire, RSA
2 81-A.
2. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiff
Ricky Ordwav, document 23
Contending that plaintiff Ricky Ordway admitted in
deposition that he could not hear his recorded voice on the three
audiotapes produced by defendant, the defendant moves to bar
Ordway's claims. Plaintiff Ordway objects. Document 44.
Plaintiff has produced for the court evidence which
indicates that more than the three tapes currently available were
3 made,3 and the law is clear that a plaintiff need only show
interception of communication, not that particular conversations
were intercepted. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th
Cir. 1990) (Edmondson, J., concurring). Because the intentional
tort of wiretapping is obviously one which by its very nature is
unknown to the plaintiff, Awbrev v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
C o ., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (N.D. G a . 1980), direct
evidence may well not have been available based on the
stealthiness of the invasion, and, accordingly, a wiretapping
claim may be established by means of circumstantial evidence.
Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 1987) .
It follows that, as plaintiff Ordway has sufficient
circumstantial evidence to give rise to a guestion of fact for
the jury, the defendant's motion to dismiss his claim must be and
it is herewith denied.
3A statement of Mike Kirkpatrick, the store manager, indicates his knowledge of at least two additional tapings. Depositions of other witnesses who were employed at relevant times at the Claremont store confirm the location of a tape recorder at or near the customer service desk. Plaintiff himself will testify as to his presence at or near the various locations at which the tape recorders were installed.
4 3. Defendant's Motion in Limine re: Calculation of Statutory
Damages Under the Federal Wiretap Statute, document 24
By virtue of this motion, defendant seeks to have the court
rule that each plaintiff who is able to establish a right to
civil damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 may recover at most $10,000,
regardless of whether more than one of the different types of
violations of the statute occurred. Plaintiffs object. Document
40 .
It has been held in this circuit that under the federal
wiretap statute "the disclosure and/or use of information
obtained through a wrongful invasion amounts to a separate injury
prohibited by statute, and makes a person subjected to such a
disclosure and/or use 'a victim, once again, of a federal
crime.'" Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 290 (1st Cir. 1993)
(citing and guoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 52
(1972)). Accordingly, although defendant strives gallantly to
distinguish them, the rulings in Romano v. Terdik, 939 F. Supp.
144, 150 (D. Conn. 1996) and Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F. Supp.
283, 284-85 (D.P.R. 1993), are correct and, with respect to the
recovery of damages under the federal statute, $10,000 may be
awarded each plaintiff for interception and $10,000 for
disclosure because they are considered two separate violations of
18 U.S.C. § 2511. Of course, the number of conversations that
5 are intercepted or the number of disclosures is irrelevant and
the statutory amount applies, regardless of the number of
interceptions or uses.
The motion must be and accordingly is herewith denied.
4. Defendant's Motion in Limine Reguestinq the Court to Rule
that Plaintiffs Can Recover Damages Under the State or Federal
Statute, But Not Both, document 25
This motion seeks a ruling from the court that the remedy of
each plaintiff will be either actual damages as proven or the
federal statutory measure. The motion further seeks to reguire
election by plaintiffs prior to trial as to which of these
remedies they will seek. Plaintiffs object. Document 42.
The record before the court will not allow it to rule
favorably on this motion. There is no law known to the court,
and the parties cite none, that reguires an order of election
such as is here sought by the defendant. Accordingly, the motion
is denied. The court, of course, will take all efforts necessary
to avoid duplication of damages if such are awarded to any of the
plaintiffs.
6 5. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Its
Actions After Discovery of the Audiotapes Except as Related to
Plaintiffs' Claims of "Interception or Use of the Contents",
document 2 6
The audiotapes which are the focus of this litigation were
discovered on August 23, 1995. Defendant suggests that evidence
of certain actions taken by it after that date should be barred
for irrelevance or unfair prejudice or because they concern
subseguent remedial measures. Plaintiffs object. Document 45.
Attached to plaintiffs' objection are a number of excerpts
of depositions and interrogatory answers. Review of same
satisfies the court that, with one exception hereinafter
discussed, plaintiffs have the better of the argument.
Without parsing all of the details set forth in plaintiffs'
well-crafted objection, it is clear that the post-tape discovery
actions of defendant have some "special relevance" to the
material issue of intent reguired to support plaintiffs' burden
of proof in this action. United States v. Carty, 993 F.2d 1005,
1011 (1st Cir. 1993). The evidence is accordingly admissible
pursuant to Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid., and the court further
finds that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or undue delay. Rule
403, Fed. R. Evid.
7 Moreover, it is well established that where a corporation
acquires or is charged with knowledge of an unauthorized act
undertaken by someone on its behalf, and fails to repudiate that
act within a reasonable time, but instead acquiesces, the
corporation is bound by the act. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co.
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 26 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 1994)
(citations omitted).
Accordingly, with the exception of the alleged three-
quarter-inch hole drilled in the wall of the manager's office,4
which the court understands cannot be verified by any witness to
its date and time of completion, and which therefore the court
finds to be too speculative or remote to allow a rational
inference to be drawn that it was accompanied by an intercepting
device, the motion must be and accordingly is herewith denied.
6. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Regarding or
Reference to the Criminal Liabilitv Provisions of the Statute at
Issue and to Exclude Evidence Related to Anv Police Investiaation
Into this Matter, document 27
This is an action brought under the civil liability
provisions of the state and federal wiretap statutes. It
4If a supervisory employee used merely his eyes or ears to watch other employees, such action would, of course, not be violative of the statutes here at issue. appears, however, that at least one of the plaintiffs requested
that the tapes in question be turned over to the county attorney,
and further that some sort of police investiqation, the scope of
which is unknown to this court, was conducted into the matter.
Defendant moves to exclude evidence of the criminal
provisions of the statutes at issue and also to exclude evidence
of the police investiqation. Plaintiffs object. Document 43.
The court is satisfied that any reference to the criminal
portions of the statute and/or to any police investiqation into
the matter would not serve to support the plaintiff's case for
recovery of damaqes and is not a "consequential factor" in the
case pursuant to Rule 401, Fed. R. Evid., and that to allow any
reference to or to admit evidence concerninq the criminal
provisions of the statutes or any police investiqation here
undertaken should be excluded because its probative value is
substantially outweiqhed by the danqer of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleadinq the jury. Rule 403, Fed.
R. Evid.
Accordinqly, the defendant's motion is herewith qranted, and
counsel are instructed to direct their witnesses to refrain from
any reference to or mention of the criminal provisions of the
statute or any police investiqation in this matter, and are not
otherwise to attempt to introduce evidence concerninq such subj ects.
7. Defendant's Motion in Limine on Claims for Punitive Damages,
document 2 8
Stating, without support by way of affidavit, deposition, or
interrogatory excerpt, that the employees of defendant who placed
the audio recorders at issue did not act wantonly, recklessly, or
maliciously, defendant moves to exclude claims for punitive
damages in this action. Plaintiffs object. Document 38.
The court finds and rules that the record before it is
insufficiently developed for it to rule on this motion, and
accordingly denies the motion. If, at the close of the
plaintiffs' case in chief the record is insufficiently developed
to support a claim for punitive damages on the part of any or all
of these plaintiffs, then defendant is, of course, at liberty to
move for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 5 0 (a), Fed.
R. Civ. P.
8. Defendant's Motion in Limine Regarding Plaintiffs'
Anticipated Claims for Lost Wages as an Element of Damages,
document 2 9
Contending that none of the defendants actually lost wages
as a result of the incidents which give rise to this action.
10 defendant moves to exclude such evidence from consideration by
the jury. Plaintiff James Desilets objects. Document 39.
The court construes the fact that only plaintiff Desilets
objects to equate with agreement that none of the remaining
plaintiffs will claim lost wages in this litigation. As regards
the claim of Mr. Desilets, he is, of course, entitled under the
respective statutes to claim either actual or statutory damages,
and if he desires to press his claim for lost wages, the court
finds that he is entitled to do so and that evidence respecting
any claim for lost wages will not be excluded on the ground of
either relevance or unfair prejudice.
Accordingly, the motion is granted as to plaintiffs Ordway,
Pederson, and Young, but is denied as to plaintiff Desilets.
9. Conclusion
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the court has
- granted defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence
with regard to plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress
(document 19);
- denied defendant's motion to dismiss the claim of
plaintiff Ordway (document 23);
- denied defendant's motion in limine re: claim of statutory
damages under the federal wiretap statute (document 24);
11 - denied defendant's motion in limine requesting the court
to require that plaintiffs can recover damages under the state or
the federal statute, but not both (document 25);
- granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion in
limine to exclude evidence of defendant's activities after
discovery of the audiotapes (document 26);
- granted defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence
regarding or reference to the criminal law provisions of the
statutes and to exclude evidence of any police investigation
(document 27);
- denied defendant's motion in limine on claims for punitive
damages (document 28); and
- granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion in
limine seeking exclusion of claims for lost wages (document 29).
As of this writing, the jury herein will be the second jury
to be selected on the morning of October 21, 1997, with trial to
follow upon completion of the number one case. If the number one
case is settled, then this case will go forward later on the day
on which the jury is drawn.
SO ORDERED.
Shane Devine, Senior Judge United States District Court
October 8, 1997
12 cc: Claude T. Buttrey, Esq. Charles L. Powell, Esq. E. Tupper Kinder, Esq.