Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedOctober 8, 1997
DocketCV-95-534-SD
StatusPublished

This text of Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores (Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores, (D.N.H. 1997).

Opinion

Desilets v. Wal-Mart Stores CV-95-534-SD 10/08/97 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

James Desilets, et al

v. Civil No. 95-534-SD

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

O R D E R

This complaint seeks recovery of damages for alleged

violations of federal, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq., and state.

Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 570-A, "wiretap" laws.

Plaintiffs allege that in August of 1995, while employed at

defendant's store in Claremont, New Hampshire, certain of their

private oral conversations were intercepted on secreted audiotape

recorders placed upon the premises by other employees of

defendant.

Trial of this action is scheduled to commence with jury

selection on October 21, 1997. This order addresses the issues

raised by certain pretrial motions.1

1The order does not address requests for voir dire questions, objections to exhibits or instructions, nor the most recently filed (on October 6, 1997) motion in limine of the defendant. The court will allow some of the voir dire at trial and will take up objections to exhibits as exhibits are proffered, and objections to instructions at the close of the trial. The most recent motion in limine must await a response from plaintiffs' counsel. 1. Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence with Respect

to Plaintiffs' Claims for Emotional Distress Damages Barred Under

New Hampshire RSA 281-A, document 19

One of the four plaintiffs, James Desilets, makes claim here

for recovery of psychological damages. Defendant seeks to bar

evidence concerning this claim, and plaintiffs object, contending

that the complaint refers to intentional torts and also

contending that the federal statute preempts any ruling to the

contrary. Document 41.

This court has previously held that the exclusivity

provision of the New Hampshire workers' compensation law bars

both intentional and nonintentional claims for emotional

distress, which gualifies as a "personal injury." Miller v. CBC

Cos., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1054, 1068 (D.N.H. 1995); see Censullo

v. Brenka Video, 989 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1993). And with

respect to the claim of preemption, which is based on the

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,2 it is, of course, a

presumption, applicable in both express and implied preemption

analyses, that state regulation of matters related to health and

safety is not invalidated under that Supremacy Clause. Phillip

2Article VI of the Constitution provides that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

2 Morris, Inc., et al v. L. Scott Harshbarqer, Attorney General, et

al, Nos. 97-8022, 8023, slip op. at 23-24 (1st Cir. Aug. 18,

1997). Clearly, the workers' compensation law of New Hampshire

and interpretations thereof concern matters related to health and

safety of the working population.

Accordingly, the court finds itself unpersuaded by the

authorities upon which plaintiffs rely and herewith grants the

motion. Counsel for all parties are instructed that no attempt

is to be made and no evidence is to be introduced concerning any

claim of psychological damages sustained by plaintiff James

Desilets, as the court finds that any such claim is barred by the

provisions of the workers' compensation law of New Hampshire, RSA

2 81-A.

2. Defendants' Motion in Limine to Dismiss Claims of Plaintiff

Ricky Ordwav, document 23

Contending that plaintiff Ricky Ordway admitted in

deposition that he could not hear his recorded voice on the three

audiotapes produced by defendant, the defendant moves to bar

Ordway's claims. Plaintiff Ordway objects. Document 44.

Plaintiff has produced for the court evidence which

indicates that more than the three tapes currently available were

3 made,3 and the law is clear that a plaintiff need only show

interception of communication, not that particular conversations

were intercepted. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th

Cir. 1990) (Edmondson, J., concurring). Because the intentional

tort of wiretapping is obviously one which by its very nature is

unknown to the plaintiff, Awbrev v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea

C o ., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (N.D. G a . 1980), direct

evidence may well not have been available based on the

stealthiness of the invasion, and, accordingly, a wiretapping

claim may be established by means of circumstantial evidence.

Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 790 (11th Cir. 1987) .

It follows that, as plaintiff Ordway has sufficient

circumstantial evidence to give rise to a guestion of fact for

the jury, the defendant's motion to dismiss his claim must be and

it is herewith denied.

3A statement of Mike Kirkpatrick, the store manager, indicates his knowledge of at least two additional tapings. Depositions of other witnesses who were employed at relevant times at the Claremont store confirm the location of a tape recorder at or near the customer service desk. Plaintiff himself will testify as to his presence at or near the various locations at which the tape recorders were installed.

4 3. Defendant's Motion in Limine re: Calculation of Statutory

Damages Under the Federal Wiretap Statute, document 24

By virtue of this motion, defendant seeks to have the court

rule that each plaintiff who is able to establish a right to

civil damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 may recover at most $10,000,

regardless of whether more than one of the different types of

violations of the statute occurred. Plaintiffs object. Document

40 .

It has been held in this circuit that under the federal

wiretap statute "the disclosure and/or use of information

obtained through a wrongful invasion amounts to a separate injury

prohibited by statute, and makes a person subjected to such a

disclosure and/or use 'a victim, once again, of a federal

crime.'" Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 290 (1st Cir. 1993)

(citing and guoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 52

(1972)). Accordingly, although defendant strives gallantly to

distinguish them, the rulings in Romano v. Terdik, 939 F. Supp.

144, 150 (D. Conn. 1996) and Menda Biton v. Menda, 812 F. Supp.

283, 284-85 (D.P.R. 1993), are correct and, with respect to the

recovery of damages under the federal statute, $10,000 may be

awarded each plaintiff for interception and $10,000 for

disclosure because they are considered two separate violations of

18 U.S.C. § 2511. Of course, the number of conversations that

5 are intercepted or the number of disclosures is irrelevant and

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Related

Gelbard v. United States
408 U.S. 41 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Williams v. Poulos
11 F.3d 271 (First Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Ralph H. Carty
993 F.2d 1005 (First Circuit, 1993)
Miller v. CBC Companies, Inc.
908 F. Supp. 1054 (D. New Hampshire, 1995)
Romano v. Terdik
939 F. Supp. 144 (D. Connecticut, 1996)
Menda Biton v. Menda
812 F. Supp. 283 (D. Puerto Rico, 1993)
Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., Inc.
505 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Georgia, 1980)
Scutieri v. Paige
808 F.2d 785 (Eleventh Circuit, 1987)

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