DCC CONSTRUCTORS v. Randall Mech., Inc.

791 So. 2d 575, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 11362, 2001 WL 904922
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedAugust 10, 2001
Docket5D00-3388
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 791 So. 2d 575 (DCC CONSTRUCTORS v. Randall Mech., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DCC CONSTRUCTORS v. Randall Mech., Inc., 791 So. 2d 575, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 11362, 2001 WL 904922 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

791 So.2d 575 (2001)

DCC CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Appellant,
v.
RANDALL MECHANICAL, INC., et al., Appellee.

No. 5D00-3388.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

August 10, 2001.

*576 James M. Talley of Fisher, Rushmer, Werrenrath, Dickson, Talley & Dunlap, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

Robert E. Morris of Robert E. Morris, P.A., Tampa for Appellee American Alliance Insurance Company.

No Appearance for other Appellee, Randall Mechanical, Inc.

PER CURIAM.

DCC Constructors, Inc. (DCC) appeals from a final summary judgment finding that American Alliance Insurance Company (American Alliance) had no responsibility under a construction performance bond issued to Randall Mechanical, Inc. (Randall) for alleged deficiencies in the installation of an HVAC system.

When alleged deficiencies appeared in the HVAC system installed by Randall under a subcontract with DCC, the owner of a newly constructed apartment building declared its general contractor, DCC, in default under the construction contract. DCC, in turn, notified Randall and American Alliance of the default and demanded correction of the deficiencies. Randall refused and DCC demanded performance by American Alliance. American Alliance also refused to perform and DCC sued it and the subcontractor for breach of the terms of the subcontract and performance bond. The relevant portions of the subcontract and bond are set forth in the Appendix.

The trial court was persuaded to enter summary judgment against DCC by American Alliance which argued that the obligations under the performance bond were never invoked because DCC never terminated Randall's subcontract.

As a general rule, a surety's liability on a bond is determined strictly from the terms and conditions of the bond agreement. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Larkin Gen. Hosp., Ltd., 593 So.2d 195 (Fla.1992). There is no language in the performance bond under examination in the instant case which requires termination of the subcontract as a condition precedent to American Alliance's surety obligations arising in the event of a default by Randall. The performance bond provides in part:

Whenever [Randall] shall be, and be declared by [DCC] to be in default under the subcontract [DCC], having performed [DCC's] obligation thereunder:
(1) [American Alliance] may promptly remedy the default subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 herein, or:
(2) [DCC] after reasonable notice to [American Alliance] may, or [American Alliance], upon demand of [DCC] may arrange for the performance of [Randall's] obligation under the subcontract subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 therein;
(3) The balance of the subcontract price, as defined below, shall be credited against the reasonable cost of completing the performance of the subcontract. If completed by [DCC] and the reasonable cost exceeds the balance of the subcontract price [American Alliance] shall pay to [DCC] such excess....

(R. 47).

Applying the language used in its bond, American Alliance's obligation as surety to perform Randall's obligations arose upon DCC's declaration of a default under the subcontract assuming that a valid act of default had occurred. The performance bond does not contain a definition *577 of "default," but the subcontract, which is incorporated by reference in the performance bond, contains extensive reference to the action or inaction that constitutes a default. Paragraph 17.1(d) references those acts or omissions by Randall which constitute a default under the subcontract and states: "Should Subcontractor at any time ... fail in the performance or observance of any of the covenants, conditions or other terms of this Subcontract...."

Clearly, Randall's alleged failure to complete the HVAC work at the project in accordance with the plans and specifications of the subcontract would constitute a breach of its warranty, and consequently, a default under the subcontract. American Alliance asserts that the remedies after default that are contained in paragraph 17.1 require that DCC first terminate Randall before American Alliance's obligations are activated.

More specifically, American Alliance argues that DCC's exclusive remedy is contained in subparagraph 17.1.3 and that provision requires DCC to terminate the subcontract before the surety is required to perform. We disagree. Subparagraph 17.1.3 is but one of the four options given to DCC that it may choose in the event of Randall's default. Subparagraph 17.1.3 gives DCC the option of terminating the subcontract in the event of a default by Randall without waiving its rights against the surety. The provision is designed to protect DCC from any claim by the surety of waiver in the event DCC chose to pursue termination of the subcontract. It does not require termination of the subcontract with Randall as a condition precedent to any action on the performance bond.

American Alliance relies upon L & A Contracting Co. v. Southern Concrete Services, Inc., 17 F.3d 106 (5th Cir.1994) to support its argument that termination of the subcontract was necessary before it was required to perform under its bond. However, L & A Contracting is distinguishable. The Fifth Circuit held that there was need for a clear, direct declaration of default by the general contractor in order to inform the surety that its principal is in material breach of its obligations under the subcontract. In that case, the general contractor gave multiple notices to the subcontractor and surety of the subcontractor's repetitive defaults and after each notice, the subcontractor would cure the default. The decision, while indicating that a legal default exists when a material breach is committed of such seriousness that it would justify termination of a subcontract, does not hold that liability under a performance bond only occurs when the general contractor actually terminates the subcontract. In the instant case and unlike the facts in L & A Contracting, DCC repeatedly notified both Randall and American Alliance in writing that Randall was in default, that Randall had failed to cure the default, and that it would look to the performance bond for recompense. Randall never attempted to cure the default. Additionally, the evidence in the instant case indicates that Randall did not fulfill its obligations under the subcontract; the subcontractor in L & A Contracting eventually satisfied its obligations and the action was for damages incurred because of the delay in performance.

We conclude that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment after concluding that DCC had to first terminate Randall before American Alliance's obligations arose. The judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

JUDGMENT VACATED; REMANDED.

PETERSON, GRIFFIN and PALMER, JJ., concur.

*578 APPENDIX

RELEVANT SUBCONTRACT & PERFORMANCE BOND PROVISIONS

The subcontract agreement, authored by DCC and made a part of the bond by reference, addresses Randall's warranty obligations at Article 13 of Part II:

13.1 Subcontractor warrants that the Work shall be of good quality, new and shall be free from defects and shall conform to and meet the requirements of the Contract and the Contract Documents...

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

JMR Construction Corp. v. Environmental Assessment & Remediation Management, Inc.
243 Cal. App. 4th 571 (California Court of Appeal, 2015)
Westchester Fire Insurance v. City of Brooksville
731 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Florida, 2010)
Dooley Constructors v. Developers Sur.
972 So. 2d 893 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2007)
Colorado Structures, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of the West
161 Wash. 2d 577 (Washington Supreme Court, 2007)
Colorado Structures, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of the West
125 Wash. App. 907 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2005)
Colo. Structures, Inc. v. INSURANCE CO. OF WEST
106 P.3d 815 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2005)
National Fire Insurance v. Fortune Construction Co.
320 F.3d 1260 (Eleventh Circuit, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
791 So. 2d 575, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 11362, 2001 WL 904922, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dcc-constructors-v-randall-mech-inc-fladistctapp-2001.