Opinion
BAXTER, J.
Section 3333.4 of the Civil Code (all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated) limits the ability of uninsured motorists and convicted drunk drivers to recover losses suffered in certain accidents. The question presented is whether the statute precludes an uninsured motorcyclist injured in a vehicular accident from recovering an award of noneconomic damages against a county and a municipality in an action for nuisance and dangerous condition of public property. Application of settled statutory construction principles leads us to conclude the answer is yes.
Factual and Procedural Background
Russell Glen Day was driving his motorcycle when a car driven by William Honda struck him in an intersection. Day then filed this action against Honda, Irving Schwartz (the owner of the property adjacent to the intersection), the County of San Bernardino (the County), and the City of Fontana (the City). As against the public entity defendants, plaintiff alleged two theories of recovery. In his cause of action for dangerous condition of public property, plaintiff alleged that the County and the City created or had actual or constructive notice of overgrown vegetation on public and private property surrounding the intersection, and that such vegetation created a vision obstruction for motorists traveling through the intersection. In his nuisance cause of action, plaintiff alleged that the public entities maintained a nuisance on their property by failing to correct, remove, reduce, or warn of the vision obstruction caused by the overgrown vegetation.
At the time of the accident, plaintiff did not have liability insurance on his motorcycle as required by state law. Discovery of that fact prompted the [272]*272County and the City to file a motion to exclude from trial any evidence of damages for pain and suffering. The trial court granted the motion, finding plaintiff’s action subject to the restrictions of section 3333.4.
Plaintiff dismissed his action against Schwartz prior to trial. At trial, a jury determined that plaintiff was not at fault in the accident. The jury awarded him $454,574.21 in economic damages and allocated responsibility for those damages between Honda (52 percent), the County (5 percent), and the City (43 percent). The trial court entered judgment accordingly.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting plaintiff’s arguments that section 3333.4 is inapplicable to actions for nuisance and dangerous condition of public property, that the statute is unconstitutional, and that retroactive application of the statute to his case violated due process. We granted plaintiff’s petition for review, limiting our review to the first issue noted.
Discussion
Does section 3333.4 restrict an uninsured driver’s recovery of noneconomic damages against local public entities in an action for nuisance and dangerous condition of property? The issue is one of statutory construction.
Our fundamental task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. (Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 777 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 937 P.2d 290].) We begin by examining the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. (People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228].) If there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. (Id. at pp. 230-231; People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232].) If, however, the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. (People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 151.) In such circumstances, we “ ‘select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see Escobedo v. Estate of Snider (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1214, 1223 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 930 P.2d 979].) These rules apply equally in construing statutes enacted through the initiative process. (Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927].)
[273]*273As relevant here, section 3333.4 provides: “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (c) [dealing with convicted drunk drivers], in any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a person shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages if any of the following applies: [f] . . . ftQ (2) The injured person was the owner of a vehicle involved in the accident and the vehicle was not insured as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state.”1
We have construed section 3333.4 twice in the recent past. In Horwich v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th 272, we held the statute did not preclude recovery of damages for loss of care, comfort, and society by a wrongful death plaintiff whose decedent was the uninsured operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident. In Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 884, 980 P.2d 433] (Hodges), we found it did not limit recovery by an uninsured motorist in a products liability action against a car manufacturer. In both instances, we found the relevant statutory language was “not pellucid” with respect to the particular factual circumstances. (Horwich v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 277; Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 113.) That is, in Horwich v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th 272, recovery of noneconomic damages was sought by “a person” who was not the uninsured owner or operator of the vehicle involved in an accident. And in Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th 109, there was no necessary connection between the plaintiff’s injury and “the operation or use” of the vehicle. We therefore considered the Legislative Analyst’s analysis and other legislative history materials for clues as to the statute’s intended goals and then construed the language to give effect to the apparent intent of the lawmakers.
In contrast to the factual scenarios presented in those previous decisions, the instant action against the public entity defendants appears to fall squarely within the terms of section 3333.4. First, plaintiff was the owner of an uninsured motorcycle. (§ 3333.4, subd. (a)(2).) Second, plaintiffs action for nuisance and dangerous condition of public property seeks “to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of [that] motor vehicle.” (Id., subd. (a).) On this last point, we note the facts here are neither [274]*274parallel nor analogous to those giving rise to the perceived ambiguity in Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th 109, for here there was a necessary and causal relationship between the plaintiff’s operation of his motorcycle and the accident for which he claimed the public entities were responsible. Since section 3333.4 contains no exception for suits against public entities,2 plaintiff appears statutorily barred from recovering noneconomic damages against the County and the City.
Although we might well stop here since the facts do not appear to raise any ambiguity or uncertainty as to the statute’s application, we shall, “in an abundance of caution, . . . test our construction against those extrinsic aids that bear on the enactors’ intent.” (Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 93 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160].) As we shall demonstrate, the legislative history materials reinforce our conclusion that the statute applies to plaintiff’s action.
Section 3333.4 was enacted through passage of Proposition 213 in the November 5, 1996 General Election. Denominated and publicized as the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, Proposition 213 sought to restrict the ability of uninsured motorists, convicted drunk drivers and convicted felons to sue for losses suffered in accidents. Because it bears directly on the issue of legislative intent, we review the proposition’s “Findings and Declaration of Purpose.” That declaration states in full:
“(a) Insurance costs have skyrocketed for those Californians who have taken responsibility for their actions. Uninsured motorists, drunk drivers, and criminal felons are law breakers, and should not be rewarded for their irresponsibility and law breaking. However, under current laws, uninsured motorists and drunk drivers are able to recover unreasonable damages from law-abiding citizens as a result of drunk driving and other accidents, and [275]*275criminals have been able to recover damages from law-abiding citizens for injuries suffered during the commission of their crimes.
“(b) Californians must change the system that rewards individuals who fail to take essential personal responsibility to prevent them from seeking unreasonable damages or from suing law-abiding citizens.
“(c) Therefore, the People of the State of California do hereby enact this measure to restore balance to our justice system by limiting the right to sue of criminals, drunk drivers, and uninsured motorists.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec., supra, text of Prop. 213, § 2, p. 102 (Ballot Pamphlet).)
In proposing to deny recovery of noneconomic losses to injured motor vehicle owners or drivers who operate or use vehicles that are “not insured as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state” (§ 3333.4, subd. (a)(2) & (3)), Proposition 213 sought to “restore balance to our justice system” by ensuring that those “who fail to take essential personal responsibility” would “not be rewarded for their irresponsibility and law breaking” (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 213, § 2, p. 102). Mindful of the express terms of section 3333.4, we now examine whether the statute’s application in actions such as the instant one would undermine the initiative’s declared purpose or otherwise lead to absurd results.
It is beyond dispute that the financial responsibility law requires owners and operators of motor vehicles “ ‘to be “financially responsible” (usually by means of insurance) for any’ bodily injury or property damage that they may cause. [Citation.] Its purpose—at least its primary purpose—is to assure compensation for persons who have suffered injury or damage of this sort. [Citations.]” (Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 332, 341 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 965 P.2d 1178].) Stated another way, the financial responsibility law is intended to ensure that the victims of negligent drivers are compensated not only for bodily injury and property damage occasioned by accidents occurring on public streets and highways, but also for vehicular accidents resulting in “damage to ‘vehicles, buildings, or other property located on public and private property off the streets and highways.’ ” (Campbell v. Zolin (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 348], quoting Stats. 1989, ch. 808, § 1, p. 2675, italics omitted.)
Public entities, many of which provide the transportation infrastructure for the motoring public, are among those directly affected by motorists who violate the financial responsibility law. For example, when an uninsured driver causes damage to roadways or to other public property on or adjacent to the roadways, including traffic signs, directional signs, traffic signals, [276]*276street lights, median strips, and landscaping, the public entity suffers a direct harm and public safety may sometimes be placed at risk until repairs to the property are made. In such situations, the public entity generally is left to bear the entire cost of the repairs necessitated by the uninsured tortfeasor’s acts and financial irresponsibility.
Violators of the financial responsibility law also detrimentally affect the interests of public entities in a more indirect way. When the negligence of an uninsured driver and the dangerous condition of public property combine to jointly cause injury to an insured driver, both tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for all economic damages awarded to the insured driver. (See Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 520, 527 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 438, 941 P.2d 71].) Typically, however, the public entity’s right of contribution (Code Civ. Proc., § 875) from the uninsured tortfeasor is meaningless because the tortfeasor is judgment proof. In such circumstances, the public entity ends up paying all of the insured driver’s economic damages while the uninsured driver pays nothing.
In light of the foregoing, we are confident that our construction of section 3333.4 promotes, rather than defeats, its general purpose. (People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 151.) By reading section 3333.4 as including within its scope actions such as the instant one, public entities are relieved of any liability for an uninsured driver’s noneconomic losses but would remain legally responsible to pay for any economic losses. This construction advances Proposition 213’s declared purpose to “change the system that rewards individuals who fail to take essential personal responsibility” and to “restore balance to our justice system.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 213, § 2, subds. (b), (c), p. 102.) Moreover, in no way does it lead to absurd results.
Conversely, were we to construe the statute as being inapplicable in an action against a public entity based upon property-related theories of liability such as nuisance and dangerous condition of property, such an entity would remain legally responsible to compensate an uninsured driver for both economic and noneconomic losses arising out of vehicular accidents involving its property, while the uninsured driver could continue avoiding any responsibility for his or her fault in damaging such property and injuring third parties. Such a construction would appear to perpetuate a system of one-sided recovery favoring the uninsured driver at the expense of the law-abiding entity, thus undermining the initiative’s goal to prevent such drivers from being “rewarded for their irresponsibility and law breaking.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 213, § 2, subd. (a), p. 102.)
Accordingly, section 3333.4 is properly construed as restricting an uninsured motorist’s ability to recover noneconomic damages in actions against [277]*277public entities alleging nuisance and dangerous condition of property. Not only does the language of section 3333.4, subdivision (a) encompass such actions within its literal scope (“any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle”), but construing the statute to have such application comports most closely with the initiative’s declared intent to “restore balance to our justice system” by barring people who “fail to take essential personal responsibility” from “seeking unreasonable damages or from suing law-abiding citizens.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 213, § 2, subds. (b), (c), p. 102.) Neither the language nor the purpose of the statute provides a basis for implying a statutory exemption that would preserve a system whereby uninsured drivers may recover fully for losses caused by public road and roadside conditions while at the same time evading financial responsibility for their own negligence in damaging public roadways and improvements3 and injuring third persons.
Although plaintiff generally agrees that section 3333.4 may apply in actions against public entities, he maintains the statute is intended to inure solely to the benefit of individuals and entities whose automobile insurance policies are implicated in the lawsuit. Under this view, recovery against a public entity is not statutorily restricted unless its liability stems from a public employee’s or agent’s operation of a motor vehicle. To support this narrower construction of the statute, plaintiff relies upon subdivision (b) of section 3333.4, the ballot arguments accompanying Proposition 213, and Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th 109. We are not convinced.
As relevant here, subdivision (b) of section 3333.4 states that “an insurer shall not be liable, directly or indirectly, under a policy of liability or uninsured motorist insurance to indemnify for non-economic losses” of an injured uninsured motorist. According to plaintiff, one may reasonably infer that section 3333.4 applies solely to actions involving accidents between motorists because subdivision (b) purports to curtail only the liability of a defendant’s automobile insurer, not any other type of insurer. Plaintiff is wrong.
On its face, the statutory subdivision expressly refers to an insurer that might otherwise be liable for indemnification of noneconomic losses under [278]*278“a policy of liability or uninsured motorist insurance.” (§ 3333.4, subd. (b), italics added.) Although a policy of liability insurance may be embraced within an automobile insurance policy (see Black’s Law Diet. (4th ed. 1951) p. 943 [definition of “Insurance,” “Automobile insurance” classification]), liability insurance policies are often issued to cover the liability of nonmotorists and are not associated exclusively with automobile insurance.4 If anything, the fact that section 3333.4, subdivision (b) employs the term “liability” insurance, instead of a more qualified term such as “automobile” insurance or “automobile liability” insurance, undercuts the notion that the statute pertains solely to accidents between insured and uninsured motorists.
Plaintiff next relies on the fact that the ballot arguments accompanying Proposition 213 make reference to stopping uninsured motorists from going after “big” noneconomic damages awards “when these lawbreakers are in an accident with an insured driver.” (Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 213, p. 51, original italics; see also id., Brief Summary of the Measures, p. 7 [“A yes vote on this measure means: . . . uninsured motorists involved in collisions . . . would be prohibited from recovering ‘pain and suffering’ awards from insured drivers”].)
The ballot arguments do not compel plaintiff’s construction of the statute. Such arguments, of course, “are not legal briefs and are not expected to cite every case the proposition may affect.” (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 237 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207, 902 P.2d 225]; see also Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 802-803 [268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934] [“The most reasonable inference is that the proponents chose to emphasize (in the limited space available for ballot arguments) what they perceived as the greatest need”].) Here we may reasonably infer from the ballot arguments that a primary aim of Proposition [279]*279213 was to protect insured motorists and to reduce automobile insurance rates. (See Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 116.) Such arguments, however, did not imply that protection of insured motorists was the initiative’s sole aim; nor did they suggest that reductions in automobile insurance premiums would be the initiative’s only effect. Rather, the express language and declared purpose of the enactment, as well as the ballot arguments’ broader focus upon the perceived need to reform a system that had rewarded lawbreakers at the expense of responsible, law-abiding citizens,5 persuade us that actions such as the instant one fall within a fair and objective reading of section 3333.4. (See People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 308 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042] [refusing to limit the scope of an initiative measure based upon the Legislative Analyst’s analysis]; Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 906 P.2d 1112] [Proposition 103 applied to surety insurance even though the ballot materials had not specifically told voters of that application]; cf. Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 732-733 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 506, 968 P.2d 65] [rejecting argument that Legislature’s focus on negligence principles supported a limitation of section 847’s immunity provisions to negligent acts].)
With respect to Hodges, our analysis in that case specifically focused on whether section 3333.4 restricted the ability of an uninsured driver to recover against a car manufacturer in a products liability action. Although [280]*280we recognized the statute could perhaps be read as extending to products liability actions (see Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 118), our review of the initiative measure and the accompanying ballot materials convinced us it was not intended to have such a broad reach. As we observed, “[t]he electorate wanted to ensure that uninsured motorists, who contribute nothing to the insurance pool, would be restricted in what they receive from it. This principle of fairness fueled the initiative. The right to recover fully for an injury caused by a design defect, even by an uninsured motorist, has no bearing on any principle of fairness having to do with the financial responsibility laws. It is not clear that anyone—either the sponsors of the measure or the voters—intended to protect from products liability claims manufacturers who do not contribute to that pool and whose other insurance rates are not affected by the existence of uninsured motorists.” (Id. at p. 115.) Neither the statutory language nor the ballot materials, we concluded, reflected any intent “to reform a system ‘unfair’ to law-abiding insured motorists by providing a windfall to manufacturers of defective vehicles.” (Id. at p. 118, fn. omitted.)
Contrary to the assertions of both plaintiff and the dissent, our observations in Hodges do not support a similar conclusion here. To begin with, Hodges merely posited that a primary aim of Proposition 213 was to limit automobile insurance claims by uninsured motorists. (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 115.) Like the ballot arguments, our decision did not suggest it was the initiative’s exclusive aim. More to the point, section 3333.4’s applicability in this case flows directly from the terms of the statute, which precludes recovery of noneconomic damages “in any action . . . arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” (id., subd. (a)) if “[t]he injured person was the owner of a vehicle involved in the accident and the vehicle was not insured . . .” (id., subd. (a)(2)).
Additionally, in contrast to the situation involving automobile manufacturers, the question of whether an uninsured motorist should be allowed to recover fully for a vehicular accident caused in part by a condition of public property bears directly on a “principle of fairness having to do with the financial responsibility laws.”6 (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 115.) As noted, the financial responsibility law was enacted to ensure that victims of negligent drivers receive compensation for damage both to their persons and to their property. (Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 341; Campbell v. Zolin, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 495-496.) Motorists [281]*281who drive in violation of that law and negligently cause damage to roadways and other public property, however, typically fail to compensate for the damage; in such circumstances, public entities wind up paying for repairs to their property while the uninsured tortfeasors escape responsibility for their actions. To pose Proposition 213’s declaration of purpose as a question, should such motorists be “rewarded for their irresponsibility and law breaking” (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 213, § 2, subd. (a), p. 102) when they, in turn, seek to recover for injuries caused by conditions of public property? The answer we discern is no. Nothing in the language of the initiative or in the ballot materials indicates that the electorate intended to forgo “balance” (ibid.) for public entities whose interests are placed directly at risk by motorists who fail to comply with the financial responsibility law.
As plaintiff correctly notes, Hodges observed that neither Proposition 213’s sponsors nor the voters intended to protect from products liability claims manufacturers whose insurance rates are “not affected by the existence of uninsured motorists.” (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 115.) Contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, however, that observation should not be read to suggest that insurance costs, whether automobile-related or otherwise, must necessarily be affected for section 3333.4 to apply.
Section 3333.4, of course, makes no mention of insurance costs as a consideration in its application in an action. It does, however, clearly limit recovery to injured persons whose vehicles are “not insured as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state.” (§ 3333.4, subd. (a)(2).) While Hodges placed emphasis on the absence of any effect on the particular defendant’s insurance costs, it must be remembered that the defendant there, in its capacity as a car manufacturer, faced no potential of direct harm to itself or its property from uninsured drivers who failed to comply with the state financial responsibility law. In that case, the consideration that car manufacturers also had no insurance rates affected by the existence of uninsured motorists was significant to our conclusion that manufacturers of defective cars were not among those whom the initiative was intended to protect.7 Here, however, the situation is otherwise and the public entity defendants are being sued in a capacity that directly implicates a “principle [282]*282of fairness having to do with the financial responsibility laws.” (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 115.) In circumstances such as these, insurance cost considerations provide no basis for negating section 3333.4’s application.
Finally, plaintiff argues the legislative. materials “reflect no intent to overturn well-established legal policies governing liability for dangerous real property or for nuisances interfering with safe use of public roads.” He also claims there is no indication that Proposition 213 was intended to alter the special statutory scheme governing liability for dangerous condition of public property (Gov. Code, §§ 830, 835), or other public liability not based on a defendant’s negligent operation of a vehicle. We disagree.
By approving the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, the voters expressed their collective intent to legislatively overturn existing law and policy determinations regarding the right of motorists to recover noneconomic damages arising out of their operation or use of uninsured motor vehicles. (§ 3333.4, subd. (a).) As discussed, it is of no consequence here that the ballot materials did not specifically refer to the act’s application in actions against local public entities for nuisance and dangerous condition of property. Such actions fall squarely within the terms of section 3333.4, and the statute’s operation in such cases promotes rather than defeats the declared purpose of Proposition 213 to restore balance to the justice system with respect to violators of the financial responsibility law. No more was required.8
Disposition
Both the language and the purpose of section 3333.4 support a construction that precludes uninsured drivers from recovering noneconomic damages in actions against local public entities for nuisance and dangerous condition of property. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
George, C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.